Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all ...
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A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.Less
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.
David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, and Peter K. Schotch
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235309
- eISBN:
- 9780191679056
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235309.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Political Philosophy
This book sets out a new logic of rules, developed to demonstrate how such a logic can contribute to the clarification of historical questions about social rules. The chapters illustrate applications ...
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This book sets out a new logic of rules, developed to demonstrate how such a logic can contribute to the clarification of historical questions about social rules. The chapters illustrate applications of this new logic in extensive treatments of a variety of accounts of social changes, analysing in these examples the content of particular social rules and the course of changes in them.Less
This book sets out a new logic of rules, developed to demonstrate how such a logic can contribute to the clarification of historical questions about social rules. The chapters illustrate applications of this new logic in extensive treatments of a variety of accounts of social changes, analysing in these examples the content of particular social rules and the course of changes in them.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an ...
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Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.Less
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of ...
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This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of the ambiguities of rule-governed behaviour: in particular, the difficulties of distinguishing between action guided by rules and action undertaken for other reasons, and the possibility of quite fundamental disagreements within a social group over the existence and content of rules.Less
This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of the ambiguities of rule-governed behaviour: in particular, the difficulties of distinguishing between action guided by rules and action undertaken for other reasons, and the possibility of quite fundamental disagreements within a social group over the existence and content of rules.
Laura Valentini
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199593859
- eISBN:
- 9780191731457
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593859.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter develops a new account of the types of social relations that principles of justice are meant to assess. It argues that the function of justice is to limit the ways in which we may ...
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This chapter develops a new account of the types of social relations that principles of justice are meant to assess. It argues that the function of justice is to limit the ways in which we may permissibly coerce one another and distinguishes between two types of coercion: interactional (directly perpetrated by agents) and systemic (occurring through systems of rules). Two key insights underpin this coercion-based normative framework. First, from a liberal perspective, certain restrictions of freedom – those defined here as coercive – need special justification. The principles articulating the required justification are those that should be called principles of justice. Second, the relevant restrictions of freedom need not be direct, that is, perpetrated by an agent – collective or individual – against other agents. They can also be indirect, resulting from formal and informal social rules, supported by a large enough number of agents. This conclusion has important implications for our thinking about justice in the global realm, where there clearly are pervasive systems of formal and informal social rules, but no overarching, state-like group agent.Less
This chapter develops a new account of the types of social relations that principles of justice are meant to assess. It argues that the function of justice is to limit the ways in which we may permissibly coerce one another and distinguishes between two types of coercion: interactional (directly perpetrated by agents) and systemic (occurring through systems of rules). Two key insights underpin this coercion-based normative framework. First, from a liberal perspective, certain restrictions of freedom – those defined here as coercive – need special justification. The principles articulating the required justification are those that should be called principles of justice. Second, the relevant restrictions of freedom need not be direct, that is, perpetrated by an agent – collective or individual – against other agents. They can also be indirect, resulting from formal and informal social rules, supported by a large enough number of agents. This conclusion has important implications for our thinking about justice in the global realm, where there clearly are pervasive systems of formal and informal social rules, but no overarching, state-like group agent.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300574
- eISBN:
- 9780199783748
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0020
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter introduces mechanism design, which is the subject wherein games are designed so that rational play results in socially desirable outcomes. The judgment of Solomon from the Bible is used ...
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This chapter introduces mechanism design, which is the subject wherein games are designed so that rational play results in socially desirable outcomes. The judgment of Solomon from the Bible is used as an introductory example. The principles of mechanism design are then described. The use of the revelation principle is illustrated with an extended analysis of the Street Lamp Problem. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is briefly described. Finally, a critical review of implementation theory is offered that emphasizes its differences from mechanism design and its shortcomings.Less
This chapter introduces mechanism design, which is the subject wherein games are designed so that rational play results in socially desirable outcomes. The judgment of Solomon from the Bible is used as an introductory example. The principles of mechanism design are then described. The use of the revelation principle is illustrated with an extended analysis of the Street Lamp Problem. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is briefly described. Finally, a critical review of implementation theory is offered that emphasizes its differences from mechanism design and its shortcomings.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state ...
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This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.Less
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.
Jules L. Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199253609
- eISBN:
- 9780191719783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
This chapter presents and defends a version of legal positivism, relying on two distinctions: one between epistemic and ontological conceptions of the rule of recognition, and the other between ...
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This chapter presents and defends a version of legal positivism, relying on two distinctions: one between epistemic and ontological conceptions of the rule of recognition, and the other between negative and positive positivism. The chapter argues that positivism is committed to the rule of recognition as a semantic or ontological rule only, and that its essential positive claim is that the authority of law everywhere is a matter of social convention. These points, taken together, make legal positivism both interesting and defensible. Because negative positivism is essentially a negative thesis, it cannot be undermined by counter-examples, any one of which would show only that, in some community or other, morality is a condition of legality at least for some norms.Less
This chapter presents and defends a version of legal positivism, relying on two distinctions: one between epistemic and ontological conceptions of the rule of recognition, and the other between negative and positive positivism. The chapter argues that positivism is committed to the rule of recognition as a semantic or ontological rule only, and that its essential positive claim is that the authority of law everywhere is a matter of social convention. These points, taken together, make legal positivism both interesting and defensible. Because negative positivism is essentially a negative thesis, it cannot be undermined by counter-examples, any one of which would show only that, in some community or other, morality is a condition of legality at least for some norms.
Denis Galligan
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199291830
- eISBN:
- 9780191700675
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291830.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book considers how legal theory, and particularly H. L. A Hart's The Concept of Law, has developed the idea of law as a highly developed social system, which has a distinctive character and ...
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This book considers how legal theory, and particularly H. L. A Hart's The Concept of Law, has developed the idea of law as a highly developed social system, which has a distinctive character and structure, and which shapes and influences people's behaviour. The concept of law as a distinct social phenomenon is examined through reference to, and analysis of, the works of M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and N. Luhmann. The book is guided by the idea that the law is a social formation with its own character and features, and that it is interrelated with other aspects of society. A general framework for law and society considers various aspects including: the nature of social rules and the concept of law as a system of rules; whether law has particular social functions and how legal orders run in parallel; coercion; the characteristic form of modern law; implementation and compliance; and laws aimed at bringing about change in society.Less
This book considers how legal theory, and particularly H. L. A Hart's The Concept of Law, has developed the idea of law as a highly developed social system, which has a distinctive character and structure, and which shapes and influences people's behaviour. The concept of law as a distinct social phenomenon is examined through reference to, and analysis of, the works of M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and N. Luhmann. The book is guided by the idea that the law is a social formation with its own character and features, and that it is interrelated with other aspects of society. A general framework for law and society considers various aspects including: the nature of social rules and the concept of law as a system of rules; whether law has particular social functions and how legal orders run in parallel; coercion; the characteristic form of modern law; implementation and compliance; and laws aimed at bringing about change in society.
Wolfgang Streeck
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199573981
- eISBN:
- 9780191702136
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573981.003.0010
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Political Economy, International Business
In the context of institutions, individual and collective action supposedly brought about intended or unintended change in institutions. Understanding such change then requires a thorough ...
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In the context of institutions, individual and collective action supposedly brought about intended or unintended change in institutions. Understanding such change then requires a thorough investigation of the relationship between social rules and social action, looking specifically into how human action becomes rule-making, rule-taking, and rule-breaking, or simply the implications of following a rule and how this affects the rule itself. However, the way that actors would respond to such social rules remain unpredictable, allowing for unanticipated consequences and other possible effects. This chapter attempts to explain the implications of social rules through the five sectors while showing how studying gradual change is essential in understanding the importance of time for social structures and how this may suggest a move from a system perspective to a process perspective.Less
In the context of institutions, individual and collective action supposedly brought about intended or unintended change in institutions. Understanding such change then requires a thorough investigation of the relationship between social rules and social action, looking specifically into how human action becomes rule-making, rule-taking, and rule-breaking, or simply the implications of following a rule and how this affects the rule itself. However, the way that actors would respond to such social rules remain unpredictable, allowing for unanticipated consequences and other possible effects. This chapter attempts to explain the implications of social rules through the five sectors while showing how studying gradual change is essential in understanding the importance of time for social structures and how this may suggest a move from a system perspective to a process perspective.
Andrei Marmor
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691141671
- eISBN:
- 9781400838707
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691141671.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents some of H. L. A. Hart's main contributions to legal philosophy. Hart's The Concept of Law is widely regarded as the single most important contribution to legal philosophy in the ...
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This chapter presents some of H. L. A. Hart's main contributions to legal philosophy. Hart's The Concept of Law is widely regarded as the single most important contribution to legal philosophy in the twentieth century. It shows that Hart's theory is the most consistent and sustained attempt to develop a detachment view of law and legal philosophy, and one that is thoroughly reductive. The chapter introduces another separation, or detachment, that Hart's theory attempted, and one that is less successful: the detachment of law from state sovereignty. The legal positivist tradition, from Hobbes to the main positivists of the nineteenth century, conceived of law as the instrument of political sovereignty, largely influenced by the emergence of the modern state. Hart tried to show that this identification of law with state sovereignty is profoundly misguided; law is independently grounded on social rules, not on political sovereignty. It is argued that Hart's attempt to separate our understanding of law from the concept of sovereignty is only partly successful.Less
This chapter presents some of H. L. A. Hart's main contributions to legal philosophy. Hart's The Concept of Law is widely regarded as the single most important contribution to legal philosophy in the twentieth century. It shows that Hart's theory is the most consistent and sustained attempt to develop a detachment view of law and legal philosophy, and one that is thoroughly reductive. The chapter introduces another separation, or detachment, that Hart's theory attempted, and one that is less successful: the detachment of law from state sovereignty. The legal positivist tradition, from Hobbes to the main positivists of the nineteenth century, conceived of law as the instrument of political sovereignty, largely influenced by the emergence of the modern state. Hart tried to show that this identification of law with state sovereignty is profoundly misguided; law is independently grounded on social rules, not on political sovereignty. It is argued that Hart's attempt to separate our understanding of law from the concept of sovereignty is only partly successful.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
The previous chapter introduced the idea of constitutional conventions, discussing their nature and place within the constitution. It left at least one important feature of conventions unexplored: ...
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The previous chapter introduced the idea of constitutional conventions, discussing their nature and place within the constitution. It left at least one important feature of conventions unexplored: their relationship with law. The task of identifying the differences between laws and constitutional conventions has caused British constitutional theorists a great deal of trouble. Two possible distinctions are frequently canvassed. First, that laws are enforced by courts, with legal sanctions following their breach, whilst conventions are enforced only by political pressure. Second, that laws are systematic, a set of rules bound together by other rules, whereas each constitutional convention stands alone. This chapter argues that neither distinction can be sustained. The difference between law and convention is one of degree: laws and conventions can be placed upon a spectrum of types of social rules, a spectrum gradated in terms of the formalization of rules. Laws lie at the most formalized end of this spectrum, but there is no single, definable, point at which rules shift from being conventions into being laws. Alongside this argument, it is contended that conventions can become laws through judicial intervention, and that conventions can ‘crystallize’ into laws over time by becoming increasingly formalized.Less
The previous chapter introduced the idea of constitutional conventions, discussing their nature and place within the constitution. It left at least one important feature of conventions unexplored: their relationship with law. The task of identifying the differences between laws and constitutional conventions has caused British constitutional theorists a great deal of trouble. Two possible distinctions are frequently canvassed. First, that laws are enforced by courts, with legal sanctions following their breach, whilst conventions are enforced only by political pressure. Second, that laws are systematic, a set of rules bound together by other rules, whereas each constitutional convention stands alone. This chapter argues that neither distinction can be sustained. The difference between law and convention is one of degree: laws and conventions can be placed upon a spectrum of types of social rules, a spectrum gradated in terms of the formalization of rules. Laws lie at the most formalized end of this spectrum, but there is no single, definable, point at which rules shift from being conventions into being laws. Alongside this argument, it is contended that conventions can become laws through judicial intervention, and that conventions can ‘crystallize’ into laws over time by becoming increasingly formalized.
Anna Bryson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198217657
- eISBN:
- 9780191678264
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198217657.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Cultural History
This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to explore the nature and development of early modern conceptions of good manners, and examine some of the particular forms ...
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This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to explore the nature and development of early modern conceptions of good manners, and examine some of the particular forms of everyday behaviour which these conceptions implied. The aim is to give some account of the meaning of ‘courtesy’ and ‘civility’ in early modern England. The chapter then discusses the sources used in the study; theoretical perspectives on the history of manners; and social values, cultural politics, and social order in early modern England. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.Less
This introductory chapter first sets out the purpose of the book, which is to explore the nature and development of early modern conceptions of good manners, and examine some of the particular forms of everyday behaviour which these conceptions implied. The aim is to give some account of the meaning of ‘courtesy’ and ‘civility’ in early modern England. The chapter then discusses the sources used in the study; theoretical perspectives on the history of manners; and social values, cultural politics, and social order in early modern England. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
David Braybrooke, Bryson Brown, Peter K. Schotch, and Laura Byrne
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198235309
- eISBN:
- 9780191679056
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235309.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Political Philosophy
The preceding chapters showed how our logic can identify more precisely the rules prevailing in the status quo ante and the rules supplanting them in the status quo post. It was also shown how the ...
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The preceding chapters showed how our logic can identify more precisely the rules prevailing in the status quo ante and the rules supplanting them in the status quo post. It was also shown how the logic can identify what difficulties beset the former rules that the latter ones escape. This chapter advances to an application wherein the process of change itself is tracked in detail and comes to close grips with several quandaries. It presents Foucault's general account of the origin of clinical medicine. It then offers a rules-analysis of certain topics selected from that account as having central importance.Less
The preceding chapters showed how our logic can identify more precisely the rules prevailing in the status quo ante and the rules supplanting them in the status quo post. It was also shown how the logic can identify what difficulties beset the former rules that the latter ones escape. This chapter advances to an application wherein the process of change itself is tracked in detail and comes to close grips with several quandaries. It presents Foucault's general account of the origin of clinical medicine. It then offers a rules-analysis of certain topics selected from that account as having central importance.
D. J. GALLIGAN
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199291830
- eISBN:
- 9780191700675
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291830.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
To be able to acquire an understanding of how social rules become standards of behavior, the social context in which these occur must first be analysed while considering the various possible ...
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To be able to acquire an understanding of how social rules become standards of behavior, the social context in which these occur must first be analysed while considering the various possible consequences attributed to these said rules. To Hart, assuming a theory of law that is both analytical and sociological meant that one should avoid a natural law approach that confuses the social reality of law with a reality which people would prefer, and it also means that the abstraction of involved theories should be made on a manageable social level. Hart identifies the constant and general features of working legal systems and analyses the internal aspects of social rules. This chapter and the succeeding chapters attempt to consider Hart's description of a municipal legal system as composed of social rules by examining this point of view of law in society.Less
To be able to acquire an understanding of how social rules become standards of behavior, the social context in which these occur must first be analysed while considering the various possible consequences attributed to these said rules. To Hart, assuming a theory of law that is both analytical and sociological meant that one should avoid a natural law approach that confuses the social reality of law with a reality which people would prefer, and it also means that the abstraction of involved theories should be made on a manageable social level. Hart identifies the constant and general features of working legal systems and analyses the internal aspects of social rules. This chapter and the succeeding chapters attempt to consider Hart's description of a municipal legal system as composed of social rules by examining this point of view of law in society.
Michael Woolcock
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557547
- eISBN:
- 9780191721083
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557547.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Development, Growth, and Environmental
This chapter focuses on both expanding and refining the analytical scope of the ‘social’ (or non-economic) aspects of chronic poverty. The chapter is structured in six sections. Section 15.2 briefly ...
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This chapter focuses on both expanding and refining the analytical scope of the ‘social’ (or non-economic) aspects of chronic poverty. The chapter is structured in six sections. Section 15.2 briefly looks at how poverty generally, and chronic poverty in particular, is explained in the current policy literature, with a focus on ‘poverty traps’ and (more recently) ‘inequality traps’. It is argued that three strands of scholarship in the non-economic social sciences have exerted quite considerable influence at the level of contemporary policy discourse (and to a lesser extent, practice), and that critics, especially those within these disciplines, have been slow to recognize this fact. Section 15.3 argues that these successes cannot do the heavy intellectual lifting required for a more comprehensive social theory of chronic poverty, and that, as such, a new edifice must be constructed and negotiated for. Section 15.4 provides three brief case studies of selected aspects of chronic poverty to demonstrate both the influence and the limits of prevailing approaches. Section 15.5 provides a defence of three constituent realms of a broader social theory of chronic poverty, namely systems of social relations, rules, and meaning. Section 15.6 concludes.Less
This chapter focuses on both expanding and refining the analytical scope of the ‘social’ (or non-economic) aspects of chronic poverty. The chapter is structured in six sections. Section 15.2 briefly looks at how poverty generally, and chronic poverty in particular, is explained in the current policy literature, with a focus on ‘poverty traps’ and (more recently) ‘inequality traps’. It is argued that three strands of scholarship in the non-economic social sciences have exerted quite considerable influence at the level of contemporary policy discourse (and to a lesser extent, practice), and that critics, especially those within these disciplines, have been slow to recognize this fact. Section 15.3 argues that these successes cannot do the heavy intellectual lifting required for a more comprehensive social theory of chronic poverty, and that, as such, a new edifice must be constructed and negotiated for. Section 15.4 provides three brief case studies of selected aspects of chronic poverty to demonstrate both the influence and the limits of prevailing approaches. Section 15.5 provides a defence of three constituent realms of a broader social theory of chronic poverty, namely systems of social relations, rules, and meaning. Section 15.6 concludes.
D. J. GALLIGAN
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199291830
- eISBN:
- 9780191700675
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199291830.003.0006
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The rule of recognition, as a social fact, aids in understanding how social rules make up a system of law in two ways. First, it serves as an ultimate rule that links rules to form a system as it ...
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The rule of recognition, as a social fact, aids in understanding how social rules make up a system of law in two ways. First, it serves as an ultimate rule that links rules to form a system as it identifies the conditions under which new rules are made and provides the basis for determining whether any social rule is a legal rule. Second, it bestows authority on specific rules as laws since any law made that complies with the rule of recognition obtains a binding quality that requires officials to act in accordance with the rule. Its two elements involve convergent behaviour on the officials's part and an internal attitude that considers the said convergent behavior as obligatory. Admiration and scepticism regarding the rule of recognition has raised issues and these are discussed in this chapter.Less
The rule of recognition, as a social fact, aids in understanding how social rules make up a system of law in two ways. First, it serves as an ultimate rule that links rules to form a system as it identifies the conditions under which new rules are made and provides the basis for determining whether any social rule is a legal rule. Second, it bestows authority on specific rules as laws since any law made that complies with the rule of recognition obtains a binding quality that requires officials to act in accordance with the rule. Its two elements involve convergent behaviour on the officials's part and an internal attitude that considers the said convergent behavior as obligatory. Admiration and scepticism regarding the rule of recognition has raised issues and these are discussed in this chapter.
Anna Bryson
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198217657
- eISBN:
- 9780191678264
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198217657.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Cultural History
In any society, a foreigner learning the language must also learn what passes for good manners. The same is true for the historian trying to understand the social rules of a period and why these ...
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In any society, a foreigner learning the language must also learn what passes for good manners. The same is true for the historian trying to understand the social rules of a period and why these change. This book explores the nature and development of early modern conceptions of good manners, and examines some of the particular forms of everyday behaviour which these conceptions implied. ‘Courtesy’ and ‘civility’ were among the values central to Tudor and Stuart assumptions and fears about the social and political order.Less
In any society, a foreigner learning the language must also learn what passes for good manners. The same is true for the historian trying to understand the social rules of a period and why these change. This book explores the nature and development of early modern conceptions of good manners, and examines some of the particular forms of everyday behaviour which these conceptions implied. ‘Courtesy’ and ‘civility’ were among the values central to Tudor and Stuart assumptions and fears about the social and political order.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756785
- eISBN:
- 9780804779562
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756785.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
H. L. A. Hart's legal theory is a theory of legal order as an order of rules. These rules are a particular variety of social rules that derive from social sources and exist in virtue of social ...
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H. L. A. Hart's legal theory is a theory of legal order as an order of rules. These rules are a particular variety of social rules that derive from social sources and exist in virtue of social practices. For Hart, these social rules depend on, or express, the attitudes of human beings toward their own and other humans' conduct as well as their ways of acting and interacting with each other as conscious agents. As a jurist, Hart addressed the explanation of laws as social rules and the explanation of social rules and rejected the notion that rules are some kind of command or imperative. He highlighted an “internal aspect” of social rules as against mere habits and external regularities of behavior. Moreover, he proposed a new route to the explanation of social rules dependent on what may be called a “hermeneutic” approach. Hart's practice theory of social rules, and by implication, legal rules as a special type of social rules, makes a distinctive, original, and valuable contribution to jurisprudence.Less
H. L. A. Hart's legal theory is a theory of legal order as an order of rules. These rules are a particular variety of social rules that derive from social sources and exist in virtue of social practices. For Hart, these social rules depend on, or express, the attitudes of human beings toward their own and other humans' conduct as well as their ways of acting and interacting with each other as conscious agents. As a jurist, Hart addressed the explanation of laws as social rules and the explanation of social rules and rejected the notion that rules are some kind of command or imperative. He highlighted an “internal aspect” of social rules as against mere habits and external regularities of behavior. Moreover, he proposed a new route to the explanation of social rules dependent on what may be called a “hermeneutic” approach. Hart's practice theory of social rules, and by implication, legal rules as a special type of social rules, makes a distinctive, original, and valuable contribution to jurisprudence.
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780804756785
- eISBN:
- 9780804779562
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804756785.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudence is detailed in his book, The Concept of Law. This book describes a legal system as a system of social rules that belong to a general class encompassing other types of ...
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H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudence is detailed in his book, The Concept of Law. This book describes a legal system as a system of social rules that belong to a general class encompassing other types of rule such as rules of morality and rules of manners and etiquette. Social rules are like moral rules in the sense that they are concerned with “obligations” or “duties.” Unlike moral rules, however, they have a systemic quality depending on the interrelationship of two kinds of rules: “primary rules” and “secondary rules.” In addition to primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of adjudication and change, every legal system also includes what Hart calls a “rule of recognition.” Hart considers himself a legal positivist, rejecting the tenets of “natural law” theorizing as propounded by thinkers ranging from Aristotle to John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Finnis. One important point to make about Hart's legal positivism concerns the relative indeterminacy of social rules and thus also of legal rules.Less
H. L. A. Hart's jurisprudence is detailed in his book, The Concept of Law. This book describes a legal system as a system of social rules that belong to a general class encompassing other types of rule such as rules of morality and rules of manners and etiquette. Social rules are like moral rules in the sense that they are concerned with “obligations” or “duties.” Unlike moral rules, however, they have a systemic quality depending on the interrelationship of two kinds of rules: “primary rules” and “secondary rules.” In addition to primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of adjudication and change, every legal system also includes what Hart calls a “rule of recognition.” Hart considers himself a legal positivist, rejecting the tenets of “natural law” theorizing as propounded by thinkers ranging from Aristotle to John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Finnis. One important point to make about Hart's legal positivism concerns the relative indeterminacy of social rules and thus also of legal rules.
