Ann E. Cudd
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187434
- eISBN:
- 9780199786213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187431.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter characterizes social groups and institutions in a way that meets the plausible objections of individualists, yet allows a social explanation of oppression. Topics discussed include ...
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This chapter characterizes social groups and institutions in a way that meets the plausible objections of individualists, yet allows a social explanation of oppression. Topics discussed include explaining human behavior, social groups, institutionally structured constraints, oppression and social groups, social groups and group harm. It is argued that any account of oppression that distinguishes it from other types of harm that can come to individuals and locates it as a social injustice requires an account of social groups. Further, harms that accrue to members of voluntary and nonvoluntary groups must be treated separately in moral arguments.Less
This chapter characterizes social groups and institutions in a way that meets the plausible objections of individualists, yet allows a social explanation of oppression. Topics discussed include explaining human behavior, social groups, institutionally structured constraints, oppression and social groups, social groups and group harm. It is argued that any account of oppression that distinguishes it from other types of harm that can come to individuals and locates it as a social injustice requires an account of social groups. Further, harms that accrue to members of voluntary and nonvoluntary groups must be treated separately in moral arguments.
Ann E. Cudd
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187434
- eISBN:
- 9780199786213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187431.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter is concerned with explaining how our cognitive psychology equips us for oppression, that is, what psychological mechanisms we have that allow and motivate us to oppress or suffer ...
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This chapter is concerned with explaining how our cognitive psychology equips us for oppression, that is, what psychological mechanisms we have that allow and motivate us to oppress or suffer oppression. It addresses the question: what psychological mechanisms account for our tendency to form social groups and to invidiously discriminate among those groups? It argues that there are two main types of material forces of oppression — violence and economic deprivation — and that oppression cannot survive without being enforced by at least one of these material ways of harming persons. Violence is separated from economic deprivation to illustrate how different cases of oppression involve different kinds of reinforcements and argue that they will require different strategies of resistance.Less
This chapter is concerned with explaining how our cognitive psychology equips us for oppression, that is, what psychological mechanisms we have that allow and motivate us to oppress or suffer oppression. It addresses the question: what psychological mechanisms account for our tendency to form social groups and to invidiously discriminate among those groups? It argues that there are two main types of material forces of oppression — violence and economic deprivation — and that oppression cannot survive without being enforced by at least one of these material ways of harming persons. Violence is separated from economic deprivation to illustrate how different cases of oppression involve different kinds of reinforcements and argue that they will require different strategies of resistance.
Ann E. Cudd
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187434
- eISBN:
- 9780199786213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187431.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that violence is and has always been a crucial component in the origin and maintenance of oppression. It explores how violence and the threat of violence constrain the actions of ...
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This chapter argues that violence is and has always been a crucial component in the origin and maintenance of oppression. It explores how violence and the threat of violence constrain the actions of groups, harming the victims and benefiting the correlative privileged social groups. It argues that women as a group are oppressed materially through violence, and that there is a credible, psychologically effective threat of greater harm that is transmitted by the obvious material harm that they do suffer.Less
This chapter argues that violence is and has always been a crucial component in the origin and maintenance of oppression. It explores how violence and the threat of violence constrain the actions of groups, harming the victims and benefiting the correlative privileged social groups. It argues that women as a group are oppressed materially through violence, and that there is a credible, psychologically effective threat of greater harm that is transmitted by the obvious material harm that they do suffer.
Ann E. Cudd
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187434
- eISBN:
- 9780199786213
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187431.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter discusses three main forces of economic oppression: oppressive economic systems (capitalism and socialism), direct forces of economic oppression, and indirect forces of economic ...
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This chapter discusses three main forces of economic oppression: oppressive economic systems (capitalism and socialism), direct forces of economic oppression, and indirect forces of economic oppression. It is argued that while capitalism and socialism are not intrinsically oppressive, both systems lend themselves to oppression in characteristic ways, and therefore each sort of system must take certain steps to guard against their respective characteristic oppressions. Direct forces of economic oppression are restrictions on opportunities that are applied from the outside on the oppressed, including enslavement, segregation, employment discrimination, group-based harassment, opportunity inequality, neocolonialism, and governmental corruption. Direct forces may not always be clearly visible, either because they happen far from the reach of legal authorities or from the view of consumers, or because they are diffused in a large society, and only apparent from a statistical analysis and comparison among social groups. In indirect forces, or oppression by choice, the oppressed are co-opted into making individual choices that add to their own oppression. When this force is at work the oppressed are faced with options that rationally induce them to choose against the collective good of their social group, and in the long run, against their own good as well. But choosing otherwise requires choosing against their own immediate interests, and changing their beliefs or preferences in ways that they may resent.Less
This chapter discusses three main forces of economic oppression: oppressive economic systems (capitalism and socialism), direct forces of economic oppression, and indirect forces of economic oppression. It is argued that while capitalism and socialism are not intrinsically oppressive, both systems lend themselves to oppression in characteristic ways, and therefore each sort of system must take certain steps to guard against their respective characteristic oppressions. Direct forces of economic oppression are restrictions on opportunities that are applied from the outside on the oppressed, including enslavement, segregation, employment discrimination, group-based harassment, opportunity inequality, neocolonialism, and governmental corruption. Direct forces may not always be clearly visible, either because they happen far from the reach of legal authorities or from the view of consumers, or because they are diffused in a large society, and only apparent from a statistical analysis and comparison among social groups. In indirect forces, or oppression by choice, the oppressed are co-opted into making individual choices that add to their own oppression. When this force is at work the oppressed are faced with options that rationally induce them to choose against the collective good of their social group, and in the long run, against their own good as well. But choosing otherwise requires choosing against their own immediate interests, and changing their beliefs or preferences in ways that they may resent.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
In pursuit of a satisfactory theory of political obligation, a start is made towards the articulation of a particular conception of a political society, with a focus on social groups. These range ...
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In pursuit of a satisfactory theory of political obligation, a start is made towards the articulation of a particular conception of a political society, with a focus on social groups. These range from the enduring and relatively permanent to the small and transient: even two people out on a walk together constitute such a group by virtue of their joint activity. This chapter makes a number of observations on that case that may serve as tests of an account of joint activity generally. For instance, the parties are understood to have a special standing to rebuke each other for action that undermines the joint activity and upon which there has been no explicit or implicit concurrence between the parties. Various ways in which joint activity may come about, including initial agreements, are explored and an account of joint activity in terms of the parties’ joint commitment is sketched.Less
In pursuit of a satisfactory theory of political obligation, a start is made towards the articulation of a particular conception of a political society, with a focus on social groups. These range from the enduring and relatively permanent to the small and transient: even two people out on a walk together constitute such a group by virtue of their joint activity. This chapter makes a number of observations on that case that may serve as tests of an account of joint activity generally. For instance, the parties are understood to have a special standing to rebuke each other for action that undermines the joint activity and upon which there has been no explicit or implicit concurrence between the parties. Various ways in which joint activity may come about, including initial agreements, are explored and an account of joint activity in terms of the parties’ joint commitment is sketched.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an ...
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Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.Less
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691149608
- eISBN:
- 9781400846337
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691149608.003.0006
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Development
This chapter looks at the social brain hypothesis. The term social brain has come to stand for the argument that the human brain, and indeed that of some other animals, is specialized for a ...
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This chapter looks at the social brain hypothesis. The term social brain has come to stand for the argument that the human brain, and indeed that of some other animals, is specialized for a collective form of life. One part of this argument is evolutionary: that the size and complexity of the brains of primates, including humans, are related to the size and complexity of their characteristic social groups. However, the social brain hypothesis is more than a general account of the role of brain size: for in this thesis, the capacities for sociality are neurally located in a specific set of brain regions shaped by evolution, notably the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex, and temporal cortex—regions that have the function of facilitating an understanding of what one might call the “mental life” of others.Less
This chapter looks at the social brain hypothesis. The term social brain has come to stand for the argument that the human brain, and indeed that of some other animals, is specialized for a collective form of life. One part of this argument is evolutionary: that the size and complexity of the brains of primates, including humans, are related to the size and complexity of their characteristic social groups. However, the social brain hypothesis is more than a general account of the role of brain size: for in this thesis, the capacities for sociality are neurally located in a specific set of brain regions shaped by evolution, notably the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex, and temporal cortex—regions that have the function of facilitating an understanding of what one might call the “mental life” of others.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social ...
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Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social groups in general, and societies in particular. Defining a plural subject as a set of persons who are jointly committed in some way, it argues for an account of social groups as plural subjects. It argues that plural subjects can be large and possess the features of anonymity, hierarchy, impersonality, and inclusiveness. These features are typically associated with a society as a special type of social group.Less
Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social groups in general, and societies in particular. Defining a plural subject as a set of persons who are jointly committed in some way, it argues for an account of social groups as plural subjects. It argues that plural subjects can be large and possess the features of anonymity, hierarchy, impersonality, and inclusiveness. These features are typically associated with a society as a special type of social group.
Nick Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This book provides an original analytical account of the state and its associated constitutional phenomena. It presents the state as a form of social group, consisting of people, territory, and ...
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This book provides an original analytical account of the state and its associated constitutional phenomena. It presents the state as a form of social group, consisting of people, territory, and institutions bound together by rules. The institutions of the state make a distinctive and characteristic claim over the people of the state, who, in turn, have a distinctive and characteristic relationship with these institutions. This account reveals the importance of at least two forms of pluralism — legal and constitutional. It also casts light on some of the more difficult questions faced by writers on constitutions — such as the possibility of states undertaking actions and forming intentions, the moral significance of these actions for the people of the state, and the capacity of the state to carry responsibility for acts between generations.Less
This book provides an original analytical account of the state and its associated constitutional phenomena. It presents the state as a form of social group, consisting of people, territory, and institutions bound together by rules. The institutions of the state make a distinctive and characteristic claim over the people of the state, who, in turn, have a distinctive and characteristic relationship with these institutions. This account reveals the importance of at least two forms of pluralism — legal and constitutional. It also casts light on some of the more difficult questions faced by writers on constitutions — such as the possibility of states undertaking actions and forming intentions, the moral significance of these actions for the people of the state, and the capacity of the state to carry responsibility for acts between generations.
John M. Levine, Kira Alexander, and Thomas Hansen
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0024
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical work on self-regulation at the group level of analysis. We examine how groups exert control over their members and how members respond to these control ...
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This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical work on self-regulation at the group level of analysis. We examine how groups exert control over their members and how members respond to these control efforts. The first section of the chapter focuses on groups as agents of control. Following a discussion of the functions that groups serve, we examine how groups use norms and roles to control their members. The second section of the chapter focuses on individuals as targets of control. Here we examine two opposing ways in which individuals respond to perceived group pressure: capitulation and resistance. We conclude by examining two implicit assumptions underlying our analysis of group control—that groups initiate control for their own ends and that members view such control as an unwelcome constraint. Using the example of social support groups, we discuss the relationship between self- and group-control when individuals seek group help in regulating their behavior.Less
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical work on self-regulation at the group level of analysis. We examine how groups exert control over their members and how members respond to these control efforts. The first section of the chapter focuses on groups as agents of control. Following a discussion of the functions that groups serve, we examine how groups use norms and roles to control their members. The second section of the chapter focuses on individuals as targets of control. Here we examine two opposing ways in which individuals respond to perceived group pressure: capitulation and resistance. We conclude by examining two implicit assumptions underlying our analysis of group control—that groups initiate control for their own ends and that members view such control as an unwelcome constraint. Using the example of social support groups, we discuss the relationship between self- and group-control when individuals seek group help in regulating their behavior.
Christopher F. Karpowitz and Tali Mendelberg
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691159751
- eISBN:
- 9781400852697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691159751.003.0012
- Subject:
- Sociology, Gender and Sexuality
This concluding chapter discusses how scholars have established the utility of different types of representation for disadvantaged groups. Descriptive representation refers to the physical presence ...
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This concluding chapter discusses how scholars have established the utility of different types of representation for disadvantaged groups. Descriptive representation refers to the physical presence of a social group in the setting of decision making. Substantive representation occurs when the concerns, values, sensibilities, or interests of that group are expressed, acted upon, and ultimately influence the outcome in some way. Symbolic representation is defined as the notion that the group is capable of governing, that its exercise of power is legitimate. The book's findings suggest an additional type of representation. In order to obtain substantive and symbolic representation, a subordinate group requires that the conditions of discussion provide the group with authoritative representation.Less
This concluding chapter discusses how scholars have established the utility of different types of representation for disadvantaged groups. Descriptive representation refers to the physical presence of a social group in the setting of decision making. Substantive representation occurs when the concerns, values, sensibilities, or interests of that group are expressed, acted upon, and ultimately influence the outcome in some way. Symbolic representation is defined as the notion that the group is capable of governing, that its exercise of power is legitimate. The book's findings suggest an additional type of representation. In order to obtain substantive and symbolic representation, a subordinate group requires that the conditions of discussion provide the group with authoritative representation.
Scott Smith-Bannister
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206637
- eISBN:
- 9780191677250
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206637.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Social History
This book contains the results of the first large-scale quantitative investigation of naming practices in early modern England. It traces the history of the fundamentally ...
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This book contains the results of the first large-scale quantitative investigation of naming practices in early modern England. It traces the history of the fundamentally significant human act of naming one's children during a period of great economic, social, and religious upheaval. Using in part the huge pool of names accumulated by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, the book sets out to show which names were most commonly used, how children came to be given these names, why they were named after godparents, parents, siblings, or saints, and how social status affected naming patterns. The chief historical significance of this research lies in the discovery of a substantial shift in naming practices in this period: away from medieval patterns of naming a child after a godparent and towards naming them after a parent. In establishing the chronology of how parents came to exercise greater choice in naming their children and over the nature of naming practices, it successfully supersedes previous scholarship on this subject. Resolutely statistical and rich in anecdote, this exploration of this deeply revealing subject will have far-reaching implications for the history of the English family and culture.Less
This book contains the results of the first large-scale quantitative investigation of naming practices in early modern England. It traces the history of the fundamentally significant human act of naming one's children during a period of great economic, social, and religious upheaval. Using in part the huge pool of names accumulated by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure, the book sets out to show which names were most commonly used, how children came to be given these names, why they were named after godparents, parents, siblings, or saints, and how social status affected naming patterns. The chief historical significance of this research lies in the discovery of a substantial shift in naming practices in this period: away from medieval patterns of naming a child after a godparent and towards naming them after a parent. In establishing the chronology of how parents came to exercise greater choice in naming their children and over the nature of naming practices, it successfully supersedes previous scholarship on this subject. Resolutely statistical and rich in anecdote, this exploration of this deeply revealing subject will have far-reaching implications for the history of the English family and culture.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are ...
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Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are thought to have to one another. These duties occupy a central position in common‐sense moral thinking, even though their precise content is often unclear. Scheffler considers two objections to associative duties: the voluntarist objection, rooted in an ideal of freedom and autonomy; and the distributive objection, rooted in a principle of equality. Like associative duties themselves, the values of freedom and equality exert genuine authority within common‐sense moral thought, and so there are deep internal conflicts in our thinking about the extent of our responsibilities to different individuals and groups.Less
Scheffler's main aim in this essay is to explore the nature of ‘associative duties’—the special duties that participants in close personal relationships and members of significant social groups are thought to have to one another. These duties occupy a central position in common‐sense moral thinking, even though their precise content is often unclear. Scheffler considers two objections to associative duties: the voluntarist objection, rooted in an ideal of freedom and autonomy; and the distributive objection, rooted in a principle of equality. Like associative duties themselves, the values of freedom and equality exert genuine authority within common‐sense moral thought, and so there are deep internal conflicts in our thinking about the extent of our responsibilities to different individuals and groups.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294900
- eISBN:
- 9780191596728
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294905.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
Issues of social group autarky are addressed, with particular reference to their economic costs. The different sections of the chapter address the social interests of such groups, give some American ...
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Issues of social group autarky are addressed, with particular reference to their economic costs. The different sections of the chapter address the social interests of such groups, give some American examples (the Lubavitch Jewish community of Brooklyn, and American farmers—the need for which has declined as agricultural productivity has risen dramatically), individual versus group economic benefits, special status for social groups, conflict between special‐status social groups (exemplified by professional, religious, status, linguistic, and ethnic groups), and conflict within special‐status groups.Less
Issues of social group autarky are addressed, with particular reference to their economic costs. The different sections of the chapter address the social interests of such groups, give some American examples (the Lubavitch Jewish community of Brooklyn, and American farmers—the need for which has declined as agricultural productivity has risen dramatically), individual versus group economic benefits, special status for social groups, conflict between special‐status social groups (exemplified by professional, religious, status, linguistic, and ethnic groups), and conflict within special‐status groups.
Robert Merrihew Adams
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199207510
- eISBN:
- 9780191708824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207510.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty ...
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This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty effective inelementarytasks of initiation into the use of ethical concepts andmodularor domain-specific tasks of teaching people how to cooperate in particular institutions and roles.Integrativetasks — more difficult but indispensable for the formation of a clearly good moral character — seem to demand more individual autonomy, and to lie less within the power of social groups. In opposition to some situationist arguments, the last section of the chapter defends the desirability of teaching virtue to the extent that it can be taught.Less
This chapter sketches a map of the ground to be covered in education for virtue, organized around a progression of three types of tasks of moral education. It is argued that society is pretty effective inelementarytasks of initiation into the use of ethical concepts andmodularor domain-specific tasks of teaching people how to cooperate in particular institutions and roles.Integrativetasks — more difficult but indispensable for the formation of a clearly good moral character — seem to demand more individual autonomy, and to lie less within the power of social groups. In opposition to some situationist arguments, the last section of the chapter defends the desirability of teaching virtue to the extent that it can be taught.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter introduces many of the ideas that will run through this book. It presents two accounts — or two groups of accounts — of the state. The first, set out by Weber and Green, focuses on the ...
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This chapter introduces many of the ideas that will run through this book. It presents two accounts — or two groups of accounts — of the state. The first, set out by Weber and Green, focuses on the institutions of the state and the type of claims those institutions made over individuals. The second, set out by Aristotle and forming the basis of much of the rest of this book, presents the state as a particular type of social group.Less
This chapter introduces many of the ideas that will run through this book. It presents two accounts — or two groups of accounts — of the state. The first, set out by Weber and Green, focuses on the institutions of the state and the type of claims those institutions made over individuals. The second, set out by Aristotle and forming the basis of much of the rest of this book, presents the state as a particular type of social group.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0004
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of ...
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This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of the ambiguities of rule-governed behaviour: in particular, the difficulties of distinguishing between action guided by rules and action undertaken for other reasons, and the possibility of quite fundamental disagreements within a social group over the existence and content of rules.Less
This chapter develops an account of rules, an account which has been directed towards illuminating the part that rules play in the existence and operation of social groups. It brings forward some of the ambiguities of rule-governed behaviour: in particular, the difficulties of distinguishing between action guided by rules and action undertaken for other reasons, and the possibility of quite fundamental disagreements within a social group over the existence and content of rules.
N. W. Barber
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199585014
- eISBN:
- 9780191595318
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199585014.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state ...
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This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.Less
This chapter argues that when we talk of states possessing intentions and acting, we use these terms in an analogous sense to their primary use in the context of individuals. To talk of a state intending a thing amounts to a claim that it shares sufficient features in common with a person intending a thing to make the statement sensible; it does not amount to a claim that the state intends things in the same sense as a person intends things. The chapter begins by considering two collections of rival approaches to this issue: individualism and holism. Individualists contend that it is inappropriate to attribute mental states to groups: it confuses rather than assists our understanding of the world. Holists, in sharp contrast, contend that groups can possess some mental states in the same sense as individuals. It is argued that there is something to be learned from each of these traditions. An account of the intentions and actions of social groups based on the rules which constitute those groups is advanced; it is contended that it is plausible to talk of groups acting and intending, even if they do not exhibit these features in precisely the same sense as individuals. The chapter concludes by exploring the limits to which the attribution of mental qualities to social groups in general and states in particular can usefully be pushed.
Scott Smith-Bannister
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206637
- eISBN:
- 9780191677250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206637.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Early Modern History, Social History
Were men, right from their entry into life, rendered distinct from other men by the name given at their baptism? Is this where English society ...
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Were men, right from their entry into life, rendered distinct from other men by the name given at their baptism? Is this where English society first expressed its sense of hierarchical order? To answer these questions, this chapter compares the names of men from five different social groups — gentry, artisans, yeomen, husbandmen, and labourers — based on Nottinghamshire marriage licences issued between 1590 and 1700. Whereas the pattern of use of the five most common names divided society, the use of the less common names united it. The phrase ‘less common names’ defines those names that were ranked between the sixth and fifteenth most frequently held name in any given decade. Name-sharing practices were the medium by which names differentiated, by social group, between the infants baptized in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.Less
Were men, right from their entry into life, rendered distinct from other men by the name given at their baptism? Is this where English society first expressed its sense of hierarchical order? To answer these questions, this chapter compares the names of men from five different social groups — gentry, artisans, yeomen, husbandmen, and labourers — based on Nottinghamshire marriage licences issued between 1590 and 1700. Whereas the pattern of use of the five most common names divided society, the use of the less common names united it. The phrase ‘less common names’ defines those names that were ranked between the sixth and fifteenth most frequently held name in any given decade. Name-sharing practices were the medium by which names differentiated, by social group, between the infants baptized in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567607
- eISBN:
- 9780191722493
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567607.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The three central topics of interest in this chapter — religion, emotion, and late modern society — are all the subject of extensive academic debate, but have not been brought together. This chapter ...
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The three central topics of interest in this chapter — religion, emotion, and late modern society — are all the subject of extensive academic debate, but have not been brought together. This chapter shows how the approach developed in the preceding chapters can shed light on religious emotion in the late modern context. A key theme of the analysis is that relations between social groups, their participants, and symbols are typically out of balance, and that this has destabilizing consequences for some religious emotional regimes, particularly those of historic forms of once ‘mainstream’ religion, most notably Christianity. The widespread destabilization and deregulation of religious emotion does not, however, mean that the late modern environment is inhospitable for religion: while it renders certain forms of emotional regime unsustainable, it opens up new possibilities for others.Less
The three central topics of interest in this chapter — religion, emotion, and late modern society — are all the subject of extensive academic debate, but have not been brought together. This chapter shows how the approach developed in the preceding chapters can shed light on religious emotion in the late modern context. A key theme of the analysis is that relations between social groups, their participants, and symbols are typically out of balance, and that this has destabilizing consequences for some religious emotional regimes, particularly those of historic forms of once ‘mainstream’ religion, most notably Christianity. The widespread destabilization and deregulation of religious emotion does not, however, mean that the late modern environment is inhospitable for religion: while it renders certain forms of emotional regime unsustainable, it opens up new possibilities for others.
