Phyllis Rooney
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about ...
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Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.Less
Attempts to identify feminist epistemology by picking out particular topics or projects that supposedly all feminist epistemologists engage, or by focusing on specific claims or theories about knowledge (justification, objectivity) to which all or most feminist epistemologists subscribe, often end up mischaracterizing the field. I argue that what makes feminist epistemology distinctive, a quarter century into its development, is best determined by examining what makes mainstream epistemology still so distinctively non‐feminist. For example, feminist epistemology includes a critical examination of historical and contemporary forms of epistemic subordination and disempowerment that it seeks to bring out from the shadows of traditional theorizing in epistemology, that is, forms of exclusion or distancing of women and other “others” from domains, conceptions, and idealizations of knowledge and of epistemology. This feminist project, though it encompasses quite a range of specific inquiries, is distinctive to the extent that proponents of mainstream projects or perspectives in epistemology remain hostile to, dismissive of, or notably ignorant of it. Mainstream marginalizations and dismissals of feminist work are underwritten by distinctively limited understandings of specific features of epistemological theorizing that come to the fore in an examination of the relationship between feminist and mainstream work in epistemology. These features include: a recognition of the historical situatedness of epistemology; an appreciation of different types of relationships between epistemology and politics; the promotion of epistemological reflexivity; critical re-assessments of starting concepts and questions in epistemology; and recognition of important connections between epistemic normativity and moral or political normativity.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and ...
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This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.Less
This is a collection of chapters by the leading proponent of process reliabilism, explaining its relation to rival and/or neighboring theories including evidentialism, other forms of reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. It addresses other prominent themes in contemporary epistemology, such as the internalism/externalism debate, the epistemological upshots of experimental challenges to intuitional methodology, the source of epistemic value, and social epistemology. The Introduction addresses late-breaking responses to ongoing exchanges with friends, rivals, and critics of reliabilism.
Sanford C. Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199593248
- eISBN:
- 9780191594625
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge ...
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This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving “coverage,” where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. It is argued that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. The book uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non‐orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social‐reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief‐fixation involves epistemic reliance on others.Less
This book concerns the role others play in our attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and cases involving “coverage,” where a subject aims to acquire knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she would have heard about it by now. It is argued that these cases challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the knowing subject herself. The book uses results of this sort to question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist epistemology, and to explore what a non‐orthodox reliabilist epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a social‐reliabilist epistemology — one that results from the application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which belief‐fixation involves epistemic reliance on others.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter discusses a wider range of conceptions of social epistemology that range from those that expose traditional epistemology to those that are close to the classical epistemological “canon”. ...
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This chapter discusses a wider range of conceptions of social epistemology that range from those that expose traditional epistemology to those that are close to the classical epistemological “canon”. It introduces the concepts of revisionism, preservationism, and the expansionist conception of social epistemology.Less
This chapter discusses a wider range of conceptions of social epistemology that range from those that expose traditional epistemology to those that are close to the classical epistemological “canon”. It introduces the concepts of revisionism, preservationism, and the expansionist conception of social epistemology.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
How is social epistemology related to mainstream epistemology? Does it retain the traditional character of epistemology while merely giving it a social twist? Or does it advocate a radical ...
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How is social epistemology related to mainstream epistemology? Does it retain the traditional character of epistemology while merely giving it a social twist? Or does it advocate a radical socializing enterprise that heads down a very different path? In the latter case it might not merit the label “epistemology” at all. In the former case what exactly are the social twists and how do they relate to the mainstream? Three conceptions of social epistemology are distinguished here: revisionist, preservationist, and expansionist. Revisionism rejects mainstream assumptions, including the objectivity of truth and rationality, and it is plausible to deny it the status of “real” epistemology. Preservationism is in keeping with mainstream epistemology and qualifies as “real” epistemology. It studies epistemic decision-making by individual doxastic agents. What makes it social is its study of doxastic decision-making in light of social evidence. Other preservationist topics include epistemic norms associated with various speech and communicational activities (assertion, debate, argumentation). Expansionistm seeks to enlarge the reach of social epistemology while remaining continuous with the tradition. Its chief topics are the epistemic properties of collective doxastic agents and the influence of alternative social systems on epistemic outcomes. Illustrations of the social-system approach include (i) examination of legal adjudication systems and (ii) epistemic approaches to democracy. In law we can ask which of various trial systems (species of social epistemic systems) tend to generate the most accurate verdicts. In political theory democratic decision-making processes might be defended by appeal to their putative epistemic characteristics, e.g., their reliability. Less
How is social epistemology related to mainstream epistemology? Does it retain the traditional character of epistemology while merely giving it a social twist? Or does it advocate a radical socializing enterprise that heads down a very different path? In the latter case it might not merit the label “epistemology” at all. In the former case what exactly are the social twists and how do they relate to the mainstream? Three conceptions of social epistemology are distinguished here: revisionist, preservationist, and expansionist. Revisionism rejects mainstream assumptions, including the objectivity of truth and rationality, and it is plausible to deny it the status of “real” epistemology. Preservationism is in keeping with mainstream epistemology and qualifies as “real” epistemology. It studies epistemic decision-making by individual doxastic agents. What makes it social is its study of doxastic decision-making in light of social evidence. Other preservationist topics include epistemic norms associated with various speech and communicational activities (assertion, debate, argumentation). Expansionistm seeks to enlarge the reach of social epistemology while remaining continuous with the tradition. Its chief topics are the epistemic properties of collective doxastic agents and the influence of alternative social systems on epistemic outcomes. Illustrations of the social-system approach include (i) examination of legal adjudication systems and (ii) epistemic approaches to democracy. In law we can ask which of various trial systems (species of social epistemic systems) tend to generate the most accurate verdicts. In political theory democratic decision-making processes might be defended by appeal to their putative epistemic characteristics, e.g., their reliability.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138795
- eISBN:
- 9780199833252
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138791.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant ...
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Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology” argues that naturalistic epistemology is compatible with a priori warrant, and shows how scientific research supports an innate faculty of number cognition that can generate arithmetic belief with a priori warrant. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues” examines the prospects for a unifying account of distinct epistemic values, such as justified belief and true belief. The next three papers consider intuitions and introspection from an epistemological perspective. One paper explains how intuitions can play the evidential role that philosophical practice assigns to it. Two papers argue that introspection plays an unavoidable but legitimate role in the science of consciousness despite being a “private” method. The final three papers deal with aspects of social epistemology. One asks how novices can justifiably choose among two or more competing experts. Another explores the possibility of an epidemiology of knowledge, of which memetics is a prominent example. The final paper provides a critical survey and guide to the diverse approaches to social epistemology.Less
Explores issues ranging from introspection to social epistemology. “Internalism Exposed” pinpoints problems in the defense of internalism as an approach to epistemic justification. “A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology” argues that naturalistic epistemology is compatible with a priori warrant, and shows how scientific research supports an innate faculty of number cognition that can generate arithmetic belief with a priori warrant. “The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues” examines the prospects for a unifying account of distinct epistemic values, such as justified belief and true belief. The next three papers consider intuitions and introspection from an epistemological perspective. One paper explains how intuitions can play the evidential role that philosophical practice assigns to it. Two papers argue that introspection plays an unavoidable but legitimate role in the science of consciousness despite being a “private” method. The final three papers deal with aspects of social epistemology. One asks how novices can justifiably choose among two or more competing experts. Another explores the possibility of an epidemiology of knowledge, of which memetics is a prominent example. The final paper provides a critical survey and guide to the diverse approaches to social epistemology.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812875
- eISBN:
- 9780199933150
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social ...
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This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social epistemology in terms of different “actors” that are also the players of focal interest. The chapter shows that social epistemology is prepared to study individual doxastic agents who “choose” among other doxastic attitudes toward a proposition. The chapter also determines that social epistemology can imagine the existence of collective agents and can study social systems that house institutions and relationship patterns.Less
This chapter summarizes social epistemology and its taxonomies. It presents a wider range of measures of epistemic appraisal, as well as a framework that classifies the varieties of social epistemology in terms of different “actors” that are also the players of focal interest. The chapter shows that social epistemology is prepared to study individual doxastic agents who “choose” among other doxastic attitudes toward a proposition. The chapter also determines that social epistemology can imagine the existence of collective agents and can study social systems that house institutions and relationship patterns.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138795
- eISBN:
- 9780199833252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138791.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Philosophers, sociologists of knowledge, and other academics pursue the topic of social epistemology, but often in entirely disparate fashions. “Knowledge” is usually central to social epistemology, ...
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Philosophers, sociologists of knowledge, and other academics pursue the topic of social epistemology, but often in entirely disparate fashions. “Knowledge” is usually central to social epistemology, but some investigators take “knowledge” to be mere belief or institutionalized belief, whereas others take it to be at least true belief. Radical social epistemologists dismiss traditional epistemology and view their approach as a replacement or successor subject, whereas others see social epistemology as an extension of classical epistemology. Other contrasts include differences on the nature of the “social” and differences on the role, if any, for social constructivism. Social epistemologists often view their field as a normative one, but some concentrate on rationality, others on (e.g., testimonial) justification, and still others on social practices that conduce to knowledge.Less
Philosophers, sociologists of knowledge, and other academics pursue the topic of social epistemology, but often in entirely disparate fashions. “Knowledge” is usually central to social epistemology, but some investigators take “knowledge” to be mere belief or institutionalized belief, whereas others take it to be at least true belief. Radical social epistemologists dismiss traditional epistemology and view their approach as a replacement or successor subject, whereas others see social epistemology as an extension of classical epistemology. Other contrasts include differences on the nature of the “social” and differences on the role, if any, for social constructivism. Social epistemologists often view their field as a normative one, but some concentrate on rationality, others on (e.g., testimonial) justification, and still others on social practices that conduce to knowledge.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325195
- eISBN:
- 9780199776412
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter first identifies what is extremely valuable and distinctive in the approach to Ethics Glover takes in Humanity. It then goes on to argue that Glover's approach is incomplete, because it ...
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This chapter first identifies what is extremely valuable and distinctive in the approach to Ethics Glover takes in Humanity. It then goes on to argue that Glover's approach is incomplete, because it is insufficiently empirical and, more importantly because it lacks a conceptual framework capable of identifying the full range of topics for empirically informed Ethics research. The needed conceptual framework must incorporate social moral epistemology, which focuses on the interaction between the moral‐epistemic virtues and vices of individuals and the moral‐epistemic functions of institutions. Through the use of historical examples of the sort Glover appeals to in Humanity, this chapter shows that work in Ethics must pay more attention to the ethics of believing and to the role that institutions play in the formation of systems of belief.Less
This chapter first identifies what is extremely valuable and distinctive in the approach to Ethics Glover takes in Humanity. It then goes on to argue that Glover's approach is incomplete, because it is insufficiently empirical and, more importantly because it lacks a conceptual framework capable of identifying the full range of topics for empirically informed Ethics research. The needed conceptual framework must incorporate social moral epistemology, which focuses on the interaction between the moral‐epistemic virtues and vices of individuals and the moral‐epistemic functions of institutions. Through the use of historical examples of the sort Glover appeals to in Humanity, this chapter shows that work in Ethics must pay more attention to the ethics of believing and to the role that institutions play in the formation of systems of belief.
Michael A Bishop and J. D. Trout
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195162295
- eISBN:
- 9780199835539
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195162293.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. It identifies three challenges that remain in the construction of a naturalistic epistemology. First, an effective epistemology needs to continue to ...
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This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. It identifies three challenges that remain in the construction of a naturalistic epistemology. First, an effective epistemology needs to continue to discover handy new heuristics that help us reason reliably about significant matters. Second, we need to identify with more effectiveness what is involved in human well-being. A third project essential to the development of a prescriptive, reason-guiding epistemology is social epistemology.Less
This chapter presents some concluding thoughts. It identifies three challenges that remain in the construction of a naturalistic epistemology. First, an effective epistemology needs to continue to discover handy new heuristics that help us reason reliably about significant matters. Second, we need to identify with more effectiveness what is involved in human well-being. A third project essential to the development of a prescriptive, reason-guiding epistemology is social epistemology.
Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ...
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This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language, together with the best linguistic theory of such ascriptions, provide important evidence for epistemological theorizing. Another is the ‘cognitive turn’ in which research in cognitive science is invoked to shed light on the nature of knowledge ascriptions. Finally, recent years have witnessed a ‘social turn’ within which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions are considered in relation to the growing field of social epistemology. This introductory chapter discusses each of these three turns. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.Less
This book brings together a number of diverse strands of contemporary research that have focused on knowledge ascriptions. One such strand is the ‘linguistic turn’ according to which knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language, together with the best linguistic theory of such ascriptions, provide important evidence for epistemological theorizing. Another is the ‘cognitive turn’ in which research in cognitive science is invoked to shed light on the nature of knowledge ascriptions. Finally, recent years have witnessed a ‘social turn’ within which the social functions of knowledge ascriptions are considered in relation to the growing field of social epistemology. This introductory chapter discusses each of these three turns. It then presents an overview of the subsequent chapters.
Lorraine Code
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577477
- eISBN:
- 9780191595189
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language
Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, ...
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Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, abstracted, or elaborated, counted as the most reliable sources, with testimony ranking as a distant, and usually compromised, third. In this chapter's view, social epistemology reverses this ranking, granting a central place to testimony in the production of knowledge, and interrogating assumptions about the replicability and homogeneity of perception and memory. It thus generates a range of issues that had seemed to be hors de question for traditional epistemologists. Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, this chapter proposes that epistemic inquiry socially reconfigured is more fully naturalized than post-Quinean naturalized epistemology has been. Social epistemology focuses on epistemic practices communally engaged by identifiable knowers in the world (thus not principally in the laboratory); who are situated not just socially, but ethically, politically, demographically, geographically, and ecologically, where aspects of such “situatedness” often count among the conditions that make knowledge possible. The inquiry focuses on testimony and advocacy as practices where these factors are particularly salient, and on ignorance not as a mere lack or failure of knowledge, but as a modality of not-knowing, or knowing inadequately, unjustly, which is itself situationally fostered, inhibited, or eradicated.Less
Epistemologists in the 21st century come from a long tradition in which perception, memory, and testimony were viewed as the sources of knowledge. Of these, perception and memory, however enhanced, abstracted, or elaborated, counted as the most reliable sources, with testimony ranking as a distant, and usually compromised, third. In this chapter's view, social epistemology reverses this ranking, granting a central place to testimony in the production of knowledge, and interrogating assumptions about the replicability and homogeneity of perception and memory. It thus generates a range of issues that had seemed to be hors de question for traditional epistemologists. Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location, this chapter proposes that epistemic inquiry socially reconfigured is more fully naturalized than post-Quinean naturalized epistemology has been. Social epistemology focuses on epistemic practices communally engaged by identifiable knowers in the world (thus not principally in the laboratory); who are situated not just socially, but ethically, politically, demographically, geographically, and ecologically, where aspects of such “situatedness” often count among the conditions that make knowledge possible. The inquiry focuses on testimony and advocacy as practices where these factors are particularly salient, and on ignorance not as a mere lack or failure of knowledge, but as a modality of not-knowing, or knowing inadequately, unjustly, which is itself situationally fostered, inhibited, or eradicated.
Sanford C. Goldberg
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199593248
- eISBN:
- 9780191594625
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This chapter pursues the unfinished agenda of Goldman's epistemological project since underline Knowledge in a Social World: making explicit the connection between his earlier reliabilist approach to ...
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This chapter pursues the unfinished agenda of Goldman's epistemological project since underline Knowledge in a Social World: making explicit the connection between his earlier reliabilist approach to epistemology with his more recent veritistic social epistemology.Less
This chapter pursues the unfinished agenda of Goldman's epistemological project since underline Knowledge in a Social World: making explicit the connection between his earlier reliabilist approach to epistemology with his more recent veritistic social epistemology.
Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160849
- eISBN:
- 9781400851348
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160849.003.0008
- Subject:
- Sociology, Economic Sociology
This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion ...
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This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.Less
This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.
Thomas M. Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199203567
- eISBN:
- 9780191708190
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199203567.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter investigates the epistemology of belief that the Bible is divinely inspired. It assumes that most Christians arejustified in believing as much and asks: Whence comes justification for ...
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This chapter investigates the epistemology of belief that the Bible is divinely inspired. It assumes that most Christians arejustified in believing as much and asks: Whence comes justification for this belief? It considers and rejects the possibility that justification for the belief comes by way of argument from history or natural theology, then considers and rejects the possibility that its justification owes to something like Calvin's ‘internal testimony of the Holy Spirit’. Rather, the chapter argues, for most Christians, justification for belief that the Bible is divinely inspired is akin to the justification enjoyed by beliefs accepted on the basis of testimony from those deemed expert by one's social group.Less
This chapter investigates the epistemology of belief that the Bible is divinely inspired. It assumes that most Christians arejustified in believing as much and asks: Whence comes justification for this belief? It considers and rejects the possibility that justification for the belief comes by way of argument from history or natural theology, then considers and rejects the possibility that its justification owes to something like Calvin's ‘internal testimony of the Holy Spirit’. Rather, the chapter argues, for most Christians, justification for belief that the Bible is divinely inspired is akin to the justification enjoyed by beliefs accepted on the basis of testimony from those deemed expert by one's social group.
Allen Buchanan
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226259345
- eISBN:
- 9780226259512
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226259512.003.0006
- Subject:
- Education, Higher Education
This chapter advances the view that social epistemology has important implications for the structure of our educational practices. It argues, first, that educational practices should take social ...
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This chapter advances the view that social epistemology has important implications for the structure of our educational practices. It argues, first, that educational practices should take social epistemology seriously because the success of the educational enterprise requires an effective response to two of the central problems of social epistemology, namely, the novice-expert problem and the general problem of identifying reliable testimony. It argues, second, that social moral epistemology is especially relevant to education for the following reason: If education is informed by social moral epistemology, it may be able, first, to reduce the risk that individuals’ beliefs will be manipulated by those who mobilize the public in support of wrongful mass violence and, second, to prevent the educational enterprise itself from contributing to the production of false beliefs that tend to support mass violence. The chapter concludes with suggestions for how to adapt Critical Thinking curricula to the findings presented.Less
This chapter advances the view that social epistemology has important implications for the structure of our educational practices. It argues, first, that educational practices should take social epistemology seriously because the success of the educational enterprise requires an effective response to two of the central problems of social epistemology, namely, the novice-expert problem and the general problem of identifying reliable testimony. It argues, second, that social moral epistemology is especially relevant to education for the following reason: If education is informed by social moral epistemology, it may be able, first, to reduce the risk that individuals’ beliefs will be manipulated by those who mobilize the public in support of wrongful mass violence and, second, to prevent the educational enterprise itself from contributing to the production of false beliefs that tend to support mass violence. The chapter concludes with suggestions for how to adapt Critical Thinking curricula to the findings presented.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238201
- eISBN:
- 9780191597527
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238207.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but ...
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A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After laying these concerns to rest, “veritistic” social epistemology is advanced as a normative discipline seeking practices and institutions that would best foster knowledge. The book explores forms and methods of communication, including norms of argumentation, information technology, and institutional structures governing speech and the media. Social dimensions of knowledge quests are explored in science, law, democracy, and education. The book examines popular topics in contemporary epistemology such as testimony and Bayesianism, while breaking new ground by connecting epistemology with historically unrelated branches of philosophy such as political and legal theory. Democracy's success, it is argued, requires the attainment of certain epistemic desiderata, and substantive justice depends on well‐chosen procedures of legal evidence.Less
A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After laying these concerns to rest, “veritistic” social epistemology is advanced as a normative discipline seeking practices and institutions that would best foster knowledge. The book explores forms and methods of communication, including norms of argumentation, information technology, and institutional structures governing speech and the media. Social dimensions of knowledge quests are explored in science, law, democracy, and education. The book examines popular topics in contemporary epistemology such as testimony and Bayesianism, while breaking new ground by connecting epistemology with historically unrelated branches of philosophy such as political and legal theory. Democracy's success, it is argued, requires the attainment of certain epistemic desiderata, and substantive justice depends on well‐chosen procedures of legal evidence.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138795
- eISBN:
- 9780199833252
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138791.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Social scientists often investigate the social propagation of belief, but social epistemology is interested in the social routes to true (or false) beliefs. One approach to the social propagation of ...
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Social scientists often investigate the social propagation of belief, but social epistemology is interested in the social routes to true (or false) beliefs. One approach to the social propagation of belief is “memetics,” a selectionist account of belief propagation modeled on biological evolution. This chapter examines the prospects for a contagion approach to primitive cases of belief transmission, modeled on emotion transmission. However, if any such approach is to be useful for social epistemology, one must consider the truth‐conduciveness of primitive speech and acceptance dispositions. Building partly on suggestions of Thomas Reid, some possible implications of a contagion, or epidemiological model, are explored.Less
Social scientists often investigate the social propagation of belief, but social epistemology is interested in the social routes to true (or false) beliefs. One approach to the social propagation of belief is “memetics,” a selectionist account of belief propagation modeled on biological evolution. This chapter examines the prospects for a contagion approach to primitive cases of belief transmission, modeled on emotion transmission. However, if any such approach is to be useful for social epistemology, one must consider the truth‐conduciveness of primitive speech and acceptance dispositions. Building partly on suggestions of Thomas Reid, some possible implications of a contagion, or epidemiological model, are explored.
David K. Henderson and John Greco (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199642632
- eISBN:
- 9780191807145
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199642632.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological ...
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This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several chapters explicitly address this methodology. Other chapters focus on advancing some application of it. For example, some of the chapters focus on the implications for purposeful epistemology for contextualism about epistemic evaluation and for the idea that such evaluation involves “pragmatic encroachment.” Others explore the idea that purposes allow one to understand various conceptual demands on knowing, such as the demand that knowers can give reasons. The text explores how purposeful epistemology might shed light on the debate between internalist and externalist epistemologies. One way in which one might develop a purposeful epistemology is to think of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm in which agents manage to coordinate their individual and group pursuit of true belief. One chapter develops such an approach. Finally, many of the chapters take direction from reflection on Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. For example, one chapter develops ideas in Craig to apply purposeful epistemology to issues regarding testimonial knowledge.Less
This volume aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point(s) or purpose(s) of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several chapters explicitly address this methodology. Other chapters focus on advancing some application of it. For example, some of the chapters focus on the implications for purposeful epistemology for contextualism about epistemic evaluation and for the idea that such evaluation involves “pragmatic encroachment.” Others explore the idea that purposes allow one to understand various conceptual demands on knowing, such as the demand that knowers can give reasons. The text explores how purposeful epistemology might shed light on the debate between internalist and externalist epistemologies. One way in which one might develop a purposeful epistemology is to think of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm in which agents manage to coordinate their individual and group pursuit of true belief. One chapter develops such an approach. Finally, many of the chapters take direction from reflection on Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the State of Nature. For example, one chapter develops ideas in Craig to apply purposeful epistemology to issues regarding testimonial knowledge.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199936472
- eISBN:
- 9780199980697
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936472.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book gives an extended argument for epistemic authority from the implications of reflective self-consciousness. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is ...
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This book gives an extended argument for epistemic authority from the implications of reflective self-consciousness. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. The book argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modelled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. The book investigates the way the problem of disagreement between communities or between the self and others is a conflict within self-trust, and argue against communal self-reliance on the same grounds as the book uses in arguing against individual self-reliance. The book explains how any change in belief is justified—by the conscientious judgment that the change will survive future conscientious self-reflection. The book concludes with an account of autonomy.Less
This book gives an extended argument for epistemic authority from the implications of reflective self-consciousness. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. The book argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modelled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. The book investigates the way the problem of disagreement between communities or between the self and others is a conflict within self-trust, and argue against communal self-reliance on the same grounds as the book uses in arguing against individual self-reliance. The book explains how any change in belief is justified—by the conscientious judgment that the change will survive future conscientious self-reflection. The book concludes with an account of autonomy.
