Matt J. Rossano
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195385816
- eISBN:
- 9780199870080
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385816.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Chapter 6 examines the evolutionary origins of religion prior to the African Interregnum period and looks at what happen to religion after this period. Prior to the Interregnum, it is argued that the ...
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Chapter 6 examines the evolutionary origins of religion prior to the African Interregnum period and looks at what happen to religion after this period. Prior to the Interregnum, it is argued that the social lives of our primate and hominin ancestors, especially their social rituals and social emotions, laid the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the “supernaturalized” religion that emerged during the Interregnum. A key transitional moment came about 500,000 ybp when our ancestors evolved the capacity to engage in “group mimesis”—that is, they were able to sing, chant, dance, and march together in rhythm. These group-based rituals had powerful consciousness-altering and social bonding effects. After the interregnum, increased social stratification encouraged the emergence of ancestor worship and with it religious narratives and mythologies. As society and religion became increasingly complex and stratified the basic framework for classic paganism began to take form.Less
Chapter 6 examines the evolutionary origins of religion prior to the African Interregnum period and looks at what happen to religion after this period. Prior to the Interregnum, it is argued that the social lives of our primate and hominin ancestors, especially their social rituals and social emotions, laid the groundwork for the eventual emergence of the “supernaturalized” religion that emerged during the Interregnum. A key transitional moment came about 500,000 ybp when our ancestors evolved the capacity to engage in “group mimesis”—that is, they were able to sing, chant, dance, and march together in rhythm. These group-based rituals had powerful consciousness-altering and social bonding effects. After the interregnum, increased social stratification encouraged the emergence of ancestor worship and with it religious narratives and mythologies. As society and religion became increasingly complex and stratified the basic framework for classic paganism began to take form.
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151250
- eISBN:
- 9781400838837
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
This chapter examines the role of social emotions such as guilt and shame in supporting human cooperation, and how these could have evolved. It first models the process by which an emotion such as ...
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This chapter examines the role of social emotions such as guilt and shame in supporting human cooperation, and how these could have evolved. It first models the process by which an emotion such as shame may affect social behavior in a simple public goods game before discussing how shame and guilt along with internalized ethical norms foster cooperation to be sustained with minimal levels of costly punishment, resulting in mutually beneficial interactions at limited cost. It also explains how the internalization of norms and the expression of these norms in a social emotion such as guilt and shame induce the individual to place a contemporaneous value on the future consequences of present behavior, rather than relying upon an appropriately discounted accounting of its probable payoffs in the distant future. The chapter suggests that shame, guilt, and other social emotions may function like pain by providing personally beneficial guides for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process.Less
This chapter examines the role of social emotions such as guilt and shame in supporting human cooperation, and how these could have evolved. It first models the process by which an emotion such as shame may affect social behavior in a simple public goods game before discussing how shame and guilt along with internalized ethical norms foster cooperation to be sustained with minimal levels of costly punishment, resulting in mutually beneficial interactions at limited cost. It also explains how the internalization of norms and the expression of these norms in a social emotion such as guilt and shame induce the individual to place a contemporaneous value on the future consequences of present behavior, rather than relying upon an appropriately discounted accounting of its probable payoffs in the distant future. The chapter suggests that shame, guilt, and other social emotions may function like pain by providing personally beneficial guides for action that bypass the explicit cognitive optimizing process.
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151250
- eISBN:
- 9781400838837
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, History of Economic Thought
Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded ...
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Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.Less
Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.
Lisa A. Williams and David DeSteno
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199926725
- eISBN:
- 9780199394531
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926725.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Strong social relationships, goal-attainment, and feeling esteemed by peers are critical components of adaptive social life and well-being. This chapter provides an overview of how positive social ...
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Strong social relationships, goal-attainment, and feeling esteemed by peers are critical components of adaptive social life and well-being. This chapter provides an overview of how positive social emotions motivate behaviors that lead to such benefits. In particular, this chapter will focus on how positive social emotions foster forward-looking social motivations (e.g., perseverance, leadership, prosocial behavior and affiliation). Despite carrying costs for the current self, such motivations have beneficial payoffs for the future self (e.g., skill attainment, social esteem, and rewarding social relationships). The process of weighing costs and benefits for the current self against those for the future self is termed intertemporal choice. This chapter reviews a growing corpus of empirical research on the functions of the positive social emotions pride and gratitude in shaping intertemporal choice toward the future-self. We review how both trait-like dispositions and the moment-to-moment experience of these emotions enact such outcomes. We conclude by suggesting new avenues for scientific inquiry into the “light side” of positive social emotions.Less
Strong social relationships, goal-attainment, and feeling esteemed by peers are critical components of adaptive social life and well-being. This chapter provides an overview of how positive social emotions motivate behaviors that lead to such benefits. In particular, this chapter will focus on how positive social emotions foster forward-looking social motivations (e.g., perseverance, leadership, prosocial behavior and affiliation). Despite carrying costs for the current self, such motivations have beneficial payoffs for the future self (e.g., skill attainment, social esteem, and rewarding social relationships). The process of weighing costs and benefits for the current self against those for the future self is termed intertemporal choice. This chapter reviews a growing corpus of empirical research on the functions of the positive social emotions pride and gratitude in shaping intertemporal choice toward the future-self. We review how both trait-like dispositions and the moment-to-moment experience of these emotions enact such outcomes. We conclude by suggesting new avenues for scientific inquiry into the “light side” of positive social emotions.
Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199793532
- eISBN:
- 9780199928569
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793532.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
In this chapter, which responds to chapter 1, we use the value pluralism that is part of our account of shame to criticize the idea that shame is a social emotion, i.e. that it necessarily connects ...
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In this chapter, which responds to chapter 1, we use the value pluralism that is part of our account of shame to criticize the idea that shame is a social emotion, i.e. that it necessarily connects with social values and discloses our submission to external standards or our concern for how we appear in the eyes of others. Shame, we first argue, is never heteronomous. We then claim that the relevant values need not have to do with our social standing or invasion of our privacy, and that shame elicited by the appearance one gives should be distinguished from other types of shame. The role of others, we contend, is most of the time confined to triggering our realization that we are or have behaved in a way that is below the threshold of what we personally deem acceptable. Finally, we argue that shame does not require the subject to take the perspective of another upon what she is or what she does.Less
In this chapter, which responds to chapter 1, we use the value pluralism that is part of our account of shame to criticize the idea that shame is a social emotion, i.e. that it necessarily connects with social values and discloses our submission to external standards or our concern for how we appear in the eyes of others. Shame, we first argue, is never heteronomous. We then claim that the relevant values need not have to do with our social standing or invasion of our privacy, and that shame elicited by the appearance one gives should be distinguished from other types of shame. The role of others, we contend, is most of the time confined to triggering our realization that we are or have behaved in a way that is below the threshold of what we personally deem acceptable. Finally, we argue that shame does not require the subject to take the perspective of another upon what she is or what she does.
Allan Gibbard
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195370423
- eISBN:
- 9780199851980
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195370423.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification ...
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This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition.Less
This chapter discusses moral reasoning. It presents a situation wherein morality lies outside the scope of empirical science. It notes that science itself rests on intuitions about the justification of empirical conclusions. It explains that human's social emotions are especially refined and elaborate. Many of human feelings are intensely social, as with guilt and resentment, with shame and disdain. It adds that humans are beings with language, and make judgments that are expressed with language. It discusses that moral questions are planning questions of a particular kind, questions of how to feel about things, where the feelings in questions are the moral sentiments. It emphasizes that not only do humans think about how things are, but they also act and feel. It also explains how moral intuition works and how plans require intuition.
Daniel M. T. Fessler
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- April 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195130027
- eISBN:
- 9780199893874
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
The male flash of anger illustrates how evolutionary psychology and cultural anthropology provide complementary components in vertically integrated explanations. Anger is a response to transgression ...
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The male flash of anger illustrates how evolutionary psychology and cultural anthropology provide complementary components in vertically integrated explanations. Anger is a response to transgression and accounts for the age- and sex-biased distribution of violent risk-taking behavior. Evolutionary psychology also provides an ultimate explanation for the processes occurring at the level of the neurotransmitter: childhood experience influences adult risk-taking propensities, while culturally-constituted socialization practices and interactional patterns shape childhood experience, inscribing culturally-preferred responses to transgression on individual actors; these tacit lessons are further reinforced by overt morally weighted cultural schemas and lexicons. Cultural group selection can occur because those systems that most successfully meet the challenges posed by the socioecological setting are most likely to prosper and spread. Because any given system is the product of unique historical events, even dysfunctional beliefs and practices may persist.Less
The male flash of anger illustrates how evolutionary psychology and cultural anthropology provide complementary components in vertically integrated explanations. Anger is a response to transgression and accounts for the age- and sex-biased distribution of violent risk-taking behavior. Evolutionary psychology also provides an ultimate explanation for the processes occurring at the level of the neurotransmitter: childhood experience influences adult risk-taking propensities, while culturally-constituted socialization practices and interactional patterns shape childhood experience, inscribing culturally-preferred responses to transgression on individual actors; these tacit lessons are further reinforced by overt morally weighted cultural schemas and lexicons. Cultural group selection can occur because those systems that most successfully meet the challenges posed by the socioecological setting are most likely to prosper and spread. Because any given system is the product of unique historical events, even dysfunctional beliefs and practices may persist.
Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199659180
- eISBN:
- 9780191772238
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology
This book presents a comprehensive overview of contemporary theories and research on collective emotions. It spans several disciplines and brings together, for the first time, various strands of ...
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This book presents a comprehensive overview of contemporary theories and research on collective emotions. It spans several disciplines and brings together, for the first time, various strands of inquiry and up-to-date research in the study of collective emotions and related phenomena. In focusing on conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues in collective emotion research, the volume aims at narrowing the gap between the wealth of studies on individual emotions and inquiries into collective emotions. The book catches up with a renewed interest into the collective dimensions of emotions and their close relatives, for example emotional climates, atmospheres, communities, and intergroup emotions. This interest is propelled by a more general increase in research on the social and interpersonal aspects of emotion on the one hand, and by trends in philosophy and cognitive science towards refined conceptual analyses of collective entities and the collective properties of cognition on the other hand. Eminent scholars from disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, and information science address various issues related to the properties, causes, and social consequences of collective emotions. The book represents understandings of the collective properties of emotions ranging from mimicry and contagion in social interaction to shared beliefs, collective intentions, social practices, and political mobilization. The 28 chapters are divided into seven sections: “Conceptual perspectives”; “Collective emotion in face-to-face interactions”; “The social-relational dimension of collective emotion”; “The social consequences of collective emotions”; “Group-based and intergroup emotion”; “Rituals, movements, and social organization”; and “Collective emotions in online social systems.”Less
This book presents a comprehensive overview of contemporary theories and research on collective emotions. It spans several disciplines and brings together, for the first time, various strands of inquiry and up-to-date research in the study of collective emotions and related phenomena. In focusing on conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues in collective emotion research, the volume aims at narrowing the gap between the wealth of studies on individual emotions and inquiries into collective emotions. The book catches up with a renewed interest into the collective dimensions of emotions and their close relatives, for example emotional climates, atmospheres, communities, and intergroup emotions. This interest is propelled by a more general increase in research on the social and interpersonal aspects of emotion on the one hand, and by trends in philosophy and cognitive science towards refined conceptual analyses of collective entities and the collective properties of cognition on the other hand. Eminent scholars from disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, neuroscience, and information science address various issues related to the properties, causes, and social consequences of collective emotions. The book represents understandings of the collective properties of emotions ranging from mimicry and contagion in social interaction to shared beliefs, collective intentions, social practices, and political mobilization. The 28 chapters are divided into seven sections: “Conceptual perspectives”; “Collective emotion in face-to-face interactions”; “The social-relational dimension of collective emotion”; “The social consequences of collective emotions”; “Group-based and intergroup emotion”; “Rituals, movements, and social organization”; and “Collective emotions in online social systems.”
James M. Jasper
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- April 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199659180
- eISBN:
- 9780191772238
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0023
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Developmental Psychology
Sociology locates emotions, not in the individual and not in “the group”, but in between these two, in the interactions among individuals. But these interactions are shaped by cultural expectations, ...
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Sociology locates emotions, not in the individual and not in “the group”, but in between these two, in the interactions among individuals. But these interactions are shaped by cultural expectations, hierarchies, organizational commands, and formal and informal rituals; individuals tend to have emotions that are socially appropriate and predictable. So when most members of a group (almost never all of them) feel or display the same emotions at the same time, the reason is not some group mind or automatic contagion (although contagion does exist). It is that the same expectations, social structures, and interactive processes are affecting all of them. Research on the emotions of protest show a number of mechanisms by which these processes operate.Less
Sociology locates emotions, not in the individual and not in “the group”, but in between these two, in the interactions among individuals. But these interactions are shaped by cultural expectations, hierarchies, organizational commands, and formal and informal rituals; individuals tend to have emotions that are socially appropriate and predictable. So when most members of a group (almost never all of them) feel or display the same emotions at the same time, the reason is not some group mind or automatic contagion (although contagion does exist). It is that the same expectations, social structures, and interactive processes are affecting all of them. Research on the emotions of protest show a number of mechanisms by which these processes operate.
Dan Zahavi
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199590681
- eISBN:
- 9780191789656
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590681.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter engages with the topic of shame. What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-ideal, and ...
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This chapter engages with the topic of shame. What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion or is it rather a distinct social emotion, or is there something misleading about these alternatives? The chapter explores these questions and discusses whether the experience of shame presupposes a possession of a first-person perspective and a capacity for empathy, and whether it exemplifies an other-mediated form of self-experience and to that extent involves a more complex self than the thin experiential self.Less
This chapter engages with the topic of shame. What does the fact that we feel shame tell us about the nature of self? Does shame testify to the presence of a self-concept, a (failed) self-ideal, and a capacity for critical self-assessment, or does it rather, as some have suggested, point to the fact that the self is in part socially constructed? Should shame primarily be classified as a self-conscious emotion or is it rather a distinct social emotion, or is there something misleading about these alternatives? The chapter explores these questions and discusses whether the experience of shame presupposes a possession of a first-person perspective and a capacity for empathy, and whether it exemplifies an other-mediated form of self-experience and to that extent involves a more complex self than the thin experiential self.
Cheshire Calhoun
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199328796
- eISBN:
- 9780190272104
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199328796.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Making a place for shame in the mature moral agent’s psychology would seem to depend on reconciling the agent’s vulnerability to shame with her capacity for autonomous judgment. The standard strategy ...
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Making a place for shame in the mature moral agent’s psychology would seem to depend on reconciling the agent’s vulnerability to shame with her capacity for autonomous judgment. The standard strategy is to argue that mature agents are only shamed before themselves or before those whose evaluative judgments mirror their own. Because this strategy forces us to discount as irrational or immature many everyday experiences of shame, including the shame felt by members of subordinate groups, this chapter argues that shame does not depend on endorsing the shamer’s criticism. Moral criticism has “practical weight” for us and the power to shame when it is seen as issuing from those who are to be taken seriously because they are co-participants with us in a shared social practice of morality. Thus shame is a social emotion.Less
Making a place for shame in the mature moral agent’s psychology would seem to depend on reconciling the agent’s vulnerability to shame with her capacity for autonomous judgment. The standard strategy is to argue that mature agents are only shamed before themselves or before those whose evaluative judgments mirror their own. Because this strategy forces us to discount as irrational or immature many everyday experiences of shame, including the shame felt by members of subordinate groups, this chapter argues that shame does not depend on endorsing the shamer’s criticism. Moral criticism has “practical weight” for us and the power to shame when it is seen as issuing from those who are to be taken seriously because they are co-participants with us in a shared social practice of morality. Thus shame is a social emotion.
Lingtao Yu and Michelle K. Duffy
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780190228057
- eISBN:
- 9780190629458
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190228057.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
In this chapter, we review the extant literature regarding envy in organizations, identifying the ways people express and respond to envy from two different perspectives: the enviers and the envied. ...
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In this chapter, we review the extant literature regarding envy in organizations, identifying the ways people express and respond to envy from two different perspectives: the enviers and the envied. We propose that social-contextual factors play a large role in how enviers and the envied respond to the experience of envying or being envied (i.e., positively or negatively) and elucidate a framework to categorize a variety of attitudinal, relational, and behavioral responses to envying and being envied. Our perspective recognizes that envy is a natural occurrence in today’s organizations due to a variety of envy-inducing organizational practices and policies; therefore, neither scholars nor practitioners should exclusively look for the permanent elimination of envy, but rather should identify possible antidotes or poisons to envy once it is triggered in organizations.Less
In this chapter, we review the extant literature regarding envy in organizations, identifying the ways people express and respond to envy from two different perspectives: the enviers and the envied. We propose that social-contextual factors play a large role in how enviers and the envied respond to the experience of envying or being envied (i.e., positively or negatively) and elucidate a framework to categorize a variety of attitudinal, relational, and behavioral responses to envying and being envied. Our perspective recognizes that envy is a natural occurrence in today’s organizations due to a variety of envy-inducing organizational practices and policies; therefore, neither scholars nor practitioners should exclusively look for the permanent elimination of envy, but rather should identify possible antidotes or poisons to envy once it is triggered in organizations.
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226309798
- eISBN:
- 9780226309934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226309934.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
In the background of the dubious triumph of emotional Cartesianism, this chapter advances the genealogical project of reconstituting social emotions by first showing how they have been obscured: in ...
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In the background of the dubious triumph of emotional Cartesianism, this chapter advances the genealogical project of reconstituting social emotions by first showing how they have been obscured: in this case, by a late-modern fixation on masculine political agency asserted at the expense of political “passivism.’’ The chapter presents sermons to the rebellious Long Parliament (1640–1660) in order to show how a nonreductive, early modern understanding of social passions was incapacitated by a radicalized late-modern active/passive dyad.Less
In the background of the dubious triumph of emotional Cartesianism, this chapter advances the genealogical project of reconstituting social emotions by first showing how they have been obscured: in this case, by a late-modern fixation on masculine political agency asserted at the expense of political “passivism.’’ The chapter presents sermons to the rebellious Long Parliament (1640–1660) in order to show how a nonreductive, early modern understanding of social passions was incapacitated by a radicalized late-modern active/passive dyad.
Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- August 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199665327
- eISBN:
- 9780191779725
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665327.003.0022
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Sociolinguistics / Anthropological Linguistics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter suggests that the existence of nascent linguistic communication among archaic humans enabled the evolution of a new type of memory-encoding and recall, word-based episodic recall. ...
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This chapter suggests that the existence of nascent linguistic communication among archaic humans enabled the evolution of a new type of memory-encoding and recall, word-based episodic recall. Episodic recall and imagination — which consists of reconstructing and recombining representations of past experiences to generate novel ones — became free of the experiential cues that were part of individuals’ past experiences. The ability to voluntarily recall a train of episodes and to recombine them gave the individual an insight into others’ minds as well as into her own mind. The chapter argues that imagination-instructing linguistic communication evolved as part of an integrated suite of social practices and cognitive-emotional capacities, and we highlight the role of new memory systems, expanded childhood, and symbolic pretend play in this co-evolutionary process.Less
This chapter suggests that the existence of nascent linguistic communication among archaic humans enabled the evolution of a new type of memory-encoding and recall, word-based episodic recall. Episodic recall and imagination — which consists of reconstructing and recombining representations of past experiences to generate novel ones — became free of the experiential cues that were part of individuals’ past experiences. The ability to voluntarily recall a train of episodes and to recombine them gave the individual an insight into others’ minds as well as into her own mind. The chapter argues that imagination-instructing linguistic communication evolved as part of an integrated suite of social practices and cognitive-emotional capacities, and we highlight the role of new memory systems, expanded childhood, and symbolic pretend play in this co-evolutionary process.
