John S. Dryzek
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250431
- eISBN:
- 9780191717253
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925043X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Some social choice theorists attempt to turn the science of politics against democracy in general and deliberative democracy in particular. They claim the arbitrariness and instability of democracy ...
More
Some social choice theorists attempt to turn the science of politics against democracy in general and deliberative democracy in particular. They claim the arbitrariness and instability of democracy will be exacerbated by unconstrained deliberation. The response shows that there are mechanisms endogenous to deliberation that can respond to the social choice theory critique, emphasizing the construction of public opinion through the contestation of discourses in the public sphere and its transmission to the state by communicative means, including rhetoric.Less
Some social choice theorists attempt to turn the science of politics against democracy in general and deliberative democracy in particular. They claim the arbitrariness and instability of democracy will be exacerbated by unconstrained deliberation. The response shows that there are mechanisms endogenous to deliberation that can respond to the social choice theory critique, emphasizing the construction of public opinion through the contestation of discourses in the public sphere and its transmission to the state by communicative means, including rhetoric.
Patrick R. Laughlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147918
- eISBN:
- 9781400836673
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147918.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter discusses social choice theory, an axiomatic and deductive approach to societal problem solving by existing or possible voting procedures. Social choice theory in economics and political ...
More
This chapter discusses social choice theory, an axiomatic and deductive approach to societal problem solving by existing or possible voting procedures. Social choice theory in economics and political science considers how the members of a society such as voters or policy makers may make societal decisions such as selection among competing candidates to office or policies by existing or possible voting systems. Thus, social combination models and social choice theory address the same basic issue: the aggregation of group member preferences to a collective group response. As a historical example, the representatives from the American colonies who met at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced a multitude of judgmental issues on the composition, powers, and procedures of their government. Over four months, they achieved consensus on the U.S. Constitution. Once this consensus on judgmental issues was achieved, the U.S. Constitution became a conceptual system and guide for group problem solving for subsequent generations of Americans.Less
This chapter discusses social choice theory, an axiomatic and deductive approach to societal problem solving by existing or possible voting procedures. Social choice theory in economics and political science considers how the members of a society such as voters or policy makers may make societal decisions such as selection among competing candidates to office or policies by existing or possible voting systems. Thus, social combination models and social choice theory address the same basic issue: the aggregation of group member preferences to a collective group response. As a historical example, the representatives from the American colonies who met at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced a multitude of judgmental issues on the composition, powers, and procedures of their government. Over four months, they achieved consensus on the U.S. Constitution. Once this consensus on judgmental issues was achieved, the U.S. Constitution became a conceptual system and guide for group problem solving for subsequent generations of Americans.
Jack Knight and James Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151236
- eISBN:
- 9781400840335
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151236.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter addresses the challenges that social choice theory brings to normative claims about democracy. Social choice theorists commonly critique democratic decision making on the grounds that ...
More
This chapter addresses the challenges that social choice theory brings to normative claims about democracy. Social choice theorists commonly critique democratic decision making on the grounds that voting is susceptible to unavoidable pathologies and that insofar as voting is essential to democracy, those pathologies subvert the normative legitimacy of democratic outcomes. Because voting is an essential component of any democratic institutional arrangement in any large, heterogeneous, complex society, the systematic instability and ambiguity that social choice theorists establish raises serious, unavoidable difficulties for some interpretations of democracy. Yet populism and liberalism hardly exhaust the theoretical vantage points from which such findings might be interpreted. Indeed, the chapter offers a reading of social choice theory that suggests an obvious, justifiable response to the putative dilemma fabricated by theorists who insist that the only available options are an impossible populism or an unpalatable liberalism.Less
This chapter addresses the challenges that social choice theory brings to normative claims about democracy. Social choice theorists commonly critique democratic decision making on the grounds that voting is susceptible to unavoidable pathologies and that insofar as voting is essential to democracy, those pathologies subvert the normative legitimacy of democratic outcomes. Because voting is an essential component of any democratic institutional arrangement in any large, heterogeneous, complex society, the systematic instability and ambiguity that social choice theorists establish raises serious, unavoidable difficulties for some interpretations of democracy. Yet populism and liberalism hardly exhaust the theoretical vantage points from which such findings might be interpreted. Indeed, the chapter offers a reading of social choice theory that suggests an obvious, justifiable response to the putative dilemma fabricated by theorists who insist that the only available options are an impossible populism or an unpalatable liberalism.
Jules L. Coleman
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199253609
- eISBN:
- 9780191719783
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253609.003.0012
- Subject:
- Law, Competition Law
The modern theory of social choice contains a number of attempts to develop a defence of particular voting or collective decision procedures by appeal to axioms aimed at characterising one or another ...
More
The modern theory of social choice contains a number of attempts to develop a defence of particular voting or collective decision procedures by appeal to axioms aimed at characterising one or another aspect of procedural fairness. This chapter examines democracy and social choice based on the work of William Riker, who has argued that social choice theory undermines the coherence of populist democratic theory and makes plausible only a very weak form of Madisonian liberalism. In Riker's view, voting is legitimate and desirable only because it enables us to remove officials, thereby constraining their ability arbitrarily to constrain our liberty over time. Riker claims not only that attempts to justify decision rules on procedural or axiomatic grounds fail, but also that proceduralism is itself an inadequate basis for evaluating collective decision-making institutions.Less
The modern theory of social choice contains a number of attempts to develop a defence of particular voting or collective decision procedures by appeal to axioms aimed at characterising one or another aspect of procedural fairness. This chapter examines democracy and social choice based on the work of William Riker, who has argued that social choice theory undermines the coherence of populist democratic theory and makes plausible only a very weak form of Madisonian liberalism. In Riker's view, voting is legitimate and desirable only because it enables us to remove officials, thereby constraining their ability arbitrarily to constrain our liberty over time. Riker claims not only that attempts to justify decision rules on procedural or axiomatic grounds fail, but also that proceduralism is itself an inadequate basis for evaluating collective decision-making institutions.
Patrick R. Laughlin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691147918
- eISBN:
- 9781400836673
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691147918.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of ...
More
Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of scientific researchers, auditors, financial analysts, air crash investigators, and forensic art experts are increasingly important in our complex and interdependent society. This comprehensive textbook presents important theories and experimental research about group problem solving. The book focuses on tasks that have demonstrably correct solutions within mathematical, logical, scientific, or verbal systems, including algebra problems, analogies, vocabulary, and logical reasoning problems. It explores basic concepts in group problem solving, social combination models, group memory, group ability and world knowledge tasks, rule induction problems, letters-to-numbers problems, evidence for positive group-to-individual transfer, and social choice theory. The conclusion proposes ten generalizations that are supported by the theory and research on group problem solving. The book is an essential resource for decision-making research in social and cognitive psychology, but also extremely relevant to multidisciplinary and multicultural problem-solving teams in organizational behavior, business administration, management, and behavioral economics.Less
Experimental research by social and cognitive psychologists has established that cooperative groups solve a wide range of problems better than individuals. Cooperative problem solving groups of scientific researchers, auditors, financial analysts, air crash investigators, and forensic art experts are increasingly important in our complex and interdependent society. This comprehensive textbook presents important theories and experimental research about group problem solving. The book focuses on tasks that have demonstrably correct solutions within mathematical, logical, scientific, or verbal systems, including algebra problems, analogies, vocabulary, and logical reasoning problems. It explores basic concepts in group problem solving, social combination models, group memory, group ability and world knowledge tasks, rule induction problems, letters-to-numbers problems, evidence for positive group-to-individual transfer, and social choice theory. The conclusion proposes ten generalizations that are supported by the theory and research on group problem solving. The book is an essential resource for decision-making research in social and cognitive psychology, but also extremely relevant to multidisciplinary and multicultural problem-solving teams in organizational behavior, business administration, management, and behavioral economics.
Jennifer Prah Ruger
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559978
- eISBN:
- 9780191721489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559978.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
This chapter draws on social choice theory and proposes incompletely theorized agreements (ITAs) as an approach to collective decision‐making in public policy and human rights. The chapter presents ...
More
This chapter draws on social choice theory and proposes incompletely theorized agreements (ITAs) as an approach to collective decision‐making in public policy and human rights. The chapter presents difficulties in social choice, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, and delineates three ITA models, incompletely specified agreements, and incompletely specified and generalized agreements. Health and health capabilities are multidimensional concepts about which there is no unique view. This chapter develops the ITA framework to health and health care decision‐making, and begins to operationalize the health capability paradigm by extending it when dominance partial ordering and incomplete specification cannot resolve conflicts among different views about health. The incomplete ordering of the capability view, in combination with incompletely theorized agreements on that ordering, allows for reasoned health policy development and analysis in the face of pluralism and conflicting views.Less
This chapter draws on social choice theory and proposes incompletely theorized agreements (ITAs) as an approach to collective decision‐making in public policy and human rights. The chapter presents difficulties in social choice, as illustrated by Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, and delineates three ITA models, incompletely specified agreements, and incompletely specified and generalized agreements. Health and health capabilities are multidimensional concepts about which there is no unique view. This chapter develops the ITA framework to health and health care decision‐making, and begins to operationalize the health capability paradigm by extending it when dominance partial ordering and incomplete specification cannot resolve conflicts among different views about health. The incomplete ordering of the capability view, in combination with incompletely theorized agreements on that ordering, allows for reasoned health policy development and analysis in the face of pluralism and conflicting views.
Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199290420
- eISBN:
- 9780191710506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0015
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Most, if not all, practitioners of welfare economics and social choice theory are presumed to be welfaristic in their conviction. Indeed, they evaluate the goodness of an economic policy and/or ...
More
Most, if not all, practitioners of welfare economics and social choice theory are presumed to be welfaristic in their conviction. Indeed, they evaluate the goodness of an economic policy and/or economic system in terms of the welfare that people receive at the culmination outcomes thereby generated. Recent years have witnessed a substantial upsurge of interest in the non‐welfaristic bases, or even the non‐consequentialist bases, of welfare economics and social choice theory. Capitalizing on the axiomatic approach explored in the recent past, this chapter tries to provide a coherent analysis of consequentialism vis‐a‐vis non‐consequentialism. To begin with, this chapter develops an abstract framework in which the primitive of the analysis is a preference ordering held by an evaluator over the pairs of culmination outcomes, and opportunity sets from which those culmination outcomes are chosen. As a partial test to see how much relevance can be claimed the axiomatized concepts of consequentialism and non‐consequentialism, two simple applications of this abstract framework are worked out. The first application is to the Arrovian social choice theory, and the second application is to the analysis of ultimatum games.Less
Most, if not all, practitioners of welfare economics and social choice theory are presumed to be welfaristic in their conviction. Indeed, they evaluate the goodness of an economic policy and/or economic system in terms of the welfare that people receive at the culmination outcomes thereby generated. Recent years have witnessed a substantial upsurge of interest in the non‐welfaristic bases, or even the non‐consequentialist bases, of welfare economics and social choice theory. Capitalizing on the axiomatic approach explored in the recent past, this chapter tries to provide a coherent analysis of consequentialism vis‐a‐vis non‐consequentialism. To begin with, this chapter develops an abstract framework in which the primitive of the analysis is a preference ordering held by an evaluator over the pairs of culmination outcomes, and opportunity sets from which those culmination outcomes are chosen. As a partial test to see how much relevance can be claimed the axiomatized concepts of consequentialism and non‐consequentialism, two simple applications of this abstract framework are worked out. The first application is to the Arrovian social choice theory, and the second application is to the analysis of ultimatum games.
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198722274
- eISBN:
- 9780191789106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, ...
More
We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.Less
We introduce and discuss the problems of intertheoretic incomparability and merely ordinal theories. We then introduce the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and social choice, and explain how this analogy can help us to overcome these problems. The rest of the chapter is spent fleshing out how this idea can help us to develop a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty that is applicable even when all theories under consideration are merely ordinal, and even when there is neither level-nor unit- comparability between those theories. We consider whether My Favourite Theory or My Favourite Option might be the right theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty in conditions of merely ordinal theories and incomparability, but reject both of these accounts. We defend the idea that, when maximizing choice worthiness is not possible, one should use the Borda Rule instead.
William MacAskill, Krister Bykvist, and Toby Ord
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- October 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198722274
- eISBN:
- 9780191789106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198722274.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses how to take into account moral uncertainty over interval-scale measurable but non-comparable theories. Once again, we make use of the analogy between decision-making under ...
More
This chapter discusses how to take into account moral uncertainty over interval-scale measurable but non-comparable theories. Once again, we make use of the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and voting. We give examples of interval-scale theories where it’s plausible to think that these theories are incomparable with each other and discuss what to do in such cases. Arguing against the Borda Rule and Ted Lockhart’s Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories, we argue in favour of an account we call variance voting. Finally, we discuss what to do in conditions where one has positive credence in some merely ordinal theories, some interval-scale but non-comparable theories, and some theories that are both interval-scale measurable and comparable with each other. We discuss whether the normalization used by this account should be done only within the decision-situation at hand, or whether it should be done over all possible decision-situations.Less
This chapter discusses how to take into account moral uncertainty over interval-scale measurable but non-comparable theories. Once again, we make use of the analogy between decision-making under moral uncertainty and voting. We give examples of interval-scale theories where it’s plausible to think that these theories are incomparable with each other and discuss what to do in such cases. Arguing against the Borda Rule and Ted Lockhart’s Principle of Equity Among Moral Theories, we argue in favour of an account we call variance voting. Finally, we discuss what to do in conditions where one has positive credence in some merely ordinal theories, some interval-scale but non-comparable theories, and some theories that are both interval-scale measurable and comparable with each other. We discuss whether the normalization used by this account should be done only within the decision-situation at hand, or whether it should be done over all possible decision-situations.
Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195382198
- eISBN:
- 9780199932399
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382198.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter is devoted to theoretical models, which are characterized by their reliance on deductive reasoning, their technique (social choice and game theory), and their level of abstraction. ...
More
This chapter is devoted to theoretical models, which are characterized by their reliance on deductive reasoning, their technique (social choice and game theory), and their level of abstraction. Although there are many ways to categorize models, we create a classification scheme that is consistent with the usefulness and purpose of models. Models serve in any one, or more, of four different roles: foundational, organizational, exploratory, and predictive. We argue that models should be judged, not by how well they predict, which is a common standard, but by how useful they are. This approach avoids the arbitrary precision of cookbook methodologies, and properly calls attention to the role of taste in choosing between theoretical models.Less
This chapter is devoted to theoretical models, which are characterized by their reliance on deductive reasoning, their technique (social choice and game theory), and their level of abstraction. Although there are many ways to categorize models, we create a classification scheme that is consistent with the usefulness and purpose of models. Models serve in any one, or more, of four different roles: foundational, organizational, exploratory, and predictive. We argue that models should be judged, not by how well they predict, which is a common standard, but by how useful they are. This approach avoids the arbitrary precision of cookbook methodologies, and properly calls attention to the role of taste in choosing between theoretical models.
Christian List and Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199591565
- eISBN:
- 9780191725494
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591565.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates ...
More
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. This book offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. The book argues that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, this account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.Less
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. This book offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. The book argues that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, this account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015134
- eISBN:
- 9780262295604
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter presents a new basic model, which consists of a common language of evaluation, a set of judges, and a set of competitors. It expresses the problem of what to do with judges’ scores and ...
More
This chapter presents a new basic model, which consists of a common language of evaluation, a set of judges, and a set of competitors. It expresses the problem of what to do with judges’ scores and how to resolve them into a single score in a concise or systematic way. The model identifies the shortcomings of traditional models of social choice theory and provides a new model as an alternative. Six axioms of the basic model are satisfied in a method of grading called social grading function f, in which there is no ambiguity in grading, and the final grade assigned to every single alternative is independent of all other alternatives. The deep preferences or utilities of a judge or a voter play an important role in voting and judging as every decision-maker tries to maximize his utility.Less
This chapter presents a new basic model, which consists of a common language of evaluation, a set of judges, and a set of competitors. It expresses the problem of what to do with judges’ scores and how to resolve them into a single score in a concise or systematic way. The model identifies the shortcomings of traditional models of social choice theory and provides a new model as an alternative. Six axioms of the basic model are satisfied in a method of grading called social grading function f, in which there is no ambiguity in grading, and the final grade assigned to every single alternative is independent of all other alternatives. The deep preferences or utilities of a judge or a voter play an important role in voting and judging as every decision-maker tries to maximize his utility.
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015134
- eISBN:
- 9780262295604
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter describes the majority judgment method used to elect officials; to classify wines; and to judge Olympic competitors in skating, diving, and gymnastics. It also provides ways to ...
More
This chapter describes the majority judgment method used to elect officials; to classify wines; and to judge Olympic competitors in skating, diving, and gymnastics. It also provides ways to counteract cheating and strategic manipulation of the judges or the voters. The desirable properties of classical social choice theory are satisfied by the majority judgment method. The chapter also explains several key ideas, including majority-grade, majority-ranking, majority-value, majority-gauge, abbreviated majority-value, and kth-order function. It demonstrates the superiority of the majority judgment to any other method of voting and judging competitions by comparing the basic principles of the traditional theory of social choice.Less
This chapter describes the majority judgment method used to elect officials; to classify wines; and to judge Olympic competitors in skating, diving, and gymnastics. It also provides ways to counteract cheating and strategic manipulation of the judges or the voters. The desirable properties of classical social choice theory are satisfied by the majority judgment method. The chapter also explains several key ideas, including majority-grade, majority-ranking, majority-value, majority-gauge, abbreviated majority-value, and kth-order function. It demonstrates the superiority of the majority judgment to any other method of voting and judging competitions by comparing the basic principles of the traditional theory of social choice.
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015134
- eISBN:
- 9780262295604
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.003.0022
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book has presented several traditional and new methods of social choice theory, providing solutions to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. Four major arguments, including human ...
More
This book has presented several traditional and new methods of social choice theory, providing solutions to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. Four major arguments, including human behavior, gaming the vote, meaningfulness, and practice, which make the majority judgment the most suitable method to be used for voting and rating, have also been presented. The creation and use of common languages of grades for voters or judges have also been demonstrated through the Orsay experiment. The book has emphasized that the properties of good mechanisms for aggregating opinions are determined by various elements, including common sense, ethics, and the realities of human behavior.Less
This book has presented several traditional and new methods of social choice theory, providing solutions to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. Four major arguments, including human behavior, gaming the vote, meaningfulness, and practice, which make the majority judgment the most suitable method to be used for voting and rating, have also been presented. The creation and use of common languages of grades for voters or judges have also been demonstrated through the Orsay experiment. The book has emphasized that the properties of good mechanisms for aggregating opinions are determined by various elements, including common sense, ethics, and the realities of human behavior.
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015134
- eISBN:
- 9780262295604
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter focuses on the use of majority-ranking compared with the traditional model of social choice theory. Social grading function as strategy-proof-in-ranking is used in the chapter to ...
More
This chapter focuses on the use of majority-ranking compared with the traditional model of social choice theory. Social grading function as strategy-proof-in-ranking is used in the chapter to illustrate the dominance of the strategy for judges to assign grades according to their wishes. The difference of the ranking procedure used by the International Skating Union (ISU) and the majority-ranking is presented, highlighting ISU’s use of increasingly ad hoc devices for its majority-grade system. Precision of majority-ranking is compared with ISU’s ranking system along with the comparison of majority-ranking for the SCW, election Society with ISU’s ranking system. The chapter presents the majority-ranking characterization that equals majority-grade characterization.Less
This chapter focuses on the use of majority-ranking compared with the traditional model of social choice theory. Social grading function as strategy-proof-in-ranking is used in the chapter to illustrate the dominance of the strategy for judges to assign grades according to their wishes. The difference of the ranking procedure used by the International Skating Union (ISU) and the majority-ranking is presented, highlighting ISU’s use of increasingly ad hoc devices for its majority-grade system. Precision of majority-ranking is compared with ISU’s ranking system along with the comparison of majority-ranking for the SCW, election Society with ISU’s ranking system. The chapter presents the majority-ranking characterization that equals majority-grade characterization.
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015134
- eISBN:
- 9780262295604
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.003.0016
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter focuses on majority judgment drawbacks. Properties, including participant-consistency, join-consistency, and proper cancellation, which majority judgment does not satisfy, are also ...
More
This chapter focuses on majority judgment drawbacks. Properties, including participant-consistency, join-consistency, and proper cancellation, which majority judgment does not satisfy, are also lacking in other traditional models of social choice theory. The chapter concludes that majority judgment is a practical method for ranking and electing, and is a choice-monotonic, rank-monotonic, and strongly monotonic method. Drawbacks of traditional models are also highlighted, and it is stated that the traditional models lack guarantees of change in the estimation of voters without affecting the outcome of the election or ranking. The chapter discusses the critics of the majority judgment, who do not take into consideration the strategic behavior of judges and voters.Less
This chapter focuses on majority judgment drawbacks. Properties, including participant-consistency, join-consistency, and proper cancellation, which majority judgment does not satisfy, are also lacking in other traditional models of social choice theory. The chapter concludes that majority judgment is a practical method for ranking and electing, and is a choice-monotonic, rank-monotonic, and strongly monotonic method. Drawbacks of traditional models are also highlighted, and it is stated that the traditional models lack guarantees of change in the estimation of voters without affecting the outcome of the election or ranking. The chapter discusses the critics of the majority judgment, who do not take into consideration the strategic behavior of judges and voters.
Daniel M. Hausman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190233181
- eISBN:
- 9780190233204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190233181.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Most health economists value health states by their contribution to well-being, and they measure well-being and the value of health by eliciting preferences. If the satisfaction of preferences does ...
More
Most health economists value health states by their contribution to well-being, and they measure well-being and the value of health by eliciting preferences. If the satisfaction of preferences does not constitute well-being, can well-being still be measured by preferences? After clarifying what economists take preferences to be, this chapter argues that there is a connection between preferences and welfare that makes it possible in favorable circumstances to measure well-being by measuring preferences. This connection does not assume that preference satisfaction constitutes well-being. This chapter also distinguishes preferences both from other attitudes that generate rankings of health states and from feelings or subjective experiences. It concludes by addressing the analogy between the way that values are assigned to health states by measuring preferences and the way in which social choice theorists rely on preferences to evaluate social policies.Less
Most health economists value health states by their contribution to well-being, and they measure well-being and the value of health by eliciting preferences. If the satisfaction of preferences does not constitute well-being, can well-being still be measured by preferences? After clarifying what economists take preferences to be, this chapter argues that there is a connection between preferences and welfare that makes it possible in favorable circumstances to measure well-being by measuring preferences. This connection does not assume that preference satisfaction constitutes well-being. This chapter also distinguishes preferences both from other attitudes that generate rankings of health states and from feelings or subjective experiences. It concludes by addressing the analogy between the way that values are assigned to health states by measuring preferences and the way in which social choice theorists rely on preferences to evaluate social policies.
Daniel M. Hausman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- April 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190233181
- eISBN:
- 9780190233204
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190233181.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Health economists can draw conclusions about what makes people better off from the preferences of competent evaluators if three conditions are met: (1) respondents have true beliefs concerning the ...
More
Health economists can draw conclusions about what makes people better off from the preferences of competent evaluators if three conditions are met: (1) respondents have true beliefs concerning the relevant facts; (2) their preferences reflect their judgment concerning what promotes their own interests; and (3) their preferences satisfy the standard axioms and are not distorted by deliberative flaws. In the special context of eliciting preferences in order to assign values to health states, health economists might be able to shape the circumstances to enable people to satisfy the three conditions. This chapter shows that health economists have failed to implement this strategy and considers how much economists can do. In particular it considers the questions of whose preferences to elicit, whether averaging is defensible, and whether health economists should be eliciting preferences rather than attempting to evaluate health states themselves.Less
Health economists can draw conclusions about what makes people better off from the preferences of competent evaluators if three conditions are met: (1) respondents have true beliefs concerning the relevant facts; (2) their preferences reflect their judgment concerning what promotes their own interests; and (3) their preferences satisfy the standard axioms and are not distorted by deliberative flaws. In the special context of eliciting preferences in order to assign values to health states, health economists might be able to shape the circumstances to enable people to satisfy the three conditions. This chapter shows that health economists have failed to implement this strategy and considers how much economists can do. In particular it considers the questions of whose preferences to elicit, whether averaging is defensible, and whether health economists should be eliciting preferences rather than attempting to evaluate health states themselves.