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In the assisted dying context, the legal significance of the dispute over the slippery slope argument is enormous. The force of logical slippery slope arguments depends on the mechanism of legal change used, and is weak unless the mechanism of legal change is either rights or the defence of necessity. In relation to the empirical slippery slope argument, greater caution is needed before relying on the ‘Dutch experience’ when discussing proposals for the regulation of assisted dying in other jurisdictions, and the possible consequences of such regulation. There is no evidence from the Netherlands that the legalization of voluntary euthanasia caused an increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia. We should learn from the experience in jurisdictions which have legalized assisted dying, while recognizing that because of different social contexts and the use of diverse mechanisms of legal change, those experiences do not translate directly to other jurisdictions.

This chapter examines ‘slippery slope’ and other dangers of states resorting to torturing terrorists in ticking bomb situations. First, general consequentialist reasons are cited supporting an absolute prohibition on torture in the real world, because of the extent of harm that would result if torture were ever to be allowed. Specific problems in the immediate context, including certainty, immediacy, deciding whom to torture, the effectiveness of torture, and alternatives thereto are examined, as are problems in the wider context, including the ‘institutionalization trap’, the legitimacy torture would accord other inhumane means of fighting terrorism and crime, the effect of torture on conflicts, resort to torture as a victory for terrorism, and the ramifications of legalising torture in a ticking bomb situation for laws and their enforcement. Finally, the Abu Ghraib torture scandal is described as the quintessential ‘slippery slope’ torture case.

Something is amiss with the debate over euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. On the one side were liberals, who thought physician-assisted suicide and perhaps voluntary active euthanasia were ethically acceptable and should be legal; on the other side were conservatives, who believed assisted dying was immoral and/or dangerous to legalize as a matter of public policy. This chapter explores the richness of this debate by showing something of the terrain of the debate and the figures that have inhabited it, both the public figures and the academic ones partly behind the scenes. It examines the principal arguments for assisted dying, namely, the argument from autonomy and the argument from relief of pain and suffering, as well as the principal arguments against it, namely, the argument from the intrinsic wrongness of killing, the argument from the integrity of the profession, and the argument from potential abuse (known as the slippery-slope argument).

This chapter introduces Part II, examining the ticking bomb question as one of public, practical, morality in the real world, namely whether it is morally justifiable for democratic states facing terrorism to torture in order to save many innocent lives. It outlines the parameters for discussing the question. Part II is to first address the question of whether transferring the ‘torture in a ticking bomb situation’ (TBS) moral dilemma from the private to the public sphere in itself entails a different moral solution. Secondly, the question is to be addressed of whether — accepting arguendo that torture in this situation is morally justified — states can torture in TBSs while limiting both torture and its direct and indirect harm to a morally acceptable level, or else must slide down an inevitable, and intolerable ‘slippery slope’. ‘Slippery surface’ dangers unique to the public sphere are also discussed.

The presentation of a multitude of conflicting and seemingly irresolvable rights-based claims suggests the need to examine more closely the phenomenon of rights-based arguments in the context of assisted suicide. The problems associated with such arguments are illuminated by looking at some of the critiques of rights which have gained popularity in recent years, and by discussing their applicability to the rights-based arguments used in the assisted suicide debate. The critiques are divided into two broad categories. The first contains arguments regarding the inadequacies associated with rights discourse when attempting to solve complex social problems, and particularly in the context of personal rights. This category includes the problems of indeterminacy, absolutism and the prevalence of slippery slopes, to name only the more familiar critiques. The second category questions the underlying assumptions of current rights discourse, querying the focus on individualism and autonomy, and raises concerns about absence of community.

The death-and-dying debates, especially where they focus on physician-assisted dying — euthanasia and suicide — involve five central arguments — two pro, three con. These include two arguments for moral acceptance and/or legalization, the argument from autonomy or self-determination and the argument from the relief of pain and suffering, sometimes also called the argument from mercy. On the other side, the principal arguments against assisted dying include the argument from the intrinsic wrongness of killing, the argument concerning the integrity of the medical profession, and the argument about the potential for abuse, the so-called slippery-slope argument. This book challenges assumptions about how we can and should die, illuminates the structure of arguments for and against physician-assisted suicide, explores the morality of suicide (the deepest issue underlying the death-and-dying controversies that are visible in public debate), speculates a bit about how the future might look and what we should be prepared for, and looks for possibilities of resolution in these ancient, yet new, debates.

This chapter addresses methodological preliminaries in order to influence the logically and rhetorically correct argumentative framework. It specifically explores the strategies along which the debate could move: the by-analogy strategy, the ontological strategy, and the type-token strategy. It turns to the major arguments that can be used. It also highlights the roles and responsibilities of the scientific community, proposing a sort of international agency that should monitor and prepare analyses of what is occurring. This chapter shows that the transcendence argument against the actions of creating and using protocells is a false belief. It also suggests that the slippery slope argument is either fallacious or very weak, and therefore useless against protocells.

This chapter examines the alternative strategy of those advocating physician-assisted death (PAD): passing legislation that allows death with dignity. It begins with an overview of the slippery slope argument and other arguments presented by those opposed to legalization of PAD, including the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Roman Catholic Church. It then considers the political battles in the states over the right to die, with particular emphasis on initial efforts to legalize PAD through the use of the initiative and the referendum processes. It also discusses efforts in various states, including Washington State and California, to pass PAD legislation and concludes by outlining six factors that determine the success or failure of PAD initiatives at the state level.

This chapter concludes the discussion of the ticking bomb question as one of public, practical morality. Introducing torture into the interrogation rooms of modern democracies is fraught with dangers of torture expanding beyond the confines of a ticking bomb situation (TBS), in particular in view of fears of ‘mega-terrorism’ such as nuclear attacks, and its effects reaching far beyond the immediate context, reversing the means-end relationship between citizen and state which is at the foundations of democracy and leading to ‘no holds barred’ wars in which terrorists thrive. States introducing or maintaining a minimal absolutist prohibition on torture may thus not be able to guarantee us absolute safety from terrorists, but no torturing state has been able to do that either, and we will at least be absolutely safe, in this respect, from abuse by our own state.

This chapter examines the alternative strategy of those advocating physician-assisted death (PAD): passing legislation that allows death with dignity. It begins with an overview of the slippery slope argument and other arguments presented by those opposed to legalization of PAD, including the American Medical Association (AMA) and the Roman Catholic Church. It then considers the political battles in the states over the right to die, with particular emphasis on initial efforts to legalize PAD through the use of the initiative and the referendum processes. It also discusses efforts in various states, including Washington State and California, to pass PAD legislation and concludes by outlining six factors that determine the success or failure of PAD initiatives at the state level.

The main purpose of this chapter is to articulate the different types of vagueness, and related linguistic indeterminacies, that we find in statutory language and to explain their different rationales. The chapter argues that the various normative considerations involved in employing vague terms in legislation depend on the kind of vagueness in question. While some cases of vagueness in law are concerned with fairly standard problems of borderline cases, other are not. I also argue that semantic vagueness can be distinguished from conversational vagueness, which we also find in law, and that vagueness in law should be clearly distinguished from cases of ambiguity and polysemy.

This chapter explores some of the questions surrounding the battles over the right to die, such as whether there are viable alternatives to physician-assisted death (PAD) for terminally ill patients who refuse to live without any realizable quality of life. It also considers a number of so-called givens in the recounting of the efforts to introduce PAD legislation in various states, including the enormous power of the federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, in the PAD legal battles; the power of the “sanctity of life” PAD opponents that include the Roman Catholic Church; and the local politics underlying all the PAD battles. Finally, it discusses the impact of the slippery slope argument in the PAD debates and the prospects for transplants—a few dying men and women who move to one of the states that allow terminally ill persons to end their lives on their own terms.

This chapter explores some of the questions surrounding the battles over the right to die, such as whether there are viable alternatives to physician-assisted death (PAD) for terminally ill patients who refuse to live without any realizable quality of life. It also considers a number of so-called givens in the recounting of the efforts to introduce PAD legislation in various states, including the enormous power of the federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, in the PAD legal battles; the power of the “sanctity of life” PAD opponents that include the Roman Catholic Church; and the local politics underlying all the PAD battles. Finally, it discusses the impact of the slippery slope argument in the PAD debates and the prospects for transplants—a few dying men and women who move to one of the states that allow terminally ill persons to end their lives on their own terms.

This chapter considers whether there is, in extreme situations, a ‘public morality’ that is distinct from ‘private morality’ and its implications on the ‘ticking bomb’ debate, including a discussion of the ‘dirty hands’ dilemma. Theorists have argued that there are differences between action in the private and public spheres relating to representation, numbers, impersonality and impartiality, violence and consequences. However, those justifying torture in a ticking bomb situation have relied on general consequentialist arguments rather than limiting them to the public sphere or to officials. The effects of torture by officials would nevertheless be much more extensive than if inflicted by a private individual, and officials have a positive duty to protect the population. Theorists have argued that in the real world citizens must limit the powers of leaders, including by absolute prohibitions based on general moral grounds.