John F Kihlstrom
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was imported into social psychology, and formed the basis for a new generation of “dual-process” theories of social cognition and ...
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The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was imported into social psychology, and formed the basis for a new generation of “dual-process” theories of social cognition and behavior. However, some social psychologists have gone further to claim that automatic processes dominate social interaction, leaving little room for anything like free will. For these theorists, human beings are machines — automatons — after all. However, no empirical evidence supports such a strong claim about human nature. In part, the automaticity juggernaut appears to reflect a reaction to the cognitive revolution in social psychology, with its implication that social interactions are mediated by conscious, deliberate, rational thought; in part, it may be a reflection of the biologization of social psychology. But it also seems to be a reflection of an emerging “People Are Stupid” trend within social psychology, as well as a throwback to the historical alliance between situationism and radical behaviorism. Finally, the emphasis on automaticity appears to be based on the “epiphenomenalist suspicion” that consciousness plays no role in human behavior, as well as the allure of the pinball determinism of classical physics.Less
The distinction between automatic and controlled cognitive processes was imported into social psychology, and formed the basis for a new generation of “dual-process” theories of social cognition and behavior. However, some social psychologists have gone further to claim that automatic processes dominate social interaction, leaving little room for anything like free will. For these theorists, human beings are machines — automatons — after all. However, no empirical evidence supports such a strong claim about human nature. In part, the automaticity juggernaut appears to reflect a reaction to the cognitive revolution in social psychology, with its implication that social interactions are mediated by conscious, deliberate, rational thought; in part, it may be a reflection of the biologization of social psychology. But it also seems to be a reflection of an emerging “People Are Stupid” trend within social psychology, as well as a throwback to the historical alliance between situationism and radical behaviorism. Finally, the emphasis on automaticity appears to be based on the “epiphenomenalist suspicion” that consciousness plays no role in human behavior, as well as the allure of the pinball determinism of classical physics.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that ...
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One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. The book argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. The book also argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. On the whole, this book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or phronesis — an excellence of deliberating and making choices — and argues that phronesis is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues. This book also examines issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and “the virtuous person”.Less
One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. The book argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. The book also argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. On the whole, this book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or phronesis — an excellence of deliberating and making choices — and argues that phronesis is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues. This book also examines issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and “the virtuous person”.
David Ashford
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9781846318597
- eISBN:
- 9781846318016
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781846318597.001.0000
- Subject:
- Society and Culture, Cultural Studies
Engaging with the rich catalogue of cultural material relating to the London Underground, this cultural geography sets out to explore one of the strangest spaces of the modern world. The first to ...
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Engaging with the rich catalogue of cultural material relating to the London Underground, this cultural geography sets out to explore one of the strangest spaces of the modern world. The first to complete that slow process of estrangement from the natural topography initiated by the Industrial Revolution, London Underground is shown to be what French anthropologist Marc Augé has called non-lieu: non-places, like the motorway, supermarket or airport lounge, compelled to interpret their relation to the invisible landscapes they traverse through the media of signs and maps. The tube-network is revealed to be a transitional form, linking spaces of alienation in Victorian England, such as the railway, and the fully virtual spaces of our contemporary consumer-capitalism. This history of alienation, and of the bold struggle to overcome it, recounted in London Underground: a cultural geography, is nothing less than the history of how people have attempted to make a home in the psychopathological spaces of the modern world. London Underground: a cultural geography taps the current enthusiasm for cultural history, for psychogeography, for books on modern urban space, and for all things relating to London, providing an account of the system's representation and reshaping in fiction, film, art, music, graffiti, connecting the long history of the tube-network to wider theoretical concerns relating to the Victorian City, Cultural Geography, Modernism, Post-modernism and Situationist Theory.Less
Engaging with the rich catalogue of cultural material relating to the London Underground, this cultural geography sets out to explore one of the strangest spaces of the modern world. The first to complete that slow process of estrangement from the natural topography initiated by the Industrial Revolution, London Underground is shown to be what French anthropologist Marc Augé has called non-lieu: non-places, like the motorway, supermarket or airport lounge, compelled to interpret their relation to the invisible landscapes they traverse through the media of signs and maps. The tube-network is revealed to be a transitional form, linking spaces of alienation in Victorian England, such as the railway, and the fully virtual spaces of our contemporary consumer-capitalism. This history of alienation, and of the bold struggle to overcome it, recounted in London Underground: a cultural geography, is nothing less than the history of how people have attempted to make a home in the psychopathological spaces of the modern world. London Underground: a cultural geography taps the current enthusiasm for cultural history, for psychogeography, for books on modern urban space, and for all things relating to London, providing an account of the system's representation and reshaping in fiction, film, art, music, graffiti, connecting the long history of the tube-network to wider theoretical concerns relating to the Victorian City, Cultural Geography, Modernism, Post-modernism and Situationist Theory.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter articulates a problem that virtue ethicists and their critics alike have almost entirely ignored, but which if unresolved would jeopardize the very possibility of virtue ethics. This ...
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This chapter articulates a problem that virtue ethicists and their critics alike have almost entirely ignored, but which if unresolved would jeopardize the very possibility of virtue ethics. This problem stems from the conjunction of a necessary feature of virtue ethics and a commonplace one. The necessary feature is that virtue ethics understands right actions and virtuous persons in terms of the virtues, in the plural; and the commonplace is that virtue ethicists tend to be so open-handed about what “the virtues” are that on many theories there will be infinitely many of them. If right action is action in accordance with the virtues, and a virtuous person a person who has the virtues, but virtue ethics tells us that the virtues are infinitely many, then virtue ethics cannot say what right action is action in accordance with, or what it would be to be a virtuous person. This problem is called here the “enumeration problem”.Less
This chapter articulates a problem that virtue ethicists and their critics alike have almost entirely ignored, but which if unresolved would jeopardize the very possibility of virtue ethics. This problem stems from the conjunction of a necessary feature of virtue ethics and a commonplace one. The necessary feature is that virtue ethics understands right actions and virtuous persons in terms of the virtues, in the plural; and the commonplace is that virtue ethicists tend to be so open-handed about what “the virtues” are that on many theories there will be infinitely many of them. If right action is action in accordance with the virtues, and a virtuous person a person who has the virtues, but virtue ethics tells us that the virtues are infinitely many, then virtue ethics cannot say what right action is action in accordance with, or what it would be to be a virtuous person. This problem is called here the “enumeration problem”.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Philosophical psychologists have told us that “situationism” is bad news for virtue ethics and virtue theory more generally. Situationism is a research paradigm in social psychology that holds that ...
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Philosophical psychologists have told us that “situationism” is bad news for virtue ethics and virtue theory more generally. Situationism is a research paradigm in social psychology that holds that situational variables have an impact on behavior that tells against disposition-based explanations of behavior. Some philosophical psychologists have argued that since there is little evidence for psychological dispositions, and since virtue theory as such is a normative theory about such dispositions, therefore virtue theory as such is empirically misguided. And since virtue ethics presupposes some theory of the virtues, virtue ethics is empirically misguided, too, and therefore of little practical value to creatures like us. This chapter begins a sustained argument that while situationism is plausible; it is not bad news for virtue theory provided that virtues are understood as forms of responsiveness to reasons. While situationism is bad news for “dispositions” of a certain type, virtues need not and indeed should not be understood as dispositions of this type. The chapter closely examines the contrast between situationism and the more traditional research program it means to replace, namely dispositionism. It then reviews situationism as motivating a positive alternative in personality theory and some positive evidence in favor of that alternative.Less
Philosophical psychologists have told us that “situationism” is bad news for virtue ethics and virtue theory more generally. Situationism is a research paradigm in social psychology that holds that situational variables have an impact on behavior that tells against disposition-based explanations of behavior. Some philosophical psychologists have argued that since there is little evidence for psychological dispositions, and since virtue theory as such is a normative theory about such dispositions, therefore virtue theory as such is empirically misguided. And since virtue ethics presupposes some theory of the virtues, virtue ethics is empirically misguided, too, and therefore of little practical value to creatures like us. This chapter begins a sustained argument that while situationism is plausible; it is not bad news for virtue theory provided that virtues are understood as forms of responsiveness to reasons. While situationism is bad news for “dispositions” of a certain type, virtues need not and indeed should not be understood as dispositions of this type. The chapter closely examines the contrast between situationism and the more traditional research program it means to replace, namely dispositionism. It then reviews situationism as motivating a positive alternative in personality theory and some positive evidence in favor of that alternative.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter examines a body of social-psychological experiments that appear to give evidence against dispositionist accounts of personality and in favor of the importance of situation construal for ...
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This chapter examines a body of social-psychological experiments that appear to give evidence against dispositionist accounts of personality and in favor of the importance of situation construal for behavior — a central situationist claim. The interpretation of this evidence has been the subject of enormous recent philosophical controversy. Consequently, the chapter begins by examining the methodology behind these experiments. It then reviews a small but representative sample of four major experiments of this type, and then considers and rejects a number of objections to the situationist interpretations of the findings of these experiments. The chapter argues that the evidence favors situationism, and in particular a cognitive-affective personality theory over a dispositionist one.Less
This chapter examines a body of social-psychological experiments that appear to give evidence against dispositionist accounts of personality and in favor of the importance of situation construal for behavior — a central situationist claim. The interpretation of this evidence has been the subject of enormous recent philosophical controversy. Consequently, the chapter begins by examining the methodology behind these experiments. It then reviews a small but representative sample of four major experiments of this type, and then considers and rejects a number of objections to the situationist interpretations of the findings of these experiments. The chapter argues that the evidence favors situationism, and in particular a cognitive-affective personality theory over a dispositionist one.
Jennifer Radden and John Z. Sadler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389371
- eISBN:
- 9780199866328
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389371.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Some tensions inherent in joining the traditional concept of character to that of social roles are outlined in Chapter 6. They are illustrated through a discussion of the moral psychological dangers ...
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Some tensions inherent in joining the traditional concept of character to that of social roles are outlined in Chapter 6. They are illustrated through a discussion of the moral psychological dangers that attend role morality: inner compartmentalization or lack of integrity, inconstant virtues (honored in one role and neglected in another), and apparently incompatible roles (such as healer and upholder of criminal justice). Some difficulties springing from the way virtues are habituated, are also introduced, including the ethical status of virtues that are merely feigned (as when the practitioner pretends an empathic response to the patient that is not wholehearted or genuine).Less
Some tensions inherent in joining the traditional concept of character to that of social roles are outlined in Chapter 6. They are illustrated through a discussion of the moral psychological dangers that attend role morality: inner compartmentalization or lack of integrity, inconstant virtues (honored in one role and neglected in another), and apparently incompatible roles (such as healer and upholder of criminal justice). Some difficulties springing from the way virtues are habituated, are also introduced, including the ethical status of virtues that are merely feigned (as when the practitioner pretends an empathic response to the patient that is not wholehearted or genuine).
Jon Hanson and Mark Yeboah
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737512
- eISBN:
- 9780199918638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Since its initial publication, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been applied in a diverse array of disciplines. Application to the legal and policy arenas, however, has been uncommon. This is ...
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Since its initial publication, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been applied in a diverse array of disciplines. Application to the legal and policy arenas, however, has been uncommon. This is true even though the dominant schemas that shape law and policy are like the attitudes, stereotypes, and other forms of implicit cognition that the IAT is so often harnessed to measure. Based upon research designed to identify the dominant knowledge structures, schemas and categories that shape law and policy, the most significant and salient policy scripts boil down to "markets are good, regulation is bad." This chapter will discuss the initial results of an ongoing Policy IAT intended to investigate the strength of those policy scripts across the ideological spectrum. The results shed light on the variability of policy scripts across political categories and attributional styles along a situationist-dispositionist spectrum as well as the malleability of implicit associations.Less
Since its initial publication, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been applied in a diverse array of disciplines. Application to the legal and policy arenas, however, has been uncommon. This is true even though the dominant schemas that shape law and policy are like the attitudes, stereotypes, and other forms of implicit cognition that the IAT is so often harnessed to measure. Based upon research designed to identify the dominant knowledge structures, schemas and categories that shape law and policy, the most significant and salient policy scripts boil down to "markets are good, regulation is bad." This chapter will discuss the initial results of an ongoing Policy IAT intended to investigate the strength of those policy scripts across the ideological spectrum. The results shed light on the variability of policy scripts across political categories and attributional styles along a situationist-dispositionist spectrum as well as the malleability of implicit associations.
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737512
- eISBN:
- 9780199918638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter describes a major rift extending across many important debates over our legal structures, policies, and theories of law. It argues that the divide is based, to a significant extent, on ...
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This chapter describes a major rift extending across many important debates over our legal structures, policies, and theories of law. It argues that the divide is based, to a significant extent, on contrasting attributional tendencies: the less accurate dispositionist approach, which explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people’s dispositions (that is, stable personalities, preferences, and the like), and the more accurate situationist approach, which bases attributions of causation and responsibility on unseen influences within us and around us (that is, cognitive proclivities and structures and external environmental forces). As this chapter summarizes, research on the underlying motives and conceptual metaphors behind conservatism and liberalism help explain the vital connections between those attributional styles and political ideologies.Less
This chapter describes a major rift extending across many important debates over our legal structures, policies, and theories of law. It argues that the divide is based, to a significant extent, on contrasting attributional tendencies: the less accurate dispositionist approach, which explains outcomes and behavior with reference to people’s dispositions (that is, stable personalities, preferences, and the like), and the more accurate situationist approach, which bases attributions of causation and responsibility on unseen influences within us and around us (that is, cognitive proclivities and structures and external environmental forces). As this chapter summarizes, research on the underlying motives and conceptual metaphors behind conservatism and liberalism help explain the vital connections between those attributional styles and political ideologies.
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737512
- eISBN:
- 9780199918638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0019
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter explores the way in which dispositionism maintains its dominance as an attributional framework despite failing to capture accurately the causes of human behavior. The answer lies in a ...
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This chapter explores the way in which dispositionism maintains its dominance as an attributional framework despite failing to capture accurately the causes of human behavior. The answer lies in a subordinate dynamic and discourse, naïve cynicism: the basic subconscious mechanism by which dispositionists discredit and dismiss generally more accurate situationist insights and their proponents. Without the operation of naïve cynicism, dispositionism would be far more vulnerable to challenge and change. Naïve cynicism is, thus, critically important to explaining how and why certain legal policies manage to carry the day. As a case study, the chapter considers the naïve cynical backlash against situationist accounts of the causes of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and other detentions centers.Less
This chapter explores the way in which dispositionism maintains its dominance as an attributional framework despite failing to capture accurately the causes of human behavior. The answer lies in a subordinate dynamic and discourse, naïve cynicism: the basic subconscious mechanism by which dispositionists discredit and dismiss generally more accurate situationist insights and their proponents. Without the operation of naïve cynicism, dispositionism would be far more vulnerable to challenge and change. Naïve cynicism is, thus, critically important to explaining how and why certain legal policies manage to carry the day. As a case study, the chapter considers the naïve cynical backlash against situationist accounts of the causes of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and other detentions centers.
Adam Benforado and Jon Hanson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737512
- eISBN:
- 9780199918638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0020
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter demonstrates that naive cynicism is a pervasive dynamic that shapes policy debates big and small. It argues that naïve cynicism can operate at a particular moment or over long periods of ...
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This chapter demonstrates that naive cynicism is a pervasive dynamic that shapes policy debates big and small. It argues that naïve cynicism can operate at a particular moment or over long periods of time, and that naïve cynicism is embraced and encouraged by both elite knowledge-producers and the average person on the street. Examining the reactions of prominent academics to situationist scholarship, the chapter offers evidence that naive cynicism has played a significant role in retarding the growth and influence of insights drawn from social psychology and related fields within the dominant legal theoretical frameworks of the last half-century. Despite providing a more accurate depiction of the behavior of legal actors, this research from the mind sciences has been dismissed for decades in favor of commonsense dispositionist notions of causation, responsibility, and blame.Less
This chapter demonstrates that naive cynicism is a pervasive dynamic that shapes policy debates big and small. It argues that naïve cynicism can operate at a particular moment or over long periods of time, and that naïve cynicism is embraced and encouraged by both elite knowledge-producers and the average person on the street. Examining the reactions of prominent academics to situationist scholarship, the chapter offers evidence that naive cynicism has played a significant role in retarding the growth and influence of insights drawn from social psychology and related fields within the dominant legal theoretical frameworks of the last half-century. Despite providing a more accurate depiction of the behavior of legal actors, this research from the mind sciences has been dismissed for decades in favor of commonsense dispositionist notions of causation, responsibility, and blame.
Fernanda Nicola
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199737512
- eISBN:
- 9780199918638
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0025
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter explores how ideology influences legal change. In particular, it discusses how feminist ideologies, often allied with social conservative ones, have changed how lawyers and judges ...
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This chapter explores how ideology influences legal change. In particular, it discusses how feminist ideologies, often allied with social conservative ones, have changed how lawyers and judges approach interspousal torts. Those changes, though limited in scale, are apparent in doctrine and damage assessments. More generally, they are shaping how our society understands the relationships between men and women. While legal reformers are allowing women's stories of abuse finally to be heard, they tend to hear only stereotypical stories. Those stories are fueling a dispositionist perspective that reinforces stereotyped gender narratives in which women are either helpless victims of abuse or heartless perpetrators of emotional abuse. This dispositionist approach to tort law looks to individual choices and stereotyped narratives to attribute responsibility and blame in a rational and straightforward way, and overlooks the situational influences and constraints of each character in a tort lawsuit.Less
This chapter explores how ideology influences legal change. In particular, it discusses how feminist ideologies, often allied with social conservative ones, have changed how lawyers and judges approach interspousal torts. Those changes, though limited in scale, are apparent in doctrine and damage assessments. More generally, they are shaping how our society understands the relationships between men and women. While legal reformers are allowing women's stories of abuse finally to be heard, they tend to hear only stereotypical stories. Those stories are fueling a dispositionist perspective that reinforces stereotyped gender narratives in which women are either helpless victims of abuse or heartless perpetrators of emotional abuse. This dispositionist approach to tort law looks to individual choices and stereotyped narratives to attribute responsibility and blame in a rational and straightforward way, and overlooks the situational influences and constraints of each character in a tort lawsuit.
Daniel C. Russell
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199565795
- eISBN:
- 9780191721311
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565795.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter turns from social psychology to philosophical psychology, arguing that the positive account of personality suggested by situationism is one that virtue theory can naturally embrace, ...
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This chapter turns from social psychology to philosophical psychology, arguing that the positive account of personality suggested by situationism is one that virtue theory can naturally embrace, provided that virtues are forms of responsiveness to reasons. It begins by further defending the empirical adequacy of such a personality theory, which some philosophical psychologists have ignored, played down, or explicitly rejected. The rest of the chapter considers several possible virtue-theoretical responses to John Doris' recent charge that no virtue theory embracing the situationist view of personality could be both empirically and normatively adequate. The chapter rejects Doris' assumption that a normatively adequate virtue theory must depict virtues as proclivities to stereotypically “virtuous” behaviors. Rather, the virtue theorist can define character traits in terms of cognitive-affective personality attributes, and define virtues as character traits that are appropriately responsive to reasons. The chapter concludes that virtue theories that make phronesis part of all virtue are in the unique position of standing firmly on the current evidence from social psychology about the nature of personality.Less
This chapter turns from social psychology to philosophical psychology, arguing that the positive account of personality suggested by situationism is one that virtue theory can naturally embrace, provided that virtues are forms of responsiveness to reasons. It begins by further defending the empirical adequacy of such a personality theory, which some philosophical psychologists have ignored, played down, or explicitly rejected. The rest of the chapter considers several possible virtue-theoretical responses to John Doris' recent charge that no virtue theory embracing the situationist view of personality could be both empirically and normatively adequate. The chapter rejects Doris' assumption that a normatively adequate virtue theory must depict virtues as proclivities to stereotypically “virtuous” behaviors. Rather, the virtue theorist can define character traits in terms of cognitive-affective personality attributes, and define virtues as character traits that are appropriately responsive to reasons. The chapter concludes that virtue theories that make phronesis part of all virtue are in the unique position of standing firmly on the current evidence from social psychology about the nature of personality.
Mark Rowlands
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199842001
- eISBN:
- 9780199979844
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199842001.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The other difference that effective critical scrutiny of motivations brings is an alteration in the cognitive structure of motivation. This takes the form of metacognition: higher-order thoughts ...
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The other difference that effective critical scrutiny of motivations brings is an alteration in the cognitive structure of motivation. This takes the form of metacognition: higher-order thoughts about one's motivations. This chapter argues that metacognitive abilities are not the sort of thing that could yield control over motivations. The very issue of control that arises at the first-order level of motivations also arises at the metacognitive level. To suppose otherwise is to assume that something miraculous happens in the move from first order to metalevel. This fallacy is labeled the “miracle-of-the-meta.” The fallacy is motivated and explained by way of discussion of higher-order thought models of consciousness.If the arguments of chapters 6 and 7 are correct, we have no workable account of the connection between scrutiny and control (and hence between control and both normativity and morality). The SCNM schema breaks down at the S-C stage.Less
The other difference that effective critical scrutiny of motivations brings is an alteration in the cognitive structure of motivation. This takes the form of metacognition: higher-order thoughts about one's motivations. This chapter argues that metacognitive abilities are not the sort of thing that could yield control over motivations. The very issue of control that arises at the first-order level of motivations also arises at the metacognitive level. To suppose otherwise is to assume that something miraculous happens in the move from first order to metalevel. This fallacy is labeled the “miracle-of-the-meta.” The fallacy is motivated and explained by way of discussion of higher-order thought models of consciousness.If the arguments of chapters 6 and 7 are correct, we have no workable account of the connection between scrutiny and control (and hence between control and both normativity and morality). The SCNM schema breaks down at the S-C stage.
Peter Railton
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693269
- eISBN:
- 9780191732058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Traditional virtue-oriented approaches to ethics suppose that acquiring relatively stable character traits, such as courage and compassion, is crucial in addressing the question of how to be. ...
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Traditional virtue-oriented approaches to ethics suppose that acquiring relatively stable character traits, such as courage and compassion, is crucial in addressing the question of how to be. However, recent psychological studies cast doubt on the idea that people develop such traits. In light of this pessimism, the paper raises the question: what is left of virtue theory? It argues that much remains once one shifts from a traditional understanding of virtues to one of cognitive/affective “if…then” dispositions that form a person’s character. The central proposal is to understand such dispositions as “habitudes” – habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are acquired by example and repetition, and that enable one to competently react to varying situations one confronts. The resulting model of ethical comportment represents a psychologically realistic understanding of virtue. Furthermore, this account fits well with what we learn from the field of positive psychology about subjective well-being, thus helping to vindicate eudaimonism.Less
Traditional virtue-oriented approaches to ethics suppose that acquiring relatively stable character traits, such as courage and compassion, is crucial in addressing the question of how to be. However, recent psychological studies cast doubt on the idea that people develop such traits. In light of this pessimism, the paper raises the question: what is left of virtue theory? It argues that much remains once one shifts from a traditional understanding of virtues to one of cognitive/affective “if…then” dispositions that form a person’s character. The central proposal is to understand such dispositions as “habitudes” – habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that are acquired by example and repetition, and that enable one to competently react to varying situations one confronts. The resulting model of ethical comportment represents a psychologically realistic understanding of virtue. Furthermore, this account fits well with what we learn from the field of positive psychology about subjective well-being, thus helping to vindicate eudaimonism.
David R. Mandel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195133622
- eISBN:
- 9780199847952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133622.003.0012
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
The question “What can social psychology tell us about the Holocaust?” is a difficult and complex one to answer. Perhaps it is fair to begin by saying that the Holocaust has influenced our ...
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The question “What can social psychology tell us about the Holocaust?” is a difficult and complex one to answer. Perhaps it is fair to begin by saying that the Holocaust has influenced our understanding of social psychology more than the other way around. In the 1960s and early 1970s, seminal work in the field continued to be motivated by a need to understand the perpetrators of the Holocaust and other acts of collective violence. To this day, these studies represent social psychology's most salient demonstrations of situationism — a core tenet of the field that emphasizes the power of the situational forces over human behavior. This chapter discusses some of the ways in which genocide instigators differ from perpetrators and examines the most notorious genocidal and democidal instigator of the twentieth century, Adolf Hitler, from a social-psychological perspective. It demonstrates that even Hitler can be examined in terms of the same social-psychological principles used to describe and explain ordinary individuals.Less
The question “What can social psychology tell us about the Holocaust?” is a difficult and complex one to answer. Perhaps it is fair to begin by saying that the Holocaust has influenced our understanding of social psychology more than the other way around. In the 1960s and early 1970s, seminal work in the field continued to be motivated by a need to understand the perpetrators of the Holocaust and other acts of collective violence. To this day, these studies represent social psychology's most salient demonstrations of situationism — a core tenet of the field that emphasizes the power of the situational forces over human behavior. This chapter discusses some of the ways in which genocide instigators differ from perpetrators and examines the most notorious genocidal and democidal instigator of the twentieth century, Adolf Hitler, from a social-psychological perspective. It demonstrates that even Hitler can be examined in terms of the same social-psychological principles used to describe and explain ordinary individuals.
Matthew Talbert and Jessica Wolfendale
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- October 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780190675875
- eISBN:
- 9780190675905
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190675875.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In 2005, US Marines killed 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians in the town of Haditha. How should we assess the perpetrators of this and other war crimes? Is it unfair to blame the Marines because they were ...
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In 2005, US Marines killed 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians in the town of Haditha. How should we assess the perpetrators of this and other war crimes? Is it unfair to blame the Marines because they were subject to situational pressures such as combat stress? Or should they be held responsible for their actions, since they intentionally chose to kill civilians? In this book, we take up these questions and propose a provocative theory of the causes of war crimes and the responsibility of perpetrators. In the first half of the book, we criticize accounts that explain war crimes by reference to external situational pressures, such as peer pressure, combat stress, and propaganda. We develop an alternative theory of war crimes that explains how military personnel make sense of their participation in war crimes through the lens of their self-conceptions, goals, and values. In the second half of the book, we reject theories of responsibility that excuse perpetrators on the grounds that situational pressures often lead them to believe that their behavior is permissible. Such theories are, we contend, unacceptably exculpating and imply that it’s unreasonable for victims of war crimes to blame their attackers. In contrast, we argue that perpetrators of war crimes may be blameworthy if their actions express objectionable attitudes toward their victims, even if they sincerely believe that what they are doing is right. In addition, we show that the demand that victims of war crimes forego blame fails to show sufficient regard for their moral standing.Less
In 2005, US Marines killed 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians in the town of Haditha. How should we assess the perpetrators of this and other war crimes? Is it unfair to blame the Marines because they were subject to situational pressures such as combat stress? Or should they be held responsible for their actions, since they intentionally chose to kill civilians? In this book, we take up these questions and propose a provocative theory of the causes of war crimes and the responsibility of perpetrators. In the first half of the book, we criticize accounts that explain war crimes by reference to external situational pressures, such as peer pressure, combat stress, and propaganda. We develop an alternative theory of war crimes that explains how military personnel make sense of their participation in war crimes through the lens of their self-conceptions, goals, and values. In the second half of the book, we reject theories of responsibility that excuse perpetrators on the grounds that situational pressures often lead them to believe that their behavior is permissible. Such theories are, we contend, unacceptably exculpating and imply that it’s unreasonable for victims of war crimes to blame their attackers. In contrast, we argue that perpetrators of war crimes may be blameworthy if their actions express objectionable attitudes toward their victims, even if they sincerely believe that what they are doing is right. In addition, we show that the demand that victims of war crimes forego blame fails to show sufficient regard for their moral standing.
Lytle Shaw (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9781846312311
- eISBN:
- 9781846316067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/liverpool/9781846312311.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry
This chapter addresses the crisis in ‘gestural’ painting of the late 1950s in the context of O'Hara's collaboration with Norman Bluhm: the Poem-Paintings. It places these works provocatively ...
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This chapter addresses the crisis in ‘gestural’ painting of the late 1950s in the context of O'Hara's collaboration with Norman Bluhm: the Poem-Paintings. It places these works provocatively alongside the gestural aesthetics of Situationism, arguing that the ‘realization of gesture in urban situations’ practised by the Situationists in Europe was analogous to O'Hara's practice of ‘productively debasing poetry’. It also reconsiders O'Hara's relationship to Abstract Expressionism, particularly the influential conservative version advanced by professional art critics.Less
This chapter addresses the crisis in ‘gestural’ painting of the late 1950s in the context of O'Hara's collaboration with Norman Bluhm: the Poem-Paintings. It places these works provocatively alongside the gestural aesthetics of Situationism, arguing that the ‘realization of gesture in urban situations’ practised by the Situationists in Europe was analogous to O'Hara's practice of ‘productively debasing poetry’. It also reconsiders O'Hara's relationship to Abstract Expressionism, particularly the influential conservative version advanced by professional art critics.
Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199688234
- eISBN:
- 9780191767548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199688234.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. ...
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This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. Situationism began as a challenge to the psychology of character traits, targeting ethical theories that presuppose a trait psychology. Psychological research suggests that (often trivial) environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. Epistemology pursues questions about the nature of knowledge. While there are internal differences within virtue epistemology between responsibilists and reliabilists, they all analyze knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. Until recently, virtue epistemology and situationism were separate literatures, but philosophers have begun to examine the apparent incompatibility between situationist psychology and virtue epistemology. The essays in this volume take up this new problem of epistemic situationism from multiple points of view—some skeptical or revisionary, others conservative. The collection amounts to a comprehensive assessment of the current thinking on this wide ranging and crucial area of modern philosophy.Less
This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. Situationism began as a challenge to the psychology of character traits, targeting ethical theories that presuppose a trait psychology. Psychological research suggests that (often trivial) environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. Epistemology pursues questions about the nature of knowledge. While there are internal differences within virtue epistemology between responsibilists and reliabilists, they all analyze knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. Until recently, virtue epistemology and situationism were separate literatures, but philosophers have begun to examine the apparent incompatibility between situationist psychology and virtue epistemology. The essays in this volume take up this new problem of epistemic situationism from multiple points of view—some skeptical or revisionary, others conservative. The collection amounts to a comprehensive assessment of the current thinking on this wide ranging and crucial area of modern philosophy.
Alison Ross
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780748683178
- eISBN:
- 9781474408684
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748683178.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Nancy's writing on the image may be understood as a critical engagement with the traditions of modern aesthetics and classical theories of art. However, the starting point for his approach to the ...
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Nancy's writing on the image may be understood as a critical engagement with the traditions of modern aesthetics and classical theories of art. However, the starting point for his approach to the image indicates that his writing on this topic has much wider ambitions than the treatment of a regional aesthetic topic. Nancy defines the image as a mode of access to sense. Nancy attempts an ontological rehabilitation of the image, which reiterates the precepts of his conception of being as ‘co-presence’. I will argue here that a careful study of the implications of this rehabilitation of the image can be used to clarify the significance of the tacit references that Nancy's ontology makes regarding politics.Less
Nancy's writing on the image may be understood as a critical engagement with the traditions of modern aesthetics and classical theories of art. However, the starting point for his approach to the image indicates that his writing on this topic has much wider ambitions than the treatment of a regional aesthetic topic. Nancy defines the image as a mode of access to sense. Nancy attempts an ontological rehabilitation of the image, which reiterates the precepts of his conception of being as ‘co-presence’. I will argue here that a careful study of the implications of this rehabilitation of the image can be used to clarify the significance of the tacit references that Nancy's ontology makes regarding politics.
