Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, ...
More
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.Less
Ordinary language and scientific language enable us to speak about, in a singular way (with demonstratives and names), what we recognize not to exist: fictions, the contents of our hallucinations, abstract objects, and various idealized nonexistent objects to which our scientific theories more conveniently apply. Indeed, references to such nonexistent items—especially in the case of the application of mathematics to the sciences—are indispensable. Scientific and ordinary languages allow us to say things about Pegasus or about hallucinated objects that are true (or false) such as “Pegasus was believed by the ancient Greeks to be a flying horse,” or “That elf I’m now hallucinating over there is wearing blue shoes.” Standard contemporary metaphysical views and standard contemporary philosophical semantic analyses of singular idioms have not successfully accommodated these routine practices of saying true and false things about the nonexistent while simultaneously honoring the insight that such things do not exist in any way at all (and have no properties). This book reconfigures metaphysics and semantics in a radical way to allow the accommodation of our ordinary ways of speaking of what does not exist while retaining the absolutely crucial assumption that such objects exist in no way at all, have no properties, and so are not the truth-makers for the truths and falsities that are about them.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Our singular thinking about numbers (using numerals) is examined, and Tyler Burge’s attempt to read ontological commitments from those uses are rebuffed. It’s shown how our numerical thinking ...
More
Our singular thinking about numbers (using numerals) is examined, and Tyler Burge’s attempt to read ontological commitments from those uses are rebuffed. It’s shown how our numerical thinking involves the involuntary thinking of numbers as objects; but it’s also shown that such involuntary object-directed thinking is compatible with our simultaneously recognizing that there are no actual objects involved. An important distinction is drawn between a word referringr to something and its referringe to something, where in the first case, referencer is a relation between the word and what it refers to; but in the second case, no such relation is involved. The aboutness intuitions are explored as a possible motivation for Meinongianism. In the light of the foregoing, the notion of empty singular thought is introduced and justified.Less
Our singular thinking about numbers (using numerals) is examined, and Tyler Burge’s attempt to read ontological commitments from those uses are rebuffed. It’s shown how our numerical thinking involves the involuntary thinking of numbers as objects; but it’s also shown that such involuntary object-directed thinking is compatible with our simultaneously recognizing that there are no actual objects involved. An important distinction is drawn between a word referringr to something and its referringe to something, where in the first case, referencer is a relation between the word and what it refers to; but in the second case, no such relation is involved. The aboutness intuitions are explored as a possible motivation for Meinongianism. In the light of the foregoing, the notion of empty singular thought is introduced and justified.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0000
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Our thinking and speech about what doesn’t exist involves use/mention errors. When we recognize that “Pegasus doesn’t exist” can’t be about Pegasus (because there is no such object), we warp what the ...
More
Our thinking and speech about what doesn’t exist involves use/mention errors. When we recognize that “Pegasus doesn’t exist” can’t be about Pegasus (because there is no such object), we warp what the sentence is about to something else, concepts, words, and so on—items that it’s clear the sentence isn’t about. This aboutness intuition, when coupled with our apparent ability to say what is true and false about what doesn’t exist clashes with the otherwise natural view that what doesn’t exist has no properties. This chapter makes clear why it’s the aboutness intuition that must be modifed in order to understand how we talk and think about what doesn’t exist. This chapter also summarizes the contents of the rest of the book. There is also an appendix to the chapter that lays out important background metaphysical assumptions about what exists and what doesn’t, including the mind- and language-independence criterion for what exists.Less
Our thinking and speech about what doesn’t exist involves use/mention errors. When we recognize that “Pegasus doesn’t exist” can’t be about Pegasus (because there is no such object), we warp what the sentence is about to something else, concepts, words, and so on—items that it’s clear the sentence isn’t about. This aboutness intuition, when coupled with our apparent ability to say what is true and false about what doesn’t exist clashes with the otherwise natural view that what doesn’t exist has no properties. This chapter makes clear why it’s the aboutness intuition that must be modifed in order to understand how we talk and think about what doesn’t exist. This chapter also summarizes the contents of the rest of the book. There is also an appendix to the chapter that lays out important background metaphysical assumptions about what exists and what doesn’t, including the mind- and language-independence criterion for what exists.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This introduction takes notes of the fact that we have many different kinds of discourses—moral discourse, mathematical discourse, scientific discourse, fictional discourse, and so on—and that one ...
More
This introduction takes notes of the fact that we have many different kinds of discourses—moral discourse, mathematical discourse, scientific discourse, fictional discourse, and so on—and that one response to this has been various pluralist doctrines: pluralism about logic, about metaphysics, and about truth. The external discourse demand and the rejection of Quine’s criterion, and a companion doctrine about singular idioms can be used against the various pluralist views. Crucial in the attack is the fact that statements from a discourse-domain can be brought to bear evidentially and deductively to establish and refute statements in quite different discourse-domains. It is a puzzle how this is possible, one which it is promised will be resolved in part II, and specifically in chapter 4.Less
This introduction takes notes of the fact that we have many different kinds of discourses—moral discourse, mathematical discourse, scientific discourse, fictional discourse, and so on—and that one response to this has been various pluralist doctrines: pluralism about logic, about metaphysics, and about truth. The external discourse demand and the rejection of Quine’s criterion, and a companion doctrine about singular idioms can be used against the various pluralist views. Crucial in the attack is the fact that statements from a discourse-domain can be brought to bear evidentially and deductively to establish and refute statements in quite different discourse-domains. It is a puzzle how this is possible, one which it is promised will be resolved in part II, and specifically in chapter 4.
