Elliott Sober
- Published in print:
- 1975
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198244073
- eISBN:
- 9780191680724
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244073.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of ...
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The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions. Yet recent theorizing about simplicity presents a veritable chaos of opinion. Here one finds arguments that simplicity is high probability, that it is low probability, and that it is not a probability at all. Indeed, the complexities of the problem of simplicity have led some to question the possibility and the fruitfulness of trying to define the notion of simplicity that seems to be involved in hypothesis choice. This book tries to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions. The more informative a hypothesis is in answering these questions, the simpler it is. The informativeness of hypotheses relative to questions is characterized by the amount of extra information they need to yield answers. The more additional information a hypothesis needs to answer a question, the less informative it is relative to that question.Less
The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions. Yet recent theorizing about simplicity presents a veritable chaos of opinion. Here one finds arguments that simplicity is high probability, that it is low probability, and that it is not a probability at all. Indeed, the complexities of the problem of simplicity have led some to question the possibility and the fruitfulness of trying to define the notion of simplicity that seems to be involved in hypothesis choice. This book tries to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions. The more informative a hypothesis is in answering these questions, the simpler it is. The informativeness of hypotheses relative to questions is characterized by the amount of extra information they need to yield answers. The more additional information a hypothesis needs to answer a question, the less informative it is relative to that question.
David Pugmire
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199276899
- eISBN:
- 9780191602689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276897.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Residual issues—emotions need a kind of simplicity, but this is compatible with subtlety. Generally, what is the point of scrutinising the losses of integrity to which emotions are various ...
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Residual issues—emotions need a kind of simplicity, but this is compatible with subtlety. Generally, what is the point of scrutinising the losses of integrity to which emotions are various susceptible? Isn’t this over-sophisticated, and shouldn’t feeling good not be enough? The answer is no: the costs of emotion’s foibles are themselves emotional.Less
Residual issues—emotions need a kind of simplicity, but this is compatible with subtlety. Generally, what is the point of scrutinising the losses of integrity to which emotions are various susceptible? Isn’t this over-sophisticated, and shouldn’t feeling good not be enough? The answer is no: the costs of emotion’s foibles are themselves emotional.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261826
- eISBN:
- 9780191698781
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261826.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its ...
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Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. It draws together the philosophy of science, metaphysics and epistemology to study the relationship between what there is and how we can understand it. The author seeks to describe — in a way accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike — the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions.Less
Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. It draws together the philosophy of science, metaphysics and epistemology to study the relationship between what there is and how we can understand it. The author seeks to describe — in a way accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike — the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions.
Maximilian de Gaynesford
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199287826
- eISBN:
- 9780191603570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199287821.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
‘Purism’, the claim that I is a pure indexical, is a contradictory position which requires the truth of three doctrines that have been shown to be myths: ‘rule theory’, ‘independence’, and ‘the ...
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‘Purism’, the claim that I is a pure indexical, is a contradictory position which requires the truth of three doctrines that have been shown to be myths: ‘rule theory’, ‘independence’, and ‘the guarantee’. A rash craving for simplicity explains its almost-universal support. ‘Purism’ is false for reasons that create a presumption in favour of a sharply diverging conception: that I is a deictic term. Thus, it is now necessary to establish what a ‘deictic term’ is, and whether I counts as one.Less
‘Purism’, the claim that I is a pure indexical, is a contradictory position which requires the truth of three doctrines that have been shown to be myths: ‘rule theory’, ‘independence’, and ‘the guarantee’. A rash craving for simplicity explains its almost-universal support. ‘Purism’ is false for reasons that create a presumption in favour of a sharply diverging conception: that I is a deictic term. Thus, it is now necessary to establish what a ‘deictic term’ is, and whether I counts as one.
Rein Taagepera
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199534661
- eISBN:
- 9780191715921
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534661.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
Predictive models should be as simple as one can get away with, and they must not predict absurdities. They join the parsimony of “Occam's razor” to the “Sherlock Holmes principle”: Show how things ...
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Predictive models should be as simple as one can get away with, and they must not predict absurdities. They join the parsimony of “Occam's razor” to the “Sherlock Holmes principle”: Show how things cannot be connected, and only one acceptable form of relationship may remain – or very few. Conceptual models must not predict absurdities even under extreme circumstances. All too many variables are interdependent rather than “independent” or “dependent,” so it is safer to talk about input and output variables under given conditions.Less
Predictive models should be as simple as one can get away with, and they must not predict absurdities. They join the parsimony of “Occam's razor” to the “Sherlock Holmes principle”: Show how things cannot be connected, and only one acceptable form of relationship may remain – or very few. Conceptual models must not predict absurdities even under extreme circumstances. All too many variables are interdependent rather than “independent” or “dependent,” so it is safer to talk about input and output variables under given conditions.
Laurence Freeman
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265536
- eISBN:
- 9780191760327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265536.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Contemplative consciousness opens up new ways to seeing and understanding, by refreshing the mind and spirit for acceptance of the unusual and the seemingly unconnected. The prophetic seeks radical ...
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Contemplative consciousness opens up new ways to seeing and understanding, by refreshing the mind and spirit for acceptance of the unusual and the seemingly unconnected. The prophetic seeks radical insights into the transformation of present structures, no matter how apparently complex. Both search for the undeniable human need to give meaning to experience, observation, and prophesy. Mortality provides another backdrop, as well as the merging of contradictions. Simplicity, stillness, meditation, and free ranging thought based on faith and love enable us to contemplate tipping points from the unimaginable to the imaginable. The best science is contemplative. And the best responses are just, moderate, prudent, and courageous. We need to learn to respond, and contemplative meditation opens the pathways of the mind.Less
Contemplative consciousness opens up new ways to seeing and understanding, by refreshing the mind and spirit for acceptance of the unusual and the seemingly unconnected. The prophetic seeks radical insights into the transformation of present structures, no matter how apparently complex. Both search for the undeniable human need to give meaning to experience, observation, and prophesy. Mortality provides another backdrop, as well as the merging of contradictions. Simplicity, stillness, meditation, and free ranging thought based on faith and love enable us to contemplate tipping points from the unimaginable to the imaginable. The best science is contemplative. And the best responses are just, moderate, prudent, and courageous. We need to learn to respond, and contemplative meditation opens the pathways of the mind.
Mark C. Baker
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195179675
- eISBN:
- 9780199869794
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines two different views of universal grammar. Most linguists assume that universal grammar is underspecified — providing us with an incomplete grammar to be elaborated by learning. ...
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This chapter examines two different views of universal grammar. Most linguists assume that universal grammar is underspecified — providing us with an incomplete grammar to be elaborated by learning. But the alternative is that it is overspecified — providing us with a full range of possible grammars from which we select one on the basis of environmental input. Underspecification is now the dominant view in the developmental sciences, and is often treated as the null hypothesis on grounds of greater possibility, parsimony, and simplicity. The chapter questions whether the underspecification view is really feasible and whether it is more parsimonious than the overspecification view, drawing on examples from certain African languages. It also shows that the perplexity evoked by overspecification theories disappears if language has a concealing purpose as well as a communicating purpose, similar to a code.Less
This chapter examines two different views of universal grammar. Most linguists assume that universal grammar is underspecified — providing us with an incomplete grammar to be elaborated by learning. But the alternative is that it is overspecified — providing us with a full range of possible grammars from which we select one on the basis of environmental input. Underspecification is now the dominant view in the developmental sciences, and is often treated as the null hypothesis on grounds of greater possibility, parsimony, and simplicity. The chapter questions whether the underspecification view is really feasible and whether it is more parsimonious than the overspecification view, drawing on examples from certain African languages. It also shows that the perplexity evoked by overspecification theories disappears if language has a concealing purpose as well as a communicating purpose, similar to a code.
Stephen Hampton
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199533367
- eISBN:
- 9780191714764
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199533367.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Church History
This chapter complements chapter six by setting out the doctrine of God which was advanced by the Anglican Reformed. Tracing the most detailed Reformed presentation of the issues, the Cambridge ...
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This chapter complements chapter six by setting out the doctrine of God which was advanced by the Anglican Reformed. Tracing the most detailed Reformed presentation of the issues, the Cambridge lectures of Pearson, it shows how the Reformed were committed to a remarkably Thomist conception of the divine nature and the divine attributes. Advancing a strong conception of divine simplicity, they held, as many of their contemporaries did not, to the idea of eternity as timeless, and denied the existence of middle knowledge or a conditional will within the Godhead. The chapter underlines that the Anglican Reformed explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to Roman Catholic Thomist thinking, and in fact preferred to cite those Roman Catholic authorities rather than contemporary continental Reformed sources.Less
This chapter complements chapter six by setting out the doctrine of God which was advanced by the Anglican Reformed. Tracing the most detailed Reformed presentation of the issues, the Cambridge lectures of Pearson, it shows how the Reformed were committed to a remarkably Thomist conception of the divine nature and the divine attributes. Advancing a strong conception of divine simplicity, they held, as many of their contemporaries did not, to the idea of eternity as timeless, and denied the existence of middle knowledge or a conditional will within the Godhead. The chapter underlines that the Anglican Reformed explicitly acknowledged their indebtedness to Roman Catholic Thomist thinking, and in fact preferred to cite those Roman Catholic authorities rather than contemporary continental Reformed sources.
John Russell Roberts
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195313932
- eISBN:
- 9780199871926
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313932.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The chapter begins the task of elucidating Berkeley's active/passive distinction by focusing on his understanding of the concept of existence. The latter is elucidated by mapping Berkeley's ...
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The chapter begins the task of elucidating Berkeley's active/passive distinction by focusing on his understanding of the concept of existence. The latter is elucidated by mapping Berkeley's understanding of its relationship to concepts such as simplicity, unity, identity, and substance. Berkeley's view of existence is contrasted with the competing views of Descartes and Locke. Throughout the chapter, the bundle-theory interpretation of spirits is used as a stalking horse and shown to be incompatible with Berkeley's account of existence as it applies to spirits.Less
The chapter begins the task of elucidating Berkeley's active/passive distinction by focusing on his understanding of the concept of existence. The latter is elucidated by mapping Berkeley's understanding of its relationship to concepts such as simplicity, unity, identity, and substance. Berkeley's view of existence is contrasted with the competing views of Descartes and Locke. Throughout the chapter, the bundle-theory interpretation of spirits is used as a stalking horse and shown to be incompatible with Berkeley's account of existence as it applies to spirits.
Paul Bloomfield
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. ...
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This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. It contends that Moore did not properly diagnose the openness of the relevant questions about goodness; it is not simplicity versus complexity, and it is not indefinability versus definability. Rather, it is the normativity involved in moral judgments and concepts that keeps Moorean questions open and blocks definitions of ‘good’; the same sort of normativity that keeps questions open in relation to concepts like ‘plus’, ‘mass’, and ‘triangle’. The issue of normativity in semantics, epistemology, and ethics is basically the same. ‘How can features of the world establish conditions under which it makes sense for us to think that there are ways we ought to conduct ourselves (with regard to our actions, our speech, or our beliefs) and other ways which ought not to be followed?’ A clear implication of this line of argument is that those working in metaethics have often laboured under the mistaken assumption that moral terms like ‘good’ are especially problematic.Less
This chapter begins by noting that the 20th century beneficiary of the open question argument has been (rather ironically) the class of non-realist views, including non-cognitivism and expressivism. It contends that Moore did not properly diagnose the openness of the relevant questions about goodness; it is not simplicity versus complexity, and it is not indefinability versus definability. Rather, it is the normativity involved in moral judgments and concepts that keeps Moorean questions open and blocks definitions of ‘good’; the same sort of normativity that keeps questions open in relation to concepts like ‘plus’, ‘mass’, and ‘triangle’. The issue of normativity in semantics, epistemology, and ethics is basically the same. ‘How can features of the world establish conditions under which it makes sense for us to think that there are ways we ought to conduct ourselves (with regard to our actions, our speech, or our beliefs) and other ways which ought not to be followed?’ A clear implication of this line of argument is that those working in metaethics have often laboured under the mistaken assumption that moral terms like ‘good’ are especially problematic.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
There are two different explanations of events — inanimate or scientific (in terms of the powers and liabilities of objects), and personal (in terms of the powers, beliefs, and purposes of persons). ...
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There are two different explanations of events — inanimate or scientific (in terms of the powers and liabilities of objects), and personal (in terms of the powers, beliefs, and purposes of persons). The ‘laws of nature’ are just statements about the powers and liabilities of objects of some kind. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis).Less
There are two different explanations of events — inanimate or scientific (in terms of the powers and liabilities of objects), and personal (in terms of the powers, beliefs, and purposes of persons). The ‘laws of nature’ are just statements about the powers and liabilities of objects of some kind. An explanatory hypothesis is probable insofar as it leads us to expect many otherwise inexplicable events to be explained, is simple, and fits in with ‘background knowledge’ (knowledge of how things work in fields outside the scope of the hypothesis).
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
There are three possible ultimate explanations of all observable phenomena: materialism (physical objects, their powers and liabilities, and their ability to explain everything else); a mixed theory; ...
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There are three possible ultimate explanations of all observable phenomena: materialism (physical objects, their powers and liabilities, and their ability to explain everything else); a mixed theory; and theism (God explains everything else). In postulating God, a person to whose powers, knowledge, freedom, and length of life has zero limits (except those of logic), theism provides the simplest ultimate explanation that there can be.Less
There are three possible ultimate explanations of all observable phenomena: materialism (physical objects, their powers and liabilities, and their ability to explain everything else); a mixed theory; and theism (God explains everything else). In postulating God, a person to whose powers, knowledge, freedom, and length of life has zero limits (except those of logic), theism provides the simplest ultimate explanation that there can be.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198235446
- eISBN:
- 9780191705618
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198235446.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The Universe is governed by very simple laws of nature which exist (together with the boundary conditions of the universe) to produce humans. God may be expected to produce a universe like this ...
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The Universe is governed by very simple laws of nature which exist (together with the boundary conditions of the universe) to produce humans. God may be expected to produce a universe like this because of the goodness of humans; but it is immensely unlikely that mere chance would produce such a universe. Although Darwinian evolution is part of the explanation of the existence of humans, its own operation requires explanation, ultimately provided by God.Less
The Universe is governed by very simple laws of nature which exist (together with the boundary conditions of the universe) to produce humans. God may be expected to produce a universe like this because of the goodness of humans; but it is immensely unlikely that mere chance would produce such a universe. Although Darwinian evolution is part of the explanation of the existence of humans, its own operation requires explanation, ultimately provided by God.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199271672
- eISBN:
- 9780191709357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271672.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
An explanatory hypothesis (whether of the personal or scientific kind) is probable in so far as it makes probable the occurrence of many observed phenomena, the occurrence of which is not probable ...
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An explanatory hypothesis (whether of the personal or scientific kind) is probable in so far as it makes probable the occurrence of many observed phenomena, the occurrence of which is not probable otherwise; and in so far as it is simple, and fits with background knowledge. This account of the probability of hypothesis is given precise form by Bayes's Theorem.Less
An explanatory hypothesis (whether of the personal or scientific kind) is probable in so far as it makes probable the occurrence of many observed phenomena, the occurrence of which is not probable otherwise; and in so far as it is simple, and fits with background knowledge. This account of the probability of hypothesis is given precise form by Bayes's Theorem.
Nicholas Maxwell
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261550
- eISBN:
- 9780191698750
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261550.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter argues that the problem of what the simplicity of a theory is can be solved within the framework of aim-oriented approach. It addresses the following questions: (1) What is simplicity?; ...
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This chapter argues that the problem of what the simplicity of a theory is can be solved within the framework of aim-oriented approach. It addresses the following questions: (1) What is simplicity?; and (2) What is the rationale for preferring simple to complex theories? In the present context, simplicity refers to the simplicity of the form of a law or theory, or the extent to which a theory is explanatory, elegant, or unified. The chapter asserts that in assessing the relative simplicity of two theories, what matters is the content, not their form, it is what theories assert about the world that must accord with physicalism. The chapter concludes that standard empiricism cannot solve the problem of what simplicity is, but an aim-oriented approach can.Less
This chapter argues that the problem of what the simplicity of a theory is can be solved within the framework of aim-oriented approach. It addresses the following questions: (1) What is simplicity?; and (2) What is the rationale for preferring simple to complex theories? In the present context, simplicity refers to the simplicity of the form of a law or theory, or the extent to which a theory is explanatory, elegant, or unified. The chapter asserts that in assessing the relative simplicity of two theories, what matters is the content, not their form, it is what theories assert about the world that must accord with physicalism. The chapter concludes that standard empiricism cannot solve the problem of what simplicity is, but an aim-oriented approach can.
Barry Dainton
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199288847
- eISBN:
- 9780191710742
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288847.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our ...
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Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. This book argues that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost — provided our streams of consciousness flow on — we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. In short, phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any other form of continuity. This book is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. Losses of consciousness are the most serious problem facing any experience-based approach: how can we survive them? The book shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. Other issues discussed include embodiment, the simplicity of the self, mental holism and fission.Less
Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions should be framed in terms of mental rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. This book argues that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost — provided our streams of consciousness flow on — we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. In short, phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any other form of continuity. This book is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. Losses of consciousness are the most serious problem facing any experience-based approach: how can we survive them? The book shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. Other issues discussed include embodiment, the simplicity of the self, mental holism and fission.
Lev Ginzburg and Mark Colyvan
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195168167
- eISBN:
- 9780199790159
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168167.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Ecology
It can be very difficult to decide between two competing theories. It is rarely a straightforward matter of appealing to evidence. Sometimes neither theory conforms perfectly with the evidence, and ...
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It can be very difficult to decide between two competing theories. It is rarely a straightforward matter of appealing to evidence. Sometimes neither theory conforms perfectly with the evidence, and sometimes more than one theory can be made to agree with the evidence. The issue then is not which theory best accords with the data, but which does so in the simplest or least ad hoc way. This chapter discusses some of the philosophical issues associated with scientific theory choice. These issues in philosophy of science shed light on the choice of population model, and lend support to the inertial model proposed in this book.Less
It can be very difficult to decide between two competing theories. It is rarely a straightforward matter of appealing to evidence. Sometimes neither theory conforms perfectly with the evidence, and sometimes more than one theory can be made to agree with the evidence. The issue then is not which theory best accords with the data, but which does so in the simplest or least ad hoc way. This chapter discusses some of the philosophical issues associated with scientific theory choice. These issues in philosophy of science shed light on the choice of population model, and lend support to the inertial model proposed in this book.
Andrew Radde-Gallwitz
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199574117
- eISBN:
- 9780191722110
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574117.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies, Theology
Divine simplicity is the idea that, as the ultimate principle of the universe, God must be a non‐composite unity not made up of parts or diverse attributes. The idea was appropriated by early ...
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Divine simplicity is the idea that, as the ultimate principle of the universe, God must be a non‐composite unity not made up of parts or diverse attributes. The idea was appropriated by early Christian theologians from non‐Christian philosophy and played a pivotal role in the development of Christian thought. Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz charts the progress of the idea of divine simplicity from the second through the fourth centuries, with particular attention to Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, two of the most subtle writers on this topic, both instrumental in the construction of the Trinitarian doctrine proclaimed as orthodox at the Council of Constantinople in 381. He demonstrates that divine simplicity was not a philosophical appendage awkwardly attached to the early Christian doctrine of God, but a notion that enabled Christians to articulate the consistency of God as portrayed in their scriptures. Basil and Gregory offered a unique construal of simplicity in responding to their principal doctrinal opponent, Eunomius of Cyzicus. Challenging accepted interpretations of Cappadocian brothers and the standard account of divine simplicity in recent philosophical literature, Radde‐Gallwitz argues that Basil and Gregory's achievement in transforming ideas inherited from the non‐Christian philosophy of their time has an ongoing relevance for Christian theological epistemology today.Less
Divine simplicity is the idea that, as the ultimate principle of the universe, God must be a non‐composite unity not made up of parts or diverse attributes. The idea was appropriated by early Christian theologians from non‐Christian philosophy and played a pivotal role in the development of Christian thought. Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz charts the progress of the idea of divine simplicity from the second through the fourth centuries, with particular attention to Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa, two of the most subtle writers on this topic, both instrumental in the construction of the Trinitarian doctrine proclaimed as orthodox at the Council of Constantinople in 381. He demonstrates that divine simplicity was not a philosophical appendage awkwardly attached to the early Christian doctrine of God, but a notion that enabled Christians to articulate the consistency of God as portrayed in their scriptures. Basil and Gregory offered a unique construal of simplicity in responding to their principal doctrinal opponent, Eunomius of Cyzicus. Challenging accepted interpretations of Cappadocian brothers and the standard account of divine simplicity in recent philosophical literature, Radde‐Gallwitz argues that Basil and Gregory's achievement in transforming ideas inherited from the non‐Christian philosophy of their time has an ongoing relevance for Christian theological epistemology today.
Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199574117
- eISBN:
- 9780191722110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574117.003.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies, Theology
The Introduction defines divine simplicity and theological epistemology. The latter is distinguished from religious epistemology, which asks, ‘On what grounds is someone's holding a certain belief ...
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The Introduction defines divine simplicity and theological epistemology. The latter is distinguished from religious epistemology, which asks, ‘On what grounds is someone's holding a certain belief justified?’ Theological epistemology starts from beliefs about God held by religious people and asks, ‘In what sense does the believer attribute these to God?’ The doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God's unity precludes a diversity of parts or attributes, raises problems for theological epistemology. Divine simplicity forces theologians to explain how divine attributes are predicated of God without introducing composition, complexity, or, most importantly, contradiction into God. In referring the various scriptural portrayals of God to a simple entity, early Christians attempted to explain how these can be coherent and consistent. Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa are unique in their approach to these ideas. They steer a median course between the identity thesis, according to which God's attributes are identical with God, and radical apophaticism, which says that no attribute can properly be ascribed to God. Basil and Gregory view divine attributes as propria, unique identifying characteristics inherent in the divine nature, but not identical with its essence. Attention is given to Christopher Stead's interpretation of Basil and Gregory.Less
The Introduction defines divine simplicity and theological epistemology. The latter is distinguished from religious epistemology, which asks, ‘On what grounds is someone's holding a certain belief justified?’ Theological epistemology starts from beliefs about God held by religious people and asks, ‘In what sense does the believer attribute these to God?’ The doctrine of divine simplicity, according to which God's unity precludes a diversity of parts or attributes, raises problems for theological epistemology. Divine simplicity forces theologians to explain how divine attributes are predicated of God without introducing composition, complexity, or, most importantly, contradiction into God. In referring the various scriptural portrayals of God to a simple entity, early Christians attempted to explain how these can be coherent and consistent. Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa are unique in their approach to these ideas. They steer a median course between the identity thesis, according to which God's attributes are identical with God, and radical apophaticism, which says that no attribute can properly be ascribed to God. Basil and Gregory view divine attributes as propria, unique identifying characteristics inherent in the divine nature, but not identical with its essence. Attention is given to Christopher Stead's interpretation of Basil and Gregory.
Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199574117
- eISBN:
- 9780191722110
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199574117.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies, Theology
Chapter 3 sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of Eunomius of Cyzicus and his opponents. It outlines the background to his view that ingeneracy, that is, having no cause, is the essential ...
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Chapter 3 sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of Eunomius of Cyzicus and his opponents. It outlines the background to his view that ingeneracy, that is, having no cause, is the essential characteristic of God. Two theologians are examined on this issue: Justin Martyr and Dionysius of Alexandria, the latter of whom comes closest to Eunomius' position, though in the context of a late third‐century argument about whether matter is also ingenerate. A second section investigates the background to Eunomius' view, labelled the ‘identity thesis’, that God's essence and God's attributes are identical. It is suggested that Athanasius of Alexandria, though far removed doctrinally from Eunomius, articulated a similar position in a text Eunomius likely knew. One common theme in the two is a concern to avoid construing the attributes of God as essential complements, that is as parts of God's essence. Clearly if God's essence has parts, it is not simple. Some background is given on essential complements, which Eunomius will accuse Basil of maintaining.Less
Chapter 3 sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of Eunomius of Cyzicus and his opponents. It outlines the background to his view that ingeneracy, that is, having no cause, is the essential characteristic of God. Two theologians are examined on this issue: Justin Martyr and Dionysius of Alexandria, the latter of whom comes closest to Eunomius' position, though in the context of a late third‐century argument about whether matter is also ingenerate. A second section investigates the background to Eunomius' view, labelled the ‘identity thesis’, that God's essence and God's attributes are identical. It is suggested that Athanasius of Alexandria, though far removed doctrinally from Eunomius, articulated a similar position in a text Eunomius likely knew. One common theme in the two is a concern to avoid construing the attributes of God as essential complements, that is as parts of God's essence. Clearly if God's essence has parts, it is not simple. Some background is given on essential complements, which Eunomius will accuse Basil of maintaining.
