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Logical and Ontological Types

Denis McManus

in The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”

This chapter discusses how Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘the illogical’ as sign/symbol confusion affects our understanding of logical and ontological ‘types’. It explores the notion that the ... More

This chapter discusses how Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘the illogical’ as sign/symbol confusion affects our understanding of logical and ontological ‘types’. It explores the notion that the confusion that ‘the illogical’ embodies needs to be addressed by introducing novel notations rather than constructing theories of logical and ontological ‘types’. It considers what talk of such ‘types’ amounts to if there is no real task for such theories to perform.Less

Conclusion

Denis McManus

in The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”

This chapter reviews how the author’s reading presents those features of the Tractatus (described in Ch. 1) that Wittgenstein himself described as crucial. It clarifies the interpretation of the ... More

This chapter reviews how the author’s reading presents those features of the Tractatus (described in Ch. 1) that Wittgenstein himself described as crucial. It clarifies the interpretation of the say/show distinction and explains how that theme runs through the many and superficially diverse interests of the book. It offers an interpretation of why Wittgenstein said that the ‘point’ of the Tractatus is ethical and connects this interpretation to his reflections on logical truth. Crucial to the diverse forms of philosophical confusion discussed is a spiritually significant willingness to confusedly endow words with a life of their own: this enchanting of, and enchantment by words transposes on to them, and the world which we then see them as ‘fitting’, responsibilities that are actually ours to bear.Less

Sense and Ineffabilia—Kierkegaard and the Tractatus

Genia Schönbaumsfeld

in A Confusion of the Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion

The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible ... More

The aim of this chapter is to undermine ‘resolute’ readings, advanced by James Conant, of both the Tractatus and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Interesting parallels are indeed discernible between Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein, but the exposure of a doctrine of ‘substantial nonsense’ (or of ineffable truth) isn't one of them. For whilst Wittgenstein is clearly committed to the notion of ineffabilia in the Tractatus, Climacus'/Kierkegaard's project in Postscript has nothing whatever to do with such a conception. A profound disanalogy therefore exists, in this respect, between the early Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. The points of contact that can therefore be perceived between the early Wittgenstein and the Danish philosopher cannot be located in the actual endorsement (or rejection) of similar views about the nature of language and what lies beyond its limits, but are rather to be found in a certain commonality of vision as regards ethics and religion.Less

Problem Cases for the General Form

Denis McManus

in The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”

This chapter examines how Wittgenstein envisaged the analysis of some important kinds of proposition that, at least superficially, do not fit the requirements of the general form of the proposition. ... More

This chapter examines how Wittgenstein envisaged the analysis of some important kinds of proposition that, at least superficially, do not fit the requirements of the general form of the proposition. General propositions represent a fundamental and central case in point and an explanation is offered of how Wittgenstein might have imagined their analysis. This explanation draws on ideas set out earlier in the book concerning the articulation of how particular languages and models ‘make sense’, the character of ‘logical types’ and ‘the illogical’, and Wittgenstein’s philosophical ambitions for notational reforms.Less

Epilogue: Wittgenstein's verdict

Noam Reisner

in Milton and the Ineffable

This brief epilogue offers a quotation from Wittgenstein's letters about poetry as a concluding remark for the book as a whole, and speculates whether or not Wittgenstein — a philosopher everywhere ... More

This brief epilogue offers a quotation from Wittgenstein's letters about poetry as a concluding remark for the book as a whole, and speculates whether or not Wittgenstein — a philosopher everywhere committed to exploring the limits of language and the problems of ineffability — would have approved of Milton's poetry, which appears to transgress the limits of Wittgensteinian ‘sense’ as it moves into the realms of ineffable ‘nonsense’. Using Wittgenstein's say-show distinction, as outlined in the Tractatus and implicitly alluded to in the discussed quotation, the epilogue finally concludes that Milton only ever pretends to say the unsayable, and that this pretence is what matters in his poetry.Less

Was he Trying to Whistle I t?

P. M. S Hacker

in Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies

Wittgenstein’s doctrines of what can be said and of what cannot be said but only shown, and the paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus that the sentences of the book are nonsensical, are outlined. ... More

Wittgenstein’s doctrines of what can be said and of what cannot be said but only shown, and the paradoxical conclusion of the Tractatus that the sentences of the book are nonsensical, are outlined. Professor Cora Diamond’s interpretation of the Tractatus is sketched. It is criticized as inconsistent with the text of the Tractatus, on the one hand, and with everything that Wittgenstein said about the Tractatus, both while writing it and thereafter, on the other.Less

Ethics and ‘the Inexpressible’

Denis McManus

in The Enchantment of Words: Wittgenstein's “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”

This chapter presents evidence that suggests that ideas of decency and conscience play a part in Wittgenstein’s obscure early remarks about the ethical and its supposed ‘inexpressibility’. An initial ... More

This chapter presents evidence that suggests that ideas of decency and conscience play a part in Wittgenstein’s obscure early remarks about the ethical and its supposed ‘inexpressibility’. An initial reading is offered, which gives a way of making sense of some of these remarks and identifies parallels with themes in the philosophy of logic that Wittgenstein seemed to have seen as parallel. However, the following chapter will argue that the inexpressible form of ‘ethical knowledge’ that the initial reading seems to reveal is actually a rung on a ‘ladder’ that is to be ‘climbed’ and then ‘thrown away’.Less

When the Whistling had to Sto p

P. M. S Hacker

in Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies

Ten propositional types that, according to the Tractatus, cannot ‘be said’ are identified. Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus account of each of these types of proposition is examined.

Schopenhauer’s Anti-Kantian Account of Morality

Barbara Hannan

in The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy

This chapter gives an overview of Kant's ethical theory, including both its appealing features and its problematic points. It notes that the following possess intuitive appeal: (1) Kant's notion that ... More

This chapter gives an overview of Kant's ethical theory, including both its appealing features and its problematic points. It notes that the following possess intuitive appeal: (1) Kant's notion that the maxim of a moral act must be universalizable; (2) Kant's insistence that rational beings are worthy of respect because they can overcome (at least some of) their desires and inclinations and act out of a sense of duty. It is argued, however, that Kant's theory of human psychology is unrealistic; reason alone cannot motivate action without any admixture of desire or inclination. The idea of a “categorical imperative” is criticized as unfounded and nonsensical, and it is argued that all imperatives are necessarily hypothetical. Kant's remarks condemning suicide are compared with Schopenhauer's; both are criticized. Schopenhauer's ethics of compassion is defended. Wittgenstein's views on ethics, and his “saying”/“showing” distinction, are discussed, and it is argued that these views have Schopenhauerian roots.Less

Logic and solipsism

James Levine

in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation

In this chapter, Berkeley’s ‘Master Argument’ is used to analyze how Russell and Wittgenstein regard the issue of solipsism. Berkeley argues that it is self–refuting to suppose that something is ... More

In this chapter, Berkeley’s ‘Master Argument’ is used to analyze how Russell and Wittgenstein regard the issue of solipsism. Berkeley argues that it is self–refuting to suppose that something is unthought-of, and concludes that everything is thought-of. Russell and Wittgenstein avoid, in different ways, a comparable argument for the solipsistic view that I am acquainted with everything: Russell by means of his view of generality; Wittgenstein by denying that if it is self-refuting to suppose p, we are entitled to conclude not-p. On this reading, while Wittgenstein does not hold that solipsism is a metaphysical truth that can only be ‘shown’, the show/say distinction is not ‘kicked away’ by the end of the Tractatus. Finally, it is argued that a recent debate between Nagel and Davidson regarding the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes mirrors the debate between Russell and Wittgenstein regarding solipsism.Less

The Tractatus’ Philosophy of Logic and Carnap

Oskari Kuusela

in Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy: Re-examining the Roots and Development of Analytic Philosophy

This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to ... More

This chapter discusses the relation between the Tractatus’ and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. Explained in Carnapian terms, the goal of the Tractatus is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, logical principles and concepts of a logical language to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore part of the Tractatus’ view, and contrary to Carnap’s criticism, the sentences of the Tractatus can be clearly distinguished from nonsensical metaphysical statements. Moreover, despite the Tractatus’ rejection of syntactical statements, there is a correspondence between Wittgenstein’s saying–showing distinction and Carnap’s object-language/syntax-language distinction. Both constitute ways to clarify the logical distinction between the logico-syntactical determinations concerning language and the use of language according to such determinations, a distinction absent in Frege and Russell. Wittgenstein’s distinction thus constitutes a precursor of the object-language/syntax-language distinction which the latter in a certain sense affirms. The saying–showing distinction agrees with Carnap’s position also in marking logic as something that is not true/false about either language or reality, a view that underlies Carnap’s principle of tolerance. The standard view that Carnap overcame the philosophy of logic of the Tractatus in the 1930s must therefore be regarded as problematic and misleading.Less

What is Frege’s ‘concept horse problem’?

Ian Proops

in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation

Frege’s concept horse problem is often presented as inspiring what the Tractatus has to say about logical category distinctions and the say-show distinction. But what exactly is that problem; how far ... More

Frege’s concept horse problem is often presented as inspiring what the Tractatus has to say about logical category distinctions and the say-show distinction. But what exactly is that problem; how far is it soluble, and how far did Frege suppose it soluble? The chapter argues that the problems commentators have discussed under this rubric in fact constitute a family of distinct sub-problems, some of which Frege regarded as soluble, others of which he regarded as innocuous, and yet others of which he simply ignored. Since the most acute of these sub-problems—the problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions—is one with which Frege did not expressly concern himself in writings available to Wittgenstein, the Tractatus does not—contrary to Peter Geach—derive its distinctive doctrines on these matters from Frege. Rather, reflection on Frege’s writings serves as the occasion for Wittgenstein to formulate those doctrines for himselfLess