Bruce Walsh and Michael Lynch
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198830870
- eISBN:
- 9780191868986
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198830870.003.0030
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics, Biochemistry / Molecular Biology
This chapter extends many of the results from Chapter 29 on single trait-fitness associations to the multiple trait setting. It examines the estimate of multivariate fitness surfaces, starting with ...
More
This chapter extends many of the results from Chapter 29 on single trait-fitness associations to the multiple trait setting. It examines the estimate of multivariate fitness surfaces, starting with quadratic surfaces and then moving to nonparametric versions (which assume no a prior functional form). It also examines path analysis, the analysis of missing data, and multilevel selection.Less
This chapter extends many of the results from Chapter 29 on single trait-fitness associations to the multiple trait setting. It examines the estimate of multivariate fitness surfaces, starting with quadratic surfaces and then moving to nonparametric versions (which assume no a prior functional form). It also examines path analysis, the analysis of missing data, and multilevel selection.
C. M. Lessells
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- December 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199692576
- eISBN:
- 9780191774737
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692576.003.0009
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
Sexual conflict over parental investment (PI) occurs because both parents accrue a fitness benefit through care provided by either parent, but pay the fitness cost of only their own care. As a result ...
More
Sexual conflict over parental investment (PI) occurs because both parents accrue a fitness benefit through care provided by either parent, but pay the fitness cost of only their own care. As a result there is sexually antagonistic selection over the amount of PI by each of the parents. How will this sexual conflict be evolutionarily resolved? The evolution of manipulative traits in one or both sexes is infrequent in sexual conflict over PI. Instead, the two sexes coevolve until neither sex can increase its fitness by changing its parental care strategy. Modelling such situations requires game theory models seeking evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs). This chapter reviews game theory models and related experimental evidence for two major parental care decisions. The first decision is how long to care for offspring (also referred to as offspring desertion or mate desertion). Here the length of care by each sex not only affects fitness benefit through offspring, but also the availability of mates and hence the fitness benefits of desertion. Species with variable mating patterns have been particularly important in experimentally investigating the costs and benefits of desertion. The second decision is how much to care for offspring. The original Houston-Davies model conceptualized parental care as a single amount of investment by each sex where neither sex could react to its mate's care (‘sealed bid’ models). More recent models have incorporated negotiation between the parents. Model predictions have been tested using experiments manipulating partner effort.Less
Sexual conflict over parental investment (PI) occurs because both parents accrue a fitness benefit through care provided by either parent, but pay the fitness cost of only their own care. As a result there is sexually antagonistic selection over the amount of PI by each of the parents. How will this sexual conflict be evolutionarily resolved? The evolution of manipulative traits in one or both sexes is infrequent in sexual conflict over PI. Instead, the two sexes coevolve until neither sex can increase its fitness by changing its parental care strategy. Modelling such situations requires game theory models seeking evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs). This chapter reviews game theory models and related experimental evidence for two major parental care decisions. The first decision is how long to care for offspring (also referred to as offspring desertion or mate desertion). Here the length of care by each sex not only affects fitness benefit through offspring, but also the availability of mates and hence the fitness benefits of desertion. Species with variable mating patterns have been particularly important in experimentally investigating the costs and benefits of desertion. The second decision is how much to care for offspring. The original Houston-Davies model conceptualized parental care as a single amount of investment by each sex where neither sex could react to its mate's care (‘sealed bid’ models). More recent models have incorporated negotiation between the parents. Model predictions have been tested using experiments manipulating partner effort.
