John Mullan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122524
- eISBN:
- 9780191671449
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122524.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
With the rise of the novel in the mid-18th century came the rise of sentimentalism. While the fondness for sentiment embarrassed later literary critics, it originally legitimized a morally suspect ...
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With the rise of the novel in the mid-18th century came the rise of sentimentalism. While the fondness for sentiment embarrassed later literary critics, it originally legitimized a morally suspect phenomenon: the novel. This book describes that legitimation, yet it looks beyond the narrowly literary to the lives and expressed philosophies of some of the major writers of the age, showing the language of feeling to be a resource of philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith, as much as novelists like Samuel Richardson and Laurence Sterne.Less
With the rise of the novel in the mid-18th century came the rise of sentimentalism. While the fondness for sentiment embarrassed later literary critics, it originally legitimized a morally suspect phenomenon: the novel. This book describes that legitimation, yet it looks beyond the narrowly literary to the lives and expressed philosophies of some of the major writers of the age, showing the language of feeling to be a resource of philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith, as much as novelists like Samuel Richardson and Laurence Sterne.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in ...
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There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence, caring, and compassion and their place in the moral life. This book seeks to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so primarily in terms of the notion of empathy. Hume tried to do something like this more than two centuries ago, though he didn't have the word empathy and used the term sympathy instead. But Hume misconstrued the phenomenology of moral approval and disapproval, and the nascent theories of moral meaning he grounded in approval and disapproval allow for (much) less objectivity than moral judgments seem to possess. The present book uses a semi‐Kripkean reference‐fixing view of terms like right and wrong to show how moral claims can be objectively valid a priori and yet at the same time action‐guiding and motivating — something that Kantian ethics seeks to provide, but sentimentalism turns out to be more capable of giving us. In addition to dealing with semantic issues, this book shows how sentimentalist forms of moral education and moral learning are possible; and in its later chapters, it also focuses on normative issues of public morality: discussing respect, autonomy, justice, and objectivity itself in strictly sentimentalist care‐ethical terms and demonstrating that such an approach can be thoroughly feminist in its implications and goals. Rationalism now dominates the scene in moral philosophy, but there are signs of change, and this book works to encourage those possibilities.Less
There has been a great deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in metaethical questions about the meaning of moral terms or in normative issues about benevolence, caring, and compassion and their place in the moral life. This book seeks to deal with both sorts of issues and to do so primarily in terms of the notion of empathy. Hume tried to do something like this more than two centuries ago, though he didn't have the word empathy and used the term sympathy instead. But Hume misconstrued the phenomenology of moral approval and disapproval, and the nascent theories of moral meaning he grounded in approval and disapproval allow for (much) less objectivity than moral judgments seem to possess. The present book uses a semi‐Kripkean reference‐fixing view of terms like right and wrong to show how moral claims can be objectively valid a priori and yet at the same time action‐guiding and motivating — something that Kantian ethics seeks to provide, but sentimentalism turns out to be more capable of giving us. In addition to dealing with semantic issues, this book shows how sentimentalist forms of moral education and moral learning are possible; and in its later chapters, it also focuses on normative issues of public morality: discussing respect, autonomy, justice, and objectivity itself in strictly sentimentalist care‐ethical terms and demonstrating that such an approach can be thoroughly feminist in its implications and goals. Rationalism now dominates the scene in moral philosophy, but there are signs of change, and this book works to encourage those possibilities.
Shaun Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195169348
- eISBN:
- 9780199835041
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169344.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. ...
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This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. This indicates that philosophical accounts of moral judgment that eschew the emotions are mistaken. However, the volume also argues that prevailing philosophical accounts that embrace a role for the emotions are also mistaken. The empirical work points to a quite different account of moral judgment than philosophers have considered, an account in which normative rules and emotions make independent contributions to moral judgment. Further, the volume argues that the emotions play an important role in the normative rules that get fixed in the culture. The history of norms indicates that norms that resonate with our emotions are more likely to survive.Less
This volume develops a new account of the nature of moral judgment. Evidence from developmental psychology and psychopathologies suggests that emotions play a crucial role in normal moral judgment. This indicates that philosophical accounts of moral judgment that eschew the emotions are mistaken. However, the volume also argues that prevailing philosophical accounts that embrace a role for the emotions are also mistaken. The empirical work points to a quite different account of moral judgment than philosophers have considered, an account in which normative rules and emotions make independent contributions to moral judgment. Further, the volume argues that the emotions play an important role in the normative rules that get fixed in the culture. The history of norms indicates that norms that resonate with our emotions are more likely to survive.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138375
- eISBN:
- 9780199833696
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138376.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Since the revival of virtue ethics, most work in virtue ethics has been Aristotelian in inspiration. This book draws, however, from the virtue‐ethical tradition of British moral sentimentalism a la ...
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Since the revival of virtue ethics, most work in virtue ethics has been Aristotelian in inspiration. This book draws, however, from the virtue‐ethical tradition of British moral sentimentalism a la Hume and Hutcheson, and is also influenced by the recently articulated ”ethics of caring”. It defends an agent‐based virtue ethics that treats the moral quality of motivation as the basis for all other ethical evaluations, and the emphasis is on caring, love, and benevolence rather than the sorts of considerations that Aristotle mainly focuses on.Less
Since the revival of virtue ethics, most work in virtue ethics has been Aristotelian in inspiration. This book draws, however, from the virtue‐ethical tradition of British moral sentimentalism a la Hume and Hutcheson, and is also influenced by the recently articulated ”ethics of caring”. It defends an agent‐based virtue ethics that treats the moral quality of motivation as the basis for all other ethical evaluations, and the emphasis is on caring, love, and benevolence rather than the sorts of considerations that Aristotle mainly focuses on.
Keith Gandal
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195338911
- eISBN:
- 9780199867127
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195338911.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory, American, 20th Century Literature
This chapter discusses methodology and places the book in the context of related scholarship on the subject. In particular, it takes issue with literary scholarship whose approach is based on a ...
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This chapter discusses methodology and places the book in the context of related scholarship on the subject. In particular, it takes issue with literary scholarship whose approach is based on a history of ideas or discourses and thus eschews attention to authors' biographies, or experiences of authors — and thus ultimately ignores historical experiences.(It addresses Walter Michaels' Our America, which is an influential example of such scholarship that addresses modernist novels and their relationship to 1920s nativism.) The chapter also argues with studies of the relationship between modernist style and politics that give attention to stylistics per se, apart from plot and character. It discusses the common plot that unifies the 1920s novels at issue, discusses why critics have missed this plot, and offers an alternative argument about modernist style in the context of modernist plots and characters, as well as the historical context of the mobilization. In so doing, it traces the deconstruction of the sentimental novel of seduction by Progressive Era realist writers and the rise of the modernist, racist promiscuity plot, which the three 1920s novels at issue here share with each other, and with Djuna Barnes' Nightwood and Nathanael West's The Day of the Locust.Less
This chapter discusses methodology and places the book in the context of related scholarship on the subject. In particular, it takes issue with literary scholarship whose approach is based on a history of ideas or discourses and thus eschews attention to authors' biographies, or experiences of authors — and thus ultimately ignores historical experiences.(It addresses Walter Michaels' Our America, which is an influential example of such scholarship that addresses modernist novels and their relationship to 1920s nativism.) The chapter also argues with studies of the relationship between modernist style and politics that give attention to stylistics per se, apart from plot and character. It discusses the common plot that unifies the 1920s novels at issue, discusses why critics have missed this plot, and offers an alternative argument about modernist style in the context of modernist plots and characters, as well as the historical context of the mobilization. In so doing, it traces the deconstruction of the sentimental novel of seduction by Progressive Era realist writers and the rise of the modernist, racist promiscuity plot, which the three 1920s novels at issue here share with each other, and with Djuna Barnes' Nightwood and Nathanael West's The Day of the Locust.
Thomas Holden
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579945
- eISBN:
- 9780191722776
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This is the first of two chapters documenting and examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the natural limits of our human passions, ...
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This is the first of two chapters documenting and examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the natural limits of our human passions, along with his sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, in order to conclude that the deity is beyond the projected, response-dependent world of moral properties. The chapter focuses on the first stage of the argument, Hume's claim that the deity is not the ‘natural object’ of any of our passions, including love, hate, gratitude, envy, and the rest. In Hume's view, none of our passions — none of our affective attitudes, none of our intentional feelings, emotions, or sentiments — can be directed toward this sort of transcendental being.Less
This is the first of two chapters documenting and examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. The argument appeals to Hume's account of the natural limits of our human passions, along with his sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, in order to conclude that the deity is beyond the projected, response-dependent world of moral properties. The chapter focuses on the first stage of the argument, Hume's claim that the deity is not the ‘natural object’ of any of our passions, including love, hate, gratitude, envy, and the rest. In Hume's view, none of our passions — none of our affective attitudes, none of our intentional feelings, emotions, or sentiments — can be directed toward this sort of transcendental being.
Thomas Holden
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579945
- eISBN:
- 9780191722776
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This is the second of two chapters examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. According to the argument, human passions, including our feelings of moral approval and disapproval, ...
More
This is the second of two chapters examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. According to the argument, human passions, including our feelings of moral approval and disapproval, range only so far as the outer frontier of sense and imagination. Given Hume's sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, it follows that the projected properties of virtue and vice are confined to the immanent world, and cannot characterize any transcendental order beyond this permanent horizon: the deity cannot have any moral attributes. It is argued that Hume is committed to this argument, and that he is aware that he is so committed. The chapter also examines possible objections to the argument, and concludes that it is defensible on Hume's own terms.Less
This is the second of two chapters examining Hume's argument from sentimentalism to moral atheism. According to the argument, human passions, including our feelings of moral approval and disapproval, range only so far as the outer frontier of sense and imagination. Given Hume's sentimentalist metaphysics of morals, it follows that the projected properties of virtue and vice are confined to the immanent world, and cannot characterize any transcendental order beyond this permanent horizon: the deity cannot have any moral attributes. It is argued that Hume is committed to this argument, and that he is aware that he is so committed. The chapter also examines possible objections to the argument, and concludes that it is defensible on Hume's own terms.
Frederick C. Beiser
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199573011
- eISBN:
- 9780191722202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573011.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, who is considered as the last great thinker in the rationalist tradition of aesthetics. Lessing occupies a unique place in the rationalist tradition. ...
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This chapter focuses on Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, who is considered as the last great thinker in the rationalist tradition of aesthetics. Lessing occupies a unique place in the rationalist tradition. He was its single thinker to be not only a great aesthetician but also a great writer. No one else in this tradition combined so well critical reflection on the arts with the practice of them. Lessing's work as a dramatist shaped his aesthetic thought, which in turn altered the course of the rationalist tradition. Since he saw that writers need inspiration, Lessing became more sceptical of rules, and more appreciative of genius, than most of his predecessors and contemporaries.Less
This chapter focuses on Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, who is considered as the last great thinker in the rationalist tradition of aesthetics. Lessing occupies a unique place in the rationalist tradition. He was its single thinker to be not only a great aesthetician but also a great writer. No one else in this tradition combined so well critical reflection on the arts with the practice of them. Lessing's work as a dramatist shaped his aesthetic thought, which in turn altered the course of the rationalist tradition. Since he saw that writers need inspiration, Lessing became more sceptical of rules, and more appreciative of genius, than most of his predecessors and contemporaries.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to ...
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This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to propositions about reasons, so that the normative domain is the domain of reasons. Part I sets out the foundations of this analysis, basing it on three primitive reason relations. Part II applies the analysis to epistemic reasons, hence to aprioricity, modality and probability, Part III to evaluative and practical reasons, hence value and morality. Part III also discusses the structure of practical reason, arguing that practical reasons have three normative sources, considers the nature of moral judgement, and discusses the relationship between moral judgement and practical reasons. Finally Part IV moves to the metatheory of reason relations, arguing for an irrealist form of cognitivism. It is shown how this metaphysics of reason grounds a new form of Critical philosophy. Freedom and knowledge are possible only if we can have a priori knowledge of reason relations, and such knowledge is only possible because it is grounded in pure spontaneity. Skorupski relates his argument to the insights of two traditions in the history of philosophy: the Critical or Kantian tradition, and the tradition of moral sentimentalism.Less
This book is about normativity and reasons. It works out the consequences of a currently much discussed account of normativity, according to which all normative propositions are reducible to propositions about reasons, so that the normative domain is the domain of reasons. Part I sets out the foundations of this analysis, basing it on three primitive reason relations. Part II applies the analysis to epistemic reasons, hence to aprioricity, modality and probability, Part III to evaluative and practical reasons, hence value and morality. Part III also discusses the structure of practical reason, arguing that practical reasons have three normative sources, considers the nature of moral judgement, and discusses the relationship between moral judgement and practical reasons. Finally Part IV moves to the metatheory of reason relations, arguing for an irrealist form of cognitivism. It is shown how this metaphysics of reason grounds a new form of Critical philosophy. Freedom and knowledge are possible only if we can have a priori knowledge of reason relations, and such knowledge is only possible because it is grounded in pure spontaneity. Skorupski relates his argument to the insights of two traditions in the history of philosophy: the Critical or Kantian tradition, and the tradition of moral sentimentalism.
Nigel Leask
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199572618
- eISBN:
- 9780191722974
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572618.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Poetry, 18th-century Literature
This chapter argues that Burns's poetic self-fashioning was a successful attempt to achieve sentimental and cultural credit in the face of the practical financial difficulties that he faces as an ...
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This chapter argues that Burns's poetic self-fashioning was a successful attempt to achieve sentimental and cultural credit in the face of the practical financial difficulties that he faces as an Ayrshire farmer. Like others of his class, he was inculcated with the ideology of improvement but found it impossible to make practical headway due to undercapitalization and high rentals. Burns's alternative vocation as a poet is discussed in relation to his Commonplace Book, the Verse Epistles in the Kilmarnock Volume, and his most ambitious poem, ‘The Vision’. The chapter also analyses his relationship to patronage and his creation of a virtual community of upper class Ayrshire patrons, with reference to the social geography and the 18th-century cartography of Ayrshire.Less
This chapter argues that Burns's poetic self-fashioning was a successful attempt to achieve sentimental and cultural credit in the face of the practical financial difficulties that he faces as an Ayrshire farmer. Like others of his class, he was inculcated with the ideology of improvement but found it impossible to make practical headway due to undercapitalization and high rentals. Burns's alternative vocation as a poet is discussed in relation to his Commonplace Book, the Verse Epistles in the Kilmarnock Volume, and his most ambitious poem, ‘The Vision’. The chapter also analyses his relationship to patronage and his creation of a virtual community of upper class Ayrshire patrons, with reference to the social geography and the 18th-century cartography of Ayrshire.
John Mullan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122524
- eISBN:
- 9780191671449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122524.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
Throughout the 18th century, those who extolled Samuel Richardson's novels as paragons of their form emphasized two things: these texts inculcated virtue, and they staged exquisite scenes of feeling ...
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Throughout the 18th century, those who extolled Samuel Richardson's novels as paragons of their form emphasized two things: these texts inculcated virtue, and they staged exquisite scenes of feeling and distress. The relationship between these two capacities of the novels, a relationship which continually preoccupied both Richardson and his readers, distinguishes the texts ‘sentimentalism’. If Richardson's writings have become in some ways alien or inaccessible to us, one reason is that their moral didacticism and their indulgence in cameos of lachrymose emotion together invite a practice of reading now forgotten. These preoccupations of the narratives have become foreign, or even embarrassing; for Samuel Johnson and for Richardson's other supporters, however, they raised the texts above the normal level of the novel's aspirations. They lent the form a new moral and stylistic density. Women are bound together — in Richardson's extraordinary version of femininity — in sighs, in tears, in postures, and in movements instantly understood. This is his version of essential sociability.Less
Throughout the 18th century, those who extolled Samuel Richardson's novels as paragons of their form emphasized two things: these texts inculcated virtue, and they staged exquisite scenes of feeling and distress. The relationship between these two capacities of the novels, a relationship which continually preoccupied both Richardson and his readers, distinguishes the texts ‘sentimentalism’. If Richardson's writings have become in some ways alien or inaccessible to us, one reason is that their moral didacticism and their indulgence in cameos of lachrymose emotion together invite a practice of reading now forgotten. These preoccupations of the narratives have become foreign, or even embarrassing; for Samuel Johnson and for Richardson's other supporters, however, they raised the texts above the normal level of the novel's aspirations. They lent the form a new moral and stylistic density. Women are bound together — in Richardson's extraordinary version of femininity — in sighs, in tears, in postures, and in movements instantly understood. This is his version of essential sociability.
John Mullan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122524
- eISBN:
- 9780191671449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122524.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
In 1779, there appeared through three consecutive issues of the Edinburgh periodical The Mirror a sentimental tale which became known, and much anthologized, as the ‘Story of La Roche’. It was ...
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In 1779, there appeared through three consecutive issues of the Edinburgh periodical The Mirror a sentimental tale which became known, and much anthologized, as the ‘Story of La Roche’. It was written by Henry Mackenzie, editor of The Mirror, and a man renowned chiefly for the success of his novel The Man of Feeling. It tells of how an atheistic philosopher living in France meets a clergyman (La Roche) and his daughter, how' he comes to admire their simple virtue, and how, when the daughter dies, he learns to appreciate the combined sensibility and religiosity of the ‘good old man's’ reactions. The sceptical philosopher is made to acknowledge the worth of a religion which ‘was that of sentiment, not theory’. In one way, the story is just a minor relic of sentimentalism. When Mackenzie showed it to Adam Smith, he immediately recognized its subject (or target) as David Hume. In Samuel Richardson's fiction, the enemies to affection, however metaphorical, were clearly and cruelly specified.Less
In 1779, there appeared through three consecutive issues of the Edinburgh periodical The Mirror a sentimental tale which became known, and much anthologized, as the ‘Story of La Roche’. It was written by Henry Mackenzie, editor of The Mirror, and a man renowned chiefly for the success of his novel The Man of Feeling. It tells of how an atheistic philosopher living in France meets a clergyman (La Roche) and his daughter, how' he comes to admire their simple virtue, and how, when the daughter dies, he learns to appreciate the combined sensibility and religiosity of the ‘good old man's’ reactions. The sceptical philosopher is made to acknowledge the worth of a religion which ‘was that of sentiment, not theory’. In one way, the story is just a minor relic of sentimentalism. When Mackenzie showed it to Adam Smith, he immediately recognized its subject (or target) as David Hume. In Samuel Richardson's fiction, the enemies to affection, however metaphorical, were clearly and cruelly specified.
John Mullan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122524
- eISBN:
- 9780191671449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122524.003.0005
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
The anonymous pamphlet A Funeral Discourse, Occasioned by the Much Lamented Death of Mr Yorick, published in 1761, was but one of the many spoofs and rejoinders which attached themselves to Laurence ...
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The anonymous pamphlet A Funeral Discourse, Occasioned by the Much Lamented Death of Mr Yorick, published in 1761, was but one of the many spoofs and rejoinders which attached themselves to Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy throughout the 1760s and 1770s. If we are to recover Sterne's ‘sentimentalism’, we should look at the reception and circulation of his writings, and if we do this we can follow the lead of the pamphleteer. Sterne's fiction is notoriously self-conscious about the modes of a novel's coherence — about the powers of a narrator to convince, to beguile, and to satisfy. It is attentive to its ‘sociality’. Sterne's characters are attached to the world by the metaphors and allusions on which they rely, and which protect them against death, discord, and disaster. They are not mad, first because they are attached to each other by sympathy, and second because they are innocents whose limited ways with words are displayed to a reader who has to be sophisticated to comprehend their transparent instincts.Less
The anonymous pamphlet A Funeral Discourse, Occasioned by the Much Lamented Death of Mr Yorick, published in 1761, was but one of the many spoofs and rejoinders which attached themselves to Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy throughout the 1760s and 1770s. If we are to recover Sterne's ‘sentimentalism’, we should look at the reception and circulation of his writings, and if we do this we can follow the lead of the pamphleteer. Sterne's fiction is notoriously self-conscious about the modes of a novel's coherence — about the powers of a narrator to convince, to beguile, and to satisfy. It is attentive to its ‘sociality’. Sterne's characters are attached to the world by the metaphors and allusions on which they rely, and which protect them against death, discord, and disaster. They are not mad, first because they are attached to each other by sympathy, and second because they are innocents whose limited ways with words are displayed to a reader who has to be sophisticated to comprehend their transparent instincts.
John Mullan
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198122524
- eISBN:
- 9780191671449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198122524.003.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
This chapter focuses on three very different writers whose works all chronicle peculiarly intimate relationships between the texts they produced and the social lives for which they also became known: ...
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This chapter focuses on three very different writers whose works all chronicle peculiarly intimate relationships between the texts they produced and the social lives for which they also became known: David Hume, Samuel Richardson, and Laurence Sterne. From the perspective of sentimentalism, all were committed to the resources of a language of feeling for the purpose of representing necessary social bonds; all discovered in their writings a sociability which was dependent upon the communication of passions and sentiments. It is this discovery which was formative of that fashion of 18th-century fiction now called ‘sentimental’. For these authors, the conception of harmonious sociability was dramatized not only in the books they produced, but also in their self-conscious efforts actually to live out models of social being. A biography of any of them records the attempt to make exemplary a social life. It might seem a trivial occupation, as the novelistic vogue of sentiment can appear a facile indulgence; both, however, are historically significant, bespeaking the difficulty which a polite culture was having in imagining the nature of social relations.Less
This chapter focuses on three very different writers whose works all chronicle peculiarly intimate relationships between the texts they produced and the social lives for which they also became known: David Hume, Samuel Richardson, and Laurence Sterne. From the perspective of sentimentalism, all were committed to the resources of a language of feeling for the purpose of representing necessary social bonds; all discovered in their writings a sociability which was dependent upon the communication of passions and sentiments. It is this discovery which was formative of that fashion of 18th-century fiction now called ‘sentimental’. For these authors, the conception of harmonious sociability was dramatized not only in the books they produced, but also in their self-conscious efforts actually to live out models of social being. A biography of any of them records the attempt to make exemplary a social life. It might seem a trivial occupation, as the novelistic vogue of sentiment can appear a facile indulgence; both, however, are historically significant, bespeaking the difficulty which a polite culture was having in imagining the nature of social relations.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book is about normativity and reasons. The Introduction outlines the main themes of the book and introduces the topics to be covered.
This book is about normativity and reasons. The Introduction outlines the main themes of the book and introduces the topics to be covered.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter begins an account of the normative sources of evaluative‐practical reasoning, and its distinctive concepts. One such source is a principle that can be called the ‘Bridge’ principle, ...
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This chapter begins an account of the normative sources of evaluative‐practical reasoning, and its distinctive concepts. One such source is a principle that can be called the ‘Bridge’ principle, since it is the bridge by which thought crosses from evaluative reasons to practical reasons. The concept of a person's good and the concept of personal ideals both belong within this sentimentalist territory.Less
This chapter begins an account of the normative sources of evaluative‐practical reasoning, and its distinctive concepts. One such source is a principle that can be called the ‘Bridge’ principle, since it is the bridge by which thought crosses from evaluative reasons to practical reasons. The concept of a person's good and the concept of personal ideals both belong within this sentimentalist territory.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapters 13 and 14 argue that sentimentalism can give no account of how impartiality enters into the sources of practical reasons. Impartial principles underlie our notions of good and of rights; ...
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Chapters 13 and 14 argue that sentimentalism can give no account of how impartiality enters into the sources of practical reasons. Impartial principles underlie our notions of good and of rights; their epistemic basis cannot be the affective dispositions, it can only be the disinterested dispositions of the will. Chapter 13 discusses the principle of Good and utilitarianism.Less
Chapters 13 and 14 argue that sentimentalism can give no account of how impartiality enters into the sources of practical reasons. Impartial principles underlie our notions of good and of rights; their epistemic basis cannot be the affective dispositions, it can only be the disinterested dispositions of the will. Chapter 13 discusses the principle of Good and utilitarianism.
John Skorupski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587636
- eISBN:
- 9780191595394
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587636.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Why do we engage in moral judgement, as well as practical judgements about what to do? Understanding the role of moral judgement requires a deeper understanding of the moral feelings than has been ...
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Why do we engage in moral judgement, as well as practical judgements about what to do? Understanding the role of moral judgement requires a deeper understanding of the moral feelings than has been undertaken so far, so Chapter 15 examines the moral feelings and their relation to moral judgement.Less
Why do we engage in moral judgement, as well as practical judgements about what to do? Understanding the role of moral judgement requires a deeper understanding of the moral feelings than has been undertaken so far, so Chapter 15 examines the moral feelings and their relation to moral judgement.
Andrew Lawson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199828050
- eISBN:
- 9780199933334
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199828050.003.0002
- Subject:
- Literature, American, 19th Century Literature
This chapter shows how Cooke’s Balzacian realism provides a solid referential ground for her characters, locating them within a household economy in the process of being broken up by the forced ...
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This chapter shows how Cooke’s Balzacian realism provides a solid referential ground for her characters, locating them within a household economy in the process of being broken up by the forced migrations and commercial transactions of the market economy. While the sentimentalism of Harriet Beecher Stowe assumes a bond of sympathy between her characters and her readership, Cooke’s realism highlights the social gulf between her subjects, the women of the rural poor, and her educated, middle-class readers. The chapter traces the downward mobility of Cooke’s father, Henry Wadsworth Terry, and the privations Cooke endured as a result of this loss of social position. Her stories are narrated through an imaginative identification with the marginal and the excluded, constructing a militantly frugal, lower-middle-class aesthetic aimed against upper-middle-class extravagance and pretension.Less
This chapter shows how Cooke’s Balzacian realism provides a solid referential ground for her characters, locating them within a household economy in the process of being broken up by the forced migrations and commercial transactions of the market economy. While the sentimentalism of Harriet Beecher Stowe assumes a bond of sympathy between her characters and her readership, Cooke’s realism highlights the social gulf between her subjects, the women of the rural poor, and her educated, middle-class readers. The chapter traces the downward mobility of Cooke’s father, Henry Wadsworth Terry, and the privations Cooke endured as a result of this loss of social position. Her stories are narrated through an imaginative identification with the marginal and the excluded, constructing a militantly frugal, lower-middle-class aesthetic aimed against upper-middle-class extravagance and pretension.
Simon Blackburn
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199548057
- eISBN:
- 9780191594953
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548057.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter rebuts recent attacks on sentimentalism by Samuel Kerstein and Christopher Peacocke. Each has supposed that it follows from expressive theories of ethics that if our sentiments were ...
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This chapter rebuts recent attacks on sentimentalism by Samuel Kerstein and Christopher Peacocke. Each has supposed that it follows from expressive theories of ethics that if our sentiments were different so would our obligations be. The chapter refutes this view.Less
This chapter rebuts recent attacks on sentimentalism by Samuel Kerstein and Christopher Peacocke. Each has supposed that it follows from expressive theories of ethics that if our sentiments were different so would our obligations be. The chapter refutes this view.
