Cecilia Sjöholm
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780231173087
- eISBN:
- 9780231539906
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231173087.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Relying on Kantian notions of judgement, Sjöholm explores its relevance and applications in Arendt’s aesthetics. Arendt argues that taste alone cannot be the requisite of judgement. Historically, ...
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Relying on Kantian notions of judgement, Sjöholm explores its relevance and applications in Arendt’s aesthetics. Arendt argues that taste alone cannot be the requisite of judgement. Historically, racism and xenophobia can corrupt taste a pure category, such as the corrupt ideology of the Third Reich. Arendt critiques Kant by arguing that, both, aesthetics operates at the level of appearances and appearances can be corrupted by totalitarian regimes and thought. Perception – which is offered as sedimentation of appearances - informs aesthetics. Narratives solidify a sense of the real community and can similarly pervert perception through ideology. As always, Arendt is historically considering The Third Reich in the background of all theorizing, and Sjöholm is directly engaging with Arendt’s political commitment. Arendt locates the ‘sensus communis’ away from the transcendental logic of Kant, and towards the plurality of the public sphere. Arendt’s ‘sensus communis’ is the solidification of a collective, plural and political body towards a new reality; the integration of plurality of senses through the production of a communityLess
Relying on Kantian notions of judgement, Sjöholm explores its relevance and applications in Arendt’s aesthetics. Arendt argues that taste alone cannot be the requisite of judgement. Historically, racism and xenophobia can corrupt taste a pure category, such as the corrupt ideology of the Third Reich. Arendt critiques Kant by arguing that, both, aesthetics operates at the level of appearances and appearances can be corrupted by totalitarian regimes and thought. Perception – which is offered as sedimentation of appearances - informs aesthetics. Narratives solidify a sense of the real community and can similarly pervert perception through ideology. As always, Arendt is historically considering The Third Reich in the background of all theorizing, and Sjöholm is directly engaging with Arendt’s political commitment. Arendt locates the ‘sensus communis’ away from the transcendental logic of Kant, and towards the plurality of the public sphere. Arendt’s ‘sensus communis’ is the solidification of a collective, plural and political body towards a new reality; the integration of plurality of senses through the production of a community
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198777908
- eISBN:
- 9780191823374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777908.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter provides a general discussion of the internal senses and their differences in structure from the external senses. Aquinas posits that the four internal senses of sensus communis, ...
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This chapter provides a general discussion of the internal senses and their differences in structure from the external senses. Aquinas posits that the four internal senses of sensus communis, imagination (vis imaginativa), vis cogitativa (the vis aestimativa in animals), and the sense memory (vis memorativa) are necessary in order to account for the pre-analytic facets of sense knowledge and perceptual awareness. The chapter also provides an analysis of the difference between ‘senses’ and ‘sensorium’, and explains what Aquinas and Aristotle often refer to as the ‘seat of consciousness’. This internal sense faculty of the sensus communis combines the sensible forms received from the external senses—a far cry from several contemporary Aquinas scholars who suggest that a phantasm is the object of the sensus communis.Less
This chapter provides a general discussion of the internal senses and their differences in structure from the external senses. Aquinas posits that the four internal senses of sensus communis, imagination (vis imaginativa), vis cogitativa (the vis aestimativa in animals), and the sense memory (vis memorativa) are necessary in order to account for the pre-analytic facets of sense knowledge and perceptual awareness. The chapter also provides an analysis of the difference between ‘senses’ and ‘sensorium’, and explains what Aquinas and Aristotle often refer to as the ‘seat of consciousness’. This internal sense faculty of the sensus communis combines the sensible forms received from the external senses—a far cry from several contemporary Aquinas scholars who suggest that a phantasm is the object of the sensus communis.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198777908
- eISBN:
- 9780191823374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777908.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explores the internal sense faculty, which Aristotle sometimes refers to as the ‘phantasia’, and argues that several contemporary Aquinas commentators have not developed four-square ...
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This chapter explores the internal sense faculty, which Aristotle sometimes refers to as the ‘phantasia’, and argues that several contemporary Aquinas commentators have not developed four-square accounts of the imagination or of phantasia. Aquinas appears to be using the term itself (phantasia) to apply to all three faculties of the internal sensorium—the imagination, the vis cogitativa, and the sense memory; this appears counter to his earlier reference to the phantasia as a term illustrative only of the imagination. The incidental object of sense is the specific sensible object of the vis cogitativa. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that Descartes in the Sixth Meditation blurs the sensus communis with the imagination, and this conceptual blur can lead one down the slippery slope of representationalism.Less
This chapter explores the internal sense faculty, which Aristotle sometimes refers to as the ‘phantasia’, and argues that several contemporary Aquinas commentators have not developed four-square accounts of the imagination or of phantasia. Aquinas appears to be using the term itself (phantasia) to apply to all three faculties of the internal sensorium—the imagination, the vis cogitativa, and the sense memory; this appears counter to his earlier reference to the phantasia as a term illustrative only of the imagination. The incidental object of sense is the specific sensible object of the vis cogitativa. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that Descartes in the Sixth Meditation blurs the sensus communis with the imagination, and this conceptual blur can lead one down the slippery slope of representationalism.
Pavel Gregoric
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199277377
- eISBN:
- 9780191707537
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken ...
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Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.Less
Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.
Michaele L. Ferguson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199921584
- eISBN:
- 9780199980413
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199921584.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, American Politics
Underlying the two views of democracy in terms of commonality and political freedom are two different mental pictures of how people share. This chapter draws out these two mental pictures from a ...
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Underlying the two views of democracy in terms of commonality and political freedom are two different mental pictures of how people share. This chapter draws out these two mental pictures from a reading of Danielle Allen’s account of the integration of Little Rock High School in 1957. The first – the objective picture of sharing – holds that sharing requires sharing some thing in common that is objectively real and independent of those who share it. This picture is what drives democratic theorists to focus on what the demos shares in common, and ironically undergirds an antidemocratic approach to politics in which elites seem best positioned to determine the content of commonality. The second picture – an intersubjective picture – is derived here from a critical engagement with Hannah Arendt – and holds that people share when they have a first-person experience of themselves as inhabiting the world together with plural others. This picture highlights the role that all humans play in building and sustaining a world that can be experienced as common. That is, it highlights humanity’s ordinary and radically democratic capacity for political freedom: the capacity to shape the world we share in common with others.Less
Underlying the two views of democracy in terms of commonality and political freedom are two different mental pictures of how people share. This chapter draws out these two mental pictures from a reading of Danielle Allen’s account of the integration of Little Rock High School in 1957. The first – the objective picture of sharing – holds that sharing requires sharing some thing in common that is objectively real and independent of those who share it. This picture is what drives democratic theorists to focus on what the demos shares in common, and ironically undergirds an antidemocratic approach to politics in which elites seem best positioned to determine the content of commonality. The second picture – an intersubjective picture – is derived here from a critical engagement with Hannah Arendt – and holds that people share when they have a first-person experience of themselves as inhabiting the world together with plural others. This picture highlights the role that all humans play in building and sustaining a world that can be experienced as common. That is, it highlights humanity’s ordinary and radically democratic capacity for political freedom: the capacity to shape the world we share in common with others.
Jennifer Van Horn
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781469629568
- eISBN:
- 9781469629582
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of North Carolina Press
- DOI:
- 10.5149/northcarolina/9781469629568.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, American History: early to 18th Century
Elite colonists in the port cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston sought to construct a new civil society on the margins of the British Empire. They turned to material artifacts as ...
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Elite colonists in the port cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston sought to construct a new civil society on the margins of the British Empire. They turned to material artifacts as a means of building networks between people. Through purchase of common goods and similar modes of object use, colonial consumers formulated communities of taste that drew individuals together. Colonists relied upon the power of assemblage to transform their individual identities and to create a sensus communis. The portraits painted by Joseph Blackburn in Bermuda and New England illuminate the regional divergences in transatlantic polite culture and point to the local bonds forged through artifacts and objects’ power to assemble the social.Less
Elite colonists in the port cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston sought to construct a new civil society on the margins of the British Empire. They turned to material artifacts as a means of building networks between people. Through purchase of common goods and similar modes of object use, colonial consumers formulated communities of taste that drew individuals together. Colonists relied upon the power of assemblage to transform their individual identities and to create a sensus communis. The portraits painted by Joseph Blackburn in Bermuda and New England illuminate the regional divergences in transatlantic polite culture and point to the local bonds forged through artifacts and objects’ power to assemble the social.
Jonardon Ganeri
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198757405
- eISBN:
- 9780191817304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198757405.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The term ‘mind’ (mano) is used in a confused range of different and contradictory senses in the early Pāli canon. Buddhaghosa will impose order by distinguishing distinct cognitive modules, each with ...
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The term ‘mind’ (mano) is used in a confused range of different and contradictory senses in the early Pāli canon. Buddhaghosa will impose order by distinguishing distinct cognitive modules, each with its proper domain of cognitive work. Early perception, the subliminal orienting, and initial reception of a stimulus into the perceptual process, is the function of ‘mind-element’ (mano-dhātu), a low-level cognitive system. Late perception and working memory is the function of a high-level cognitive system, ‘mind-discrimination-element’ (mano-viññāṇa-dhātu). In deference to ancient Buddhist tradition, Buddhaghosa refers to six sense-modalities, the sixth being called ‘mind’ (mano). Just as each of the five types of sensory datum enters perceptual processing though a proprietary sense-door, so the objects of mind enter through a ‘mind-door’. However, this is not a sixth channel, a window onto a proprietary sort of mental object, but is nothing other than the door gating projection into short-term working memory.Less
The term ‘mind’ (mano) is used in a confused range of different and contradictory senses in the early Pāli canon. Buddhaghosa will impose order by distinguishing distinct cognitive modules, each with its proper domain of cognitive work. Early perception, the subliminal orienting, and initial reception of a stimulus into the perceptual process, is the function of ‘mind-element’ (mano-dhātu), a low-level cognitive system. Late perception and working memory is the function of a high-level cognitive system, ‘mind-discrimination-element’ (mano-viññāṇa-dhātu). In deference to ancient Buddhist tradition, Buddhaghosa refers to six sense-modalities, the sixth being called ‘mind’ (mano). Just as each of the five types of sensory datum enters perceptual processing though a proprietary sense-door, so the objects of mind enter through a ‘mind-door’. However, this is not a sixth channel, a window onto a proprietary sort of mental object, but is nothing other than the door gating projection into short-term working memory.
Anthony J. Lisska
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198777908
- eISBN:
- 9780191823374
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198777908.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter provides further development of Aquinas’s theory of sensation and perception in terms of the necessary conditions for sight. It begins with a discussion of the intentional act of seeing ...
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This chapter provides further development of Aquinas’s theory of sensation and perception in terms of the necessary conditions for sight. It begins with a discussion of the intentional act of seeing in explicating Aquinas on sensation, and provides an analysis of the importance of the diaphanum or medium and the role light plays in the act of seeing. The first part of this analysis pertains to the mental acts proper to the external sensorium—the external senses and the sensus communis. The second part pertains to the mental acts proper to the internal sensorium—the three internal senses of the imagination (vis imaginativa), the vis cogitativa, and the sense memory (vis memorativa).Less
This chapter provides further development of Aquinas’s theory of sensation and perception in terms of the necessary conditions for sight. It begins with a discussion of the intentional act of seeing in explicating Aquinas on sensation, and provides an analysis of the importance of the diaphanum or medium and the role light plays in the act of seeing. The first part of this analysis pertains to the mental acts proper to the external sensorium—the external senses and the sensus communis. The second part pertains to the mental acts proper to the internal sensorium—the three internal senses of the imagination (vis imaginativa), the vis cogitativa, and the sense memory (vis memorativa).
