Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary, and Finn Spicer (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199551118
- eISBN:
- 9780191594960
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive ...
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What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis: the former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.Less
What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis: the former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind.
John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014601
- eISBN:
- 9780262289795
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science’s classical, first-generation ...
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This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science’s classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Enaction, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1991) breaks from CTM’s formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. Enaction offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: The relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science.Less
This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science’s classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Enaction, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1991) breaks from CTM’s formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. Enaction offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: The relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science.
John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262014601
- eISBN:
- 9780262289795
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for an all-encompassing renewal of cognitive science as a whole. There have been many critiques of classical, ...
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The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for an all-encompassing renewal of cognitive science as a whole. There have been many critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). This book explores new paths instead of going over already covered ground. Enaction, initially articulated as a program for understanding cognition, makes a radical break from the formalisms of information-processing and symbolic representations prevalent in cognitive science. Within this program, cognition is grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment in contrast to the classical scheme, which relegates perception to a preliminary “module” based on sensory input alone. This is followed by “cognitive” planning, representations of goals, and ultimately, the decision to act.Less
The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for an all-encompassing renewal of cognitive science as a whole. There have been many critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). This book explores new paths instead of going over already covered ground. Enaction, initially articulated as a program for understanding cognition, makes a radical break from the formalisms of information-processing and symbolic representations prevalent in cognitive science. Within this program, cognition is grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment in contrast to the classical scheme, which relegates perception to a preliminary “module” based on sensory input alone. This is followed by “cognitive” planning, representations of goals, and ultimately, the decision to act.
Charles Lenay and Matthieu Tixier
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- June 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780199674923
- eISBN:
- 9780191842702
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199674923.003.0058
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems, Development
This chapter introduces the principle of sensory substitution and presents the main systems which currently exist, starting with the pioneering work of Paul Bach-y-Rita. Some research in this domain ...
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This chapter introduces the principle of sensory substitution and presents the main systems which currently exist, starting with the pioneering work of Paul Bach-y-Rita. Some research in this domain pursues the ideal of restoring an exact imitation of normal perceptual systems, but whenever there is a technical mediation, variations become possible and so there will always be possible novelties or augmentations. We highlight that these devices also open up the possibility of experimental studies of active perception within a minimalist framework, which lead to the conclusion that rather than “sensory substitution” one should more properly speak of “perceptual supplementation”. When we make prosthetic devices to assist persons with sensory disabilities, this creates possibilities of new forms of sensorimotor dynamics which open up new perceptual domains and augment the subjects’ capabilities. This raises new questions about the conditions of individual appropriation and social adoption of these innovations.Less
This chapter introduces the principle of sensory substitution and presents the main systems which currently exist, starting with the pioneering work of Paul Bach-y-Rita. Some research in this domain pursues the ideal of restoring an exact imitation of normal perceptual systems, but whenever there is a technical mediation, variations become possible and so there will always be possible novelties or augmentations. We highlight that these devices also open up the possibility of experimental studies of active perception within a minimalist framework, which lead to the conclusion that rather than “sensory substitution” one should more properly speak of “perceptual supplementation”. When we make prosthetic devices to assist persons with sensory disabilities, this creates possibilities of new forms of sensorimotor dynamics which open up new perceptual domains and augment the subjects’ capabilities. This raises new questions about the conditions of individual appropriation and social adoption of these innovations.
