C. B. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234103
- eISBN:
- 9780191715570
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234103.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if there is a ‘private world problem’. It is also argued that the role of knowledge of behaviour (or what a sensation is ‘apt to cause’) and/or physical circumstances (or that by which the sensation is ‘apt to be caused’) needs better understanding. The rejection of analogical ways of thinking about the experiences of others and the complementary fixation on public, observable, shared behaviour and circumstances leads — when carried to its fair conclusion — to a second joke, which is explained in the chapter.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the private world problem, and argues that with or without sensations, the spectre of the ‘private world’ arises equally, so sensations are not the problem if there is a ‘private world problem’. It is also argued that the role of knowledge of behaviour (or what a sensation is ‘apt to cause’) and/or physical circumstances (or that by which the sensation is ‘apt to be caused’) needs better understanding. The rejection of analogical ways of thinking about the experiences of others and the complementary fixation on public, observable, shared behaviour and circumstances leads — when carried to its fair conclusion — to a second joke, which is explained in the chapter.
Bernard J. Baars
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195102659
- eISBN:
- 9780199864126
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195102659.001.1
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Sensory and Motor Systems, Behavioral Neuroscience
The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers. Although still embroiled ...
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The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers. Although still embroiled in debate, scientists are now beginning to find common ground in their understanding of consciousness, which may pave the way for a unified explanation of how and why we experience and understand the world around us. This book brings the subject to life with a metaphor that has been used to understand consciousness since the time of Aristotle—the mind as theater. Here consciousness is seen as a “stage” on which our sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings play to a vast, silent audience (the immensely complicated inner-workings of the brain's unconscious processes). Behind the scenes, silent context operators shape conscious experience; they include implicit expectations, self systems, and scene setters. Using this framework, the book presents compelling evidence that human consciousness rides on top of biologically ancient mechanisms. In humans it manifests itself in inner speech, imagery, perception, and voluntary control of thought and action. Topics like hypnosis, absorbed states of mind, adaptation to trauma, and the human propensity to project expectations on uncertainty, all fit into the expanded theater metaphor.Less
The study of conscious experience has seen remarkable strides in the last ten years, reflecting important technological breakthroughs and the enormous efforts of researchers. Although still embroiled in debate, scientists are now beginning to find common ground in their understanding of consciousness, which may pave the way for a unified explanation of how and why we experience and understand the world around us. This book brings the subject to life with a metaphor that has been used to understand consciousness since the time of Aristotle—the mind as theater. Here consciousness is seen as a “stage” on which our sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings play to a vast, silent audience (the immensely complicated inner-workings of the brain's unconscious processes). Behind the scenes, silent context operators shape conscious experience; they include implicit expectations, self systems, and scene setters. Using this framework, the book presents compelling evidence that human consciousness rides on top of biologically ancient mechanisms. In humans it manifests itself in inner speech, imagery, perception, and voluntary control of thought and action. Topics like hypnosis, absorbed states of mind, adaptation to trauma, and the human propensity to project expectations on uncertainty, all fit into the expanded theater metaphor.
Raffaella De Rosa
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199570379
- eISBN:
- 9780191722455
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570379.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, History of Philosophy
While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. This ...
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While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. This book is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctional and purely internalist accounts); and it has the advantage of providing an adequate solution to the problem of sensory misrepresentation within Descartes' internalist theory of ideas. In sum, the book offers a novel account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations; provides a panoramic overview, and critical assessment, of the scholarly literature on this issue; and places Descartes' theory of sensation in the central position it deserves among the philosophical and scientific investigations of the workings of the human mind.Less
While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. This book is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctional and purely internalist accounts); and it has the advantage of providing an adequate solution to the problem of sensory misrepresentation within Descartes' internalist theory of ideas. In sum, the book offers a novel account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations; provides a panoramic overview, and critical assessment, of the scholarly literature on this issue; and places Descartes' theory of sensation in the central position it deserves among the philosophical and scientific investigations of the workings of the human mind.
A. D. (Bud) Craig
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691156767
- eISBN:
- 9781400852727
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691156767.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Neurobiology
This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations ...
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This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations and mental states known as feelings. Drawing on own cutting-edge research, the author has identified an area deep inside the mammalian brain—the insular cortex—as the place where interoception, or the processing of bodily stimuli, generates feelings. The book shows how this crucial pathway for interoceptive awareness gives rise in humans to the feeling of being alive, vivid perceptual feelings, and a subjective image of the sentient self across time. The book explains how feelings represent activity patterns in our brains that signify emotions, intentions, and thoughts, and how integration of these patterns is driven by the unique energy needs of the hominid brain. It describes the essential role of feelings and the insular cortex in such diverse realms as music, fluid intelligence, and bivalent emotions, and relates these ideas to the philosophy of William James and even to feelings in dogs. The book is also a compelling insider's account of scientific discovery, one that takes readers behind the scenes as the astonishing answer to this neurological puzzle is pursued and pieced together from seemingly unrelated fields of scientific inquiry. This book will fundamentally alter the way that neuroscientists and psychologists categorize sensations and understand the origins and significance of human feelings.Less
This book brings together startling evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to present revolutionary new insights into how our brains enable us to experience the range of sensations and mental states known as feelings. Drawing on own cutting-edge research, the author has identified an area deep inside the mammalian brain—the insular cortex—as the place where interoception, or the processing of bodily stimuli, generates feelings. The book shows how this crucial pathway for interoceptive awareness gives rise in humans to the feeling of being alive, vivid perceptual feelings, and a subjective image of the sentient self across time. The book explains how feelings represent activity patterns in our brains that signify emotions, intentions, and thoughts, and how integration of these patterns is driven by the unique energy needs of the hominid brain. It describes the essential role of feelings and the insular cortex in such diverse realms as music, fluid intelligence, and bivalent emotions, and relates these ideas to the philosophy of William James and even to feelings in dogs. The book is also a compelling insider's account of scientific discovery, one that takes readers behind the scenes as the astonishing answer to this neurological puzzle is pursued and pieced together from seemingly unrelated fields of scientific inquiry. This book will fundamentally alter the way that neuroscientists and psychologists categorize sensations and understand the origins and significance of human feelings.
Austen Clark
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238515
- eISBN:
- 9780191679650
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238515.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are ...
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This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are other requirements. What are they, and how can they be put together to yield full-blown sensing? Drawing on the findings of current neuroscience, the author proposes and defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that he calls ‘feature-placing’. Sensing proceeds by picking out place-times in or around the body of the sentient organism, and characterizing qualities (features) that appear at those place-times. Such feature-placing is a primitive kind — probably the most primitive kind — of mental representation. Once its peculiarities have been described, many of the puzzles about the intentionality of sensation, and the phenomena that lead some to label it ‘pseudo-intentional’, can be resolved. The hypothesis casts light on many other troublesome phenomena, including the varieties of illusion, the problem of projection, the notion of a visual field, the location of after-images, the existence of sense-data, and the role of perceptual demonstratives.Less
This book offers a general account of the forms of mental representation that we call ‘sensory’. To sense something, one must have some capacity to discriminate among sensory qualities; but there are other requirements. What are they, and how can they be put together to yield full-blown sensing? Drawing on the findings of current neuroscience, the author proposes and defends the hypothesis that the various modalities of sensation share a generic form that he calls ‘feature-placing’. Sensing proceeds by picking out place-times in or around the body of the sentient organism, and characterizing qualities (features) that appear at those place-times. Such feature-placing is a primitive kind — probably the most primitive kind — of mental representation. Once its peculiarities have been described, many of the puzzles about the intentionality of sensation, and the phenomena that lead some to label it ‘pseudo-intentional’, can be resolved. The hypothesis casts light on many other troublesome phenomena, including the varieties of illusion, the problem of projection, the notion of a visual field, the location of after-images, the existence of sense-data, and the role of perceptual demonstratives.
Wallace Matson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199812691
- eISBN:
- 9780199919420
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812691.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many ...
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Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many metaphysicians continue to believe in the contingency of the world, thereby still stirring the pot in which simmer the traditional ‘problems’ of external-world skepticism, induction, other minds, etc. But two 17th century philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, produced Grand Theories satisfying the Milesian requirements. Hobbes's Monism consisted in asserting that nothing exists but bodies in motion. Sensations and all mental items are motions in the brain. Hobbesian Naturalism was his claim that bodies are not driven by forces other than those inherent in them. He was a Rationalist, holding that all true propositions are necessarily true. He did not distinguish between philosophy and science: both are the finding out of causes from effects and vice versa, by “ratiocination.”Less
Although participants in the scientific enterprise comply at least tacitly with the Milesian requirements of monism, naturalism, and rationalism, not all philosophers have followed suit. Many metaphysicians continue to believe in the contingency of the world, thereby still stirring the pot in which simmer the traditional ‘problems’ of external-world skepticism, induction, other minds, etc. But two 17th century philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, produced Grand Theories satisfying the Milesian requirements. Hobbes's Monism consisted in asserting that nothing exists but bodies in motion. Sensations and all mental items are motions in the brain. Hobbesian Naturalism was his claim that bodies are not driven by forces other than those inherent in them. He was a Rationalist, holding that all true propositions are necessarily true. He did not distinguish between philosophy and science: both are the finding out of causes from effects and vice versa, by “ratiocination.”
J. M. Hinton
- Published in print:
- 1973
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198244035
- eISBN:
- 9780191680717
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244035.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter dismisses the idea that there are events which would be reported by E-reports, if there were such reports, but which, in the absence of these, cannot be reported at all. It states that ...
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This chapter dismisses the idea that there are events which would be reported by E-reports, if there were such reports, but which, in the absence of these, cannot be reported at all. It states that it does not seem that any of the trains of thought considered, as possibly leading to a belief in the existence of E-reports, can be adapted so as to become good arguments for this rather strange idea. However, it is not easy to see what else but this idea can be intended by philosophers who say that one cannot describe the sensations. They do not mean that it cannot describe the sensation which the chapter describes as the queer tickling sensation up the spine when one is a fourteen-year-old boy and the attractive art mistress looks over one's shoulder. Nor do they mean that one cannot make perception-claims and illusion-reports, or assert perception–illusion disjunctions.Less
This chapter dismisses the idea that there are events which would be reported by E-reports, if there were such reports, but which, in the absence of these, cannot be reported at all. It states that it does not seem that any of the trains of thought considered, as possibly leading to a belief in the existence of E-reports, can be adapted so as to become good arguments for this rather strange idea. However, it is not easy to see what else but this idea can be intended by philosophers who say that one cannot describe the sensations. They do not mean that it cannot describe the sensation which the chapter describes as the queer tickling sensation up the spine when one is a fourteen-year-old boy and the attractive art mistress looks over one's shoulder. Nor do they mean that one cannot make perception-claims and illusion-reports, or assert perception–illusion disjunctions.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the ...
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This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the connection between his cries and the domain of exclamations and sentences in the language of pain. There is no moment of recognition on his part that mediates between his pain and his crying, certainly none that involves an act of identifying or naming what he is feeling as pain. It is the adults who recognize his cries as cries of pain, and hence are in a position to replace them with primitive linguistic forms of pain behaviour, and so induct him into (this dimension of) life with language. In other words, the relevant linguistic connection between ‘pain’ and pain is set up for the individual learner by the society of which he is a part.Less
This chapter analyzes how words refer to sensations through Wittgenstein's tale of the hurt child. The child, who hurts himself, cries; it is not he, but the adults around him, who make the connection between his cries and the domain of exclamations and sentences in the language of pain. There is no moment of recognition on his part that mediates between his pain and his crying, certainly none that involves an act of identifying or naming what he is feeling as pain. It is the adults who recognize his cries as cries of pain, and hence are in a position to replace them with primitive linguistic forms of pain behaviour, and so induct him into (this dimension of) life with language. In other words, the relevant linguistic connection between ‘pain’ and pain is set up for the individual learner by the society of which he is a part.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the ...
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This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.Less
This chapter examines §246 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which begins to question the conception of sensations as ‘private’. Wittgenstein seems essentially uninterested in the possibility of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in what his interlocutor might mean by his answer to the opening question; he does not ask himself, and thereby invite us to ask ourselves, what the interlocutor might be trying to get at through his invocation of a cognitive disparity between the first-person and third-person cases. Instead, he responds as if the meanings of the words he employs are either self-evident and singular (adverting to the normal use of the word ‘to know’), or barely capable of an alternative interpretation (‘except perhaps as a joke’). This apparent refusal to open himself to other possibilities of sense is epitomized by the moment when he turns words which might have been used to invite an exercise of the sympathetic imagination to purely sarcastic intent (‘How else are we to use it?’, ‘What is it supposed to mean?’). And without allowing such space for the imagination to be exercised, there seems to be little ground for attributing a resolute strategy to Wittgenstein at this point.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines the internal structure of the (interrupted) reflection on the status of the conclusions established in §246. Wittgenstein offers two pairs of propositions that he explicitly ...
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This chapter examines the internal structure of the (interrupted) reflection on the status of the conclusions established in §246. Wittgenstein offers two pairs of propositions that he explicitly claims (or implies) are comparable with each other: first, ‘Sensations are private’ and ‘One plays patience by oneself’, and then ‘Every rod has a length’ and ‘This body has extension’. Their comparability resides in their tendency to elicit the following kind of response from those to whom they are addressed: ‘I can't imagine the opposite’, or ‘What would it be like if it were otherwise?’ Wittgenstein suggests (call this the second level of his reflections) that this betrays an implicit awareness on the part of the respondents that these pairs of propositions are grammatical rather than empirical — by which he means that they do not represent a state of affairs that might have been otherwise, but would rather be advanced (to quote the preceding §247) ‘when one was explaining the meaning of the word [‘sensation’, or ‘patience’, or ‘rod’ or ‘body’] to him.Less
This chapter examines the internal structure of the (interrupted) reflection on the status of the conclusions established in §246. Wittgenstein offers two pairs of propositions that he explicitly claims (or implies) are comparable with each other: first, ‘Sensations are private’ and ‘One plays patience by oneself’, and then ‘Every rod has a length’ and ‘This body has extension’. Their comparability resides in their tendency to elicit the following kind of response from those to whom they are addressed: ‘I can't imagine the opposite’, or ‘What would it be like if it were otherwise?’ Wittgenstein suggests (call this the second level of his reflections) that this betrays an implicit awareness on the part of the respondents that these pairs of propositions are grammatical rather than empirical — by which he means that they do not represent a state of affairs that might have been otherwise, but would rather be advanced (to quote the preceding §247) ‘when one was explaining the meaning of the word [‘sensation’, or ‘patience’, or ‘rod’ or ‘body’] to him.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter analyzes §258. It considers the question: can the diarist establish a meaning for his term ‘S’? If so, it must be possible to define that meaning, for the grammar of meaning is such that ...
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This chapter analyzes §258. It considers the question: can the diarist establish a meaning for his term ‘S’? If so, it must be possible to define that meaning, for the grammar of meaning is such that a coherent practice of employing a word presupposes a standard of correctness for its use. The diarist attempts to establish this by impressing on himself the connection between the sign and the original sensation; future candidate sensations will correctly be called ‘S’-type sensations if they resemble the original sample sensation, otherwise not. But, as Wittgenstein points out, to be able to remember the original sensation correctly, we must be able, in principle, to distinguish memories of ‘S’ from memories of other sensations (call them ‘T’ and ‘U’); but we could only do so if we already had a standard of correctness for the use of ‘S’ (since talk of a ‘memory of S’ can be meaningful only if ‘S’ is meaningful).Less
This chapter analyzes §258. It considers the question: can the diarist establish a meaning for his term ‘S’? If so, it must be possible to define that meaning, for the grammar of meaning is such that a coherent practice of employing a word presupposes a standard of correctness for its use. The diarist attempts to establish this by impressing on himself the connection between the sign and the original sensation; future candidate sensations will correctly be called ‘S’-type sensations if they resemble the original sample sensation, otherwise not. But, as Wittgenstein points out, to be able to remember the original sensation correctly, we must be able, in principle, to distinguish memories of ‘S’ from memories of other sensations (call them ‘T’ and ‘U’); but we could only do so if we already had a standard of correctness for the use of ‘S’ (since talk of a ‘memory of S’ can be meaningful only if ‘S’ is meaningful).
Desmond Clarke
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199261239
- eISBN:
- 9780191597213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261237.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Descartes argues that no explanation of any phenomenon may assume or merely re‐describe what needs to be explained. He cannot, therefore, propose substance dualism as a theory of mind. To explain ...
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Descartes argues that no explanation of any phenomenon may assume or merely re‐describe what needs to be explained. He cannot, therefore, propose substance dualism as a theory of mind. To explain mental activities such as sensation, memory, or imagination, one must hypothesize how they result from interaction between the environment, the senses, and the processing of the brain. Descartes initiated such a naturalized account. However, given the state of neurology in the seventeenth century, his efforts were doomed. The failure to construct a scientific theory that bridges the theoretical gap between mental events and matter (as understood by Descartes) results, by default, in a property dualism that marks the limits of his scientific efforts.Less
Descartes argues that no explanation of any phenomenon may assume or merely re‐describe what needs to be explained. He cannot, therefore, propose substance dualism as a theory of mind. To explain mental activities such as sensation, memory, or imagination, one must hypothesize how they result from interaction between the environment, the senses, and the processing of the brain. Descartes initiated such a naturalized account. However, given the state of neurology in the seventeenth century, his efforts were doomed. The failure to construct a scientific theory that bridges the theoretical gap between mental events and matter (as understood by Descartes) results, by default, in a property dualism that marks the limits of his scientific efforts.
Stephen Mulhall
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199208548
- eISBN:
- 9780191709067
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208548.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter examines why should the discovery that a particular sensation (whose presence we choose to express or note by using the sign ‘S’) is correlated with a rise in blood pressure give us any ...
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This chapter examines why should the discovery that a particular sensation (whose presence we choose to express or note by using the sign ‘S’) is correlated with a rise in blood pressure give us any additional reason to think that the supposition of a mistake in identifying the sensation itself was mere show? Wittgenstein's text claims that regular misidentification of the actual sensation would not matter; for if I could tell that my blood pressure is rising despite misidentifying the sensation, that could only be on the basis of my thinking (often wrongly) that I am having that sensation. But to say that misrecognition would be an irrelevance for that reason would amount to saying that the actual presence or absence of a sensation would be an irrelevance — for the usefulness of our utterances of ‘S’ would then no longer be dependent on their being responsive to or expressive of my actually having a particular sensation. In short, if ‘S’ really is the name of a sensation, Wittgenstein's conclusion about misrecognition simply begs the question against his opponent; and if it is not, his conclusion is valid but irrelevant to its purported subject-matter.Less
This chapter examines why should the discovery that a particular sensation (whose presence we choose to express or note by using the sign ‘S’) is correlated with a rise in blood pressure give us any additional reason to think that the supposition of a mistake in identifying the sensation itself was mere show? Wittgenstein's text claims that regular misidentification of the actual sensation would not matter; for if I could tell that my blood pressure is rising despite misidentifying the sensation, that could only be on the basis of my thinking (often wrongly) that I am having that sensation. But to say that misrecognition would be an irrelevance for that reason would amount to saying that the actual presence or absence of a sensation would be an irrelevance — for the usefulness of our utterances of ‘S’ would then no longer be dependent on their being responsive to or expressive of my actually having a particular sensation. In short, if ‘S’ really is the name of a sensation, Wittgenstein's conclusion about misrecognition simply begs the question against his opponent; and if it is not, his conclusion is valid but irrelevant to its purported subject-matter.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the ...
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Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.Less
Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.
Beth Palmer
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199599110
- eISBN:
- 9780191725371
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599110.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Women's Literature, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
This book explores the ways in which women writers utilized the powerful position of author-editor to perform conventions of gender and genre in the Victorian period. It examines Mary Elizabeth ...
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This book explores the ways in which women writers utilized the powerful position of author-editor to perform conventions of gender and genre in the Victorian period. It examines Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Ellen Wood, and Florence Marryat's magazines (Belgravia, Argosy, and London Society respectively) alongside their sensation fiction to explore the mutually influential strategies of authorship and editorship. The relationship between sensation's success as a popular fiction genre and its serialization in the periodical press was not just complexly reciprocal but also self-conscious and performative. Publishing sensation in Victorian magazines offered women writers a set of discursive strategies that they could transfer outwards into other cultural discourses and performances. With these strategies they could explore, enact and re-work contemporary notions of female agency and autonomy as well as negotiate contemporary criticism. Combining authorship and editorship gave these middle-class women exceptional control over the shaping of fiction, its production, and its dissemination. By paying attention to the ways in which the sensation genre is rooted in the press network this book offers a new, broader context for the phenomenal success of works like Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret and Ellen Wood's East Lynne. The book reaches back to the mid-nineteenth century to explore the press conditions initiated by figures like Charles Dickens and Mrs Beeton that facilitated the later success of these sensation writers. By looking forwards to the new woman writers of the 1890s the book draws conclusions regarding the legacies of sensational author-editorship in the Victorian press and beyond.Less
This book explores the ways in which women writers utilized the powerful position of author-editor to perform conventions of gender and genre in the Victorian period. It examines Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Ellen Wood, and Florence Marryat's magazines (Belgravia, Argosy, and London Society respectively) alongside their sensation fiction to explore the mutually influential strategies of authorship and editorship. The relationship between sensation's success as a popular fiction genre and its serialization in the periodical press was not just complexly reciprocal but also self-conscious and performative. Publishing sensation in Victorian magazines offered women writers a set of discursive strategies that they could transfer outwards into other cultural discourses and performances. With these strategies they could explore, enact and re-work contemporary notions of female agency and autonomy as well as negotiate contemporary criticism. Combining authorship and editorship gave these middle-class women exceptional control over the shaping of fiction, its production, and its dissemination. By paying attention to the ways in which the sensation genre is rooted in the press network this book offers a new, broader context for the phenomenal success of works like Mary Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret and Ellen Wood's East Lynne. The book reaches back to the mid-nineteenth century to explore the press conditions initiated by figures like Charles Dickens and Mrs Beeton that facilitated the later success of these sensation writers. By looking forwards to the new woman writers of the 1890s the book draws conclusions regarding the legacies of sensational author-editorship in the Victorian press and beyond.
C. Stephen Evans
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199217168
- eISBN:
- 9780191712401
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217168.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter explicates the concept of a natural sign. The original Reidian concept of a natural sign is either a sensation or a perception that is causally linked “upstream” to what the sign ...
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This chapter explicates the concept of a natural sign. The original Reidian concept of a natural sign is either a sensation or a perception that is causally linked “upstream” to what the sign signifies and “downstream” to the generation of a characteristic judgment. The author extends Reid's work to consider the idea of a “theistic natural sign.” A theistic natural sign ought to be something that is connected both to God and to a human disposition to believe in God. He argues that both widespread belief in God and current cognitive science are consistent with the claim that theistic signs exist. Finally, he argues that theistic natural signs might be understood as either (a) non‐propositional grounds on which belief in God is warranted, or (b) non‐propositional (or, perhaps, even propositional) evidence for the fact of God's existence. He remains neutral between these competing views.Less
This chapter explicates the concept of a natural sign. The original Reidian concept of a natural sign is either a sensation or a perception that is causally linked “upstream” to what the sign signifies and “downstream” to the generation of a characteristic judgment. The author extends Reid's work to consider the idea of a “theistic natural sign.” A theistic natural sign ought to be something that is connected both to God and to a human disposition to believe in God. He argues that both widespread belief in God and current cognitive science are consistent with the claim that theistic signs exist. Finally, he argues that theistic natural signs might be understood as either (a) non‐propositional grounds on which belief in God is warranted, or (b) non‐propositional (or, perhaps, even propositional) evidence for the fact of God's existence. He remains neutral between these competing views.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter explains how Reid arrives at his appeal to suggestion by an argument from elimination. It then discusses his application of his theory of suggestion to tactile perception. Reid claims ...
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This chapter explains how Reid arrives at his appeal to suggestion by an argument from elimination. It then discusses his application of his theory of suggestion to tactile perception. Reid claims that the Way of Ideas operates upon the assumption that the immediate intentional objects of our thoughts are ideas or other representational intermediaries. The Way of Ideas attempts to reduce contentful mental states to non-contentful features of those states, whereas Reid takes intentional content as irreducible and basic. Special attention is given to Reid's experimentum crucis, or ‘crucial test’, a thought experiment involving a subject's systematic sensory deprivation. Reid seeks to show that the uses of sensation, custom, and reasoning are singly and jointly insufficient for the formation of our perceptual contents. He takes this as a fine objection to the Way of Ideas, on which sensations and reflection upon sensations are sufficient for providing us with our perceptual contents.Less
This chapter explains how Reid arrives at his appeal to suggestion by an argument from elimination. It then discusses his application of his theory of suggestion to tactile perception. Reid claims that the Way of Ideas operates upon the assumption that the immediate intentional objects of our thoughts are ideas or other representational intermediaries. The Way of Ideas attempts to reduce contentful mental states to non-contentful features of those states, whereas Reid takes intentional content as irreducible and basic. Special attention is given to Reid's experimentum crucis, or ‘crucial test’, a thought experiment involving a subject's systematic sensory deprivation. Reid seeks to show that the uses of sensation, custom, and reasoning are singly and jointly insufficient for the formation of our perceptual contents. He takes this as a fine objection to the Way of Ideas, on which sensations and reflection upon sensations are sufficient for providing us with our perceptual contents.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental ...
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This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental states takes them as objects. It argues that Reidian sensations are qualitative feelings and not perceived intermediaries. Indeed, sensations, strictly speaking, are not even necessary for perceptual events. Though this confirms some fears about Reid's theory — that he has in a sense omitted sensations from his theory of perception — it is argued that he does this intentionally. This conclusion is justified by examining Reid's provocative comments to the effect that our capacity to experience sensations evolved or was created for the purpose of enhancing our survival, and not for the purpose of assisting us in getting information about the mind-independent world.Less
This chapter focuses on the relationship between Reidian sensation and perception. It considers whether sensations are intentional objects of other mental states and, if so, what type of mental states takes them as objects. It argues that Reidian sensations are qualitative feelings and not perceived intermediaries. Indeed, sensations, strictly speaking, are not even necessary for perceptual events. Though this confirms some fears about Reid's theory — that he has in a sense omitted sensations from his theory of perception — it is argued that he does this intentionally. This conclusion is justified by examining Reid's provocative comments to the effect that our capacity to experience sensations evolved or was created for the purpose of enhancing our survival, and not for the purpose of assisting us in getting information about the mind-independent world.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter examines Reid's account of how we are perceptually aware of qualities. It begins by describing how Reid structures the debate about qualities and our perception of them. It then turns to ...
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This chapter examines Reid's account of how we are perceptually aware of qualities. It begins by describing how Reid structures the debate about qualities and our perception of them. It then turns to his inchoate analysis of primary and secondary qualities, devoting special attention to whether Reidian secondary qualities are dispositions.Less
This chapter examines Reid's account of how we are perceptually aware of qualities. It begins by describing how Reid structures the debate about qualities and our perception of them. It then turns to his inchoate analysis of primary and secondary qualities, devoting special attention to whether Reidian secondary qualities are dispositions.
Ryan Nichols
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276912
- eISBN:
- 9780191707759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276912.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter analyzes Reid's treatment of the Molyneux question. Molyneux's question can be presented in general form as this: ‘Were a blind person to be given sight, and were a cube and a sphere set ...
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This chapter analyzes Reid's treatment of the Molyneux question. Molyneux's question can be presented in general form as this: ‘Were a blind person to be given sight, and were a cube and a sphere set in her field of vision, would she be capable of identifying which object is which?’ In the Inquiry, Reid gives both a ‘no’ and a ‘yes’ to Molyneux's question. The thrust of Reid's response to Molyneux's issues emphasizes the limitations Reid places upon sensation in the perceptual process. This chapter exhibits the key differences between Reid and the Way of Ideas, and confirms several other attributions made to Reid in the material preceding this chapter.Less
This chapter analyzes Reid's treatment of the Molyneux question. Molyneux's question can be presented in general form as this: ‘Were a blind person to be given sight, and were a cube and a sphere set in her field of vision, would she be capable of identifying which object is which?’ In the Inquiry, Reid gives both a ‘no’ and a ‘yes’ to Molyneux's question. The thrust of Reid's response to Molyneux's issues emphasizes the limitations Reid places upon sensation in the perceptual process. This chapter exhibits the key differences between Reid and the Way of Ideas, and confirms several other attributions made to Reid in the material preceding this chapter.
