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Since the early 1980s, the regime type of the Finnish political system has gradually mutated, because of the complementary processes of de-presidentialization and re-presidentialization. The former entailed the erosion of the formal prerogatives of the President and a switch from a semi-presidential towards a parliamentary type of executive. This process culminated in the coming into force of a totally new constitution in 2000. Re-presidentialization, in turn, consists of the growing power of the Prime Minister within the newly parliamentarized political executive. Most of the causes of the de facto ‘re-presidentialization’ of Finnish politics are structural rather than contingent. The internal activities of political parties have declined as they have transformed themselves into modern electoralist organizations, and the autonomy of the leaders from their parties has increased. Partisan dealignment and ideological convergence between the parties has made space for the personalization of politics. The personalization of politics, in combination with the declining role of party organizations, enhances the autonomy of party leaders within their own parties. In contemporary Finland, the leaders with the strongest presidential capacities contest the premiership rather than the presidency.

Describes the chain of delegation in the context of a semi-presidential democracy. The Finnish president has wide-ranging powers and is a strong political player, which influences the patterns of delegation and accountability in Finland. The chain of delegation and accountability in Finnish democracy is influenced by a number of constraints relating to political parties, the party system, and the power of various kinds of external agents (i.e. interest organizations and international actors like the European Union).

Describes the chain of delegation in the context of a semi-presidential democracy, which grafts a popularly elected president with extensive constitutional powers onto a more or less conventional parliamentary system. The direct linkage between the president and voters enables the president to dominate the other actors in the French parliamentary system, especially if the president is from the same party group as the parliamentary majority. If the president and the parliamentary majority are from different party groups (cohabitation), then the French system conforms more to the traditional delegation chain of a parliamentary regime.

Portugal’s blend of semi-presidentialism with multipartism has created a regime capable of generating a wide variety of governing solutions. This flexibility has helped consolidate one of Western Europe’s youngest democracies, but it is indicative of how complex the country’s delegation process is. The 1982 constitutional revision simplified the delegation process because it eliminated the possibility of presidential government. However, presidents have remained important in policy-making, particularly due to their use of the presidential veto, which is a unique characteristic of Portugal’s institutional design vis-à-vis its Western European partners. The President’s absolute veto over cabinet decrees constitutes an important constraint on the powerful Portuguese cabinet.

Provides an introduction to the concept of semi‐presidentialism and establishes a framework for the study of the politics of semi‐presidential regimes. The first part sketches the evolution of the concept of semi‐presidentialism, considers some of the main criticisms of the concept, proposes a slight reformulation of the standard definition of the term, and identifies a list of semi‐presidential regimes. The second part of the chapter outlines a framework for the comparative study of semi‐presidential regimes, which provides for particular attention to be paid to the constitutional powers of political actors, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the regime, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relationship between the president and that majority. In this way, this chapter then provides the basis both for the in‐depth country studies of semi‐presidentialism that follow and for the conclusion, which examines the comparative experience of semi‐presidentialism and addresses the issue of whether countries should adopt a semi‐presidential form of government in preference to either presidential or parliamentary forms of government.

Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to parliament, there is a directly elected president, who appoints the government and can dismiss it, although in practical terms the president has very little accountability. Nevertheless, Austria is generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists, and indeed it is parliamentary elections rather than presidential elections that decide the distribution of power. This chapter concentrates on the post‐war period, although the interwar years are also important for understanding the gap between the large constitutional powers and limited role that presidents have actually played. It draws on the literature on the Austrian presidency, original archival work, and interviews with political actors. The different sections of the chapter are: The Historical Legacy of Introducing Semi‐Presidentialism; Constitutional Powers and Their Practical Relevance; The Presidency and Party Politics; and Conclusion.

Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?

The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted by referendum in September 1958, and this chapter explores the relationship between the president and the prime minister in that Fifth Republic. The first section of the chapter, Patterns of Political Leadership, provides an overview of presidential–prime ministerial relations. The second section, French Semi‐Presidentialism in Context, discusses the constitutional situation, the founding context of the 1962 reform, and the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority. The concluding section, The Contemporary Nature of French Semi‐Presidentialism, considers the wider context of presidential–prime ministerial relations, and discusses the changing parameters of executive leadership generally. In these ways, the contemporary nature of the Fifth Republic's semi‐presidential system is established.

The office of Icelandic president was created in 1944 to take over the functions of the Danish monarch, which were largely ceremonial at that time, and is non‐party political. Although the president is directly elected, political power in Iceland lies with the parliament and a government that is responsible to it. This chapter explores the actual and potential powers of the Icelandic presidency in the light of Duverger's concept of semi‐presidential government, arguing that traditional interpretations of the Icelandic constitution have overlooked the distinctiveness of semi‐presidential government, and noting that the powerlessness of the presidency is less a fact of law than of politics. An attempt is also made to account for why the presidency has developed in the manner of a powerless figurehead rather than as an effective political leader. The three sections of the chapter are: The Presidency and Political Leadership in Iceland—formation of the regime, constitutional powers, parliamentary majorities; The Presidency and the Political Forces—presidentialism in Iceland, the choice of a president; and Conclusion.

The Irish presidency is usually seen as one of the weakest in any liberal democracy, certainly as the weakest presidency to be filled by direct election. This chapter does not argue that this characterization is necessarily wrong, but it does raise questions about the nature of the presidency: is it really as weak as it seems, and, if so, is this because of written or unwritten constraints; is the presidency weak at all times, or has it been in the past—or could it be in the future—more significant under some circumstances than others? The Irish political system is based very much on the Westminster model, and although it deviates from it in some important respects (e.g. it has a proportional representation electoral system, a written constitution, judicial review, and much experience of coalition government), the central role of the government in the political process is unquestionable and largely unquestioned. Within this overall framework of executive dominance, however, there is scope for some variation according to circumstances: parliament might be a little more effective vis‐à‐vis government during periods of minority government, or at times when the ever‐changing committee system is in one of its more productive modes; within the government, the Taoiseach (prime minister) is more likely to be dominant during periods of single‐party government than in coalitions; it is fair to say, though, that no one looks to the president for political leadership. The first section of the chapter considers two factors that have a strong influence upon the role of the president—the formation of the regime, and the provisions of the constitution; the next section examines relations between the president and other political actors; and the final one draws conclusions.

The semi‐presidential regime in Bulgaria is of recent origin: it was established in July 1991, when a Great National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which proclaims that ‘Bulgaria shall be a republic with a parliamentary form of government’; the emphasis on ‘parliamentary’ highlights the subordinate role of the president, who is elected directly by the voters for period five years. Even though the framers of the constitution deliberately created a dual structure of the executive branch, the text of the fundamental law envisages a mode of distribution of prerogatives that is heavily skewed in favour of the legislature and a cabinet accountable to the deputies. It is difficult, however, to sustain a claim that a general pattern of leadership is beginning to emerge under Bulgarian semi‐presidentialism, since the country has only had two presidents under its new constitution; the closest to a valid generalization which may be ventured in the light of the evidence is that, while parliament enjoys supremacy over law‐making and the government remains the primary site of executive decision‐making, the rapports between these two institutions and the presidency have varied dramatically, with the influence of the head of state running the gamut from almost complete exclusion to a palpable ability to shape agendas. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse the ways in which constitutionally designed patterns of institutional interaction shift in response to changes in the social and economic environment rather than to chronicle events—the analysis is conceived as a chronology of the successive problems with which political actors had to cope. The three sections of the chapter are: Constitutional Balance of Power; Presidential/Parliamentary Relations; and Conclusion.

The Republic of Lithuania is known as a semi‐presidential state, and while it has some basic similarities with other semi‐presidential states, this chapter looks at the main peculiarities of the regime and describes the status of presidential power. The first section explains the reasons why the citizens of Lithuania voted for a semi‐presidential regime, while those in the other two Baltic states (Latvia and Estonia), preferred to adopt a parliamentary form of government where the presidency has little constitutional power; some of the peculiarities of the Lithuanian political system are explained with particular reference to the historical background which had such an impact on the creation of the system. The second section defines the constitutional, or de jure, power of the Lithuanian presidency and clarifies its relationship with the de jure power of the Seimas, or parliament, and the government. The third section analyses the political ‘triangle’ of the president, parliament, and the government, and also presents the political realities of the last six years in Lithuania. The fourth section focuses on the personality of the president with an analysis of the period from 1993 to 1998, and the last section sets out the main conclusions of the chapter and provides a prognosis for the development of the future political system in the country.

The eight years of post‐communist democratic rule in Poland have been marked by a struggle between rival constitutional agendas, and although the institutional set‐up has remained the same as under the 1989 Roundtable Agreement (a dual executive and a dual legislature), the formal competencies and effective powers of these institutions have changed over time. There were two stages in the constitution‐making process: the round table negotiations leading to constitutional amendments, and the regular constitution‐making process. The transition to democracy was to have been gradual and controlled with a new constitution being passed before the first fully competitive parliamentary elections in 1993. Instead, democratic institutions emerged in a stepwise and piecemeal manner with political events overtaking constitutional initiatives. Minor amendments were made to the 1952 constitution in anticipation of a completely new constitution being passed relatively quickly, but when it became clear that the two houses of parliament would be unable to agree on a common draft, a stopgap constitution was passed which dealt only with executive–legislative relations. The often ambiguous provisions of this 1992 Little Constitution were interpreted by various political forces in ways that bolstered their respective institutional powers, and its passing did not lead to a less heated debate between those who wanted a ‘governing’ president and those who favoured a figurehead president with weak powers. A semi‐presidential system is in place, but its nature has been the source of institutional squabbles throughout the period considered here (1989–97), with the balance of power moving very much in favour of the prime minister. The constitution‐making process was formally completed in the summer of 1997 with the passing of the full constitution by a legislature dominated by parties with roots in the former communist regime. Its confirmation by referendum was by a narrow majority, and the numerous political parties and organizations not represented in the 1993–97 legislature have vowed to reopen negotiations on certain constitutional provisions in the next parliamentary term. The different parts of this chapter discuss the historical context, constitutional powers under the Little Constitution, political practice, and the writing of the second constitution.

Romania emerged from one of the darkest periods in its history in December 1989, when Ceauşsescu's regime was overthrown, leaving Romania with a traumatized population and a devastated economy, and the gradual establishment of a democratic system of government during the last seven years has been painful and not without setbacks. The new institutional system established in Romania is semi‐presidential in the sense of the definition used in this book: it has a directly elected fixed‐term president alongside a prime minister who is responsible to parliament. The semi‐presidential system of government was established gradually, initially on the basis of the Electoral Law of 14 Mar 1990 and the rules of procedure of parliament adopted after the May 1990 elections. The institutional provisions of the Electoral Law and the rules of procedure of parliament subsequently formed the basis of the semi‐presidential system of government established under the new constitution, which was approved in a referendum in December 1991. It is important to note that there is no historical precedent for the establishment of a semi‐presidential system of government in Romania, and the inheritance of the whole period between independence (in 1878) and the fall of the Ceauşescu regime generally provides an unsuitable basis for the development of a democratic system of government. The chapter is divided into three main parts, organised according to the three factors identified by Duverger as determining for the leadership style in semi‐presidential systems: the events surrounding the formation of the system; the constitutional powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament; and the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and the majority.

The Russian presidency is of recent origin, although there was always a prime minister, or (in the Soviet period) a chairman of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister and his colleagues were elected by the Soviet parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in addition, there was a collective presidency or Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, with the chairman of that body carrying out the functions of head of state—although there was still no presidency as such. Neither the chairman of the Presidium nor the prime minister was accountable in any meaningful way to the parliament, or (still more so) a mass electorate; rather, decisions on matters of this kind were taken by the party leadership and routinely ratified. All this began to change in the late Soviet period: a presidency was approved with some haste in March 1990, and Gorbachev was elected as its first incumbent with the support of 71% of the Congress of People's Deputies who voted (there was no popular vote). The next president was Yeltsin, who had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament in May 1990, and in June 1991 was elected Russia's first‐ever president in a direct popular election against five other candidates. The presidency, as it was established by this time, was normally an elective office, and it was a position of executive authority, but its powers extended under Yeltsin. The four sections of this chapter look at the experience of the Russian presidency under the following headings: The Context of Semi‐Presidentialism in Russia; Constitutional Powers; Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Parliaments; and Yeltsin and the Russian Semi‐Presidency.

In Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, which is the general representative house, and a National Council, which is a body representing various interests and has very limited powers; executive power is divided between the president and the government; judicial power is exercised by the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, which rules on the conformity of legal enactments with the constitution and the law and decides constitutional complaints and certain other matters. It is generally accepted that Slovenia has a parliamentary system in which the focus of political decision–making lies with the parliament and the government. As in most other Central and East European countries in transition, in Slovenia the formal powers of parliament remain very strong, but, unlike the pure parliamentarism that certain countries opted for, the Slovene arrangements belong more to a group that could be characterized as parliamentarism with a directly (popularly) elected (or semi‐presidential) president. The role of the president is relatively small, and is to act as the head of state, whose function or powers are mainly of a representative, initiative, and protocol nature. After an introduction discussing whether Slovenia has a parliamentary or semi‐presidential system, this chapter focuses on the actual nature and features of the position and role of the president in the context of the constitutional and political system of the Republic of Slovenia, in six further sections: National Independence and Establishment of the First President of the Republic, Parliament and Government; Historical Factors and the Events Surrounding the Formation of the Regime; The Constitutional Powers of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament; The Nature of the Parliamentary Majority and the Relationship Between the President and the Majority; and Conclusion.

Ukraine can be said to have a semi‐presidential system insofar as it has direct presidential elections combined with a prime minister and a government answerable to both president and parliament. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has also gained a reputation for political gridlock: both of the presidents elected since independence disappointed the initial hopes of their supporters, building up an impressive array of powers on paper, but proving unable to match this in practice. Conflict between presidents, prime ministers, and the chairmen of parliament has been an endemic feature of Ukrainian politics, as have the frustrations of a weak and fractious post‐communist party system. This chapter seeks to explain why semi‐presidentialism has nevertheless provided an attractive form of political compromise in Ukraine's ethnically, linguistically, and regionally divided society, despite the problems of political stasis that it has both reflected and helped to promote. The aim is to explain why circumstances have made it difficult for Ukraine to choose any other regime type, despite the residual enthusiasm of the Ukrainian Left for a Soviet (i.e. parliamentary) republic. The chapter first examines how semi‐presidentialism was established in Ukraine and then looks at Duverger's other key criteria of semi‐presidentialism: the constitutional powers of the key political actors, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relations between the president and that majority.

The focus of this chapter is the academic debate on the choice of semi‐presidentialism as an appropriate constitutional arrangement. However, it does not aim to demonstrate that semi‐presidentialism is either a better or worse form of government than presidentialism or parliamentarism, and it has not been written with the intention of establishing a definitive list of the advantages and disadvantages of semi‐presidential regimes. Rather, the chapter is concerned with the terms of the debate. It aims to show that as it currently stands the debate about the pros and cons of the various regime types is fundamentally flawed, and that the assumptions underlying the contemporary debate need to be reconsidered before meaningful conclusions about the true advantages and disadvantages of these regime types can be drawn. Drawing on the country studies in the previous chapters, the first part of this chapter identifies the diverse patterns of leadership to be found in European semi‐presidential regimes; the second part returns to Duverger's framework for the study of semi‐presidentialism and considers the importance of historical, constitutional, party political, and other factors in determining why these leadership patterns should vary so much; and finally, the third part indicates what the experience of European semi‐presidentialism tells us about the issue of comparative institutional engineering.