Mark Timmons (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that ...
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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.Less
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics aims to provide, on an annual basis, some of the best contemporary work in the field of normative ethical theory. Each volume features new essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of issues and positions in normative ethical theory, and represents a sampling of recent developments in this field. This second volume includes contributions by Robert Audi, Christian Coons, Julia Driver, William J. Fitzpatrick, Thomas Hurka, Esther Shubert, Daniel Jacobson, Elinor Mason, Michael Nelson, Luke Robinson, Jacob Ross, Andrew Sepielli, and Cynthia A. Stark. The topics discussed include: Kantian intuitionism, welfarism, the objective standard of good, intention, permissibility and double effect, moral dumbfounding and moral stupidity, coercion and integrity, practical reason and morality, atomism, subjective normativity and action guidance, and Rawlsian self-respect.
Robert N. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599349
- eISBN:
- 9780191731556
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599349.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an ...
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Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation, and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him- or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, such as it being impossible to owe anything to yourself, or the belief that an obligation to improve oneself is overly ‘moralistic’. It argues against Kantian universalization arguments for a duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has, but defends arguments based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept a requirement of self-improvement, and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed.Less
Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation, and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him- or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, such as it being impossible to owe anything to yourself, or the belief that an obligation to improve oneself is overly ‘moralistic’. It argues against Kantian universalization arguments for a duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has, but defends arguments based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept a requirement of self-improvement, and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed.
Mike W. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195304718
- eISBN:
- 9780199786572
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195304713.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter continues the discussion began in Chapter 1 on the ways moral values are embedded in conceptions of mental disorders and positive health, focusing on when mental health is defined ...
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This chapter continues the discussion began in Chapter 1 on the ways moral values are embedded in conceptions of mental disorders and positive health, focusing on when mental health is defined positively, as psychological well-being. Positive conceptions of health invariably embody or presuppose moral values. Marie Jahoda identified six (overlapping) criteria for positive health, which today, is the starting point for many contemporary discussions. These are: (1) self-esteem, (2) psychological integration, (3) personal autonomy, (4) self-actualization, (5) social coping, and (6) realistic cognition. It is argued that these criteria are closely linked, respectively, to self-respect, integrity, moral autonomy, authenticity, responsibility, and truthfulness. They are not synonymous with these virtues, however, and each feature can be unfolded in subjective or objective directions, thereby reflecting ambiguities in the therapeutic trend.Less
This chapter continues the discussion began in Chapter 1 on the ways moral values are embedded in conceptions of mental disorders and positive health, focusing on when mental health is defined positively, as psychological well-being. Positive conceptions of health invariably embody or presuppose moral values. Marie Jahoda identified six (overlapping) criteria for positive health, which today, is the starting point for many contemporary discussions. These are: (1) self-esteem, (2) psychological integration, (3) personal autonomy, (4) self-actualization, (5) social coping, and (6) realistic cognition. It is argued that these criteria are closely linked, respectively, to self-respect, integrity, moral autonomy, authenticity, responsibility, and truthfulness. They are not synonymous with these virtues, however, and each feature can be unfolded in subjective or objective directions, thereby reflecting ambiguities in the therapeutic trend.
Richard S. Weiss
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195335231
- eISBN:
- 9780199868803
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335231.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Hinduism
This chapter looks at the utopian character that siddha practitioners ascribe to siddha medicine. The features attributed to siddha medicine—egalitarianism, rationality, science, accordance with ...
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This chapter looks at the utopian character that siddha practitioners ascribe to siddha medicine. The features attributed to siddha medicine—egalitarianism, rationality, science, accordance with nature, and global applicability—qualify siddha to be the medicine of our global future. The details of this formulation took shape within the context of Tamil revivalism, and siddha practitioners have given rational and global qualities to even the more religious features of siddha medical discourse, such as its connection to Shaivism. These formulations of an effective, original, and natural medicine glorify Tamil civilization and give rise to a variety of desires and motivations among their authors and intended audiences, and they contribute to assertions of the contemporary relevance of Tamil civilization and tradition.Less
This chapter looks at the utopian character that siddha practitioners ascribe to siddha medicine. The features attributed to siddha medicine—egalitarianism, rationality, science, accordance with nature, and global applicability—qualify siddha to be the medicine of our global future. The details of this formulation took shape within the context of Tamil revivalism, and siddha practitioners have given rational and global qualities to even the more religious features of siddha medical discourse, such as its connection to Shaivism. These formulations of an effective, original, and natural medicine glorify Tamil civilization and give rise to a variety of desires and motivations among their authors and intended audiences, and they contribute to assertions of the contemporary relevance of Tamil civilization and tradition.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195314311
- eISBN:
- 9780199871780
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314311.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Starting with etymological issues, this chapter focuses on the relation of feeling insulted to anger and dejection, the contrast between intentional and unintentional insult, and issues of ...
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Starting with etymological issues, this chapter focuses on the relation of feeling insulted to anger and dejection, the contrast between intentional and unintentional insult, and issues of self-respect and self-esteem. Disappointed expectations of attention and respect can lead in extreme situations to moral insult when one's essential identity is undermined, as it may be by certain forms of profiling and discrimination.Less
Starting with etymological issues, this chapter focuses on the relation of feeling insulted to anger and dejection, the contrast between intentional and unintentional insult, and issues of self-respect and self-esteem. Disappointed expectations of attention and respect can lead in extreme situations to moral insult when one's essential identity is undermined, as it may be by certain forms of profiling and discrimination.
Thomas L. Brodie
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195138368
- eISBN:
- 9780199834037
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138368.003.0037
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
The narrative recounts first, how the butler finally remembered his sins and Joseph, thus bringing Joseph to be in charge of the famine situation (Genesis 41), and then how the famished brothers went ...
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The narrative recounts first, how the butler finally remembered his sins and Joseph, thus bringing Joseph to be in charge of the famine situation (Genesis 41), and then how the famished brothers went to Egypt and there began to remember Joseph and their sin (Genesis 42). Joseph's treatment of his brother may seem harsh, but immediate self‐revelation would have left them feeling guilty. Instead, he leads them into a process of remembering, into a conversion that will restore their self‐respect.Less
The narrative recounts first, how the butler finally remembered his sins and Joseph, thus bringing Joseph to be in charge of the famine situation (Genesis 41), and then how the famished brothers went to Egypt and there began to remember Joseph and their sin (Genesis 42). Joseph's treatment of his brother may seem harsh, but immediate self‐revelation would have left them feeling guilty. Instead, he leads them into a process of remembering, into a conversion that will restore their self‐respect.
Maurizio Viroli
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151823
- eISBN:
- 9781400840274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151823.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter focuses on servitude. Although Italian history has had moments and examples of moral greatness and a sincere love of liberty, for many centuries it has been a history of servitude, ...
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This chapter focuses on servitude. Although Italian history has had moments and examples of moral greatness and a sincere love of liberty, for many centuries it has been a history of servitude, variously in thrall to foreign masters, despotic governments, and the spiritual and temporal dominion of a church that employed both the word and alongside it the sword and the gallows; at times the Italians have been oppressed by all three at once. Indeed, a long familiarity with servitude has shaped Italian mores, which—it is well known—constitute the most tenacious of all social forces. The principal trait of the servile soul is how little respect it has for itself and for others. Even if it may seem strange, servants have no self-respect; they sense that they have little worth and so they willingly accept their condition. This lack of self-respect brings with it indifference, which, in turn, generates a full and continuous cynicism.Less
This chapter focuses on servitude. Although Italian history has had moments and examples of moral greatness and a sincere love of liberty, for many centuries it has been a history of servitude, variously in thrall to foreign masters, despotic governments, and the spiritual and temporal dominion of a church that employed both the word and alongside it the sword and the gallows; at times the Italians have been oppressed by all three at once. Indeed, a long familiarity with servitude has shaped Italian mores, which—it is well known—constitute the most tenacious of all social forces. The principal trait of the servile soul is how little respect it has for itself and for others. Even if it may seem strange, servants have no self-respect; they sense that they have little worth and so they willingly accept their condition. This lack of self-respect brings with it indifference, which, in turn, generates a full and continuous cynicism.
Mike W. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845217
- eISBN:
- 9780199933068
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845217.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Morally good lives are not always happy, and happy lives are not always morally good. Nevertheless, happiness and morality are connected in a variety of ways. Happiness is one of the basic goods for ...
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Morally good lives are not always happy, and happy lives are not always morally good. Nevertheless, happiness and morality are connected in a variety of ways. Happiness is one of the basic goods for a human being. It is a moral good, as well as a self-interested good, at least when it is not based directly on immorality. Although it is intrinsically good, its value increases as it intertwines with morality and other aspects of good lives. Thus, loving our lives has greater worth insofar as our lives are worth loving, and our enjoyments and sense of meaning have greater worth insofar as they are rooted in justified values. In addition to a right to pursue happiness, there is a limited responsibility (rooted in self-respect) to pursue happiness. In addition, the virtues promote happiness, and vice versa.Less
Morally good lives are not always happy, and happy lives are not always morally good. Nevertheless, happiness and morality are connected in a variety of ways. Happiness is one of the basic goods for a human being. It is a moral good, as well as a self-interested good, at least when it is not based directly on immorality. Although it is intrinsically good, its value increases as it intertwines with morality and other aspects of good lives. Thus, loving our lives has greater worth insofar as our lives are worth loving, and our enjoyments and sense of meaning have greater worth insofar as they are rooted in justified values. In addition to a right to pursue happiness, there is a limited responsibility (rooted in self-respect) to pursue happiness. In addition, the virtues promote happiness, and vice versa.
Thomas E. Hill Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199692002
- eISBN:
- 9780191741241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692002.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The aim here is, first, to frame the question to be considered about the responsibility to resist oppression, second, to describe briefly three second order responsibilities especially pertinent to ...
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The aim here is, first, to frame the question to be considered about the responsibility to resist oppression, second, to describe briefly three second order responsibilities especially pertinent to “by-standers,” third, to note some connections to often over-looked aspects of Kant’s ethics, and, finally, to suggest briefly how we might see neglect of these responsibilities as failures to respect both oneself and others. The main question here is not about what specifically to do in various contexts of oppression. It is instead a prior question about certain forward-looking moral responsibilities of those who may be or become bystanders in oppressive conditions. The three special responsibilities are second-order responsibilities to exercise due care in deliberation, to scrutinize one’s motives for remaining passive, and to try to develop virtue conceived as strength of will to do what is right despite obstacles. The three responsibilities are drawn from Kant’s later writings on ethics and religion, where Kant seems to take more seriously the problem that many moral failures are due to negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. By neglect of the special second-order duties we contribute to the on-going oppression of others, but we also fail to respect ourselves properly insofar as we do not do what we can to implement our basic moral commitments.Less
The aim here is, first, to frame the question to be considered about the responsibility to resist oppression, second, to describe briefly three second order responsibilities especially pertinent to “by-standers,” third, to note some connections to often over-looked aspects of Kant’s ethics, and, finally, to suggest briefly how we might see neglect of these responsibilities as failures to respect both oneself and others. The main question here is not about what specifically to do in various contexts of oppression. It is instead a prior question about certain forward-looking moral responsibilities of those who may be or become bystanders in oppressive conditions. The three special responsibilities are second-order responsibilities to exercise due care in deliberation, to scrutinize one’s motives for remaining passive, and to try to develop virtue conceived as strength of will to do what is right despite obstacles. The three responsibilities are drawn from Kant’s later writings on ethics and religion, where Kant seems to take more seriously the problem that many moral failures are due to negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. By neglect of the special second-order duties we contribute to the on-going oppression of others, but we also fail to respect ourselves properly insofar as we do not do what we can to implement our basic moral commitments.
Daniel Attas
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282951
- eISBN:
- 9780191712319
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282951.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Can Rawls's theory provide a framework for assessing obligations to future generations? Extending the veil of ignorance so that participants in the original position do not know to which generation ...
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Can Rawls's theory provide a framework for assessing obligations to future generations? Extending the veil of ignorance so that participants in the original position do not know to which generation they belong appears to fail in this endeavour. Earlier generations cannot improve their situation by ‘cooperating’ with later generations. Such circumstances, lacking mutuality, leave no room for an agreement or contract. Nevertheless, the original position can be reconstructed so as to model relations of mutuality between generations even if these are absent from the real world. This chapter assesses earlier attempts to do this and provides a rationale for viewing the just savings principle as a clause in the full formulation of the difference principle.Less
Can Rawls's theory provide a framework for assessing obligations to future generations? Extending the veil of ignorance so that participants in the original position do not know to which generation they belong appears to fail in this endeavour. Earlier generations cannot improve their situation by ‘cooperating’ with later generations. Such circumstances, lacking mutuality, leave no room for an agreement or contract. Nevertheless, the original position can be reconstructed so as to model relations of mutuality between generations even if these are absent from the real world. This chapter assesses earlier attempts to do this and provides a rationale for viewing the just savings principle as a clause in the full formulation of the difference principle.
David Owen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199231560
- eISBN:
- 9780191716119
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231560.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
In Daybreak, Nietzsche presents his project of re-evaluation as, in part, oriented to this task: ‘We shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic and restore to these ...
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In Daybreak, Nietzsche presents his project of re-evaluation as, in part, oriented to this task: ‘We shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic and restore to these actions their value — we shall deprive them of their bad conscience!’ (D s148). Given this commitment to realigning the relationship of ethical value to ‘actions decried as egoistic’, it may be instructive to focus on the case of self-love, a disposition which is clearly understood as exemplary of the ‘egoistic’ by proponents of modern morality. In this respect, an analysis of Nietzsche's account of the nature and value of self-love provides a basis for reflecting on both what he intends by the project of restoring goodwill and value to ‘egoistic’ actions, and the cogency of this project. This chapter begins by sketching the contrast between Aristotle and Kant on self-love and self-respect, before turning to argue that Nietzsche's position can be understood as seeking to overcome the tension between the positions of Aristotle and Kant. It argues, first, that Nietzsche is committed to the value of ethical autonomy in which he takes to ground self-respect (in this respect, he is a ‘Kantian’) and, second, that Nietzsche takes self-love to be necessary to support the cultivation of ethical nobility (in this regard he is ‘Aristotelian’). The crucial move is then the argument that, for Nietzsche, ethical nobility consists in valuing ethical autonomy and, hence, the tension between self-love (love) and self-respect (law) is dissolved.Less
In Daybreak, Nietzsche presents his project of re-evaluation as, in part, oriented to this task: ‘We shall restore to men their goodwill towards the actions decried as egoistic and restore to these actions their value — we shall deprive them of their bad conscience!’ (D s148). Given this commitment to realigning the relationship of ethical value to ‘actions decried as egoistic’, it may be instructive to focus on the case of self-love, a disposition which is clearly understood as exemplary of the ‘egoistic’ by proponents of modern morality. In this respect, an analysis of Nietzsche's account of the nature and value of self-love provides a basis for reflecting on both what he intends by the project of restoring goodwill and value to ‘egoistic’ actions, and the cogency of this project. This chapter begins by sketching the contrast between Aristotle and Kant on self-love and self-respect, before turning to argue that Nietzsche's position can be understood as seeking to overcome the tension between the positions of Aristotle and Kant. It argues, first, that Nietzsche is committed to the value of ethical autonomy in which he takes to ground self-respect (in this respect, he is a ‘Kantian’) and, second, that Nietzsche takes self-love to be necessary to support the cultivation of ethical nobility (in this regard he is ‘Aristotelian’). The crucial move is then the argument that, for Nietzsche, ethical nobility consists in valuing ethical autonomy and, hence, the tension between self-love (love) and self-respect (law) is dissolved.
Jeffrie G. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195178555
- eISBN:
- 9780199850129
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178555.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the ...
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We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.Less
We have all been victims of wrongdoing. Forgiving that wrongdoing is one of the staples of current pop psychology dogma; it is seen as a universal prescription for moral and mental health in the self-help and recovery section of bookstores. At the same time, personal vindictiveness as a rule is seen as irrational and immoral. In many ways, our thinking on these issues is deeply inconsistent; we value forgiveness yet at the same time now use victim-impact statements to argue for harsher penalties for criminals. Do we have a right to hate others for what they have done to us? This book has a skeptical view when it comes to our ideas on both emotions. The book proposes that vindictive emotions (anger, resentment, and the desire for revenge) actually deserve a more legitimate place in our emotional, social, and legal lives than we currently recognize, while forgiveness deserves to be more selectively granted. The book grounds the views expressed herein on careful analysis of the nature of forgiveness, a subtle understanding of the psychology of anger and resentment, and a fine appreciation of the ethical issues of self-respect and self-defense. It also uses examples from law, literature, and religion to make various points.
Jeffrie G. Murphy
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195178555
- eISBN:
- 9780199850129
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178555.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
One risk that vindictiveness often creates is that it leads victimized people to become self-righteous fanatics. This chapter presents how forgiveness can be a more viable response to evil. It argues ...
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One risk that vindictiveness often creates is that it leads victimized people to become self-righteous fanatics. This chapter presents how forgiveness can be a more viable response to evil. It argues that forgiveness can be seen as a healing virtue since it has a capacity to free an individual from being consumed by anger, check one's tendency toward cruelty, and open doors to the restoration of broken relationships. To prove this case, the chapter cited the parable of the unforgiving servant. It is also demonstrated here that granting forgiveness does not necessarily disregard the self-respect of the victim as long as sincere repentance is manifested on the part of the wrongdoer.Less
One risk that vindictiveness often creates is that it leads victimized people to become self-righteous fanatics. This chapter presents how forgiveness can be a more viable response to evil. It argues that forgiveness can be seen as a healing virtue since it has a capacity to free an individual from being consumed by anger, check one's tendency toward cruelty, and open doors to the restoration of broken relationships. To prove this case, the chapter cited the parable of the unforgiving servant. It is also demonstrated here that granting forgiveness does not necessarily disregard the self-respect of the victim as long as sincere repentance is manifested on the part of the wrongdoer.
Gillie Bolton
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- November 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199546695
- eISBN:
- 9780191730214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546695.003.0006
- Subject:
- Palliative Care, Palliative Medicine Research, Patient Care and End-of-Life Decision Making
This chapter discusses the findings of an exploratory study that looked at the use and value of therapeutic creative writing in oncology settings. Based on the information that is presented in this ...
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This chapter discusses the findings of an exploratory study that looked at the use and value of therapeutic creative writing in oncology settings. Based on the information that is presented in this chapter, it is determined that creative writing can serve to be cathartic and can even enhance self-respect and confidence. This was due to patients being able to map the past and help young people orientate to the future.Less
This chapter discusses the findings of an exploratory study that looked at the use and value of therapeutic creative writing in oncology settings. Based on the information that is presented in this chapter, it is determined that creative writing can serve to be cathartic and can even enhance self-respect and confidence. This was due to patients being able to map the past and help young people orientate to the future.
Cynthia A. Stark
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A prominent element of Rawls's legacy is his uniting justice with self-respect. Indeed, Rawls appeals to the good of self-respect to justify several features of “justice as fairness” — the highly ...
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A prominent element of Rawls's legacy is his uniting justice with self-respect. Indeed, Rawls appeals to the good of self-respect to justify several features of “justice as fairness” — the highly influential account of distributive justice he presents in A Theory of Justice. Most who have considered the role of self-respect in Rawls's theory, throughout the four decades since its publication, have agreed that Rawls's view rests upon an irreparable equivocation between two different ideals of self-respect. In the face of this critical consensus, this chapter attempts to resurrect Rawls's approach. It argues, first, that Rawls relies upon an unambiguous notion of self-respect as a secure belief that one's contribution to one's scheme of social cooperation matters. Rawls is not clear, however, whether the value of self-respect is merely instrumental or also intrinsic. Second, it is argued that Rawls's main objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens' self-respect is not, as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens' self-respect generally, but to show that his principles counter the effects of the market on lower class citizens' sense of worth. This discussion establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self-respect as having intrinsic worth.Less
A prominent element of Rawls's legacy is his uniting justice with self-respect. Indeed, Rawls appeals to the good of self-respect to justify several features of “justice as fairness” — the highly influential account of distributive justice he presents in A Theory of Justice. Most who have considered the role of self-respect in Rawls's theory, throughout the four decades since its publication, have agreed that Rawls's view rests upon an irreparable equivocation between two different ideals of self-respect. In the face of this critical consensus, this chapter attempts to resurrect Rawls's approach. It argues, first, that Rawls relies upon an unambiguous notion of self-respect as a secure belief that one's contribution to one's scheme of social cooperation matters. Rawls is not clear, however, whether the value of self-respect is merely instrumental or also intrinsic. Second, it is argued that Rawls's main objective in arguing that justice as fairness supports citizens' self-respect is not, as many have thought, to show that his principles support citizens' self-respect generally, but to show that his principles counter the effects of the market on lower class citizens' sense of worth. This discussion establishes that Rawls, in the end, sees self-respect as having intrinsic worth.
Glen Pettigrove
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199646555
- eISBN:
- 9780191741975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646555.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Whom may we forgive? A number of people have argued that only those who are sufficiently apologetic may be forgiven. This chapter considers three of the main arguments offered against forgiving the ...
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Whom may we forgive? A number of people have argued that only those who are sufficiently apologetic may be forgiven. This chapter considers three of the main arguments offered against forgiving the unapologetic, which are that it condones wrongdoing, expresses a lack of self-respect, or leads to bad consequences. Each of these arguments is found wanting. Along the way the analysis sheds light on the relationship between forgiveness and apology, trust, reconciliation, condonation, self-respect, and punishment.Less
Whom may we forgive? A number of people have argued that only those who are sufficiently apologetic may be forgiven. This chapter considers three of the main arguments offered against forgiving the unapologetic, which are that it condones wrongdoing, expresses a lack of self-respect, or leads to bad consequences. Each of these arguments is found wanting. Along the way the analysis sheds light on the relationship between forgiveness and apology, trust, reconciliation, condonation, self-respect, and punishment.
J. M. Bernstein
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226266329
- eISBN:
- 9780226266466
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226266466.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Tracking further aspects of Améry experience, this chapter seeks to develop the affirmative side of the moral psychology underpinning experiences of moral injury, of humiliation, degradation, and ...
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Tracking further aspects of Améry experience, this chapter seeks to develop the affirmative side of the moral psychology underpinning experiences of moral injury, of humiliation, degradation, and devastation. The ‘dignity constellation’ is composed of love, lovability, respect, self-respect, and dignity. Developed through an analysis of the Nuremberg Laws and the procedures of death camps (according to Hannah Arendt), the moral character of the human body (following Fichte), the devastation of slavery (following Orlando Patterson), and an account of the dignity befitting the dead, the resulting constellation claims: Dignity is the representation of self-respect, where self-respect is the stance of one who takes herself to be of intrinsic worth and acts accordingly. Self-respect is the feeling of self-worth derived from first love. Thus to respect human dignity is to respect an individual’s standing as a constitutively vulnerable being possessed of intrinsic worth. Respect for dignity and self-respect are the third person and first person perception of the same intrinsic worth that requires the insistent affirmation of the self and the continuous acknowledgement of (respect from) others to be sustained. Self-respect requires the affirmation of bodily autonomy, while respect for dignity requires the recognition of bodily integrity.Less
Tracking further aspects of Améry experience, this chapter seeks to develop the affirmative side of the moral psychology underpinning experiences of moral injury, of humiliation, degradation, and devastation. The ‘dignity constellation’ is composed of love, lovability, respect, self-respect, and dignity. Developed through an analysis of the Nuremberg Laws and the procedures of death camps (according to Hannah Arendt), the moral character of the human body (following Fichte), the devastation of slavery (following Orlando Patterson), and an account of the dignity befitting the dead, the resulting constellation claims: Dignity is the representation of self-respect, where self-respect is the stance of one who takes herself to be of intrinsic worth and acts accordingly. Self-respect is the feeling of self-worth derived from first love. Thus to respect human dignity is to respect an individual’s standing as a constitutively vulnerable being possessed of intrinsic worth. Respect for dignity and self-respect are the third person and first person perception of the same intrinsic worth that requires the insistent affirmation of the self and the continuous acknowledgement of (respect from) others to be sustained. Self-respect requires the affirmation of bodily autonomy, while respect for dignity requires the recognition of bodily integrity.
Robert N. Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199599349
- eISBN:
- 9780191731556
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599349.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
If there is a case to be made for an obligation of self-improvement, it will likely need to appeal to some elements of the so-called Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. It is argued ...
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If there is a case to be made for an obligation of self-improvement, it will likely need to appeal to some elements of the so-called Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. It is argued that in order to get meaningful action-guiding conclusions out of the Humanity formula, we must have some sort of substantive account of what it means to respect humanity as an end in itself, what it means, in particular, for humanity to have the special value Kantians attribute to it. The case is put forward that the value of humanity should not be taken as a foundational value, but rather as reducible to the necessary end of an autonomous rational will. That yields a more in the way of substantive guidance for action.Less
If there is a case to be made for an obligation of self-improvement, it will likely need to appeal to some elements of the so-called Humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative. It is argued that in order to get meaningful action-guiding conclusions out of the Humanity formula, we must have some sort of substantive account of what it means to respect humanity as an end in itself, what it means, in particular, for humanity to have the special value Kantians attribute to it. The case is put forward that the value of humanity should not be taken as a foundational value, but rather as reducible to the necessary end of an autonomous rational will. That yields a more in the way of substantive guidance for action.
Miguel de Beistegui
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780226547374
- eISBN:
- 9780226547404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226547404.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter turns to the birth of the homo symbolicus, and of the discourse of recognition, as the third and final pillar of liberalism investigated in the book. It raises the following question: ...
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This chapter turns to the birth of the homo symbolicus, and of the discourse of recognition, as the third and final pillar of liberalism investigated in the book. It raises the following question: how is it that, whilst combated for over a thousand years in the western world, self-love (amor sui) has become a key mechanism of government, and a fundamental way of understanding and governing the self ? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the manner in which, beginning with Rousseau, Adam Smith and some of their followers, a negative form of desire (cupiditas, libido, amor sui) was turned into a positive force, that is, a key engine of ethical and political life. The longing and struggle for recognition (as the German idealists called it) became, and continues to be, the measure of social progress, and a force behind the transformation of positive law in the last two hundred years. This "most ardent desire of human nature," Adam Smith argues, is one that any progressive politics should include, and can ignore only at its own peril.Less
This chapter turns to the birth of the homo symbolicus, and of the discourse of recognition, as the third and final pillar of liberalism investigated in the book. It raises the following question: how is it that, whilst combated for over a thousand years in the western world, self-love (amor sui) has become a key mechanism of government, and a fundamental way of understanding and governing the self ? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand the manner in which, beginning with Rousseau, Adam Smith and some of their followers, a negative form of desire (cupiditas, libido, amor sui) was turned into a positive force, that is, a key engine of ethical and political life. The longing and struggle for recognition (as the German idealists called it) became, and continues to be, the measure of social progress, and a force behind the transformation of positive law in the last two hundred years. This "most ardent desire of human nature," Adam Smith argues, is one that any progressive politics should include, and can ignore only at its own peril.
Clemens Sedmak
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780197265642
- eISBN:
- 9780191760389
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265642.003.0033
- Subject:
- Law, Human Rights and Immigration
The concept of human dignity is based on a particular pattern of perception: of perceiving humans as beings rather than things. The Israeli philosopher, Avishai Margalit terms the treatment of humans ...
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The concept of human dignity is based on a particular pattern of perception: of perceiving humans as beings rather than things. The Israeli philosopher, Avishai Margalit terms the treatment of humans as ‘things’: ‘blindness to the human aspect’. Recognizing individuals as living beings means being aware of an inherent inner depth, a dimension of interiority famously described by Augustine in his Confessions. Becoming aware of interiority of other also means sensing his/her vulnerability. Human dignity needs nourishment found in model examples. Those members of society who are particularly vulnerable lack such nourishment, and focusing on these individuals helps us to realize the ‘perceptive value’ of human dignity. It is suggested that vulnerability experienced serves both as a litmus test and the basis for operationalizing the concept of human dignity.Less
The concept of human dignity is based on a particular pattern of perception: of perceiving humans as beings rather than things. The Israeli philosopher, Avishai Margalit terms the treatment of humans as ‘things’: ‘blindness to the human aspect’. Recognizing individuals as living beings means being aware of an inherent inner depth, a dimension of interiority famously described by Augustine in his Confessions. Becoming aware of interiority of other also means sensing his/her vulnerability. Human dignity needs nourishment found in model examples. Those members of society who are particularly vulnerable lack such nourishment, and focusing on these individuals helps us to realize the ‘perceptive value’ of human dignity. It is suggested that vulnerability experienced serves both as a litmus test and the basis for operationalizing the concept of human dignity.
