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Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism

Sebastiano Moruzzi

in Relative Truth

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199234950
eISBN:
9780191715846
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234950.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

This chapter argues that MacFarlane's truth-relativism faces two problems. First, it cannot explain the existence of disputes over assessment-sensitive propositions because it does not have a viable ... More


Arguments and Reasons

Alan Bailey

in Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198238522
eISBN:
9780191679667
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238522.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

The coherence of Sextus' philosophic stance depends on his Pyrrhonism having the internal resources to overcome well-known criticisms of global scepticism. If Sextus must be seen as an advocate of ... More


First Things First

Earl Conee

in Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199253722
eISBN:
9780191601361
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199253722.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Philosophers have thought that there are insuperable limits to rationally opposing skepticism, to pursuing epistemological investigations without substantial presuppositions, or to explaining ... More


Introduction: Scepticism and Rationally Justified Belief

Alan Bailey

in Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
October 2011
ISBN:
9780198238522
eISBN:
9780191679667
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238522.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

This chapter discusses some of the deficiencies of modern accounts of scepticism, and identifies two crucial arguments — the self-refutation argument and the argument that a radical global scepticism ... More


Philosophy and Pedagogy

A. A. Long

in Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199245567
eISBN:
9780191597923
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199245568.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy

Epictetus’ philosophy combines rationality, empiricism, and eudaimonism. He refutes scepticism by arguing that this stance involves self‐refutation. He requires his students to recognise that ... More


Self‐refutation and contradiction

Mi-Kyoung Lee

in Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus

Published in print:
2005
Published Online:
October 2005
ISBN:
9780199262229
eISBN:
9780191602924
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199262225.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy

In the so-called self-refutation argument of the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates argue that Protagoras can be made to refute himself, and that someone who holds Protagoras’ position must admit that it ... More


Relativism

Martin Kusch

in Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology

Published in print:
2002
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199251223
eISBN:
9780191601767
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251223.003.0020
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Takes up six arguments against relativism. The most famous amongst them are Plato's self‐refutation charge, Hillary Putnam's argument based on the parallel between methodological solipsism and ... More


Relativism

David Sedley

in The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780199267033
eISBN:
9780191601828
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199267030.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy

Examines the stages by which Protagorean relativism is refuted. These include the much-debated self-refutation argument, and the argument that only experts could have knowledge of the future. I ... More


Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

John Finnis

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580057
eISBN:
9780191729379
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.001.0001
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This book collects nineteen published and unpublished works presented here as chapters on practical reason. The first nine date from 1970 through to 2008. They include extended critiques of Hume's ... More


Historical Consciousness and Theological Foundations

John Finnis

in Religion and Public Reasons: Collected Essays Volume V

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580095
eISBN:
9780191729416
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580095.003.0010
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

The 1992 Gilson Lecture to the Mediaeval Studies Institute in Toronto, this chapter undertakes a substantial and wide-ranging critique of the theory of ‘historical’ (as opposed to ‘classical’) ... More


Scepticism's Self-Refutation

John Finnis

in Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580057
eISBN:
9780191729379
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.003.0004
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

First principles, whether theoretical or practical, cannot be demonstrated, but can be defended successfully against objections by arguments of the broad kind known to Plato and Aristotle as ... More


Self-Refutation Revisited

John Finnis

in Reason in Action: Collected Essays Volume I

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199580057
eISBN:
9780191729379
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.003.0005
Subject:
Law, Philosophy of Law

This chapter reviews the course of the argument of Chapter 3 in Volume II of this text, underlines its focus on asserting, differentiates it from Mackie's ‘commitment’ analysis, and defends it ... More


Talmudic Self-Refutation (Interpersonality I)

Sergey Dolgopolski

in Other Others: The Political after the Talmud

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
January 2019
ISBN:
9780823280186
eISBN:
9780823281640
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Fordham University Press
DOI:
10.5422/fordham/9780823280186.003.0004
Subject:
Religion, Philosophy of Religion

The chapter works through the emerging and disappearing notion of the political in the Talmud, with the notion and practice of refuting, and the underlying notion of interpersonality rather than ... More


Logic and solipsism

James Levine

in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199665785
eISBN:
9780191749261
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665785.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

In this chapter, Berkeley’s ‘Master Argument’ is used to analyze how Russell and Wittgenstein regard the issue of solipsism. Berkeley argues that it is self–refuting to suppose that something is ... More


Are Egoism and Consequentialism Self-Refuting?

Roger Crisp

in Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
September 2013
ISBN:
9780199604678
eISBN:
9780191759062
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604678.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

The paper defends egoism and consequentialism against Dancy’s charge that they are self-refuting. Exegesis and criticism is provided of relevant arguments in Parfit and Dancy, and special attention ... More


What Is Neo-Positivism and How Could We Argue for It?

Mark Balaguer

in Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
February 2021
ISBN:
9780198868361
eISBN:
9780191904813
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 7 explains how the non-factualist views established in the first part of this book fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism. This chapter formulates neo-positivism, ... More


Parmenides’ Dilemma

Mary Margaret McCabe

in Platonic Conversations

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780198732884
eISBN:
9780191796906
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732884.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

The argument of Parmenides’ Truth can be understood in dialectical terms, based on a self-verifying premiss in the second person, ‘you think’, in combination with some rules for sound argument. From ... More


Does Your Plato Bite?

Mary Margaret McCabe

in Platonic Conversations

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
June 2015
ISBN:
9780198732884
eISBN:
9780191796906
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732884.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, History of Philosophy

How are we to read Plato, and how are his arguments connected to the form of the dialogues? This chapter considers the sophists of the Euthydemus, and argues that we underestimate that dialogue if we ... More


The Standard Objections

John Macfarlane

in Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
May 2014
ISBN:
9780199682751
eISBN:
9780191781636
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682751.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter surveys the standard objections to relativism about truth: that it is self-refuting, that it makes disagreement impossible, that it is incompatible with the equivalence schema, that ... More


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