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This chapter discusses the nature of a free speech principle and explores the coherence of four justifications for that principle: arguments concerned with the importance of discovering truth, free speech as an aspect of self-fulfilment, the argument from citizen participation in a democracy, and suspicion of government. Each of these arguments emphasises the interests of either the speaker or the audience, or perhaps that of the public in an open tolerant society. Therefore, the free speech interests of speakers, recipients (listeners, readers, and viewers), and the general public in the unimpeded communication of information and ideas are considered. These distinctions may have legal significance. Some texts confer rights on both speakers and recipients, while others provide only for freedom of speech or expression, without making it clear whether both groups enjoy rights.

The chapter asks: what is the relation between disagreements of political principle and what might be called comprehensive philosophical disagreements about the good in a pluralistic society? That question is examined in this chapter with particular reference to Political Liberalism by John Rawls. It uses the phrase ‘comprehensive philosophical disagreements about the good’ as Rawls used it, to mean differences between various well-worked-out views about ultimate value or various conceptions of the nature and meaning of life. It includes, most prominently, religious disagreements; but it also includes disagreements among various secular conceptions of the good, such as hedonism, aestheticism, intellectualism, and various ethics of self-development and self-fulfilment. The chapter then asks: what is the relation between differences of these kinds and the disagreements we have in politics (and in political philosophy) concerning the fundamental principles of justice and right?

The term “artificial beauty” (renzaomeinü) became popular in China after a young Chinese woman, Hao Lulu, was dubbed as China’s first “artificial beauty” in 2003.Her story caused an upsurge of interest in cosmetic surgery and triggered a nationwide debate in China.This chapter provides a quick yet telling glimpse into the burgeoning cosmetic surgery industry and women’s involvement in it. While some people condemn the pursuit of beauty through cosmetic surgery as women’s submission to the male gaze, Hao Lulu and women like her claim their rights to cosmetic surgery as a way of self-improvement and self-fulfilment. Through discussing controversial debates concerning Hao Lulu, the author explores the newly emerging body politics and market discourse of post-Mao China. The author argues that cosmetic surgery involves both exploitation and liberation of the body, and both enslavement and empowerment of women.

This chapter shows that migrant women in Darlington, England, who strive both for self-fulfilment and to maintain family responsibilities, face a values clash. This clash, however, is not specific to women from religious minorities, but is inherent in more general tensions between individual freedoms and family responsibilities. In practice, this very often means that the same individual holds contradictory values simultaneously. This mirrors the findings of the German study in the previous chapter. In both cases, therefore, the women from minority communities are reflecting a broader value conflict typical of late modernity in which the content and meaning of a good life is constantly renegotiated.

This chapter focuses on the diversity of people living life-changing doubt and their still-religious spouses. It highlights the distinctive experiences and implications for men and women in double life marriages. It talks about double lifers that elaborated and navigated a changing morality influenced by liberal values, often in conflict with the ultra-Orthodox morality of their still-religious spouse and children. The chapter looks into the tension between revelation and secret keeping for people living double lives that meant choosing between self-fulfilment and comfortable familiarity, as well as between individual truth and protection of their family. It also reviews how double lifers secretly began violating the religious laws and obligations under the very noses of their still-religious spouses all the while appearing as ultra-Orthodox men and women to friends, family, and their communities.

This chapter is concerned with the ethics of humor. More specifically, it is concerned with a certain category of jokes that can be labeled immoral. The chapter claims both that such jokes exist, and that many of them are funny despite being immoral, which is to say that their immorality does not wholly undermine their funniness, and may even in some cases contribute to it. A first task of the chapter is to offer a workable analysis of what a joke's being funny (or humorous) amounts to. A second task is to say what it is for a joke to be immoral, or equivalently, vicious. A third task is to decide what stance is most appropriate in regard to such jokes in light of their immorality (or viciousness), and whether their total proscription is justified or even feasible.