Russ Shafer-Landau
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199259755
- eISBN:
- 9780191601835
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and ...
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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.Less
This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is devoted to an extended discussion of moral reasons. It argues that externalism about reasons is true, that moral rationalism is true, and that moral realism has an adequate account of moral disagreement. Part V is devoted to moral epistemology. It argues for the self‐evidence of pro tanto moral principles, and for a version of reliabilism about ethical knowledge.
Hugh J. McCann
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions ...
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This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions can be charged with arbitrariness. Moreover, familiar problems concerning “queerness” and supervenience remain. This chapter proposes that moral intuitions are grounded in conative experiences of “felt obligation”. It then argues that his version of intuitionism preserves the virtues of Audi's approach—indeed sharing the spirit of Audi's theory—without succumbing to the skeptical problems.Less
This chapter discusses Audi's version of metaethical intuitionism, arguing that it faces significant objections. Without a basis for the theory's claims of self-evidence, it argues, moral intuitions can be charged with arbitrariness. Moreover, familiar problems concerning “queerness” and supervenience remain. This chapter proposes that moral intuitions are grounded in conative experiences of “felt obligation”. It then argues that his version of intuitionism preserves the virtues of Audi's approach—indeed sharing the spirit of Audi's theory—without succumbing to the skeptical problems.
Ann Jefferson
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691160658
- eISBN:
- 9781400852598
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691160658.003.0003
- Subject:
- Literature, Criticism/Theory
This chapter considers how a link was established between genius and genius in a manner that sidelines the public. It explores arguments which claims that the public—now deemed “vulgar”—lacks the ...
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This chapter considers how a link was established between genius and genius in a manner that sidelines the public. It explores arguments which claims that the public—now deemed “vulgar”—lacks the requisite sensibility to respond to genius, and is bracketed out of a relation that now goes exclusively from genius to genius. Genius remains self-evident, but only to the man who is already endowed with it: he alone is equipped to recognize it, whether in himself or another. As the burden of recognition is shifted from reader-spectator to genius itself, the continuity between reader-spectator and genius is broken, and the self-evidence of genius begins to wane.Less
This chapter considers how a link was established between genius and genius in a manner that sidelines the public. It explores arguments which claims that the public—now deemed “vulgar”—lacks the requisite sensibility to respond to genius, and is bracketed out of a relation that now goes exclusively from genius to genius. Genius remains self-evident, but only to the man who is already endowed with it: he alone is equipped to recognize it, whether in himself or another. As the burden of recognition is shifted from reader-spectator to genius itself, the continuity between reader-spectator and genius is broken, and the self-evidence of genius begins to wane.
S. C. Humphreys
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269235
- eISBN:
- 9780191710094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269235.003.0006
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Ancient Religions
This chapter traces the construction in the 18th-19th centuries of the belief that fertility cult was the earliest form of religion. It developed in Enlightenment Neoplatonism (Payne Knight) and also ...
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This chapter traces the construction in the 18th-19th centuries of the belief that fertility cult was the earliest form of religion. It developed in Enlightenment Neoplatonism (Payne Knight) and also appealed to the Romantics; particular attention is paid to Hamann and Creuzer. In 19th-century classical studies, it was marginalized as primitive (Bachofen), superstitious (Jahn), or pre-Greek (Preller). Nevertheless, the assumption that it was primordial came to seem self-evident. It is argued that historicist narrative still has a useful function in revealing that such apparently self-evident facts are comparatively recent constructions.Less
This chapter traces the construction in the 18th-19th centuries of the belief that fertility cult was the earliest form of religion. It developed in Enlightenment Neoplatonism (Payne Knight) and also appealed to the Romantics; particular attention is paid to Hamann and Creuzer. In 19th-century classical studies, it was marginalized as primitive (Bachofen), superstitious (Jahn), or pre-Greek (Preller). Nevertheless, the assumption that it was primordial came to seem self-evident. It is argued that historicist narrative still has a useful function in revealing that such apparently self-evident facts are comparatively recent constructions.
TYLER BURGE
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199278534
- eISBN:
- 9780191706943
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278534.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
In reasoning about justification of the basic principles of logic and mathematics, Frege combined a traditional Euclidean conception with a more modern pragmatic one. In thinking of the self-evidence ...
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In reasoning about justification of the basic principles of logic and mathematics, Frege combined a traditional Euclidean conception with a more modern pragmatic one. In thinking of the self-evidence of axioms — understood as true, natural, starting points for justification — he strictly distinguished self-evidence from obviousness. This chapter discusses Frege's notions of axiom, self-evidence, basic truth, certainty, unprovability, and proof structure. Frege's tendency to argue for his axioms is explained not as a justification for them, but as a way of articulating a proper understanding of them; an elaboration of their self-evidence. Frege's semantical exposition of axioms and rules of inference in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic is explained in the same way. Thus, the arguments and semantical expositions are not themselves justifications, for their conclusions are self-evident: they carry their evidence or justification in themselves. Frege's more modern, pragmatic strands centre in his contextualist views about sense, his view that applications and experience with theory provide a type of justification that is significant but secondary to proof, and his strong emphasis that obviousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for self-evidence or rational certainty. The inferences involved in theory building were for Frege integral to obtaining the understanding necessary to appreciate the self-evidence and rational certainty of the basic principles of logic and mathematics.Less
In reasoning about justification of the basic principles of logic and mathematics, Frege combined a traditional Euclidean conception with a more modern pragmatic one. In thinking of the self-evidence of axioms — understood as true, natural, starting points for justification — he strictly distinguished self-evidence from obviousness. This chapter discusses Frege's notions of axiom, self-evidence, basic truth, certainty, unprovability, and proof structure. Frege's tendency to argue for his axioms is explained not as a justification for them, but as a way of articulating a proper understanding of them; an elaboration of their self-evidence. Frege's semantical exposition of axioms and rules of inference in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic is explained in the same way. Thus, the arguments and semantical expositions are not themselves justifications, for their conclusions are self-evident: they carry their evidence or justification in themselves. Frege's more modern, pragmatic strands centre in his contextualist views about sense, his view that applications and experience with theory provide a type of justification that is significant but secondary to proof, and his strong emphasis that obviousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for self-evidence or rational certainty. The inferences involved in theory building were for Frege integral to obtaining the understanding necessary to appreciate the self-evidence and rational certainty of the basic principles of logic and mathematics.
Cave Terence
- Published in print:
- 1990
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198151630
- eISBN:
- 9780191672781
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198151630.003.0016
- Subject:
- Literature, European Literature
This chapter focuses on Henry James's novel, The Ambassadors. Self-evidence is a crucial feature of the plot of The Ambassadors itself, and might well be regarded as the deep structure of anagnorisis ...
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This chapter focuses on Henry James's novel, The Ambassadors. Self-evidence is a crucial feature of the plot of The Ambassadors itself, and might well be regarded as the deep structure of anagnorisis in general, both as an aspect of narrative and as a critical topic. The Ambassadors also contains a distinct and extended scene of crisis in which a shift from ignorance to knowledge determines the ultimate relations of the characters and their personal destinies. It is a novel whose structure James himself singled out as having a ‘superior roundness’; the recognition scene proper is anticipated by a series of lesser and more partial recognitions (the word itself often being used in the text); through the character of Strether as ‘reflector’ of the action, it offers a particularly clear mapping of the fictional structures of knowledge. Most important, perhaps, the recognition is more heavily laden than in any other of James's later novels with the overarching sense of a life-story, the recovery and loss of a past that stretches far beyond the temporal limits of the fabula itself.Less
This chapter focuses on Henry James's novel, The Ambassadors. Self-evidence is a crucial feature of the plot of The Ambassadors itself, and might well be regarded as the deep structure of anagnorisis in general, both as an aspect of narrative and as a critical topic. The Ambassadors also contains a distinct and extended scene of crisis in which a shift from ignorance to knowledge determines the ultimate relations of the characters and their personal destinies. It is a novel whose structure James himself singled out as having a ‘superior roundness’; the recognition scene proper is anticipated by a series of lesser and more partial recognitions (the word itself often being used in the text); through the character of Strether as ‘reflector’ of the action, it offers a particularly clear mapping of the fictional structures of knowledge. Most important, perhaps, the recognition is more heavily laden than in any other of James's later novels with the overarching sense of a life-story, the recovery and loss of a past that stretches far beyond the temporal limits of the fabula itself.
Jennifer Church
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199678440
- eISBN:
- 9780191757945
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678440.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
The epistemology and the phenomenology of perception are closely related insofar as both depend on experiences of self-evident objectivity—experiences in which the objectivity of a state of affairs ...
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The epistemology and the phenomenology of perception are closely related insofar as both depend on experiences of self-evident objectivity—experiences in which the objectivity of a state of affairs is evident from within our experience of that state of affairs. This book offers a distinctive account of perception, showing how imagining alternate perspectives and alternate possibilities plays a key role in creating and validating experiences of self-evident objectivity. Offered first as an account of what it takes to perceive ordinary objects such as birds and trees, the account is then extended to show how it is also possible to perceive such things as causes, reasons, mental states, distant galaxies, molecular arrangements, mathematical relations, and interpersonal obligations. A chapter is devoted to the phenomenology and epistemology of moral perception, including the perception of persons as such; and a chapter is devoted to the peculiarities of aesthetic perception, including the perception of artworks as such. In all of these cases, it is argued, perception can be literal (not merely figurative or metaphorical) and substantive (not merely formal or deflationary). The account helps to explain the advantages of perceptual versus non-perceptual knowledge. It is also helps to make sense of some historical discussions of the role of the imagination in acquiring and validating knowledge (Plato’s cave, Descartes’ explanation of rational intuition, and Kant’s arguments concerning objectivity, causality, and the Categorical Imperative).Less
The epistemology and the phenomenology of perception are closely related insofar as both depend on experiences of self-evident objectivity—experiences in which the objectivity of a state of affairs is evident from within our experience of that state of affairs. This book offers a distinctive account of perception, showing how imagining alternate perspectives and alternate possibilities plays a key role in creating and validating experiences of self-evident objectivity. Offered first as an account of what it takes to perceive ordinary objects such as birds and trees, the account is then extended to show how it is also possible to perceive such things as causes, reasons, mental states, distant galaxies, molecular arrangements, mathematical relations, and interpersonal obligations. A chapter is devoted to the phenomenology and epistemology of moral perception, including the perception of persons as such; and a chapter is devoted to the peculiarities of aesthetic perception, including the perception of artworks as such. In all of these cases, it is argued, perception can be literal (not merely figurative or metaphorical) and substantive (not merely formal or deflationary). The account helps to explain the advantages of perceptual versus non-perceptual knowledge. It is also helps to make sense of some historical discussions of the role of the imagination in acquiring and validating knowledge (Plato’s cave, Descartes’ explanation of rational intuition, and Kant’s arguments concerning objectivity, causality, and the Categorical Imperative).
Rufus Black
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198270201
- eISBN:
- 9780191683947
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198270201.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter probes whether the Grisez School is able to find a new means to secure the moorings of ethics to the givenness of reality. It explores the relationship between practical reason and the ...
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This chapter probes whether the Grisez School is able to find a new means to secure the moorings of ethics to the givenness of reality. It explores the relationship between practical reason and the reality and the role of self-evidence in the Grisez School's theory in three stages. First, it considers the relationship between human nature and the fulfilling objects and objectives towards which practical reason directs people. This provides the opportunity to begin an exploration of the question of self-evidence. Second, the chapter analyses the connections between principles of practical reason (which guide people in their pursuit of those fulfilling objects and objectives) and human nature and the conditions of human existence. Third, it considers the function of knowledge about reality in the actual process of moral deliberation.Less
This chapter probes whether the Grisez School is able to find a new means to secure the moorings of ethics to the givenness of reality. It explores the relationship between practical reason and the reality and the role of self-evidence in the Grisez School's theory in three stages. First, it considers the relationship between human nature and the fulfilling objects and objectives towards which practical reason directs people. This provides the opportunity to begin an exploration of the question of self-evidence. Second, the chapter analyses the connections between principles of practical reason (which guide people in their pursuit of those fulfilling objects and objectives) and human nature and the conditions of human existence. Third, it considers the function of knowledge about reality in the actual process of moral deliberation.
Justin Clarke-Doane
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- July 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198823667
- eISBN:
- 9780191862274
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Moral Philosophy
This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that ...
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This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.Less
This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195377958
- eISBN:
- 9780199893836
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Sidgwick believes that his own proto-utilitarian axioms satisfy criteria for self-evidence, while the principles of common-sense morality, including the particularly apparently compelling principle ...
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Sidgwick believes that his own proto-utilitarian axioms satisfy criteria for self-evidence, while the principles of common-sense morality, including the particularly apparently compelling principle requiring fidelity to promises, do not. Sidgwick presents his argument for this claim in Book III of the Methods. Important predecessors like Whewell and successors like Ross, who share Sidgwick's commitment to epistemic intuitionism but develop deontological moral theories, disagree. The chapter articulates Sidgwick's argument, but suggest that it fails; its official version, directed against Whewell, is vulnerable to a charge of unfairness; and its unofficial version cannot establish Sidgwick's view against Ross's. Sidgwick is central to the development of the familiar contemporary theoretical contrast between utilitarianism and deontology; he aspires, as many utilitarians do, to argue for utilitarianism broadly on the grounds of its superior rationality; but his own attempt to argue for it in this way is a failure.Less
Sidgwick believes that his own proto-utilitarian axioms satisfy criteria for self-evidence, while the principles of common-sense morality, including the particularly apparently compelling principle requiring fidelity to promises, do not. Sidgwick presents his argument for this claim in Book III of the Methods. Important predecessors like Whewell and successors like Ross, who share Sidgwick's commitment to epistemic intuitionism but develop deontological moral theories, disagree. The chapter articulates Sidgwick's argument, but suggest that it fails; its official version, directed against Whewell, is vulnerable to a charge of unfairness; and its unofficial version cannot establish Sidgwick's view against Ross's. Sidgwick is central to the development of the familiar contemporary theoretical contrast between utilitarianism and deontology; he aspires, as many utilitarians do, to argue for utilitarianism broadly on the grounds of its superior rationality; but his own attempt to argue for it in this way is a failure.
J. B. Schneewind
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249313
- eISBN:
- 9780191598357
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198249314.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
An appeal to self-evidence and to what is intuitively given are not very satisfactory modes of solving philosophical problems; it often shuts off inquiry instead of answering ultimate questions. ...
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An appeal to self-evidence and to what is intuitively given are not very satisfactory modes of solving philosophical problems; it often shuts off inquiry instead of answering ultimate questions. Sidgwick was aware of the shortcomings of the appeal to intuition and tried to avoid them. He interprets self-evidence in terms of the basic operations of ordinary reasoning, applied to practice. He takes the problem to be that of working out what the most fundamental demands of reason are, given the conditions of human life. He develops a traditional model of approach to basic axioms, and brings out new possibilities within it.Less
An appeal to self-evidence and to what is intuitively given are not very satisfactory modes of solving philosophical problems; it often shuts off inquiry instead of answering ultimate questions. Sidgwick was aware of the shortcomings of the appeal to intuition and tried to avoid them. He interprets self-evidence in terms of the basic operations of ordinary reasoning, applied to practice. He takes the problem to be that of working out what the most fundamental demands of reason are, given the conditions of human life. He develops a traditional model of approach to basic axioms, and brings out new possibilities within it.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- April 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780197503508
- eISBN:
- 9780197503539
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197503508.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for ...
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This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.Less
This book provides an overall theory of perception and an account of knowledge and justification concerning the physical, the abstract, and the normative. It has the rigor appropriate for professionals but explains its main points using concrete examples. It accounts for two important aspects of perception on which philosophers have said too little: its relevance to a priori knowledge—traditionally conceived as independent of perception—and its role in human action. Overall, the book provides a full-scale account of perception, presents a theory of the a priori, and explains how perception guides action. It also clarifies the relation between action and practical reasoning; the notion of rational action; and the relation between propositional and practical knowledge. Part One develops a theory of perception as experiential, representational, and causally connected with its objects: as a discriminative response to those objects, embodying phenomenally distinctive elements; and as yielding rich information that underlies human knowledge. Part Two presents a theory of self-evidence and the a priori. The theory is perceptualist in explicating the apprehension of a priori truths by articulating its parallels to perception. The theory unifies empirical and a priori knowledge by clarifying their reliable connections with their objects—connections many have thought impossible for a priori knowledge as about the abstract. Part Three explores how perception guides action; the relation between knowing how and knowing that; the nature of reasons for action; the role of inference in determining action; and the overall conditions for rational action.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780190221843
- eISBN:
- 9780190221867
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190221843.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, General
This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual ...
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This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology—which is centrally concerned with belief—as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part I centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part II concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. Parts II and III together offer a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and show how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each is clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal—for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private" aspects of mental life—is explored. Part IV addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.Less
This book provides conceptions of belief and knowledge, offers a theory of how they are grounded, and connects them with the will and thereby with action, moral responsibility, and intellectual virtue. A unifying element is a commitment to representing epistemology—which is centrally concerned with belief—as integrated with a plausible philosophy of mind that does justice both to the nature of belief and to the conditions for its formation and regulation. Part I centers on belief and its relation to the will. It explores our control of our beliefs, and it describes several forms belief may take and shows how beliefs are connected with the world outside the mind. Part II concerns normative aspects of epistemology, explores the nature of intellectual virtue, and presents a theory of moral perception. Parts II and III together offer a theory of the grounds of both justification and knowledge and show how these grounds bear on the self-evident. Rationality is distinguished from justification; each is clarified in relation to the other; and the epistemological importance of the phenomenal—for instance, of intuitional experience and other "private" aspects of mental life—is explored. Part IV addresses social epistemology. It offers a theory of testimony as essential in human knowledge and a related account of the rational resolution of disagreements.
Alf Ross
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198716105
- eISBN:
- 9780191784361
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198716105.003.0012
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter analyses the idea of justice in light of its central place in natural law. As a specific principle of law, justice is concerned with the outer limits and harmonization of conflicting ...
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This chapter analyses the idea of justice in light of its central place in natural law. As a specific principle of law, justice is concerned with the outer limits and harmonization of conflicting desires, claims, and interests in the social coexistence of a plurality of individuals. Taking the view that all legal problems are problems of distribution, the postulate of justice amounts to a demand for equality in the distribution or allotment of advantages or burdens. Through examples of competing formulations of the idea of justice, it is demonstrated that such formulations comprise two elements: the formal demand for equality as such; and a substantive criterion in order to determine the class to which the norm of equality is to be applied. The formal ideal of equality as such refers only to the correct application of a general rule, whereas the presupposed substantive criterion is what gives content and force to the actually efficacious formula for justice. On this background, it is argued that once the substantive criterion has been determined, it is meaningful to speak of (formal) justice. However, it is meaningless to speak of (substantive) justice in the sense of claiming that certain substantive criteria are just as opposed to others. Whereas justice, as a norm for the legislator (as a yardstick for the ‘correctness’ of the law), is merely a chimera, justice as a norm for the judge is, on the contrary, a living and palpable reality.Less
This chapter analyses the idea of justice in light of its central place in natural law. As a specific principle of law, justice is concerned with the outer limits and harmonization of conflicting desires, claims, and interests in the social coexistence of a plurality of individuals. Taking the view that all legal problems are problems of distribution, the postulate of justice amounts to a demand for equality in the distribution or allotment of advantages or burdens. Through examples of competing formulations of the idea of justice, it is demonstrated that such formulations comprise two elements: the formal demand for equality as such; and a substantive criterion in order to determine the class to which the norm of equality is to be applied. The formal ideal of equality as such refers only to the correct application of a general rule, whereas the presupposed substantive criterion is what gives content and force to the actually efficacious formula for justice. On this background, it is argued that once the substantive criterion has been determined, it is meaningful to speak of (formal) justice. However, it is meaningless to speak of (substantive) justice in the sense of claiming that certain substantive criteria are just as opposed to others. Whereas justice, as a norm for the legislator (as a yardstick for the ‘correctness’ of the law), is merely a chimera, justice as a norm for the judge is, on the contrary, a living and palpable reality.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672028
- eISBN:
- 9780191751929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
‘Self‐Understanding’ (2007, 2011) explains how immunity to brute error in self‐knowledge is constitutive to applicability of norms of critical reason and morality. The essay argues that if all an ...
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‘Self‐Understanding’ (2007, 2011) explains how immunity to brute error in self‐knowledge is constitutive to applicability of norms of critical reason and morality. The essay argues that if all an individual’s self‐understanding could be warranted but mistaken, the self‐understanding would be too detached to ground accountability to norms of critical reason and morality. Immunity to brute error resides in use of capacities whose structures and natures are constitutive to a point of view. The relevant capacities are mostly preservational. Immunity to brute error in deductive inference; in accepting simple, self‐evident truths; and in non‐inferential beliefs about reason support are considered as comparison cases. The essay offers a general account of how the role of self‐knowledge in critical reasoning bears on warrant for the relevant self‐knowledge. The account extends beyond knowledge of occurrent thoughts to knowledge of standing attitudes, to meta‐representational episodic memory, to knowledge of anticipations of actions, and to knowledge of sensations.Less
‘Self‐Understanding’ (2007, 2011) explains how immunity to brute error in self‐knowledge is constitutive to applicability of norms of critical reason and morality. The essay argues that if all an individual’s self‐understanding could be warranted but mistaken, the self‐understanding would be too detached to ground accountability to norms of critical reason and morality. Immunity to brute error resides in use of capacities whose structures and natures are constitutive to a point of view. The relevant capacities are mostly preservational. Immunity to brute error in deductive inference; in accepting simple, self‐evident truths; and in non‐inferential beliefs about reason support are considered as comparison cases. The essay offers a general account of how the role of self‐knowledge in critical reasoning bears on warrant for the relevant self‐knowledge. The account extends beyond knowledge of occurrent thoughts to knowledge of standing attitudes, to meta‐representational episodic memory, to knowledge of anticipations of actions, and to knowledge of sensations.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198239680
- eISBN:
- 9780191598562
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198239688.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
The original Christian revelation was the teaching of Jesus, about the broad outlines of which we can obtain moderately accurate information from the New Testament, treated as an ordinary historical ...
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The original Christian revelation was the teaching of Jesus, about the broad outlines of which we can obtain moderately accurate information from the New Testament, treated as an ordinary historical document. Treating it in this way, we also learn that Jesus founded a church, and intended his life and death to be a means of our atonement. In so far as there is good historical evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus, this shows that God has authenticated the teaching of Jesus and the church that he founded. This evidence is far better evidence for the truth of the Christian revelation than is any evidence that Jesus fulfiled Old Testament prophecies, or the supposed ‘self‐evidence’ of the Bible.Less
The original Christian revelation was the teaching of Jesus, about the broad outlines of which we can obtain moderately accurate information from the New Testament, treated as an ordinary historical document. Treating it in this way, we also learn that Jesus founded a church, and intended his life and death to be a means of our atonement. In so far as there is good historical evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus, this shows that God has authenticated the teaching of Jesus and the church that he founded. This evidence is far better evidence for the truth of the Christian revelation than is any evidence that Jesus fulfiled Old Testament prophecies, or the supposed ‘self‐evidence’ of the Bible.
Jennifer Church
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199678440
- eISBN:
- 9780191757945
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678440.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Several different understandings of perceptual immediacy are criticized. A vivid example of immediate knowledge is then introduced to highlight the need for self-evident objectivity, and the ...
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Several different understandings of perceptual immediacy are criticized. A vivid example of immediate knowledge is then introduced to highlight the need for self-evident objectivity, and the importance of entertaining alternate perspectives. Arguments are presented to show why sensory content is not as relevant as usually supposed.Less
Several different understandings of perceptual immediacy are criticized. A vivid example of immediate knowledge is then introduced to highlight the need for self-evident objectivity, and the importance of entertaining alternate perspectives. Arguments are presented to show why sensory content is not as relevant as usually supposed.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199675500
- eISBN:
- 9780191757228
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675500.003.0002
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis' writings about value, exemplifying them by a consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of ...
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This chapter considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis' writings about value, exemplifying them by a consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of harmony, and of self-evidence, in identifying or constituting values, and the ways in which values can provide reasons.Less
This chapter considers some questions arising out of reflection on Finnis' writings about value, exemplifying them by a consideration of the putative value of knowledge. They include the role of harmony, and of self-evidence, in identifying or constituting values, and the ways in which values can provide reasons.
Tyler Burge
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199672028
- eISBN:
- 9780191751929
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0023
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
‘Concepts, Conceptions, Reflective Understanding: Reply to Peacocke’ (2003) discusses Christopher Peacocke’s view that apriori reflection consists in bringing to clear consciousness an implicit ...
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‘Concepts, Conceptions, Reflective Understanding: Reply to Peacocke’ (2003) discusses Christopher Peacocke’s view that apriori reflection consists in bringing to clear consciousness an implicit understanding that is already fully formed in the reflector’s psychology. The essay notes that even Leibniz and Kant’s traditional conception is more liberal, in allowing that only components of a correct explication may be present in the individual’s psychology. Against Peacocke’s account, Burge maintains that most apriori reflection is guided by examples–often socially inculcated‐‐ and senses of similarity that in themselves do not provide (even unconscious) explications. The more liberal traditional account also fails to capture reflection that obtains explications only through developing new concepts in new theoretical work or by relying on others. The explication in mathematics of Liebniz’s concept of infinitesimal is discussed as an example. The essay further reflects on the relation between non‐inferential understanding of self‐evident logical truths and inferential mastery that is necessary for having such understanding.Less
‘Concepts, Conceptions, Reflective Understanding: Reply to Peacocke’ (2003) discusses Christopher Peacocke’s view that apriori reflection consists in bringing to clear consciousness an implicit understanding that is already fully formed in the reflector’s psychology. The essay notes that even Leibniz and Kant’s traditional conception is more liberal, in allowing that only components of a correct explication may be present in the individual’s psychology. Against Peacocke’s account, Burge maintains that most apriori reflection is guided by examples–often socially inculcated‐‐ and senses of similarity that in themselves do not provide (even unconscious) explications. The more liberal traditional account also fails to capture reflection that obtains explications only through developing new concepts in new theoretical work or by relying on others. The explication in mathematics of Liebniz’s concept of infinitesimal is discussed as an example. The essay further reflects on the relation between non‐inferential understanding of self‐evident logical truths and inferential mastery that is necessary for having such understanding.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199698370
- eISBN:
- 9780191748899
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698370.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
In this chapter Robert Audi argues that cognitive diversity is inherent in the human condition. People differ greatly in what they believe even when they do not disagree. But most of us also disagree ...
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In this chapter Robert Audi argues that cognitive diversity is inherent in the human condition. People differ greatly in what they believe even when they do not disagree. But most of us also disagree with many others on various important matters. Nor are cognitive disparities limited to what is believed: we also differ in what we presuppose, presume, accept, suspect, and surmise. Even where we agree, and thereby coincide in the content of certain cognitions, we may differ in our degrees of conviction regarding the mutually accepted propositions. This paper considers the kinds of cognitive disparities—intrapersonal as well as interpersonal—of major interest for epistemology. These include rational disagreements even on self-evident propositions, which some have thought obvious in a way that precludes rationally rejecting them. On the basis of the account of cognitive diversity and several distinctions within that category, the paper indicates a number of ways both to understand rational disagreement and to resolve it when possible.Less
In this chapter Robert Audi argues that cognitive diversity is inherent in the human condition. People differ greatly in what they believe even when they do not disagree. But most of us also disagree with many others on various important matters. Nor are cognitive disparities limited to what is believed: we also differ in what we presuppose, presume, accept, suspect, and surmise. Even where we agree, and thereby coincide in the content of certain cognitions, we may differ in our degrees of conviction regarding the mutually accepted propositions. This paper considers the kinds of cognitive disparities—intrapersonal as well as interpersonal—of major interest for epistemology. These include rational disagreements even on self-evident propositions, which some have thought obvious in a way that precludes rationally rejecting them. On the basis of the account of cognitive diversity and several distinctions within that category, the paper indicates a number of ways both to understand rational disagreement and to resolve it when possible.