L. Jonathan Cohen
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236047
- eISBN:
- 9780191679179
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the ...
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This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.Less
This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
Clancy Martin (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether ...
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This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these chapters reveal the benefits of considering them together.Less
This book gathers together new chapters on deception and self-deception by leading thinkers on the subject. The chapters discuss topics including the nature and the definition of deception; whether deception is morally blameworthy or not; attacks against and defenses of self-deception; and the most famous philosophical account of lying by Immanuel Kant. Deception of others and self-deception share many more interconnections than is normally recognized, and these chapters reveal the benefits of considering them together.
Gabriele Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198235804
- eISBN:
- 9780191604058
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198235801.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be ...
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This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be able to form intentions, to evaluate and select. Self-consciousness is itself constitutive of the self, and constituent of the self are consequently evaluations and decisions about what it is worthwhile to do and what to avoid, about the sort of life one wants to lead, and the kind of person one wants to be. The interdependence of the elements of the shape of experiences means that they will be ‘edited’, that some experiences will be seen as important and others as negligible according to how they fit into existing frameworks of beliefs and inclinations.Less
This chapter explores the nature of self and self-consciousness. The self is that which gives a person her identity as she herself sees it, and that means that she has sufficient complexity to be able to form intentions, to evaluate and select. Self-consciousness is itself constitutive of the self, and constituent of the self are consequently evaluations and decisions about what it is worthwhile to do and what to avoid, about the sort of life one wants to lead, and the kind of person one wants to be. The interdependence of the elements of the shape of experiences means that they will be ‘edited’, that some experiences will be seen as important and others as negligible according to how they fit into existing frameworks of beliefs and inclinations.
Alan Millar
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199254408
- eISBN:
- 9780191719721
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions ...
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The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions upon us is shaped by our knowledge of those very beliefs and intentions and of the normative commitments they incur. The view is defended through consideration of the phenomenology of belief and intention. There is a problem posed for the ‘high’ conception of intention and belief by the plausible thought animals lacking reflective capacities can have beliefs and intentions. The problem is addressed in terms of the idea that our (reflexive) believing and intending differs in psychological kind from any believing and intending on the part of non-reflective animals. A discussion of self-deception addresses an objection to the favoured view of intention deriving from the idea that we can unknowingly intentionally deceive ourselves.Less
The view outlined thus far implicates a ‘high’ conception of beliefs and intentions on which those attitudes essentially involve reflective capacities, since the impact of our beliefs and intentions upon us is shaped by our knowledge of those very beliefs and intentions and of the normative commitments they incur. The view is defended through consideration of the phenomenology of belief and intention. There is a problem posed for the ‘high’ conception of intention and belief by the plausible thought animals lacking reflective capacities can have beliefs and intentions. The problem is addressed in terms of the idea that our (reflexive) believing and intending differs in psychological kind from any believing and intending on the part of non-reflective animals. A discussion of self-deception addresses an objection to the favoured view of intention deriving from the idea that we can unknowingly intentionally deceive ourselves.
Mele Alfred R.
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not ...
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Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not actually believe what they avow. But the chapter holds that the self‐deceived and the deluded both believe the false proposition, and so an account of the difference between self‐deception and delusion that differs from Audi's must be offered. The chapter discusses several standard cases of self‐deception, sketching his view of self‐deception as the product of motivational or emotional biases. It then considers three psychiatric delusions found in volume IV of the American Psychiatric Association's, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and argues that they are best explained not by the kind of biasing characteristic of self‐deception, but instead by the presence of cognitive deficits.Less
Audi has suggested that the difference between self‐deception and delusion with respect to a false proposition turns on whether the subject believes the false proposition: the self‐deceived do not actually believe what they avow. But the chapter holds that the self‐deceived and the deluded both believe the false proposition, and so an account of the difference between self‐deception and delusion that differs from Audi's must be offered. The chapter discusses several standard cases of self‐deception, sketching his view of self‐deception as the product of motivational or emotional biases. It then considers three psychiatric delusions found in volume IV of the American Psychiatric Association's, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and argues that they are best explained not by the kind of biasing characteristic of self‐deception, but instead by the presence of cognitive deficits.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter ...
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Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter 14) in Part III, “Intention, Self‐Deception, and Reasons for Action.”Less
Audi addresses challenges to his views about intention, moral psychology, and reasons for action that are raised by Fred Adams (Chapter 12), Alfred R. Mele (Chapter 13), and Raimo Tuomela (Chapter 14) in Part III, “Intention, Self‐Deception, and Reasons for Action.”
Amelie Rorty
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0014
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and ...
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This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and wary. Although many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it is not good all the time. The discussion surveys the field of the many and various forms of self-deception, good and bad. It also gives a long and helpful list of what self-deception is not.Less
This chapter presents a summary of many thoughtful, persuasive, and articulate defenses of the practice of self-deception, and reviews forms of self-deception about which one should be ambivalent and wary. Although many varieties of self-deception are ineradicable and useful, it is not good all the time. The discussion surveys the field of the many and various forms of self-deception, good and bad. It also gives a long and helpful list of what self-deception is not.
Paul Hammond
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264706
- eISBN:
- 9780191734557
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264706.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, Milton Studies
Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in ...
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Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in poetic language, which is more humanly complex than the combative polemics of his prose. This chapter examines Milton's thinking about the Fall of Man. His conception of the Fall is predominantly a meditation on egoism and disobedience, on selfishness and self-sacrificial love, on blindness and recognition. The chapter aims to elucidate some of the poetic means by which Milton draws his reader into the narrative of the Fall. Milton's poetry of the Fall is inter alia the fall of couples to individuals who enclose themselves in self-seeking forms of selfhood; and the fall of reason into modes of self-deception, exemplified by the recourse to the rhetorical questions that close off true reasoning and substitute human wishful thinking for the obedience to divine commands.Less
Setting aside his concern with political and theological principles, Milton's most distinctive contribution in culture is his poetry, where he thinks through the consequences of the principles in poetic language, which is more humanly complex than the combative polemics of his prose. This chapter examines Milton's thinking about the Fall of Man. His conception of the Fall is predominantly a meditation on egoism and disobedience, on selfishness and self-sacrificial love, on blindness and recognition. The chapter aims to elucidate some of the poetic means by which Milton draws his reader into the narrative of the Fall. Milton's poetry of the Fall is inter alia the fall of couples to individuals who enclose themselves in self-seeking forms of selfhood; and the fall of reason into modes of self-deception, exemplified by the recourse to the rhetorical questions that close off true reasoning and substitute human wishful thinking for the obedience to divine commands.
Garry L. Hagberg
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199234226
- eISBN:
- 9780191715440
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234226.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
This chapter introduces Behaviourism contra Cartesianism, the problems of inferential perception, speaking of a person versus speaking of a body, and first-person avowals. It also details issues ...
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This chapter introduces Behaviourism contra Cartesianism, the problems of inferential perception, speaking of a person versus speaking of a body, and first-person avowals. It also details issues concerning what we can too-easily call the description of inner content, real introspection as against metaphysically-misconstrued introspection, competing characterizations of self-deception, cases of self-representation in the arts, and the philosophical implications of Kierkegaard's ‘Diary of a Seducer’. The ‘outward’ criteria and self-knowledge are also mentioned.Less
This chapter introduces Behaviourism contra Cartesianism, the problems of inferential perception, speaking of a person versus speaking of a body, and first-person avowals. It also details issues concerning what we can too-easily call the description of inner content, real introspection as against metaphysically-misconstrued introspection, competing characterizations of self-deception, cases of self-representation in the arts, and the philosophical implications of Kierkegaard's ‘Diary of a Seducer’. The ‘outward’ criteria and self-knowledge are also mentioned.
Byron L. Sherwin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195336238
- eISBN:
- 9780199868520
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195336238.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Judaism
This chapter deals with four places where living in the covenant can affect a rendezvous with the divine, an intimate encounter with God: the sacred word, the sacred deed, the world, the self. Among ...
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This chapter deals with four places where living in the covenant can affect a rendezvous with the divine, an intimate encounter with God: the sacred word, the sacred deed, the world, the self. Among other factors, the reality of one's own mortality is portrayed as a stimulus to embarking on the spiritual and existential quest. Overcoming self-deception, pride, depression and cultivating sincerity, humility and joy are discussed as prerequisites for the human-divine relationship and for the articulation of the divine element in each human person. The world and the human body are then offered as further vehicles toward a rendezvous with God. Attitudes such as love and gratitude, and actions such as prayer, repentance, study of the Torah, sacred deeds, observance of Jewish law (halakhah) and acts of loving kindness are discussed as ways of affecting communion and intimacy with the divine.Less
This chapter deals with four places where living in the covenant can affect a rendezvous with the divine, an intimate encounter with God: the sacred word, the sacred deed, the world, the self. Among other factors, the reality of one's own mortality is portrayed as a stimulus to embarking on the spiritual and existential quest. Overcoming self-deception, pride, depression and cultivating sincerity, humility and joy are discussed as prerequisites for the human-divine relationship and for the articulation of the divine element in each human person. The world and the human body are then offered as further vehicles toward a rendezvous with God. Attitudes such as love and gratitude, and actions such as prayer, repentance, study of the Torah, sacred deeds, observance of Jewish law (halakhah) and acts of loving kindness are discussed as ways of affecting communion and intimacy with the divine.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
God's love for us – a radical gift – entails that we have an “infinite debt” of love to others. This notion excludes the idea of love as repayment; it is, moreover, a fulfillable duty, because Christ ...
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God's love for us – a radical gift – entails that we have an “infinite debt” of love to others. This notion excludes the idea of love as repayment; it is, moreover, a fulfillable duty, because Christ fulfilled it and because we are called to imitate Christ. It is feasible as long as we distinguish between the completion of our duty (which we cannot achieve) and the loving performance of it at a given moment (which we can achieve). Although the command generates “offense,” the “as yourself” reinstates limits on self‐sacrifice; justice is one such limit.Less
God's love for us – a radical gift – entails that we have an “infinite debt” of love to others. This notion excludes the idea of love as repayment; it is, moreover, a fulfillable duty, because Christ fulfilled it and because we are called to imitate Christ. It is feasible as long as we distinguish between the completion of our duty (which we cannot achieve) and the loving performance of it at a given moment (which we can achieve). Although the command generates “offense,” the “as yourself” reinstates limits on self‐sacrifice; justice is one such limit.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195327939
- eISBN:
- 9780199852444
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195327939.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter separates the problem of self-deception into two component questions: how it happens and what it is. The key to this chapter's account of self-deception is called “deflationary view”. ...
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This chapter separates the problem of self-deception into two component questions: how it happens and what it is. The key to this chapter's account of self-deception is called “deflationary view”. Self-deception, it notes, does not entail “intentionally deceiving oneself; intending to deceive oneself; intending to make it easier for oneself to believe something; concurrently believing each of two explicitly contrary propositions”. The chapter also offers a discussion of the notion of “twisted self-deception”: the phenomenon of the self-deceived person believing something he or she wants to be false.Less
This chapter separates the problem of self-deception into two component questions: how it happens and what it is. The key to this chapter's account of self-deception is called “deflationary view”. Self-deception, it notes, does not entail “intentionally deceiving oneself; intending to deceive oneself; intending to make it easier for oneself to believe something; concurrently believing each of two explicitly contrary propositions”. The chapter also offers a discussion of the notion of “twisted self-deception”: the phenomenon of the self-deceived person believing something he or she wants to be false.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199208913
- eISBN:
- 9780191723759
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208913.003.06
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience
This chapter focuses on three specific kinds of delusional confabulation — confabulations associated with the Capgras' syndrome, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello ...
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This chapter focuses on three specific kinds of delusional confabulation — confabulations associated with the Capgras' syndrome, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome. The aim is to shed some light on what sorts of causes of belief-acquisition or belief-persistence would support or challenge the idea that beliefs expressed in delusional confabulations in general are beliefs the person is self-deceived in acquiring or retaining. In the case of the confabulations, there are significant grounds for caution about the claim that self-deception is involved. But this is not to say that the same grounds for caution are present in all kinds of delusional confabulation.Less
This chapter focuses on three specific kinds of delusional confabulation — confabulations associated with the Capgras' syndrome, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome. The aim is to shed some light on what sorts of causes of belief-acquisition or belief-persistence would support or challenge the idea that beliefs expressed in delusional confabulations in general are beliefs the person is self-deceived in acquiring or retaining. In the case of the confabulations, there are significant grounds for caution about the claim that self-deception is involved. But this is not to say that the same grounds for caution are present in all kinds of delusional confabulation.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0012
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Love covers up the sins of others – by refusing to look for them, by silence, and by mitigating explanation. In forgiveness one still sees the sin of another, so one does not engage in ...
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Love covers up the sins of others – by refusing to look for them, by silence, and by mitigating explanation. In forgiveness one still sees the sin of another, so one does not engage in self‐deception. Love “forgets” the sin of another by refusing to let it hinder the relationship. The end of forgiveness is social reconciliation.Less
Love covers up the sins of others – by refusing to look for them, by silence, and by mitigating explanation. In forgiveness one still sees the sin of another, so one does not engage in self‐deception. Love “forgets” the sin of another by refusing to let it hinder the relationship. The end of forgiveness is social reconciliation.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.003.0015
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not ...
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Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not avoid the burden of confronting someone with the truth about their sin. Love does not entail self‐deception or deception of others.Less
Love attempts to restore broken bonds – our responsibility is to maintain and cultivate community. Reconciliation lacks the judicial sting of the category of forgiveness, but it nevertheless does not avoid the burden of confronting someone with the truth about their sin. Love does not entail self‐deception or deception of others.
Katalin Farkas
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199230327
- eISBN:
- 9780191710629
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230327.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
One objection to the thesis of Chapter 1 is that I have privileged to the states of my body, not only to my mind. But this is contingent: someone else could be appropriately ‘wired’ to my body and ...
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One objection to the thesis of Chapter 1 is that I have privileged to the states of my body, not only to my mind. But this is contingent: someone else could be appropriately ‘wired’ to my body and learn about its states, but they would not thereby learn about my feeling concerning these states. The thesis of Chapter 1 is also compatible with the view that standing — or dispositional — mental states are themselves non-conscious; the states can be still accessible to conscious reflection. Another objection is based on the phenomenon of self-deception, and on Freudian unconscious states which are not available to reflection. The objection is answered by arguing that the notion of unconscious mentality is parasitic on the notion of conscious mentality.Less
One objection to the thesis of Chapter 1 is that I have privileged to the states of my body, not only to my mind. But this is contingent: someone else could be appropriately ‘wired’ to my body and learn about its states, but they would not thereby learn about my feeling concerning these states. The thesis of Chapter 1 is also compatible with the view that standing — or dispositional — mental states are themselves non-conscious; the states can be still accessible to conscious reflection. Another objection is based on the phenomenon of self-deception, and on Freudian unconscious states which are not available to reflection. The objection is answered by arguing that the notion of unconscious mentality is parasitic on the notion of conscious mentality.
Sydney Shoemaker
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199744794
- eISBN:
- 9780199933396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something ...
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The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are ‘available’ in the sense that their subjects are poised to assent to their contents, to use them as premises in reasoning, and to be guided by them in their behavior. The account is compatible with the possibility of negative self-deception – mistakenly believing that one doesn’t believe something – but the closest thing to positive self-deception it allows is believing falsely that a belief with a certain content is one’s dominant belief on a certain matter through failure to realize that one has a stronger belief that contradicts it. The view has implications about Moore’s paradox that contradict widely held views. On this view self-ascriptions of beliefs can be warranted and grounded on reasons – but the reasons are not phenomenally conscious mental states (as held by Christopher Peacocke) but rather available beliefs.Less
The chapter defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are ‘available’ in the sense that their subjects are poised to assent to their contents, to use them as premises in reasoning, and to be guided by them in their behavior. The account is compatible with the possibility of negative self-deception – mistakenly believing that one doesn’t believe something – but the closest thing to positive self-deception it allows is believing falsely that a belief with a certain content is one’s dominant belief on a certain matter through failure to realize that one has a stronger belief that contradicts it. The view has implications about Moore’s paradox that contradict widely held views. On this view self-ascriptions of beliefs can be warranted and grounded on reasons – but the reasons are not phenomenally conscious mental states (as held by Christopher Peacocke) but rather available beliefs.
Mike W. Martin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199845217
- eISBN:
- 9780199933068
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199845217.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Does illusion promote or diminish happiness? It might do either, depending on the situation. We are frequently mistaken about what will make us happy, and we can deceive ourselves about how happy we ...
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Does illusion promote or diminish happiness? It might do either, depending on the situation. We are frequently mistaken about what will make us happy, and we can deceive ourselves about how happy we are. Within limits, many of these illusions augment happiness by bolstering hope and confidence. Yet honesty is even more important in the pursuit of happiness, for it helps us identify what we want most, keeps our expectations realistic, and in general keeps us in touch with reality. Examples include Peter Weir’s movie The Truman Show, Henrik Ibsen’s The Wild Duck, and Eugene O’Neill’s Iceman Cometh.Less
Does illusion promote or diminish happiness? It might do either, depending on the situation. We are frequently mistaken about what will make us happy, and we can deceive ourselves about how happy we are. Within limits, many of these illusions augment happiness by bolstering hope and confidence. Yet honesty is even more important in the pursuit of happiness, for it helps us identify what we want most, keeps our expectations realistic, and in general keeps us in touch with reality. Examples include Peter Weir’s movie The Truman Show, Henrik Ibsen’s The Wild Duck, and Eugene O’Neill’s Iceman Cometh.
Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them ...
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In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.Less
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.
Jerome Neu
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199862986
- eISBN:
- 9780199949762
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862986.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter considers Sartre's critique of Freud and his alternative account of self-deception in terms of bad faith in order to see what can be learned from him and also in order to suggest that ...
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This chapter considers Sartre's critique of Freud and his alternative account of self-deception in terms of bad faith in order to see what can be learned from him and also in order to suggest that there is still much to be learned from Freud. Where Sartre's critique is defective, as it often is, an attempt is made to bring out the underlying problem that still poses a challenge to psychoanalytic theorizing.Less
This chapter considers Sartre's critique of Freud and his alternative account of self-deception in terms of bad faith in order to see what can be learned from him and also in order to suggest that there is still much to be learned from Freud. Where Sartre's critique is defective, as it often is, an attempt is made to bring out the underlying problem that still poses a challenge to psychoanalytic theorizing.
