David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is argued that moral ambivalence is best explained through a naturalistic approach that construes morality as a social invention for promoting and regulating social cooperation. Morality ...
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It is argued that moral ambivalence is best explained through a naturalistic approach that construes morality as a social invention for promoting and regulating social cooperation. Morality accomplishes this function through the shaping not only of behavior but also of motivational structures in human beings. Biological and cultural evolutionary theories identify plausible bases for the emergence of such an invention (e.g., the strength of self-concern combined with capacities to develop other concern, reliance on cultural norms to regulate and direct behavior and motivation). Such bases, together with the common conditions of social cooperation constrain the variety of ways that the function of morality could be fulfilled (e.g., norms of reciprocity are required, and justifications for the subordination of the interests of some to that of others). Within these constraints a plurality of moralities can be true. It is explained how the conditions for what counts as a true morality can vary with the meaning of moral concepts.Less
It is argued that moral ambivalence is best explained through a naturalistic approach that construes morality as a social invention for promoting and regulating social cooperation. Morality accomplishes this function through the shaping not only of behavior but also of motivational structures in human beings. Biological and cultural evolutionary theories identify plausible bases for the emergence of such an invention (e.g., the strength of self-concern combined with capacities to develop other concern, reliance on cultural norms to regulate and direct behavior and motivation). Such bases, together with the common conditions of social cooperation constrain the variety of ways that the function of morality could be fulfilled (e.g., norms of reciprocity are required, and justifications for the subordination of the interests of some to that of others). Within these constraints a plurality of moralities can be true. It is explained how the conditions for what counts as a true morality can vary with the meaning of moral concepts.
Troy Jollimore
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691148724
- eISBN:
- 9781400838677
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691148724.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Love often seems uncontrollable and irrational, but we just as frequently appear to have reasons for loving the people we do. This book offers a new way of understanding love that accommodates both ...
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Love often seems uncontrollable and irrational, but we just as frequently appear to have reasons for loving the people we do. This book offers a new way of understanding love that accommodates both of these facts, arguing that love is guided by reason even as it resists and sometimes eludes rationality. At the same time, the book reconsiders love's moral status, acknowledging its moral dangers while arguing that it is, at heart, a moral phenomenon—an emotion that demands empathy and calls us away from excessive self-concern. Love is revealed as neither wholly moral nor deeply immoral, neither purely rational nor profoundly irrational. Rather, as Diotima says in Plato's Symposium, love is “something in between.” The book makes its case by proposing a “vision” view of love, according to which loving is a way of seeing that involves bestowing charitable attention on a loved one. This view recognizes the truth in the cliché “love is blind,” but holds that love's blindness does not undermine the idea that love is guided by reason. Reasons play an important role in love even if they rest on facts that are not themselves rationally justifiable. Filled with illuminating examples from literature, this book is an original examination of a subject of vital philosophical and human concern.Less
Love often seems uncontrollable and irrational, but we just as frequently appear to have reasons for loving the people we do. This book offers a new way of understanding love that accommodates both of these facts, arguing that love is guided by reason even as it resists and sometimes eludes rationality. At the same time, the book reconsiders love's moral status, acknowledging its moral dangers while arguing that it is, at heart, a moral phenomenon—an emotion that demands empathy and calls us away from excessive self-concern. Love is revealed as neither wholly moral nor deeply immoral, neither purely rational nor profoundly irrational. Rather, as Diotima says in Plato's Symposium, love is “something in between.” The book makes its case by proposing a “vision” view of love, according to which loving is a way of seeing that involves bestowing charitable attention on a loved one. This view recognizes the truth in the cliché “love is blind,” but holds that love's blindness does not undermine the idea that love is guided by reason. Reasons play an important role in love even if they rest on facts that are not themselves rationally justifiable. Filled with illuminating examples from literature, this book is an original examination of a subject of vital philosophical and human concern.
Raymond Martin
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195381559
- eISBN:
- 9780199869244
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381559.003.0009
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter attempts to put the worry about future-oriented self-concern to rest. It argues that whatever difficulties there may be in justifying future-oriented self-concern, they are no greater ...
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This chapter attempts to put the worry about future-oriented self-concern to rest. It argues that whatever difficulties there may be in justifying future-oriented self-concern, they are no greater for skeptics about the self than they are for believers. It also shows that some recent Buddhist commentators have exaggerated the extent to which those who deny the existence of a substantial and enduring self need, for practical purposes, to pretend that one actually exists. It argues that not much pretense is required.Less
This chapter attempts to put the worry about future-oriented self-concern to rest. It argues that whatever difficulties there may be in justifying future-oriented self-concern, they are no greater for skeptics about the self than they are for believers. It also shows that some recent Buddhist commentators have exaggerated the extent to which those who deny the existence of a substantial and enduring self need, for practical purposes, to pretend that one actually exists. It argues that not much pretense is required.
Stephen C. Angle
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195385144
- eISBN:
- 9780199869756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385144.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Despite the differences between Michael Slote and Iris Murdoch—and between them and the book's Neo-Confucian sources—Slote and Murdoch make excellent conversation partners on the subject of harmony, ...
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Despite the differences between Michael Slote and Iris Murdoch—and between them and the book's Neo-Confucian sources—Slote and Murdoch make excellent conversation partners on the subject of harmony, offering important insights and clarifications, while at the same time they are rewarded with ideas from the Confucian tradition that complement or improve their own views. The key points of dialogue include the following: (1) Drawing on Slote, Confucians can distinguish between particularist and aggregative caring, which solves a long-standing problem about caring for strangers. (2) Drawing on the Confucians, Slote can better-ground his idea of “balanced caring” by recognizing the reverence we should have for what the Neo-Confucians call universal coherence. (3) After a few qualifications, Murdoch can help us (and Slote) to see how reverence for universal coherence can indeed play needed justificatory and motivational roles, but (4) Murdoch's appeal to a transcendent notion of Good needs either serious modification or rejection. Finally, (5) both Slote and Murdoch can learn from the Neo-Confucians about the proper ways in which we should value ourselves.Less
Despite the differences between Michael Slote and Iris Murdoch—and between them and the book's Neo-Confucian sources—Slote and Murdoch make excellent conversation partners on the subject of harmony, offering important insights and clarifications, while at the same time they are rewarded with ideas from the Confucian tradition that complement or improve their own views. The key points of dialogue include the following: (1) Drawing on Slote, Confucians can distinguish between particularist and aggregative caring, which solves a long-standing problem about caring for strangers. (2) Drawing on the Confucians, Slote can better-ground his idea of “balanced caring” by recognizing the reverence we should have for what the Neo-Confucians call universal coherence. (3) After a few qualifications, Murdoch can help us (and Slote) to see how reverence for universal coherence can indeed play needed justificatory and motivational roles, but (4) Murdoch's appeal to a transcendent notion of Good needs either serious modification or rejection. Finally, (5) both Slote and Murdoch can learn from the Neo-Confucians about the proper ways in which we should value ourselves.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Self-consciousness and personal identity are fundamental features of human subjectivity. Even present-day discussions of these issues in philosophy of mind are strongly influenced by the conceptual ...
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Self-consciousness and personal identity are fundamental features of human subjectivity. Even present-day discussions of these issues in philosophy of mind are strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks given to them in early modern thought. This book discusses the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity as well as related issues, such as individuation, consciousness, reflection, self-concern, accountability, and conceptions of the soul and the afterlife, as it developed in early modern philosophy; that is, in seventeenth- and eighteenth century thinkers, such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume as well as their early critics, followers and other philosophical contemporaries. The book critically evaluates these contributions and explains the arguments in their historical context. It covers more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain and Germany without neglecting to discuss either the details of the arguments or alternative interpretations.Less
Self-consciousness and personal identity are fundamental features of human subjectivity. Even present-day discussions of these issues in philosophy of mind are strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks given to them in early modern thought. This book discusses the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity as well as related issues, such as individuation, consciousness, reflection, self-concern, accountability, and conceptions of the soul and the afterlife, as it developed in early modern philosophy; that is, in seventeenth- and eighteenth century thinkers, such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume as well as their early critics, followers and other philosophical contemporaries. The book critically evaluates these contributions and explains the arguments in their historical context. It covers more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain and Germany without neglecting to discuss either the details of the arguments or alternative interpretations.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0019
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter introduces another bias whose (ir)rationality is the leitmotif of part IV of the book: the bias towards oneself or the tendency to be more concerned that things go well for someone if ...
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This chapter introduces another bias whose (ir)rationality is the leitmotif of part IV of the book: the bias towards oneself or the tendency to be more concerned that things go well for someone if that person is identical to oneself. This bias can be rational in the relevant sense only if the relation of personal identity is such that it can justify special concern. Consequently, part IV starts by analysing this relation, before it turns to the question whether it is rationally justifiable to base self-concern upon it.Less
This chapter introduces another bias whose (ir)rationality is the leitmotif of part IV of the book: the bias towards oneself or the tendency to be more concerned that things go well for someone if that person is identical to oneself. This bias can be rational in the relevant sense only if the relation of personal identity is such that it can justify special concern. Consequently, part IV starts by analysing this relation, before it turns to the question whether it is rationally justifiable to base self-concern upon it.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0024
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
If we should endorse a factual nihilism to the effect that there is no defensible account of our identity, it follows that we should also endorse an evaluative nihilism to the effect that the bias ...
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If we should endorse a factual nihilism to the effect that there is no defensible account of our identity, it follows that we should also endorse an evaluative nihilism to the effect that the bias towards oneself, i.e., the special concern and liking for a being for the reason that it is identical to oneself, is not rationally justifiable. This chapter argues that the bias towards oneself could not be based on the notion of personal identity, even if animalism or psychologism were correct by appealing to thought-experiments in which your body is radically disintegrated but an exactly similar copy of you is created a moment later out of different constituents. The replica would not be you on any plausible theory of personal identity, but it would seem to be rational to be as much concerned about it as about your future self. It has been objected that this could not be rational, since you could not anticipate having the experiences of this replica in the same intimate way as you could anticipate having your own future experiences. This objection is however shown to be unfounded by an analysis of anticipation of experiences as an act of imaginging having the experiences of a subject which could be distinct from yourself.Less
If we should endorse a factual nihilism to the effect that there is no defensible account of our identity, it follows that we should also endorse an evaluative nihilism to the effect that the bias towards oneself, i.e., the special concern and liking for a being for the reason that it is identical to oneself, is not rationally justifiable. This chapter argues that the bias towards oneself could not be based on the notion of personal identity, even if animalism or psychologism were correct by appealing to thought-experiments in which your body is radically disintegrated but an exactly similar copy of you is created a moment later out of different constituents. The replica would not be you on any plausible theory of personal identity, but it would seem to be rational to be as much concerned about it as about your future self. It has been objected that this could not be rational, since you could not anticipate having the experiences of this replica in the same intimate way as you could anticipate having your own future experiences. This objection is however shown to be unfounded by an analysis of anticipation of experiences as an act of imaginging having the experiences of a subject which could be distinct from yourself.
Ingmar Persson
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199276905
- eISBN:
- 9780191603198
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199276900.003.0025
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Chapter 23 concluded that the bias towards oneself is not rationally justifiable. This chapter tries to provide a causal explanation of the elements of this bias. It explains how self-concern arises ...
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Chapter 23 concluded that the bias towards oneself is not rationally justifiable. This chapter tries to provide a causal explanation of the elements of this bias. It explains how self-concern arises out of the anticipation of future experiences. And it explains self-approval, or liking for oneself, as being based on properties one is aware of oneself as having rather than on the recognition of identity.Less
Chapter 23 concluded that the bias towards oneself is not rationally justifiable. This chapter tries to provide a causal explanation of the elements of this bias. It explains how self-concern arises out of the anticipation of future experiences. And it explains self-approval, or liking for oneself, as being based on properties one is aware of oneself as having rather than on the recognition of identity.
Udo Thiel
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199542499
- eISBN:
- 9780191730917
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542499.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what ...
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This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what some commentators hold, Locke distinguishes between consciousness and memory, and he ascribes to both an essential role in the constitution of personal identity. Linked to the notion of consciousness is that of self-concern: its main function for personal identity is that through it the subject relates to its own future; it also connects cognitive features (consciousness and memory) with the moral and legal features of personal identity. In this context the question of the ontological status of Lockean persons re-emerges (chapter 3). Readings that take Lockean persons to be substances are mistaken: Rather, Locke, following Pufendorf, allows that we talk of persons in analogy to substances, as if they were substances, but they are essentially, as in Pufendorf, modal entities. The chapter next examines the theological aspects of Locke's account of personal identity and its connection with Locke's view of the doctrine of original sin and the resurrection, including the controversy with Stillingfleet. A question is raised of whether Locke's account is compatible with genuine repentance. The theological aspects are connected to the thinking matter issue. Locke's materialist followers, Collins, Voltaire, Cuenz see a constructive role for a Lockean account of personal identity within a materialist metaphysics. Although Locke does not endorse materialism, his own theory would in principle fit as well into a materialist as into an immaterialist theory of the mindLess
This chapter turns to Locke's account of personal identity itself, taking up the discussion of the fundamental notions that are relevant in this account from the previous chapter. Contrary to what some commentators hold, Locke distinguishes between consciousness and memory, and he ascribes to both an essential role in the constitution of personal identity. Linked to the notion of consciousness is that of self-concern: its main function for personal identity is that through it the subject relates to its own future; it also connects cognitive features (consciousness and memory) with the moral and legal features of personal identity. In this context the question of the ontological status of Lockean persons re-emerges (chapter 3). Readings that take Lockean persons to be substances are mistaken: Rather, Locke, following Pufendorf, allows that we talk of persons in analogy to substances, as if they were substances, but they are essentially, as in Pufendorf, modal entities. The chapter next examines the theological aspects of Locke's account of personal identity and its connection with Locke's view of the doctrine of original sin and the resurrection, including the controversy with Stillingfleet. A question is raised of whether Locke's account is compatible with genuine repentance. The theological aspects are connected to the thinking matter issue. Locke's materialist followers, Collins, Voltaire, Cuenz see a constructive role for a Lockean account of personal identity within a materialist metaphysics. Although Locke does not endorse materialism, his own theory would in principle fit as well into a materialist as into an immaterialist theory of the mind
Eric T. Olson
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195134230
- eISBN:
- 9780199833528
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195134230.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Most arguments for the Psychological Approach are based on the conviction that anyone who got your psychological features would be you. The possibility of fission proves this conviction false. Those ...
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Most arguments for the Psychological Approach are based on the conviction that anyone who got your psychological features would be you. The possibility of fission proves this conviction false. Those who think that identity has no practical importance will find it even more difficult to argue for the Psychological Approach.Less
Most arguments for the Psychological Approach are based on the conviction that anyone who got your psychological features would be you. The possibility of fission proves this conviction false. Those who think that identity has no practical importance will find it even more difficult to argue for the Psychological Approach.
Julia Annas
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096521
- eISBN:
- 9780199833061
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096525.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern ...
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There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern (Aristotle), thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development (the Stoics)? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.Less
There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern (Aristotle), thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development (the Stoics)? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748617272
- eISBN:
- 9780748652358
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748617272.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter addresses the question and the concepts of self-constitution and self-understanding as they are relevant to relations between friends. It considers questions of judgement and balance in ...
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This chapter addresses the question and the concepts of self-constitution and self-understanding as they are relevant to relations between friends. It considers questions of judgement and balance in relation to the presence of tension between friends and explores the process of self-constitution, the role of emotion in that process, and its relation to notions of self-worth and rational self-concern. The chapter explains the role of friends in the process of self-constitution, and reviews the relevant works of David Hume and Baruch Spinoza.Less
This chapter addresses the question and the concepts of self-constitution and self-understanding as they are relevant to relations between friends. It considers questions of judgement and balance in relation to the presence of tension between friends and explores the process of self-constitution, the role of emotion in that process, and its relation to notions of self-worth and rational self-concern. The chapter explains the role of friends in the process of self-constitution, and reviews the relevant works of David Hume and Baruch Spinoza.
Heidi L. Maibom
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- January 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262027915
- eISBN:
- 9780262320382
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027915.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The chapter challenges the influential idea that psychopaths lack empathy. The approach combines conceptual analysis with perspectives on empirical data. Different aspects of empathy are ...
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The chapter challenges the influential idea that psychopaths lack empathy. The approach combines conceptual analysis with perspectives on empirical data. Different aspects of empathy are distinguished. The author stresses differences in constructing the notion of empathy in relation to different research focuses, which shows the need to reconceptualize empathy for the purposes of debating, and empirically researching, psychopathy. A more inclusive approach to explaining empathy, which allows a wider scope of psychological structures to be relevant, is suggested. Psychopaths’ problems in feeling for others might be due to a related lack of ability to feel for themselves in imagined scenarios. This would call for a perspective on psychopathy that focuses less on intersubjective, and more on self-concerned, psychological faculties.Less
The chapter challenges the influential idea that psychopaths lack empathy. The approach combines conceptual analysis with perspectives on empirical data. Different aspects of empathy are distinguished. The author stresses differences in constructing the notion of empathy in relation to different research focuses, which shows the need to reconceptualize empathy for the purposes of debating, and empirically researching, psychopathy. A more inclusive approach to explaining empathy, which allows a wider scope of psychological structures to be relevant, is suggested. Psychopaths’ problems in feeling for others might be due to a related lack of ability to feel for themselves in imagined scenarios. This would call for a perspective on psychopathy that focuses less on intersubjective, and more on self-concerned, psychological faculties.
Stephen White
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- November 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198808930
- eISBN:
- 9780191846649
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198808930.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We are all, to some degree or other, self-centered; we tend to concentrate on our own needs and interests to the relative exclusion of most other people’s. This chapter explores the prospects for ...
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We are all, to some degree or other, self-centered; we tend to concentrate on our own needs and interests to the relative exclusion of most other people’s. This chapter explores the prospects for justifying such partiality on grounds of individual autonomy. Two versions of this approach are considered. The first develops the idea that, to be autonomous, an agent must have available a significant range of morally permissible options. This approach is rejected in favor of a second, according to which a strong duty of impartial beneficence would objectionably render an agent subject to the wills of other agents. That is, insofar as a person is entitled to a special authoritative status in relation to what she does, that person will bear the primary responsibility for how well her life goes. The chapter concludes by considering the implications for our understanding of morally required beneficence.Less
We are all, to some degree or other, self-centered; we tend to concentrate on our own needs and interests to the relative exclusion of most other people’s. This chapter explores the prospects for justifying such partiality on grounds of individual autonomy. Two versions of this approach are considered. The first develops the idea that, to be autonomous, an agent must have available a significant range of morally permissible options. This approach is rejected in favor of a second, according to which a strong duty of impartial beneficence would objectionably render an agent subject to the wills of other agents. That is, insofar as a person is entitled to a special authoritative status in relation to what she does, that person will bear the primary responsibility for how well her life goes. The chapter concludes by considering the implications for our understanding of morally required beneficence.
Ernesto V. Garcia
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198744665
- eISBN:
- 9780191808838
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744665.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter examines the nature of authenticity, both what it is and why it is valuable. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, it critically discusses three traditional notions of ...
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This chapter examines the nature of authenticity, both what it is and why it is valuable. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, it critically discusses three traditional notions of authenticity. Second, it proposes an account of authenticity. It is argued that authenticity (1) is best understood as a personal virtue; (2) is constituted by three main elements, viz., (a) self-understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern—in particular, concern about what kind of person one is and what type of life one leads; and (3) resembles most traditional Aristotelian virtues insofar as it involves steering a middle course between two extremes, viz., a ‘deficiency’ (i.e., various forms of inauthenticity) and an ‘excess’ (i.e., a type of obsessive or narcissistic self-centeredness which many critics of authenticity rightly disparage). Third, the chapter explains why authenticity is valuable, both in instrumental and non-instrumental ways.Less
This chapter examines the nature of authenticity, both what it is and why it is valuable. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, it critically discusses three traditional notions of authenticity. Second, it proposes an account of authenticity. It is argued that authenticity (1) is best understood as a personal virtue; (2) is constituted by three main elements, viz., (a) self-understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern—in particular, concern about what kind of person one is and what type of life one leads; and (3) resembles most traditional Aristotelian virtues insofar as it involves steering a middle course between two extremes, viz., a ‘deficiency’ (i.e., various forms of inauthenticity) and an ‘excess’ (i.e., a type of obsessive or narcissistic self-centeredness which many critics of authenticity rightly disparage). Third, the chapter explains why authenticity is valuable, both in instrumental and non-instrumental ways.
