Jan Westerhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195375213
- eISBN:
- 9780199871360
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375213.003.0005
- Subject:
- Religion, Buddhism
This chapter deals with Nāgārjuna’s critique of the notion of causation. It first discusses the interdependence of cause and effect, followed by an analysis of the critique of the four ways of causal ...
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This chapter deals with Nāgārjuna’s critique of the notion of causation. It first discusses the interdependence of cause and effect, followed by an analysis of the critique of the four ways of causal production: self-production, production from another object, production from itself and another object, and causeless production. A second set of arguments Nāgārjuna presents against causation deal with the possible relations between cause and effect: cause and effect being successive, overlapping or simultaneous. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Nāgārjuna’s thought on time.Less
This chapter deals with Nāgārjuna’s critique of the notion of causation. It first discusses the interdependence of cause and effect, followed by an analysis of the critique of the four ways of causal production: self-production, production from another object, production from itself and another object, and causeless production. A second set of arguments Nāgārjuna presents against causation deal with the possible relations between cause and effect: cause and effect being successive, overlapping or simultaneous. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Nāgārjuna’s thought on time.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response ...
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Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.Less
Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples and offers a robust free will defence. Anselm holds that ‘character determinism’, the necessitation of a choice by the agent's character, does not undermine free will as long as the agent can be held responsible for his character.
Peter Ulric Tse
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262019101
- eISBN:
- 9780262313155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter explores the classical debates regarding mental causation and free will, even those that existed before neuroscience came about. It begins at the most fundamental physical level by ...
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This chapter explores the classical debates regarding mental causation and free will, even those that existed before neuroscience came about. It begins at the most fundamental physical level by reviewing evidence of the reality of an ontologically indeterministic universe. Although a nonindeterministic form of local randomness alone would suffice for the main argument concerning what neurons do, this is where most of the arguments in this book are based. The central philosophical argument opposing the logical possibility of mental causation is challenged here, with a counterargument stating that the core argument of physical reductionists against the possibility of mental causation rests on the impossibility of self-causation; if determinism were the case, then these arguments would indeed be correct, and mental causation and a “strong free will” would be logically ruled out.Less
This chapter explores the classical debates regarding mental causation and free will, even those that existed before neuroscience came about. It begins at the most fundamental physical level by reviewing evidence of the reality of an ontologically indeterministic universe. Although a nonindeterministic form of local randomness alone would suffice for the main argument concerning what neurons do, this is where most of the arguments in this book are based. The central philosophical argument opposing the logical possibility of mental causation is challenged here, with a counterargument stating that the core argument of physical reductionists against the possibility of mental causation rests on the impossibility of self-causation; if determinism were the case, then these arguments would indeed be correct, and mental causation and a “strong free will” would be logically ruled out.
Peter Ulric Tse
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262019101
- eISBN:
- 9780262313155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter argues that it is possible to hold on to a strong conception of free will despite being a physicalist and ontological indeterminist. In continuing this discussion, the strict demands of ...
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This chapter argues that it is possible to hold on to a strong conception of free will despite being a physicalist and ontological indeterminist. In continuing this discussion, the strict demands of a strong free will must first be established, namely, the possession of multiple courses of physical or mental behavior, the ability to choose among these courses, the ability to have chosen otherwise once a course of behavior is chosen, and a choice not dictated by randomness but by the one possessing free will. These demands may seem impossible since they require acts of free will to involve acts of self-causation. This chapter aims to avoid the logical fallacy of self-causation while also describing a way to meet these demands, assuming ontological indeterminism and criterial causation among neurons.Less
This chapter argues that it is possible to hold on to a strong conception of free will despite being a physicalist and ontological indeterminist. In continuing this discussion, the strict demands of a strong free will must first be established, namely, the possession of multiple courses of physical or mental behavior, the ability to choose among these courses, the ability to have chosen otherwise once a course of behavior is chosen, and a choice not dictated by randomness but by the one possessing free will. These demands may seem impossible since they require acts of free will to involve acts of self-causation. This chapter aims to avoid the logical fallacy of self-causation while also describing a way to meet these demands, assuming ontological indeterminism and criterial causation among neurons.
