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Causation

Jan Westerhoff

in Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
May 2009
ISBN:
9780195375213
eISBN:
9780199871360
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195375213.003.0005
Subject:
Religion, Buddhism

This chapter deals with Nāgārjuna’s critique of the notion of causation. It first discusses the interdependence of cause and effect, followed by an analysis of the critique of the four ways of causal ... More


Alternative Possibilities and Primary Agency

Katherin A. Rogers

in Anselm on Freedom

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199231676
eISBN:
9780191716089
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General

Anselm defends the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’ with regard to created agency, although in his system it is aseity, self-causation, that is most important. His theory presents a response ... More


Overview of Arguments

Peter Ulric Tse

in The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262019101
eISBN:
9780262313155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.003.0002
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter explores the classical debates regarding mental causation and free will, even those that existed before neuroscience came about. It begins at the most fundamental physical level by ... More


Criterial Causation Offers a Neural Basis for Free Will

Peter Ulric Tse

in The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
August 2013
ISBN:
9780262019101
eISBN:
9780262313155
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:
10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

This chapter argues that it is possible to hold on to a strong conception of free will despite being a physicalist and ontological indeterminist. In continuing this discussion, the strict demands of ... More


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