Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to ...
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Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.Less
Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.
Leif Lewin
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198277255
- eISBN:
- 9780191599774
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198277253.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing ...
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Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.Less
Is it self‐interest or public interest that dominates in public life? Rational‐choice theory, political philosophy, and electoral research were all used to answer this question. Analysing existing literature, Professor Leif Lewin shows that predominant consensus emerged on this issue by the 1980s. This consensus states that people in politics are driven mostly by their self‐interest and not by common good and society values. Although Professor Lewin is not testing existing views that ‘egoism rules’ on deep theoretical grounds, he strongly argues that empirical facts do not support such views and thus opens a new chapter in the debate on individuals’ rationality.
Combining research results and achievements of different research fields, mentioned above, the author adopts methodology never used before. Extensive literature review on studies of Western democracy provides a basis for analysis for many countries. Separate chapters of the book are devoted to the attitudes and actions of the electoral voters, politicians, and bureaucrats in power.
This allows the author to make broad conclusions, which challenges predominant views. He concludes that in most cases people in politics are driven by broader social interests rather than their own short‐term interests.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could ...
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This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.Less
This book attempts to answer the challenge of showing that morality is not a confidence trick or a fetish. It does so by arguing that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested people could accept. The problem is approached by asking by what right some people punish others, and by comparing recent developments in theories of distributive and retributive justice. The first part of the book considers retributive, utilitarian, and mixed theories of punishment. In the second part, recent theories of distributive justice, especially those of Rawls and Gauthier, are examined. It is argued that these theories cannot give an adequate account of punishment. In the final part, an argument is offered for a genuinely constructivist account of morality—constructivist in that it rejects any idea of objective, mind‐independent moral values and seeks instead to construct morality from non‐moral human concerns; genuinely constructivist in that, in contrast to Rawls, it does not take as a premise the equal moral worth of persons. The conclusion is that a genuine constructivism will show the need for, and justification of, punishment as intrinsic to morality itself.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.
This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.
Anita M. Superson
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195376623
- eISBN:
- 9780199871551
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat ...
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This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.Less
This book challenges the traditional picture of the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” and demands a demonstration that acting in morally required ways is rationally required. It argues that we defeat the action skeptic, as well as the disposition skeptic, who denies that being morally disposed is rationally required, and the motive skeptic, who believes that merely going through the motions in acting morally is rationally permissible. It argues, against internalism, that we address the amoralist, who is not moved by moral reasons he recognizes. It argues for expanding the skeptic's position from self-interest to privilege, to include morally unjustified behavior typically directed against disenfranchised social groups. It argues for revising the traditional expected utility model of rationality to exclude desires deformed by patriarchy as ones it is not irrational to have. It defends the Interdependency Thesis, which assesses the rationality of moral dispositions and of actions interdependently, and allows us to fine tune the demands of the skeptic by not focusing on acts and dispositions in themselves, but on their interconnection. It defends the view that our rational assessments of agents should reflect the complex connection between the agent's reasons for adopting a moral disposition, and for having and acting from it, whether these cohere with her reasons for acting and for wanting to be a morally good person, and the justification for the moral theory or principles she endorses. Acts come in degrees of rationality, as measured by how they contribute to the agent's consistent life plan.
Julian Le Grand
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199266999
- eISBN:
- 9780191600869
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199266999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested ...
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Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.Less
Can we rely on the public service ethos to deliver high quality public services? Are professionals such as doctors and teachers really public‐spirited altruists—knights—or self‐interested egoists—knaves? And how should the recipients of those services, patients, parents, and pupils, be treated? As passive recipients—pawns—or as active consumers—queens?
This book offers answers to these questions. It argues that the original welfare state was designed on the assumptions that those who worked within it were basically altruists or knights and that the beneficiaries were passive recipients or pawns. In consequence, services were often of low quality, delivered in a patronising fashion and inequitable in outcome. However, services designed on an opposite set of assumptions—that public service professionals are knaves and that users should be queens—also face problems: exploitation by unscrupulous professionals, and overuse by demanding consumers, especially middle class ones.
The book draws on evidence from Britain and abroad to show that, in fact, public policies designed on the basis that professionals are a mixture of knight and knave and recipients a mixture of pawn and queen deliver better quality and greater equity than policies based on more simplistic assumptions about motivation and agency. In particular, contrary to popular mythology, the book shows that policies that offer choice and competition within public services such as education and health care can deliver both excellence and equity. And policies aimed at building up individual assets and wealth ownership can empower the poor and powerless more effectively than those aimed simply at bolstering their current income.
Matt Matravers
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295730
- eISBN:
- 9780191599828
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295731.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
‘Justice as mutual advantage’ theorists argue that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested persons would accept in regulating the pursuit of their self‐interest. Taking David Gauthier's ...
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‘Justice as mutual advantage’ theorists argue that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested persons would accept in regulating the pursuit of their self‐interest. Taking David Gauthier's theory as an exemplar of this approach, it is argued that justice as mutual advantage cannot close the gap between morality and self‐interest. The conclusion is that the value of morality cannot be only that it furthers self‐interest, although this is an important part of any moral theory that is to have an adequate account of moral motivation.Less
‘Justice as mutual advantage’ theorists argue that moral norms are those that rational, self‐interested persons would accept in regulating the pursuit of their self‐interest. Taking David Gauthier's theory as an exemplar of this approach, it is argued that justice as mutual advantage cannot close the gap between morality and self‐interest. The conclusion is that the value of morality cannot be only that it furthers self‐interest, although this is an important part of any moral theory that is to have an adequate account of moral motivation.
Brian Feltham and John Cottingham (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic ...
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What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.Less
What is owed to others that I may not keep for myself? What may I keep for myself, even when others are in need? These transparently moral questions may immediately invite knee-jerk moralistic answers; or else be selfishly dismissed. And if we feel a tension between the duty to help others and what we want for ourselves, we might see it as a straightforward division between morally virtuous altruism and simple self-interest. Yet does morality really require us always to put those less fortunate before ourselves, our loved ones, even our own children, in every way? And does self-interest really offer a simple division between what is good for oneself and what is good for others? Such questions are of great importance in both moral and political theory. They are in the first place substantive questions regarding the demands that the needs and interests of others place upon us, but they broaden out into more abstract questions about the impartiality of ethical reasoning itself. A central question for this volume is whether impartiality and partiality are really opposed dimensions or if they can be harmoniously reconciled in one picture. From a variety of theoretical perspectives, the chapters in this volume explore such issues as the demandingness of morality, the nature of value and reasons, practical reasoning, and the fundamental nature of morality itself.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ...
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The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.
Derek Parfit
- Published in print:
- 1986
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198249085
- eISBN:
- 9780191598173
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019824908X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us ...
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This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us to act in ways that frustrate these aims. If these theories are revised, these objections can be partly met.Part Two discusses the relations between what a single person can rationally want or do at different times, and what different people can rationally want or do. I also discuss the rationality of four attitudes to time: temporal neutrality, and the three kinds of bias towards the present, the near, and the future.Part Three discusses personal identity, or what is involved in our continuing to exist throughout our lives. Most of us, I argue, have certain beliefs about this subject that are false, but hard to give up. If we accept these claims, they may change some of our emotions or attitudes, and we should revise some of our beliefs about both rationality and morality.Part Four discusses our obligations to future generations, and some related questions about what would be better or worse futures for mankind. The most difficult question here, which I fail to answer, is about the relative importance of the number of people who will exist, and the quality of life of these people.Less
This book has four loosely connected parts. Part One discusses some ways in which theories about morality and rationality can be self‐defeating. Such theories give us certain aims, but also tell us to act in ways that frustrate these aims. If these theories are revised, these objections can be partly met.
Part Two discusses the relations between what a single person can rationally want or do at different times, and what different people can rationally want or do. I also discuss the rationality of four attitudes to time: temporal neutrality, and the three kinds of bias towards the present, the near, and the future.
Part Three discusses personal identity, or what is involved in our continuing to exist throughout our lives. Most of us, I argue, have certain beliefs about this subject that are false, but hard to give up. If we accept these claims, they may change some of our emotions or attitudes, and we should revise some of our beliefs about both rationality and morality.
Part Four discusses our obligations to future generations, and some related questions about what would be better or worse futures for mankind. The most difficult question here, which I fail to answer, is about the relative importance of the number of people who will exist, and the quality of life of these people.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
People speak of ‘obligations’ in a variety of contexts. This chapter offers a partial characterization of the broad class of obligations with which this book is concerned. This class is important ...
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People speak of ‘obligations’ in a variety of contexts. This chapter offers a partial characterization of the broad class of obligations with which this book is concerned. This class is important from the perspective of practical reasoning, since reason requires one to fulfill such an obligation all else being equal: they provide one with sufficient reason to act in a certain way. Further, they are independent of one’s inclinations or self-interest. This class includes directed obligations, which are a matter of one person’s owing an action to another, but does not include imputed obligations.Less
People speak of ‘obligations’ in a variety of contexts. This chapter offers a partial characterization of the broad class of obligations with which this book is concerned. This class is important from the perspective of practical reasoning, since reason requires one to fulfill such an obligation all else being equal: they provide one with sufficient reason to act in a certain way. Further, they are independent of one’s inclinations or self-interest. This class includes directed obligations, which are a matter of one person’s owing an action to another, but does not include imputed obligations.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what ...
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Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what justification do you have? The first may be called the epistemic question, and the second the justificatory question. Further, and possibly related, questions may concern metaphysics, semantics, or other matters. This chapter defends ethical intuitionism as the most plausible account of our knowledge of certain basic normative principles. It advocates a form of intuitionism that is relatively modest, the essential components of the idea being that human beings have a capacity for grasping certain a priori truths, that such truths include truths about normative reasons, and that a grasp of such a truth can in itself provide justification for accepting it, in some cases sufficient justification for knowledge.Less
Anyone who claims that there is some ultimate reason for action is likely to be asked two questions. First, how do you know? That is, what capacity gives you this special insight? And, second, what justification do you have? The first may be called the epistemic question, and the second the justificatory question. Further, and possibly related, questions may concern metaphysics, semantics, or other matters. This chapter defends ethical intuitionism as the most plausible account of our knowledge of certain basic normative principles. It advocates a form of intuitionism that is relatively modest, the essential components of the idea being that human beings have a capacity for grasping certain a priori truths, that such truths include truths about normative reasons, and that a grasp of such a truth can in itself provide justification for accepting it, in some cases sufficient justification for knowledge.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us ...
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This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us is the hedonic quality of the experiences realized by the exercise of any capacity for conscious experience we now have or any such capacity in future which emerges from our present capacity (thus allowing for division of capacities, between which other things being equal we should be impartial). It argues that the well-being of others can ground reasons for each of us to act, sometimes to the detriment of our own individual well-being. The well-being of others is to be assessed impartially in the sense that no intrinsic weight is to be attached to relationships with others. This view may be described as a version of the ‘dualism of practical reason’.Less
This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us is the hedonic quality of the experiences realized by the exercise of any capacity for conscious experience we now have or any such capacity in future which emerges from our present capacity (thus allowing for division of capacities, between which other things being equal we should be impartial). It argues that the well-being of others can ground reasons for each of us to act, sometimes to the detriment of our own individual well-being. The well-being of others is to be assessed impartially in the sense that no intrinsic weight is to be attached to relationships with others. This view may be described as a version of the ‘dualism of practical reason’.
Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199248001
- eISBN:
- 9780191598272
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199248001.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the ...
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The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the justification of reason; and the objectivity of value. He argues for the centrality, but also demonstrates the limits of reason in action and belief. He suggests that our life is most truly our own when our various emotions, hopes, desires, intentions, and actions are guided by reason. He explores the universality of value and of principles of reason on one side and their dependence on social practices on the other side, and their susceptibility to change and improvement. He concludes with an illuminating explanation of self‐interest and its relation to impersonal values, in general, and to morality, in particular.Less
The book offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these essays, Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the justification of reason; and the objectivity of value. He argues for the centrality, but also demonstrates the limits of reason in action and belief. He suggests that our life is most truly our own when our various emotions, hopes, desires, intentions, and actions are guided by reason. He explores the universality of value and of principles of reason on one side and their dependence on social practices on the other side, and their susceptibility to change and improvement. He concludes with an illuminating explanation of self‐interest and its relation to impersonal values, in general, and to morality, in particular.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines the Kantian argument put forward by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality, that morality, which is identified with liberal principles of justice, is entailed in the standpoint of ...
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This chapter examines the Kantian argument put forward by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality, that morality, which is identified with liberal principles of justice, is entailed in the standpoint of self‐interest, and can be discerned through the exercise of theoretical reason. This chapter argues that it fails to overcome the dualisms that bedevilled Kant's version of this argument.Less
This chapter examines the Kantian argument put forward by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality, that morality, which is identified with liberal principles of justice, is entailed in the standpoint of self‐interest, and can be discerned through the exercise of theoretical reason. This chapter argues that it fails to overcome the dualisms that bedevilled Kant's version of this argument.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of ...
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This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.Less
This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.
Margaret Moore
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198273851
- eISBN:
- 9780191599934
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198273851.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as ...
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Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.Less
Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Taxation arouses strong passions, fueled not only by conflicts of economic self-interest, but by conflicting ideas of justice or fairness. Though empirical questions and questions of economic theory ...
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Taxation arouses strong passions, fueled not only by conflicts of economic self-interest, but by conflicting ideas of justice or fairness. Though empirical questions and questions of economic theory are inescapable in responsible discussion of tax policy, so too are philosophical questions of social and economic justice. But the topic has been neglected by philosophers, especially by comparison with such legal issues as abortion and freedom of expression. This book aims to make a start at filling this gap.Less
Taxation arouses strong passions, fueled not only by conflicts of economic self-interest, but by conflicting ideas of justice or fairness. Though empirical questions and questions of economic theory are inescapable in responsible discussion of tax policy, so too are philosophical questions of social and economic justice. But the topic has been neglected by philosophers, especially by comparison with such legal issues as abortion and freedom of expression. This book aims to make a start at filling this gap.
Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150162
- eISBN:
- 9780199833924
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150163.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
What politically feasible results might be drawn from the foregoing reflections? Self-interest does set limits to what is politically feasible, but most people defend their views about taxation in ...
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What politically feasible results might be drawn from the foregoing reflections? Self-interest does set limits to what is politically feasible, but most people defend their views about taxation in moral language. So much would be gained from the wholesale rejection of the morally obtuse but tenacious ideas of everyday libertarianism. Increasingly widespread understanding of how capitalism works may help. We may hope that most people are coming to believe that even under capitalism the organization of the economy and the allocation of its product between public and private control is a legitimate object of continual collective choice, and that this choice must be made on grounds that justify it not only economically but morally, and by a democratic procedure that legitimizes it.Less
What politically feasible results might be drawn from the foregoing reflections? Self-interest does set limits to what is politically feasible, but most people defend their views about taxation in moral language. So much would be gained from the wholesale rejection of the morally obtuse but tenacious ideas of everyday libertarianism. Increasingly widespread understanding of how capitalism works may help. We may hope that most people are coming to believe that even under capitalism the organization of the economy and the allocation of its product between public and private control is a legitimate object of continual collective choice, and that this choice must be made on grounds that justify it not only economically but morally, and by a democratic procedure that legitimizes it.
Tony Smith
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240975
- eISBN:
- 9780191598999
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240973.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter elaborates on the concept of ‘national security liberalism’, i.e. the idea that promoting democracy abroad is not only morally correct but is also in the self‐interest of US. It examines ...
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This chapter elaborates on the concept of ‘national security liberalism’, i.e. the idea that promoting democracy abroad is not only morally correct but is also in the self‐interest of US. It examines the role played by liberalism in American foreign policy throughout history, both as an expression of America's values and as a means to achieve pragmatic ends. In the last section, it underlines the limits of democracy promotion as an American foreign policy tool.Less
This chapter elaborates on the concept of ‘national security liberalism’, i.e. the idea that promoting democracy abroad is not only morally correct but is also in the self‐interest of US. It examines the role played by liberalism in American foreign policy throughout history, both as an expression of America's values and as a means to achieve pragmatic ends. In the last section, it underlines the limits of democracy promotion as an American foreign policy tool.