Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele, and Kathleen D. Vohs (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195389760
- eISBN:
- 9780199863341
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might ...
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This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.Less
This volume is aimed at readers who wish to move beyond debates about the existence of free will and the efficacy of consciousness and closer to appreciating how free will and consciousness might operate. It draws from philosophy and psychology, the two fields that have grappled most fundamentally with these issues. In this wide-ranging volume, the contributors explore issues such as how free will is connected to rational choice, planning, and self-control; roles for consciousness in decision making; the nature and power of conscious deciding; connections among free will, consciousness, and quantum mechanics; why free will and consciousness might have evolved; how consciousness develops in individuals; the experience of free will; effects on behavior of the belief that free will is an illusion; and connections between free will and moral responsibility in lay thinking. Collectively, these state-of-the-art chapters by accomplished psychologists and philosophers provide a glimpse into the future of research on free will and consciousness.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199896134
- eISBN:
- 9780199949533
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199896134.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim ...
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People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.Less
People backslide. They freely do things they believe it would be best on the whole not to do – and best from their own point of view, not just the perspective of their peers or their parents. The aim of this book is to explain why that happens. The first main item of business is to clarify the nature of backsliding – of actions that display some weakness of will. To this end, Mele uses traditional philosophical techniques dating back to Plato and Aristotle (whose work on weakness of will or “akrasia” he discusses) and some new studies in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. He then attacks the thesis that backsliding is an illusion because people never freely act contrary to what they judge best. Mele argues that it is extremely plausible that if people ever act freely, they sometimes backslide. The biggest challenge posed by backsliding is to explain why it happens. At the book’s heart is the development of a theoretical and empirical framework that sheds light both on backsliding and on exercises of self-control that prevent it. Here, Mele draws on work in social and developmental psychology and in psychiatry to motivate a view of human behavior in which both backsliding and overcoming the temptation to backslide are explicable. He argues that backsliding is no illusion and our theories about the springs of action, the power of evaluative judgments, human agency, human rationality, practical reasoning, and motivation should accommodate backsliding.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195150438
- eISBN:
- 9780199869091
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical ...
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Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.Less
Explores the related topics of self‐control and personal autonomy. Self‐control is understood as the contrary of akrasia or weakness of will, and autonomy is placed in the family of metaphysical freedom concepts: most notably, free will, free choice, and free action. The book's first half develops an analysis of the nature of self‐control and explains the potential influence of self‐control on actions, beliefs, reasoning, emotions, and values. It also develops an account of an ideally self‐controlled person and argues that even such a person will fall short of autonomy. The second half of the book first asks what may be added to ideal self‐control to yield autonomy and then defends two distinctive answers, one for compatibilist believers in autonomy (believers in autonomy who see it as compatible with determinism) and another for libertarians (believers in autonomy who see it as incompatible with determinism). The compatibilist answer features an account of control and a sensitivity to agents’ histories, and the libertarian answer adds to this a kind of causal openness that does not require agent causation and that avoids the sort of luck that undermines autonomy and moral responsibility. It is argued that the disjunction of these two answers as applied to actual human beings is more credible than the thesis that there are no autonomous human beings. This is “agnostic autonomism”: the position is agnostic about whether the falsity of determinism is required for autonomy while asserting that it is more credible that there are autonomous human beings than there are not.
Alfred R. Mele
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195156171
- eISBN:
- 9780199833467
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of ...
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What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.Less
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.
Nomy Arpaly
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195152043
- eISBN:
- 9780199785780
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195152042.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against ...
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This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).Less
This book presents a positive theory of moral worth. Chapter 1 examines the complexities of moral life that appear to differ from the paradigmatic cases of moral psychology. Chapter 2 argues against the common assumption that akrasia is always irrational, or at least, always less rational than the corresponding self-controlled action. The theory is presented in Chapter 3 — that people are praiseworthy for acts of good will and blameworthy for acts of ill will or absence of good will, and the amount of praise or blame they deserve varies with the depth of their motivation or extent of their indifference. Chapter 4 and 5 defend this theory against potential objections to the effect that there is something wrong with its failure to invoke autonomy, and clarifies the theory’s implications about some issues in moral responsibility often associated with autonomy (i.e., responsibility of kleptomaniacs, drug addicts, makers of Freudian slips, and persons driven to murder by hypnotists).
Kenneth Lipartito
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
This chapter argues for historians to explore the ‘elective affinity’ between communal and utopian societies of 19th-century America and the managerial corporation. It explores the ways that American ...
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This chapter argues for historians to explore the ‘elective affinity’ between communal and utopian societies of 19th-century America and the managerial corporation. It explores the ways that American society sought to reconcile freedom with the growth of market culture through new disciplinary institutions designed to foster self control and to deal with the travails of laissez faire competition. These methods, practiced in famous utopian communities such as Oneida, used systems of management and control, and embraced early corporate forms of organization at a time when such methods and forms were uncommon in private business. Many utopian experiments in fact evolved into profit-making enterprises after the Civil War, while many of the architects of business corporations were often connected — by ties of blood or by their ideas — to the antebellum reform tradition. The chapter argues for historians to explore these cultural connections and to recognize the deeper cultural sources of the modern corporate organization.Less
This chapter argues for historians to explore the ‘elective affinity’ between communal and utopian societies of 19th-century America and the managerial corporation. It explores the ways that American society sought to reconcile freedom with the growth of market culture through new disciplinary institutions designed to foster self control and to deal with the travails of laissez faire competition. These methods, practiced in famous utopian communities such as Oneida, used systems of management and control, and embraced early corporate forms of organization at a time when such methods and forms were uncommon in private business. Many utopian experiments in fact evolved into profit-making enterprises after the Civil War, while many of the architects of business corporations were often connected — by ties of blood or by their ideas — to the antebellum reform tradition. The chapter argues for historians to explore these cultural connections and to recognize the deeper cultural sources of the modern corporate organization.
Mark R. Leary
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195172423
- eISBN:
- 9780199786756
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172423.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Most people believe that they can solve many of the problems discussed in the book through self-control, making themselves behave in ways that are conducive to their health and happiness by force of ...
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Most people believe that they can solve many of the problems discussed in the book through self-control, making themselves behave in ways that are conducive to their health and happiness by force of will. Of course, people sometimes exercise sufficient self-restraint to override the self's natural maladaptive inclinations. Yet, as we all know, there are limits to what people can make themselves do, and people are often unable to control their thoughts, emotions, and behaviors as they desire. Many personal and social problems (such as aggression, addiction, unprotected sex, overeating, and deindividuation) result from self-regulation failure. This chapter deals with the nature of self-regulation and with the question of why people are often unable to control themselves no matter how hard they try. Topics include self-regulation, self-control strength, and ego-depletion. Implications of research for enhancing personal self-control are discussed.Less
Most people believe that they can solve many of the problems discussed in the book through self-control, making themselves behave in ways that are conducive to their health and happiness by force of will. Of course, people sometimes exercise sufficient self-restraint to override the self's natural maladaptive inclinations. Yet, as we all know, there are limits to what people can make themselves do, and people are often unable to control their thoughts, emotions, and behaviors as they desire. Many personal and social problems (such as aggression, addiction, unprotected sex, overeating, and deindividuation) result from self-regulation failure. This chapter deals with the nature of self-regulation and with the question of why people are often unable to control themselves no matter how hard they try. Topics include self-regulation, self-control strength, and ego-depletion. Implications of research for enhancing personal self-control are discussed.
John Baer, James C. Kaufman, and Roy F. Baumeister (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be ...
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Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at the ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief.Less
Do people have free will, or is universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at the ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief.
Travis C. Pratt
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195310313
- eISBN:
- 9780199871384
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310313.003.0017
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Since its arrival on the criminological scene, an impressive roster of studies has emerged supporting Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) core theoretical proposition—that criminal behavior is caused by ...
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Since its arrival on the criminological scene, an impressive roster of studies has emerged supporting Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) core theoretical proposition—that criminal behavior is caused by individuals' deficiencies in levels of self-control. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has emerged indicating that the processes assumed to establish individuals' levels of self-control are more complex than those specified by Gottfredson and Hirschi. This chapter addresses this issue by presenting an explanatory model of the development of self-control that pulls together micro- (i.e., neuropsychological, family context) and macro-level (community and institutional contexts) criminogenic influences. The purpose of this revised model is to demonstrate how self-control can be integrated into a more comprehensive—and empirically robust—theoretical framework for explaining between-individual variation in offending, within-individual variation in criminal behavior over the life course, and the spatial distribution of crime.Less
Since its arrival on the criminological scene, an impressive roster of studies has emerged supporting Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) core theoretical proposition—that criminal behavior is caused by individuals' deficiencies in levels of self-control. Nevertheless, empirical evidence has emerged indicating that the processes assumed to establish individuals' levels of self-control are more complex than those specified by Gottfredson and Hirschi. This chapter addresses this issue by presenting an explanatory model of the development of self-control that pulls together micro- (i.e., neuropsychological, family context) and macro-level (community and institutional contexts) criminogenic influences. The purpose of this revised model is to demonstrate how self-control can be integrated into a more comprehensive—and empirically robust—theoretical framework for explaining between-individual variation in offending, within-individual variation in criminal behavior over the life course, and the spatial distribution of crime.
Roy F Baumeister
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0005
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter points to a view of free will as a complex form of action control that is used (sometimes) by humans to achieve self-control and rational, intelligence decision-making, as well as making ...
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This chapter points to a view of free will as a complex form of action control that is used (sometimes) by humans to achieve self-control and rational, intelligence decision-making, as well as making and following ad hoc plans. Research suggests that these activities deplete a common but limited energy resource, so the capacity for free will is limited and biologically expensive. Blood glucose (brain fuel) maybe a major part of the common resource. Rational choice, self-control, and planful behavior are more useful forms of free will than random action. Psychologists may profitably focus more on how this mechanism works than on debating whether it fits various philosophical or theological definitions of free will. The broader context is that free will can be understood as an evolutionary adaptation to enable humans to function in the increasingly complex social world afforded by culture.Less
This chapter points to a view of free will as a complex form of action control that is used (sometimes) by humans to achieve self-control and rational, intelligence decision-making, as well as making and following ad hoc plans. Research suggests that these activities deplete a common but limited energy resource, so the capacity for free will is limited and biologically expensive. Blood glucose (brain fuel) maybe a major part of the common resource. Rational choice, self-control, and planful behavior are more useful forms of free will than random action. Psychologists may profitably focus more on how this mechanism works than on debating whether it fits various philosophical or theological definitions of free will. The broader context is that free will can be understood as an evolutionary adaptation to enable humans to function in the increasingly complex social world afforded by culture.
Daniel M Wegner
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195189636
- eISBN:
- 9780199868605
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Human action is a kind of magic, an astonishing ability to think of something and thereby make it happen. Perhaps this is why each person views self with awe — The Great Selfini amazes and delights! ...
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Human action is a kind of magic, an astonishing ability to think of something and thereby make it happen. Perhaps this is why each person views self with awe — The Great Selfini amazes and delights! We are enchanted by the operation of our minds and bodies into believing that we are “uncaused causes”, the origins of our own behavior. Unfortunately, the magic self stands in the way of the scientific understanding of the psychological, neural, and social origins of our behavior and thought. This chapter examines this standoff by outlining the theory of apparent mental causation — a theory of how the self's magic may arise. It then considers why the concept of self as an inner origin of our actions presents such a robust illusion. Finally, the chapter explores why evolution might have unfolded in such a way as to make us think we are magical creatures.Less
Human action is a kind of magic, an astonishing ability to think of something and thereby make it happen. Perhaps this is why each person views self with awe — The Great Selfini amazes and delights! We are enchanted by the operation of our minds and bodies into believing that we are “uncaused causes”, the origins of our own behavior. Unfortunately, the magic self stands in the way of the scientific understanding of the psychological, neural, and social origins of our behavior and thought. This chapter examines this standoff by outlining the theory of apparent mental causation — a theory of how the self's magic may arise. It then considers why the concept of self as an inner origin of our actions presents such a robust illusion. Finally, the chapter explores why evolution might have unfolded in such a way as to make us think we are magical creatures.
Charles W. Fowler
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199540969
- eISBN:
- 9780191716249
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199540969.001.1
- Subject:
- Biology, Biodiversity / Conservation Biology
“Systemic management” describes a holistic, objective, and universally applicable form of management, providing a framework for addressing environmental challenges such as global warming, emergent ...
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“Systemic management” describes a holistic, objective, and universally applicable form of management, providing a framework for addressing environmental challenges such as global warming, emergent diseases, deforestation, overpopulation, the extinction crisis, pollution, overfishing, and habitat destruction. Its goals are the consistently sustainable relationships between humans and ecosystems, between humans and other species, and between humans and the biosphere. This book presents a convincing argument that these goals, and the means to achieve them, can be inferred from empirical information. It describes how comparisons between humans and other species reveal patterns that can serve to guide management toward true sustainability, that is, ways that are empirically observed to work in natural systems by virtue of their emergence. It shows how this objective approach has not been possible in conventional management because sustainability is undermined by other human values. This book presents systemic management as a specialized process of pattern-based decision making that avoids the inconsistency, subjectivity, and error in current management practice. It clearly demonstrates how mimicking nature's empirical examples of sustainability can circumvent anthropocentric tendencies to overuse/misuse human values in management, and illustrates the best science for management (the science best suited for achieving sustainability) through examples of research that address specific management questions. It presents systemic management as reality-based management to replace the misdirected reductionism of conventional management with reductionism useful for directing human self-control.Less
“Systemic management” describes a holistic, objective, and universally applicable form of management, providing a framework for addressing environmental challenges such as global warming, emergent diseases, deforestation, overpopulation, the extinction crisis, pollution, overfishing, and habitat destruction. Its goals are the consistently sustainable relationships between humans and ecosystems, between humans and other species, and between humans and the biosphere. This book presents a convincing argument that these goals, and the means to achieve them, can be inferred from empirical information. It describes how comparisons between humans and other species reveal patterns that can serve to guide management toward true sustainability, that is, ways that are empirically observed to work in natural systems by virtue of their emergence. It shows how this objective approach has not been possible in conventional management because sustainability is undermined by other human values. This book presents systemic management as a specialized process of pattern-based decision making that avoids the inconsistency, subjectivity, and error in current management practice. It clearly demonstrates how mimicking nature's empirical examples of sustainability can circumvent anthropocentric tendencies to overuse/misuse human values in management, and illustrates the best science for management (the science best suited for achieving sustainability) through examples of research that address specific management questions. It presents systemic management as reality-based management to replace the misdirected reductionism of conventional management with reductionism useful for directing human self-control.
Philip Wood
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199588497
- eISBN:
- 9780191595424
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588497.003.0002
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Asian and Middle Eastern History: BCE to 500CE
This chapter examines fifth‐century ecclesiastical historians as evidence for the Christianisation of Roman politicatl ideas. These historians used heresiology as an extension of classical ...
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This chapter examines fifth‐century ecclesiastical historians as evidence for the Christianisation of Roman politicatl ideas. These historians used heresiology as an extension of classical ethnography. For them, heretics, like barbarians, were irrational and divided. These ideas changed the rules for inclusion and exclusion in the empire: now that being orthodox was equated to being Roman; ‘provincial peoples’ could claim civilised virtues, such as self‐control, that had formerly been the preserve ofan educated elite.Less
This chapter examines fifth‐century ecclesiastical historians as evidence for the Christianisation of Roman politicatl ideas. These historians used heresiology as an extension of classical ethnography. For them, heretics, like barbarians, were irrational and divided. These ideas changed the rules for inclusion and exclusion in the empire: now that being orthodox was equated to being Roman; ‘provincial peoples’ could claim civilised virtues, such as self‐control, that had formerly been the preserve ofan educated elite.
Philip Wood
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199588497
- eISBN:
- 9780191595424
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588497.003.0003
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Asian and Middle Eastern History: BCE to 500CE
This chapter discusses the hagiography of Theodoret of Cyrrhus as a specific example of the observation of self‐control amongst barbarian peoples and the ‘improvement’ of the provinces of the Roman ...
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This chapter discusses the hagiography of Theodoret of Cyrrhus as a specific example of the observation of self‐control amongst barbarian peoples and the ‘improvement’ of the provinces of the Roman world. Theodoret observes the self‐control of Syrian holy men, in spite of their barbaric behaviour, and follows earlier apologists in emphasising Christianity's barbarian origins and the unimportance of Greek. Theodoret engaged with a world where charismatic saints of the previouscentury had inspired contemporary ascetic behaviour. His hagiography is an attemptto appropriate and control the reputations of these holy men and to present himself as the perceptive guide to the dangerous frontier of Syriac‐speakers, able to exclude the heretical and praise the holy.Less
This chapter discusses the hagiography of Theodoret of Cyrrhus as a specific example of the observation of self‐control amongst barbarian peoples and the ‘improvement’ of the provinces of the Roman world. Theodoret observes the self‐control of Syrian holy men, in spite of their barbaric behaviour, and follows earlier apologists in emphasising Christianity's barbarian origins and the unimportance of Greek. Theodoret engaged with a world where charismatic saints of the previouscentury had inspired contemporary ascetic behaviour. His hagiography is an attemptto appropriate and control the reputations of these holy men and to present himself as the perceptive guide to the dangerous frontier of Syriac‐speakers, able to exclude the heretical and praise the holy.
Ran Hassin, Kevin Ochsner, and Yaacov Trope (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.001.0001
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
This book presents social, cognitive, and neuroscientific approaches to the study of self-control, connecting recent work in cognitive and social psychology with recent advances in cognitive and ...
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This book presents social, cognitive, and neuroscientific approaches to the study of self-control, connecting recent work in cognitive and social psychology with recent advances in cognitive and social neuroscience. It consists of three sections: The Social, The Mental, and The Brain. The “Mental” section is the book's anchor, examining within-individual self-control processes at all levels, from low-level attention to motivation and motivational systems. The “Social” section looks at group processes, broadly defined, and how groups and societies (attempt to) resolve conflicts between their global goals and the individual's self interest. The “Brain” section explores the brain processes that underlie self control attempts and which speak directly to mental-level processes. The book brings together multiple perspectives on self-control dilemmas from researchers in various allied disciplines in order to illustrate the depth and breadth of the research in the new field of self control.Less
This book presents social, cognitive, and neuroscientific approaches to the study of self-control, connecting recent work in cognitive and social psychology with recent advances in cognitive and social neuroscience. It consists of three sections: The Social, The Mental, and The Brain. The “Mental” section is the book's anchor, examining within-individual self-control processes at all levels, from low-level attention to motivation and motivational systems. The “Social” section looks at group processes, broadly defined, and how groups and societies (attempt to) resolve conflicts between their global goals and the individual's self interest. The “Brain” section explores the brain processes that underlie self control attempts and which speak directly to mental-level processes. The book brings together multiple perspectives on self-control dilemmas from researchers in various allied disciplines in order to illustrate the depth and breadth of the research in the new field of self control.
Matt J. Rossano
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195385816
- eISBN:
- 9780199870080
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385816.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
Chapter 8 addresses the relationship between religion and morality. It is argued that both religion and morality share a common evolutionary source: social life. Thus, while religion is certainly not ...
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Chapter 8 addresses the relationship between religion and morality. It is argued that both religion and morality share a common evolutionary source: social life. Thus, while religion is certainly not the origin of morality, it is closely related to it. Religion served as an important reinforcement mechanism for morality. In our evolutionary past, religion reinforced morality by virtue of increasing social scrutiny—creating a supernatural inhibition against norm violations. In a more modern context, religion strengthens self-control, thus increasing the likelihood that believers will practice moral self-restraint. The chapter also presents evidence that morality can be viewed as a perfectible skill and that religion provides a venue for “deliberate moral practice,” where moral skills can be elevated to their highest level. A cautionary note is included in this discussion, however. Religion’s evolutionary role in moral development has always been as a reinforcer of within-group morality, and the notion of universally applied moral values is relatively new and not always part of religion’s moral vision.Less
Chapter 8 addresses the relationship between religion and morality. It is argued that both religion and morality share a common evolutionary source: social life. Thus, while religion is certainly not the origin of morality, it is closely related to it. Religion served as an important reinforcement mechanism for morality. In our evolutionary past, religion reinforced morality by virtue of increasing social scrutiny—creating a supernatural inhibition against norm violations. In a more modern context, religion strengthens self-control, thus increasing the likelihood that believers will practice moral self-restraint. The chapter also presents evidence that morality can be viewed as a perfectible skill and that religion provides a venue for “deliberate moral practice,” where moral skills can be elevated to their highest level. A cautionary note is included in this discussion, however. Religion’s evolutionary role in moral development has always been as a reinforcer of within-group morality, and the notion of universally applied moral values is relatively new and not always part of religion’s moral vision.
ROBERT V. DODGE
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199857203
- eISBN:
- 9780199932597
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199857203.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter is concerned with tactics for controlling undesired behavior, such as overeating, smoking, excess drinking, use of recreational drugs, lack of motivation to exercise, and restrain from ...
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This chapter is concerned with tactics for controlling undesired behavior, such as overeating, smoking, excess drinking, use of recreational drugs, lack of motivation to exercise, and restrain from scratching. It is about Schelling's concept of the “divided self” and having the rational self of the present treat the untrustworthy self of the future as a different person, and the use of strategies such as commitments, threats, and promises to constrain or promote desired behavior. An addiction clinic, where patients submit an incriminating letter that will be released if they violate the terms of their residence, is discussed and illustrated with a 2 × 2 matrix. Numerous tactics one can employ in different situations are presented. An ethical/legal issue is raised for a situation wherein a person has given strict instructions to avoid whatever she says later, then subsequently gives contrary instructions over which is the real “self.” While that is not simple, many of the tactics introduced from Schelling's work offer helpful ways of controlling unwanted behavior or preventing one from behaving in a way that one will regret.Less
This chapter is concerned with tactics for controlling undesired behavior, such as overeating, smoking, excess drinking, use of recreational drugs, lack of motivation to exercise, and restrain from scratching. It is about Schelling's concept of the “divided self” and having the rational self of the present treat the untrustworthy self of the future as a different person, and the use of strategies such as commitments, threats, and promises to constrain or promote desired behavior. An addiction clinic, where patients submit an incriminating letter that will be released if they violate the terms of their residence, is discussed and illustrated with a 2 × 2 matrix. Numerous tactics one can employ in different situations are presented. An ethical/legal issue is raised for a situation wherein a person has given strict instructions to avoid whatever she says later, then subsequently gives contrary instructions over which is the real “self.” While that is not simple, many of the tactics introduced from Schelling's work offer helpful ways of controlling unwanted behavior or preventing one from behaving in a way that one will regret.
Jennifer S. Beer
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0003
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
Even rose-colored glasses cannot hide the apparent discrepancy between models of self-control and the adaptive view of positive illusions. Most models of self-control suggest that accurate ...
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Even rose-colored glasses cannot hide the apparent discrepancy between models of self-control and the adaptive view of positive illusions. Most models of self-control suggest that accurate perceptions of the relation between behavior and goals are fundamental for goal attainment. However, the adaptive view of positive illusions suggests that individuals with unrealistically positive self-perceptions are more successful at achieving goals such as satisfying personal relationships, well-being, and professional accomplishment. If people fool themselves into thinking that their behavior is consistent with their goals (e.g., “Sleeping through class will help me get a good grade because I will be well-rested on the day of the exam”) or fail to acknowledge conflict between goals (e.g., “Eating peanut butter cups is delicious and healthy because peanut butter has protein”), then how can they execute the self-control needed to adjust behavior or resolve goal conflicts? This chapter integrates these perspectives by examining the evidence for the adaptive view of positive illusions and mechanisms that underlie unrealistically positive self-perceptions. The extant research suggests that positive illusions may be advantageous for goal attainment in the short-term, particularly mood regulation, but do not promote successful self-control across time. The failure of positive illusions to promote successful self-control in a sustained manner may be explained by the shallow information processing that supports many unrealistically positive self-views. In other words, positive illusions may often reflect cognitive shortcuts that need to be corrected to serve the monitoring function described in models of self-control. The adaptive benefit of positive illusions for mood regulation suggests that this relation occurs in situations in which mood regulation is a priority or it is not too costly to sacrifice other goals at its expense.Less
Even rose-colored glasses cannot hide the apparent discrepancy between models of self-control and the adaptive view of positive illusions. Most models of self-control suggest that accurate perceptions of the relation between behavior and goals are fundamental for goal attainment. However, the adaptive view of positive illusions suggests that individuals with unrealistically positive self-perceptions are more successful at achieving goals such as satisfying personal relationships, well-being, and professional accomplishment. If people fool themselves into thinking that their behavior is consistent with their goals (e.g., “Sleeping through class will help me get a good grade because I will be well-rested on the day of the exam”) or fail to acknowledge conflict between goals (e.g., “Eating peanut butter cups is delicious and healthy because peanut butter has protein”), then how can they execute the self-control needed to adjust behavior or resolve goal conflicts? This chapter integrates these perspectives by examining the evidence for the adaptive view of positive illusions and mechanisms that underlie unrealistically positive self-perceptions. The extant research suggests that positive illusions may be advantageous for goal attainment in the short-term, particularly mood regulation, but do not promote successful self-control across time. The failure of positive illusions to promote successful self-control in a sustained manner may be explained by the shallow information processing that supports many unrealistically positive self-views. In other words, positive illusions may often reflect cognitive shortcuts that need to be corrected to serve the monitoring function described in models of self-control. The adaptive benefit of positive illusions for mood regulation suggests that this relation occurs in situations in which mood regulation is a priority or it is not too costly to sacrifice other goals at its expense.
Jessica R. Cohen and Matthew D. Lieberman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0008
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
People regularly exert control over impulsive thoughts and behaviors in order to make appropriate decisions and take appropriate actions even when they are more difficult or less pleasant than ...
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People regularly exert control over impulsive thoughts and behaviors in order to make appropriate decisions and take appropriate actions even when they are more difficult or less pleasant than alternative choices. A common theme in mental illnesses characterized by impulsivity, such as ADHD and substance abuse, is an impaired self-control mechanism. Therefore, understanding the mechanisms underlying an intact control mechanism can not only shed light on how healthy people exert self-control over their thoughts and behaviors, but help us to understand what is impaired in patient populations as well. The right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) is a region in the brain that is commonly activated when people are exerting many different forms of self-control. It is noted that other prefrontal regions also consistently activated when one exerts self-control, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex, may be recruited for other task demands and not self-control specifically. Although the right VLPFC has been linked to other functions as well, this review will focus on the hypothesized general role that it plays during acts of self-control. There are infinite manners in which one can exert self-control. We limit our discussion to six forms of conscious, explicit control that are commonly addressed in the literature: motor response inhibition, suppressing risky behavior, delaying gratification, regulating emotion, memory inhibition, and thought suppression. First, we review the literature exploring the involvement of the right VLPFC in each type of self-control separately. Next, we explore the small amount of literature comparing different forms of self-control to each other and discuss the possibility that these forms of self-control are related constructs. We also discuss the anatomical positioning of the right VLPFC and point out that it is well suited to serving a key role in exerting self-control. Finally, we conclude that although more direct research must be conducted before firm conclusions can be made, there is evidence that the right VLPFC is utilized when exerting self-control regardless of the specific domain of control.Less
People regularly exert control over impulsive thoughts and behaviors in order to make appropriate decisions and take appropriate actions even when they are more difficult or less pleasant than alternative choices. A common theme in mental illnesses characterized by impulsivity, such as ADHD and substance abuse, is an impaired self-control mechanism. Therefore, understanding the mechanisms underlying an intact control mechanism can not only shed light on how healthy people exert self-control over their thoughts and behaviors, but help us to understand what is impaired in patient populations as well. The right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) is a region in the brain that is commonly activated when people are exerting many different forms of self-control. It is noted that other prefrontal regions also consistently activated when one exerts self-control, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex, may be recruited for other task demands and not self-control specifically. Although the right VLPFC has been linked to other functions as well, this review will focus on the hypothesized general role that it plays during acts of self-control. There are infinite manners in which one can exert self-control. We limit our discussion to six forms of conscious, explicit control that are commonly addressed in the literature: motor response inhibition, suppressing risky behavior, delaying gratification, regulating emotion, memory inhibition, and thought suppression. First, we review the literature exploring the involvement of the right VLPFC in each type of self-control separately. Next, we explore the small amount of literature comparing different forms of self-control to each other and discuss the possibility that these forms of self-control are related constructs. We also discuss the anatomical positioning of the right VLPFC and point out that it is well suited to serving a key role in exerting self-control. Finally, we conclude that although more direct research must be conducted before firm conclusions can be made, there is evidence that the right VLPFC is utilized when exerting self-control regardless of the specific domain of control.
James M. Broadway, Thomas S. Redick, and Randall W. Engle
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391381
- eISBN:
- 9780199776894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology
Self-control is defined in relation to current goals of an organism. Working memory capacity (WMC) is defined as a cognitive system for maintaining access to goal representations as needed. ...
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Self-control is defined in relation to current goals of an organism. Working memory capacity (WMC) is defined as a cognitive system for maintaining access to goal representations as needed. Self-control depends on cognitive control, which depends in large part on WMC. We discuss the proposal that WMC reflects the abilities to control attention and to control retrieval from long-term memory. From within this dual-component framework (Unsworth & Engle, 2007) we discuss research that has examined relations between WMC and some types of mental self-control failure like over-general autobiographical memories, intrusive thoughts, and mind-wandering. We also discuss research examining the relation between WMC and delay discounting, a popular experimental paradigm for assessing self-control (Rachlin, 2000). Evidence suggests that for some of these phenomena, WMC is a more primary factor than the associated clinical disorders. In other cases, WMC appears to be secondary to other factors such as intelligence. Across these mixed findings at least two generalities can be derived. The positive findings demonstrate that individual differences in WMC can be a confounding “third variable” for a proposed relation between, for example, depression and over-general autobiographical memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007). On the other hand, the negative findings illustrate that individual differences in WMC can obscure more primary influences in a situation like delay discounting (Shamosh et al., 2008). In either case it would be advisable for researchers to measure WMC as a participant factor, if only to control a major source of interindividual variability in their data. Overall, we hold to our position that WMC is critically important for maintaining good self-control in support of a wide variety of goals.Less
Self-control is defined in relation to current goals of an organism. Working memory capacity (WMC) is defined as a cognitive system for maintaining access to goal representations as needed. Self-control depends on cognitive control, which depends in large part on WMC. We discuss the proposal that WMC reflects the abilities to control attention and to control retrieval from long-term memory. From within this dual-component framework (Unsworth & Engle, 2007) we discuss research that has examined relations between WMC and some types of mental self-control failure like over-general autobiographical memories, intrusive thoughts, and mind-wandering. We also discuss research examining the relation between WMC and delay discounting, a popular experimental paradigm for assessing self-control (Rachlin, 2000). Evidence suggests that for some of these phenomena, WMC is a more primary factor than the associated clinical disorders. In other cases, WMC appears to be secondary to other factors such as intelligence. Across these mixed findings at least two generalities can be derived. The positive findings demonstrate that individual differences in WMC can be a confounding “third variable” for a proposed relation between, for example, depression and over-general autobiographical memories (Dalgleish et al., 2007). On the other hand, the negative findings illustrate that individual differences in WMC can obscure more primary influences in a situation like delay discounting (Shamosh et al., 2008). In either case it would be advisable for researchers to measure WMC as a participant factor, if only to control a major source of interindividual variability in their data. Overall, we hold to our position that WMC is critically important for maintaining good self-control in support of a wide variety of goals.
