Katherine Withy
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780192859846
- eISBN:
- 9780191953163
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192859846.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Sections 11 through 17 begin to identify phenomena of lēthē, kruptesthai, and kruptein at Wrathall’s third plank. These are phenomena of concealing and concealment involved in the unconcealing of ...
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Sections 11 through 17 begin to identify phenomena of lēthē, kruptesthai, and kruptein at Wrathall’s third plank. These are phenomena of concealing and concealment involved in the unconcealing of entities as such and as a whole—which Heidegger calls being, phusis, or worlding, and which is correlated with Dasein’s disclosing. How this unconcealing relates to and is distinct from that at the second-plank (the discovering/being of entities) is discussed, as are various ways of addressing third-plank unconcealing that we find across Heidegger’s works. Phenomena of lēthē, kruptesthai, and kruptein at this plank include the nothing revealed in the mood of angst and in the animal’s world-poverty, un-truth, the mystery and falling in Heidegger’s ‘On the Essence of Truth’, the backgrounding of being when entities are discovered, and being’s lack of ‘why’ or ground. With regard to Dasein’s disclosing, both the concealing of the ‘whence’ of thrownness and inauthentic disclosing are considered.Less
Sections 11 through 17 begin to identify phenomena of lēthē, kruptesthai, and kruptein at Wrathall’s third plank. These are phenomena of concealing and concealment involved in the unconcealing of entities as such and as a whole—which Heidegger calls being, phusis, or worlding, and which is correlated with Dasein’s disclosing. How this unconcealing relates to and is distinct from that at the second-plank (the discovering/being of entities) is discussed, as are various ways of addressing third-plank unconcealing that we find across Heidegger’s works. Phenomena of lēthē, kruptesthai, and kruptein at this plank include the nothing revealed in the mood of angst and in the animal’s world-poverty, un-truth, the mystery and falling in Heidegger’s ‘On the Essence of Truth’, the backgrounding of being when entities are discovered, and being’s lack of ‘why’ or ground. With regard to Dasein’s disclosing, both the concealing of the ‘whence’ of thrownness and inauthentic disclosing are considered.
Katherine Withy
- Published in print:
- 2022
- Published Online:
- May 2022
- ISBN:
- 9780192859846
- eISBN:
- 9780191953163
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192859846.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Sections 18 through 20 consider potential counter-examples to the claim that being and disclosing are self-grounding in a way that amounts to lacking a ground. They consider claims that being and/or ...
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Sections 18 through 20 consider potential counter-examples to the claim that being and disclosing are self-grounding in a way that amounts to lacking a ground. They consider claims that being and/or disclosing are in fact grounded in temporality, das Ereignis, or what Wrathall calls ‘the clearing’. Temporality and Ereignis are shown to reinforce the claim of self-grounding rather than to stand as counter-examples to it. Wrathall’s clearing is shown not to be a genuine phenomenon of unconcealment, and the fourth plank of unconcealment that he posits for it is shown to house a purported condition of possibility that is not inconsistent with the self-grounding of being and Dasein.Less
Sections 18 through 20 consider potential counter-examples to the claim that being and disclosing are self-grounding in a way that amounts to lacking a ground. They consider claims that being and/or disclosing are in fact grounded in temporality, das Ereignis, or what Wrathall calls ‘the clearing’. Temporality and Ereignis are shown to reinforce the claim of self-grounding rather than to stand as counter-examples to it. Wrathall’s clearing is shown not to be a genuine phenomenon of unconcealment, and the fourth plank of unconcealment that he posits for it is shown to house a purported condition of possibility that is not inconsistent with the self-grounding of being and Dasein.
Jan Westerhoff
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- June 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198847915
- eISBN:
- 9780191882548
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198847915.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main ...
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The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main thesis defended is that we have good reason to deny the existence of such a world. The discussion is concerned with four main facets of assuming a real world: (a) the existence of an external world of physical objects in space and time; (b) the existence of an internal world, comprising various mental states congregated around a self; (c) the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world; and (d) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. I argue specifically that: (a) we should reject the postulation of an external world behind our representations; (b) the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and there is no substantial self acting as central unifier of our mental lives; (c) there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence; and (d) ontology, and philosophy more generally, must not be conceived of as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.Less
The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main thesis defended is that we have good reason to deny the existence of such a world. The discussion is concerned with four main facets of assuming a real world: (a) the existence of an external world of physical objects in space and time; (b) the existence of an internal world, comprising various mental states congregated around a self; (c) the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world; and (d) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. I argue specifically that: (a) we should reject the postulation of an external world behind our representations; (b) the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and there is no substantial self acting as central unifier of our mental lives; (c) there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence; and (d) ontology, and philosophy more generally, must not be conceived of as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.
Richard Velkley
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780198812814
- eISBN:
- 9780191850608
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198812814.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (Freiheitsschrift) is a reflection on the essence of the personal and its intrinsic connection to the possibility of ...
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Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (Freiheitsschrift) is a reflection on the essence of the personal and its intrinsic connection to the possibility of philosophy, with which it establishes “the first clear concept of personality”. In accord with the idea of personality the essay stresses the dialogic mode of inquiry which it opposes to the will to system. The latter, as the will to an absolute ground independent of the personal, reveals itself as unable to account for the dialogic movement of thought that is without end, as thinking never fully captures itself in concepts. This reflection frames the essay’s account of God or the One, whose original self-diremption as a personal being (whereby it grounds evil) assures the permanence of dialogic philosophizing.Less
Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (Freiheitsschrift) is a reflection on the essence of the personal and its intrinsic connection to the possibility of philosophy, with which it establishes “the first clear concept of personality”. In accord with the idea of personality the essay stresses the dialogic mode of inquiry which it opposes to the will to system. The latter, as the will to an absolute ground independent of the personal, reveals itself as unable to account for the dialogic movement of thought that is without end, as thinking never fully captures itself in concepts. This reflection frames the essay’s account of God or the One, whose original self-diremption as a personal being (whereby it grounds evil) assures the permanence of dialogic philosophizing.
