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This chapter challenges the dominant view that public bodies are unaccountable, and instead seeks to cultivate a more sophisticated frame of analysis which is aware of and sympathetic to different forms and gradations of accountability as well as different forms of scrutiny.

The means of parliamentary scrutiny are not as in the past mainly financial and exercised on the floor of the Commons. The twenty Opposition days are for political scrutiny. Estimates days, based on select committee reports, are a mixture of political, administrative, and financial scrutiny. These committees are the House's most effective scrutiny organ. Question‐time incorporates all aspects of scrutiny, though its effectiveness is limited by the small proportion of Questions receiving an oral answer. Congressional scrutiny of the Executive, judicial, and other activities is conducted in partisan authorization, appropriations and investigative committees and subcommittees, all with House‐ or Senate‐adopted investigative budgets, pursuant to law and internal rules. There is no Question‐time at the plenary level and all witnesses appear voluntarily or may be subpoenaed under rules balancing their constitutional rights with the need to gather and disclose information as the basis for legislation.

This chapter explores the political and theatrical context of the 1960s to establish why and how — after so many failed attempts — theatre censorship was finally abolished with the passing of the 1968 Theatres Act. It demonstrates that this was only made possible by the simultaneous efforts of playwrights (notably John Osborne and Edward Bond), directors, critics, and Members of both Houses of Parliament. The combined efforts of these different groups persuaded the government of Harold Wilson to establish in 1966 a Joint Select Committee to investigate theatre censorship. The chapter then shows how, despite growing opposition from Wilson, the committed support of the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins ensured that the unanimous recommendations of the Joint Select Committee were implemented in new legislation. The attempts by the Queen, Wilson, and the Lord Chamberlain (Lord Cobbold) to oppose the complete abolition of theatre censorship are documented. Possible reasons for the anxieties of the Royal Household are suggested.

This chapter shows how playwrights at the beginning of the 20th century (notably G. B. Shaw and Harley Granville Barker) led the first serious challenge to the system of statutory theatre censorship. It also shows how they were supported by Robert Harcourt MP, whose parliamentary interventions persuaded the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, to establish in 1909 a Joint Select Committee to investigate theatre censorship. The chapter then demonstrates how the constitutional battle between Lords and Commons, ignited by David Lloyd George's People's Budget in 1909, had the effect of pushing to the sidelines reform of theatre censorship. Material from the Royal Archives reveals that Edward VII adamantly refused to countenance the abolition of theatre censorship. This was a significant factor in the Asquith Government's decision to ignore the recommendations of the 1909 Joint Select Committee to replace, with a voluntary system, the theatre censorship provisions of the 1843 Theatres Act.

This chapter provides an account of the historical and theatrical context of the 1730s, emphasizing in particular Henry Fielding's satirical attacks on Walpole and George II. It explains why statutory theatre censorship was introduced in 1737 and why Walpole chose the particular form of statutory control specified in the Licensing Act. After a detailed exposition of the censorship and theatre licensing provisions in the Act, the chapter moves on to explore why no attempt was made to abolish statutory theatre censorship during the 19th century even though three parliamentary Select Committees made some reference to the topic in 1832, 1866, and 1892. In addition, the chapter gives an overview of the political context in which reform of theatre licensing in London was first discussed in 1832 and subsequently implemented in the 1843 Theatres Act. This Act confirmed the censorship powers given to the Lord Chamberlain and was to provide the statutory framework for the exercise of theatre censorship until 1968.

Norton (2000) outlined three conditions that must be met before effective parliamentary reform may proceed. The first necessary condition is a window of opportunity in which reform can take place. Second, there has to be a coherent reform agenda in place that provides a package behind which MPs might organise. Third, leadership must exist to exploit the window of opportunity and promote the reform agenda. In the summer of 1998, Charter 88 complained of the ‘disappointingly slow’ pace of reform and the ‘extremely cautious’ nature of the Modernisation Committee's recommendations. The Liaison Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Terence Higgins, used its 1997 report on the work of the select committees as an opportunity to explore the issues in greater depth. This chapter examines effectiveness in the House of Commons since 1997, focusing on various reports prepared by the Liaison Committee, the Commission to Strengthen Parliament, and the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny. It also discusses the support of the Labour Party led by Robin Cook to institute reforms in the House of Commons.

The relationship between the executive and legislature at the national level remains heavily weighted in favour of the government but a far more balanced relationship is observable at the sub‐national level.

Successive governments have been able to use their dominant position inside the House of Commons to implement effectiveness reforms, defined as those which seek to rebalance executive-legislative relations. This chapter examines some of the reforms implemented in the years prior to 1997, suggested for and implemented in the House of Commons to enhance its effectiveness. While effectiveness reforms in the early part of the century tended to suggest particularly radical solutions to the ‘problem of parliament’, such as electoral reform and devolution, that tendency was largely replaced in the post-war era by a desire to enhance effectiveness by promoting internal reform of the House of Commons itself. The chapter also considers the creation of investigative committees in the House of Commons, the decline of parliament, the establishment of Commons committees during 1961–1997, the Procedure Committee report of 1965 on parliamentary reform and how to improve the effectiveness of the Commons, the reforms initiated by Richard Crossman, and the introduction of select committees.

When the new Parliamentary session started in February 1816, Lord Elgin put forward his Petition as he requested that the House of Commons should be able to appoint a Select Committee to look into the circumstances of how he was able to acquire the much discussed collection, and determine whether it be advisable or not to sell the collection to the government. Although the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that the move be accepted, many were not inclined to accept the proposal without reservation. After discussing several points, the petition was accepted and the Select Committee was appointed. This chapter investigates the witnesses, their arguments, and how the marbles were then advised to be sold.

This chapter explores the various means by which specialist select committees in both the House of Commons and House of Lords interact with and influence government legislation. The development of select committees is widely seen as important at Westminster, having encouraged greater expertise and specialization among members, and cross-party work. Yet the select committees have only a limited formal role in the legislative process, because the ‘committee stage’ occurs elsewhere. Nonetheless, this chapter shows extensive select committee influence on the 12 case study bills. The committees can be important to setting the policy agenda, informing members, influencing debate, encouraging amendments, and—potentially—supporting the government. This particularly applies to the constitutional committees in the House of Lords, and select committees conducting pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills. However, other committees can also be important, as demonstrated by the Commons Health Committee’s intervention over the smoking ban in the Health Bill (2005–06).

This chapter synthesises the conceptual wisdom and empirical findings of existing research into the UK Parliament with the theoretical foundations of psychological studies to offer an integrated model for parliamentary political behaviour (IMPPB). The IMPPB unites research on ideology, party socialisation and institutional choice to offer a new blueprint for analysing politicians’ parliamentary behaviours. Data on MPs' basic values are then coupled with Hansard records to assess to extent of MPs’ political agency in a range of contexts of varying institutional constraint. The results show, in particular, that (a) elected representatives make important decisions based upon their own personality characteristics and that (b) this effect operates in flux with informal pressures exerted by external role alters and internal party structures. Preliminary analyses are used to set a new agenda for studies of parliamentary behaviour.

This chapter can be regarded as the continuation of the preceding chapter; in this section, the author extends his views in the field of systematics in a detailed way. The chapter explores the role of ICTs in systematics as a case study through the analysis of high-profile and public commentary. Politicization issues, the relationship between material and virtual cultures, and the historical specificity of systematics are briefly covered in the next parts of the chapter. The chapter also investigates the role of new and existing digital computer technologies and the Select Committee Report in the field of systematics. The data for this case study, drawn from the 2002 policy report, was produced by the United Kingdom's House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. The conclusion of the chapter explains that further exploration is needed on the study results.

Considered over the years since 1776, the progressive tightening of government control over the UK Parliament may be relaxing somewhat. Select committees in particular have led the way in the recovery of parliamentary authority. At the same time, courts, both domestic and European, are challenging the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. The principles of separation of powers and of federalism embodied in the US Constitution were initially reactions to British monarchical supremacy during the period of colonial rule. Consistent with that basic document, limitations imposed upon each of the branches of the Federal government, the retention of some power to the States or to the people, as well as internal separation of some House and Senate legislative and also quasi‐executive and quasi‐judicial functions have all evolved over 221 years. Internally, the diminution of procedural fairness, deliberative capacity, and transparency has been demonstrated in both Houses.

In this chapter, collective responsibility is first discussed by illustrating the three traditional branches of the collective responsibility convention: the confidence rule, the unanimity rule, and the confidentiality rule. In exploring individual ministerial responsibility, the author recalls some of the well-known cases of non-resignations by Ministers when matters of one sort or another have gone wrong. Further, this chapter also examines the civil service responsibility of Ministers by discussing the Sachsenhausen case and the role of the Select Committee. Two forms of accountability of Ministers are also discussed in this chapter.