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This chapter focuses on a number of contexts where the policy-abundant indeterminate notions are included in treaties with the effect of impacting the rights and duties of States. These contexts relate to indeterminate margin of appreciation policy notions under the European Convention on Human Rights and the WTO law, ‘self-judging’ clauses of treaty termination under trade, investment and disarmament treaties, and the concept of the threat to the peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter. The principal findings of the chapter relate to the ways of eliminating subjective judgment in interpretation, and to the criteria of locating the observable elements of indeterminate ‘political’ notions included in treaties. The role of judicial review is also addressed to help interpreting indeterminate notions.

Chapter Four examines the consequences of identifying both more or less security threats, and also specific security threats such as from immigration, for political attitudes and behaviours. Using the survey data, it looks at the effects of the breadth of global, national, community and individual threats identified, and then with respect to specific security threats individuals identify from terrorism, immigration, the economy and the environment, on voting behaviour, attitudes towards immigrants and minorities, and policy preferences. Among the findings are that voting is unique in that only global and national considerations appear influential—thus the fact that it is often the focus of studies of, for example, economic threat is misleading. The Chapter also demonstrates and explains differences in the effects of threats such as terrorism and immigration from the economy and the environment.

This chapter begins with an overview of the policy of Maritime Domain Awareness as applied in different states. From this basis, legal rules relating to intelligence gathering in different maritime zones are examined in the second part. The third part of the chapter looks at some specific initiatives under international law designed to enhance a state's knowledge about who is operating and what is happening at sea. Seafarers identification and the Long Range Identification and Tracking Regulation of the IMO are considered in this regard. The fourth part considers how information sharing has featured in various law enforcement efforts in response to maritime security threats. These analyses show that while an inclusive interest in improving information collection and sharing has prompted a range of legal initiatives, there is still a greater accommodation of exclusive interests and this emphasis has hampered the full effectiveness of these developments.

Chapter Five takes as its starting point the various ways in which elite responses to security threats such as the National Security Strategy both summarise government perceptions of the most salient threats and are also intended to send messages to the public and shape their behaviour. It examines three dimensions of the relationship between elite and non-elite perceptions and experiences of security threat politics: 1) the extent to which the British public is aware of the NSS or of other government messages and efforts to mitigate security concerns; 2) whether such awareness is associated with heightened or reduced levels of threat perception; and 3) what citizens think of such messages. The various stories people tell – of economic insecurities, fear of crime, and Islamophobia – problematise the narrow and homogenising imperatives of the National Security Strategies, and open up alternative narratives about identity, border-production, and multiple overlapping (in)securities. Awareness of any government security programme and of the NSS is low, about 10 per cent of the survey sample for each, with surprisingly little overlap between the two. Awareness of government strategies for security is also associated with perceptions of more threats.

Chapter Two outlines the 2012 study ‘Public Perceptions of Threat in Britain’ designed in order to address the gaps in the literature identified in Chapter One, along with the approach to analysis of the data. The study combined representative macro-level insights into public opinion with non-representative micro-level thick descriptive accounts of individuals’ everyday stories, experiences, and (de)constructions. The chapter sets out how an initial tranche of ten mini-focus groups, or ‘triads’, of three people, was conducted to explore questions such as how participants conceptualise ‘security’ and ‘security threat’ and whether they agree or disagree with and/or are affected by a range of government messages about security. Observations of the mini-focus groups and analysis of the transcripts were used to reflexively inform the development of an online survey that was administered to 2004 respondents in June 2012. The chapter outlines the questions asked, and why. A second wave of ten mini-focus groups was then conducted in September 2012, which concentrated on more specific areas of concern in the light of the first two stages of research. The last part of the chapter discusses the approach to analysis.

This chapter explores the link between security assurances and nuclear decision-making in Iran. The provision of security assurances has fairly played in Iranian affairs, while pride, anti-imperialism, and domestic discontent have often affected Tehran's behavior, including its nuclear policy. It is also noted that assurances might be more efficient as an instrument for influencing political factors rather than for addressing security threats. The threat environment that confronted the Shah is discussed. The case for assurance appeared to be firmer for the revolutionary period, where the absence of a security assurance is linked with the presence of nuclear activity, but the association is not as robust as it might be. Security assurances have been hardly presented to the Islamic Republic, but it is also not clear how efficient stronger assurances could have been.

This chapter assesses China's national security environment as seen through the eyes of People's Liberation Army (PLA) analysts. While foreign specialists on Chinese security would observe that China's security has never been better, at least in the fifty years since the Communist Party came to power, PLA analysts do not necessarily see it that way. Evidence suggests that Chinese military analysts believe they live in a dangerous world, with many uncertainties and potential challenges to China's sovereignty and security. The principal threat they identify comes from the United States, while the principal challenge arises from Taiwan. These twin problems are fused together in the PLA mindset, but it is most likely that they would continue to view the United States as a threat to national security irrespective of American support for Taiwan. The chapter details PLA analyses of the nature of the U.S. threat, which is seen as both global in nature and specific to China's peripheral security. It also brings to light previously opaque PLA assessments of the military dimension of the Taiwan problem—assessing Taiwan's defenses and possible strategies for the use of force against the island. The chapter also considers five scenarios in which a war might evolve should conflict erupt. Aside from the United States and Taiwan, PLA analysts also view Japan and India as potential threats to China's security and national interests.

This chapter discusses the major conclusions of the text. By returning to the three lenses offered by Goodsell, it is revealed that the security threats introduced in 2001 led to substantial changes in the core structures and operations of Congress. These changes expressed the particular value structure and priorities of the governing majority, impacted the way the Hill conducts its daily operations, and symbolized a marked movement from an open and accessible Capitol Hill atmosphere to a new security-sensitive atmosphere.

This chapter considers a variety of methods of treating Germany. The main objective of the United Nations in the treatment of Germany is to prevent it from ever again becoming a threat to the security of the world. The problem of securing this objective could be approached through destruction of Germany's industrial potential, destruction of Germany as a political entity, and removal from German society of the causes of aggression. The chapter shows that the first two solutions should be deferred until it is clear that the third alternative proves unworkable. In order to eliminate the causes of aggressiveness in German society, temporary and long-term disabilities should be imposed upon Germany. The chapter also examines the causes of German aggression, the United States' policy toward Germany, short-term measures during the period of military government, conditional measures during the probationary period, and permanent impositions upon Germany.

This chapter discusses and traces the impact of security threats on the project development and management of the Capitol Visitor Center. It was under construction from 2001 to 2008 and was opened to the public on December 2, 2008. The chapter examines the evolution of the policy debate that surrounded the Capitol Visitor Center and the subsequent debate over management of the massive project.

The Conclusion sums up the research, explores its implications, and draws lessons for the future for both academic and policy-making communities. The implications of the research are several, spanning government and its understandings of how the public views security threats and how the public perceives, experiences, and responds to messages about security threats, academic research in IR and Security Studies and how it conceives of public opinion and the role of the citizen in the risk management cycle; and academic research in Political Psychology and its understandings of the origins and consequences of threat perceptions.

This book explores the political and historical origins of formal property rights institutions by focusing on the case of Thailand. It examines the role of “security threats” as a cause of institutional change by conceptualizing them as elements of securitization. It argues that securitization provides a powerful explanation for the trajectory of institutional development in Thailand. More specifically, it explains how the process of securitization led to an intentional underdevelopment of property rights institutions in Thailand in response to the nineteenth-century threat of colonization and how institutional underdevelopment contributed to the dramatic improvement in property rights institutions in the country in response to the twentieth-century threat of communism. Episodes in the Thai case are compared and contrasted with experiences in Japan, Burma, and the Philippines.

This chapter examines three examples of nontraditional security problems and how individual Southeast Asian countries have attempted to address them. The chapter also looks at the role that the United States and China are playing in the region, and asks what the prospects might be for greater cooperation in coordinating policies and responses to these common threats so as to better ensure reliable access to food, mitigate the effects of climate change, and protect citizens in the region from deadly pathogens. There have been some regional attempts to create more cooperative frameworks for addressing these needs, but these efforts have not yet played a significant role in reshaping policies. One explanation for why cooperation is weak is that there is a lack of leadership within regional organizations in spurring greater action to tackle these issues. The leadership vacuum stems from countries’ domestic politics. Weak cooperation on these issues signals poor chances for regional coordination on other issues such as uniting against Chinese maritime claims around the nine-dash line, and has bearing on partnerships for the United States should the “pivot” become more than rhetoric.

This chapter takes the killing of Osama bin Laden as a test case for considering the moral and legal status of intentionally killing individuals deemed a threat to national security, under conditions in which the object of the targeted attack is offered little or no opportunity to surrender to attacking forces. The target in such operations, in short, is treated as though he were a belligerent: a person placed on a kill list may be targeted in a way that would be legitimate if he were an enemy combatant. It is argued that bin Laden was a legitimate military target, and that the decision-makers involved in his killing had thoroughly considered the range of options available to stop bin Laden from further terroristic acts, and were warranted in the decision to lean towards targeted killing in lieu of a capture operation. Thus, those who carried out the killing were within their scope of authority and responsibility for killing rather than for capturing bin Laden.

This chapter investigates the tension between national security and civil liberties through a distinctive conceptual framework: what linking principle can be used to connect the targeted individual with the collective group that represents the security threat? The chapter is organized as follows. Section II explains and defends this methodology by demonstrating that no account of targeted killing — whether sounding in jus in bello or jus ad bellum — can be complete without making explicit reference to a linking principle. Section III then proceeds to catalogue five major linking principles — taken from different domains of law including the use of force, international humanitarian law, and criminal law — that could potentially serve that function: direct participation, co-belligerency, membership, control, and complicity/conspiracy. Section IV concludes with a comparative evaluation of the linking principles that exposes their strengths and weaknesses.

This concluding chapter reiterates the four major themes of the preceding chapters: (i) a need to focus on the human elements in information security; (ii) a need to recognize the emergent nature of information security threats; (iii) a need to consider the multiple simultaneous contexts of information risk; and (iv) a need for immediate improvements in corporate self-governance. In the short term, companies must put in place rigorous codes of information security conduct and exercise vigilant enforcement. In the long term, companies must learn to build cultures of information security and develop a sense of collective corporate responsibility for information security, regardless of whether regulation requires them to do so. Meaningful improvements in information security require a commitment to security as an ongoing, collaborative process.

This chapter investigates the conditions under which the four elements of the embedded negotiator approach impact the likelihood of a judgment favourable to the State. These elements include laws, political preferences, institutional norms and memories, and public concerns. Court's behavior on cases under PDA, TADA and POTA is analysed. The data presented partially affirm the hypothesis that the apex court would support the state against separatist threats but would not confuse political goals with adherence to a religious faith. The higher likelihood of pro-state rulings does not link with an anti-minority attitude of Supreme Court judges. An Indian Supreme Court judge has a complex and nuanced relationship with the law, institutional memories, politics, and public concerns. It is shown that the more cases a judge hears, the more likely he is to change his mind.