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International security is undergoing a particularly radical transformation: the New Security Dilemma (NSD). States and people are no longer most threatened by interstate wars — that is, wars between nation-states — as was the case in the “modern” state system of the 17th through 20th centuries. Violent conflict today overwhelmingly involves civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, cross-border wars, transnational terrorism, and the like. Indeed, attempts by states to provide international security through traditional state-based military modes and mechanisms are proving increasingly counterproductive in today's environment of complex economic interdependence, multiculturalism, and asymmetric power relations. At the same time, some states are increasingly prioritizing interdependent economic development, the promotion of global governance (despite its structural weaknesses), and “pooled sovereignty” rather than national sovereignty, national interests, autonomy, and the threat of defection. This chapter argues that the Traditional Security Dilemma is being subsumed in a wider and more complex NSD, in which the roles of a more pluralistic universe of social, economic, and political forces are challenging the capacity of states as such to provide security.

This chapter examines the security dilemmas involved in Arab politics. It explains that security dilemma refers to an external dynamic of arms racing and spiralling regional insecurity and suggests that Arab states face two specific security dilemmas. The analysis reveals that the traditional focus on security as limited only to external military concerns is dubious at best for the Arab states system and perhaps well beyond given the fact that there is more than one security dilemma at work.

A number of developments have combined to make the Persian Gulf’s security dilemma intractable and self-sustaining. These have been both structural—a product of the larger geostrategic environment within which the region finds itself—and derived from the policy choices of state actors both within and outside of the region. To begin with, vast geographic discrepancies between much larger, poorer states, alongside small super-rich mini-states have made the Persian Gulf region an enduring conflict zone. The very nature of the phenomenon of security dilemma, namely its self-sustaining and self-perpetuating character, has also been highly consequential. Finally, the region’s security dilemma derives from a basic lack of trust among the actors involved in the region, regardless of whether of not they form alliances over specific issues.

This chapter introduces the argument of the book, identifies the limitations of previous scholarship, describes the research design, and provides the road map for the rest of the book. The chapter discusses the main theme running through the book: transnational ideologies may present a greater and more immediate national security threat than shifts in the military balance of power. This argument has two main components. First, ideology, or ideational power, triggers threat perception and affects state policy because it can undermine domestic political stability and regime survival in another state. Second, states engage in ideational balancing in response to an ideological threat. The analytical framework for understanding strategic interaction in this realm of international politics is called an “ideational security dilemma.”

This chapter elaborates the book's main arguments. It introduces the ideational security dilemma as an analytical framework and defines ideational power, what its resources are, and how it has been employed as a tool of statecraft in the Middle East. These sections are followed by an in-depth discussion of symbols. The last part describes the components and logic of ideational balancing—the targeted regime's response to an ideational threat. Ideational balancing aims to mitigate the domestic political threat from a projected transnational political ideology. Consisting of domestic and foreign policies, ideational balancing aims to mitigate the threat of ideational power projection. States employ counterframing and resource allocation measures to undermine the credibility of the ideational threat's source and to bolster commonly held beliefs about regime legitimacy. Examining the components and logic behind these responses further illuminates the source and mechanism of this non-military, domestic symbolic threat.

Chapter 1 situates Greek and Turkish nationalism within the broader picture of conflict-ridden national majorities. It provides key definitions and typologies; it integrates theories of nationalism, social movements and ethnic conflict, aiming to demonstrate major gaps in these literatures. It argues that majority nationalism and the variations in the response of majorities cannot be adequately explained simply by history or long-standing ethnic and religious rivalries. Moreover, theories of ethnic mobilization, which focus on single factor explanations, such as group status, relative (or actual or unexpected) deprivation, fear, and repression, offer an inadequate explanation of the politics of majority nationalism. Following McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (1997:152), this chapter argues for an integrated perspective in the study of majority nationalism, noting the conditions and constraints that shape protest, the institutions and mobilizing structures that support it, and the framing processes around which action is perceived and acted out.

This chapter shows how the canonical international relations literature fails to solve the cybersecurity dilemma. The mitigations that had previously been outlined no longer work on the new problems posed by cybersecurity. The chapter examines two major works, one each by Robert Jervis and Charles Glaser. It considers how each, while valuable in the areas conventional weaponry, has key weaknesses when it comes to network intrusions. The fundamental assumptions on which they rely, such as the offense-defense balance and a sharp differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, do not work well in cybersecurity.

This concluding chapter challenges the traditional belief that diplomats should ignore the internal affairs of states in order to preserve international stability and posits that the lack of internal justice may actually increase international disorder. Regarding states as unitary rational actors—with the capacity to coerce the behavior of the other actors—misses alternative explanations for the behavior of statesmen, leads to the adoption of self-fulfilling worst-case-scenario planning, is inherently confrontational, and contributes to the likelihood of the emergence of a traditional security dilemma whereby an increase in one state’s military capabilities is automatically considered a threat to the security of its neighbors.

This chapter traces the arc of the security dilemma through time. It begins with Thucydides and, stretching through the formal articulation with John Herz, Herbert Butterfield, and Robert Jervis, and continuing through the Cold War. It makes the link to intelligence work, a connection first made by Michael Herman. In particular, it shows how the security dilemma is most potent when there is a strong linkage between intelligence collection and attack, as is the case in cyber operations. This tight linkage makes collection activity more threatening, and is more likely to lead to a response by the involved nations.

This chapter provides background on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as it unfolded in 1988-1994. Rather than a chronological narrative, the chapter tells the story of these events through the prism of four categories of explanation (structural vulnerabilities, transitional factors, leadership and culture). This situates the conflict against the backdrop of the Soviet collapse, equips the reader with basic facts, and distils the main findings of the existing literature on the conflict.

This chapter uses the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as a case study to explore the relationship between trust and verification. It argues that the acceptance of verification measures has to be considered an act of trust, since it implies the acceptance of one's vulnerability as a result of an altered perception of the trustworthiness of one's opponent. More specifically, the chapter illustrates how Gorbachev's notion of trustworthiness toward the United States changed through the influence of his inner circle, his understanding of the dynamics of a security dilemma fed by mutual fear and mistrust, his trusting actions toward the development of a common security on an international level, and his personal relationship with Ronald Reagan.

While the last chapter showed how past mitigations to the security dilemma do not work in cybersecurity, this one goes further, showing that in some ways the cybersecurity dilemma is harder to solve than the security dilemma. It shows how security dilemma thinking rests on two main assumptions about information distribution and about a baseline status quo, neither of which holds up in cybersecurity. Remove these two assumptions, and the problem gets harder still. This chapter outlines the details of those assumptions and their specific flaws in the context of cybersecurity.

This chapter examines how enemy images are produced and reproduced in relations between two enemies. It identifies four drivers of security competition that block the development of trust. These are: (1) the security dilemma; (2) the problem of offence–defence differentiation; (3) peaceful/defensive self-images; (4) ideological fundamentalism; and (5) uncertainty about future intentions. Using examples such as the military stand-off on the Korean peninsula and the Libyan dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, the chapter shows how hard it is for face-to-face diplomacy to change enemy images. It also examines the problem of ‘future uncertainty’—the problem of what happens if successor leaders do not share the trust of their predecessors and have malign intent.

This chapter explores the nature of Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ conflict against concepts of a demographic security dilemma, an ethnic security dilemma, a dual minority complex, and then the question of the impact of resources through two lenses, the ‘greed thesis’ and the political economy of conflict. It examines Rohingya population growth data, and the tripartite nature of the ethnic security dilemma, which suggests that times of political transition can facilitate heightened fears between rival ethnic or cultural groups and make them more vulnerable to extremist narratives and recourse to violence. It explores the deep sense of existential threat experienced by all parties, and how, from a regional and social-psychological perspective, a majority group within a country or region can feel as if they are a threatened minority competing for territorial and cultural survival. The chapter then moves into a discussion about the role of the State in the conflict, often overlooked or downplayed yet vitally important. It then considers the economic aspects of the conflict, analyzing these from ‘greed thesis’ and political economy perspectives, highlighting the interplay between the pre-existing conflict and the post-transition economic dynamics in the region.

The introduction lays out the core argument of the book: that the security dilemma—the unintentional way in which states can threaten other states—applies to cyber operations. It demonstrates that cyber operations are a fundamental part of modern statecraft, and that the tools that scholars and practitioners have long used are useful in this new domain when coupled with new sources like intrusion reports. This chapter also outlines a roadmap of the rest of the book and explains the sourcing and methods, including its use of intrusion reports and documents leaked by Edward Snowden.

By examining the current state of NATO's science and environmental initiatives, this chapter also draws some conclusions about the distinctiveness of its sponsorship in the last sixty years of its existence. The chapter examines in particular how NATO's changes in the new millennium have catered to a comprehensive revision of its sponsorship strategy; partly as a result of the adoption of new strategic doctrines. The most striking consequence of these transitions is a new emphasis on using scientific patronage in the relationship with prospective members of the alliance and a reduced emphasis on the study of the natural environment.

This book has rejected a number of pessimistic scenarios for the current world order in view of liberal progress in the world rather than liberal crisis. Postmodern states are engaged in a security community, and international society's great respect for existing borders further reduces the relevance of the classical security dilemma. Although weak states are a serious problem, a “coming anarchy” with general breakdown of established states is not yet on the horizon. And while international terrorism is a formidable challenge, it is not a new, existential menace. However, this book has also identified a liberal dilemma related to the core liberal concept of freedom: it involves the choice between Restraint, non-intervention, tolerance, and empathy on the one hand, and Imposition, intervention, and activist promotion of universal liberal principles on the other hand. Finally, it has explored the liberal world order in relation to weak states, free markets, international institutions, and liberal values. The book concludes with a reconsideration of prospects for a liberal world order as well as liberal principles.

Wherever there is a military establishment, there is a possibility that it will provoke the very thing that it is meant to deter. A foreign enemy might be driven to attack us not despite our armed forces, but because of them, in an act of fear-induced ‘defensive aggression’. What this tells us is that a military’s contribution to ‘national security’ is not unequivocally positive. There is a trade-off involved. States armed with militaries may be less likely to find themselves on the receiving end of ‘greedy’ or ‘opportunistic’ aggression, but they are more likely to find themselves on the receiving end of preventive aggression, motivated by feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. Thankfully, international norms against the use of preventive military force have limited the instances of defensive aggression over the last century. But today these norms are unravelling. If ‘defensive aggression’ becomes legitimized, we should expect to see more of it.