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The first chapter sets the scene by placing the analysis within the framework of debates about developments in the transatlantic security community in the post-9/11 world. It explains this book's focus on the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, and discusses the methods and data used in this study. Following an analysis of changes in the field of security since the end of the Cold War — and, as a prelude to the empirical chapters, a brief discussion of the evolving roles of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE — this chapter explains the conceptual framework used in this book. Drawing on analyses of risk-management developed in the disciplines of sociology, criminology, and political science, it argues that contemporary practices aimed at preventing and fighting terrorism can be understood as instantiations of a particular form of management of allegedly exceptional risks to modern liberal order.

The final chapter explores the ways in which the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have related to each other in their (theoretically joint) effort to prevent and combat international terrorism. Drawing on the work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, it argues that important instances of cooperation among NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have been accompanied by a dynamic of competition, as each institution has sought to secure a privileged position in the changing field of security by invoking and seeking to further enhance its symbolic and material capital. This chapter also reflects on the ways in which the activities carried out by the EU, NATO, and the OSCE have further contributed to transformations in the field of security and, more broadly, to changes in norms of governance in the Euro-Atlantic area, for instance by participating in the process of blurring the boundaries between policing/defence activities, public/private spheres, and (re)constituting categories of protector/protected. Through their practices, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE have also complicated questions about the acceptable limits of exceptional treatments of exclusion that target individuals and groups deemed as enemies of the community based on liberal-democratic values.

This chapter examines some of the key OSCE initiatives adopted in the name of combating international terrorism, showing how the organization has sought to cast itself as a relevant, in some ways, uniquely competent security institution in the context of the fight against international terrorism. In particular, the OSCE has repeatedly invoked and sought to reinforce the inclusive security logic that it embodies. This chapter examines the dynamics — and limits — of some of the main practices enacted by the organization in the name of preventing and combating terrorism. It suggests that, for all its claims to the contrary, one of the key problems currently faced by the OSCE is that its ability to act as a security community-builder via the dissemination of norms of liberal-democratic governance has been significantly weakened in recent years. Simultaneously, the organization seems to have developed a greater capacity to carry out practices aimed at excluding from the OSCE territory individuals/groups suspected of involvement in terrorism. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the normative and political problems generated by this apparent change in the mix of inclusive and exclusionary security practices enacted by the OSCE.

Over the past few years, the challenge for NATO has been to transform itself into a highly flexible and complex institution, designed to manage a plurality of complex risks, especially the risk of terrorist attacks. Although NATO remains an institution that is significantly different from the EU, in response to significant changes in the field of security, the alliance has adopted a similar approach to risk-management, combining inclusive and exclusivist security practices. This chapter examines some notable examples of such practices, ranging from efforts to expand the security community via the diffusion of liberal norms in partner states, to attempts to control and exclude terrorists from the allied territory via operations such as Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. In addition, this chapter analyses NATO's most important current mission — ISAF in Afghanistan — and argues that this, too, reveals a combination of practices of inclusion and exclusion. This chapter also shows that, as in the case of the EU, practices enacted in the name of combating terrorism have contributed to a redefinition of modes of governance in the Euro-Atlantic area, especially by blurring the boundaries between the public–private spheres.

This chapter argues that the risk of terrorist attacks by transnational groups has been systematically invoked by EU bodies to justify the launch (or expansion) of a broad set of risk-management programmes and projects that involve a combination of inclusive and exclusionary practices. To begin with, those actors seen as vulnerable to, but not yet fully corrupted by, the anti-liberal ideas promoted by terrorist organizations are to be supported, monitored, and guided by the EU in an attempt to transform them into self-disciplined, ‘responsible’ liberal actors who are worthy of inclusion in liberal relations of community. Thus, in the contemporary security environment, the EU has sought to enhance its ability to construct ‘good’ (liberal) actors, both in Europe and abroad, and in so doing also to expand the broader security community of liberal-democratic values. Those inclusive practices are accompanied by attempts at enhancing the collective ability of members of the Union to identify and exclude from their territory — or at least contain and place beyond the realm of normal politics and liberal socio-economic activities — individuals and groups with alleged links to international terrorism.

Whereas previous chapters discussed strategies employed by those who stayed in the South, this chapter tells the stories of the descendants of those who migrated north, focusing on Detroit. While far in time and space from the other examples of Black agricultural resistance discussed in this book, contemporary communities in Detroit are similarly turning to agriculture as a strategy of survival and resistance. The Detroit Black Community Food Security Network (DBCFSN) formed in 2006, setting goals of improving education, food access, and collective buying. DBCFSN is rooted in a pan-African philosophy of pride and solidarity and draws from founders’ experiences in Detroit’s Black Power era and in city government. Central to DBCFSN’s approach to community food sovereignty are antiracist and anticapitalist principles that guide cooperative efforts, political education, and organizing designed to dismantle systems of white supremacy embedded in the food system. DBCFSN’s most well-known projects – the Detroit Food Policy Council, D-Town Farm, and the Ujamaa Food Buying Club – enact the strategies of prefigurative politics, economic autonomy, and commons as praxis to build collective agency and community resilience.

In Chapter 4 and 5, the case study format developed for realism is extended to two variants within what is broadly considered “liberal” IR. Chapter 4 explores liberal IR written from a “communitarian” perspective: David Mitrany’s functionalism (with its roots in the Fabian tradition), and the more systematic work of Karl Deutsch and Emanuel Adler.

Given the dangers of war, states should carefully tailor their alliances to specific threats and constraints. We expect wide variety in security strategies and pact designs. This expectation is wrong. In any year, 75 percent of states pursue identical alliance strategies. Why do countries ignore their individuated conditions and converge on a single dominant alliance strategy? This chapter presents the book’s puzzle, describing patterns in alliance design from 1715–2003.

The previous chapter showed the limits of ‘incrementalist’ theories of trust-building when it comes to the building of trust and the accurate interpretation of signals. This chapter examines what identity-based approaches to trust can contribute to the challenge of building trust between two enemies. The chapter examines security community theory and democratic peace theory. It argues that neither of these identity-based approaches has a persuasive causal mechanism for how trust develops. There is imprecision in these theories as to the relationship between trust and identity. What unites both approaches is their neglect of interpersonal relationships and the trust that can emerge from this.

Chapter 3 develops the theoretical framework further by linking individual transnationalism to orientations towards European integration. It first discusses the dependent variables of this book, i.e. European identity and EU support. Building on Deutsch’s transactionalist theory, the chapter develops a set of hypotheses on the conditions under which individual transnationalism leads to attitude change. The core argument can be summarized as follows. First, due to the highly stratified distribution of transnational interactions across society, relatively few Europeans are actually triggered to adopt a European mindset by interacting across borders. Second, not all European interactions automatically influence orientations towards European integration: their effectiveness depends on their purpose and scope. Third, increased transnational interactions can cause negative externalities with respect to the people who are not transnationally active themselves. The chapter concludes by outlining how this argument is translated into empirical research.

This chapter examines the role of gas streetlamps in community security in American cities during the 1800s. It describes a gas lamp that served as an outpost of order in the notorious Five Points neighborhood in Manhattan in 1850. It suggests that during this period gas lamps can be considered the best policemen because they allowed the nocturnal city to be seen, understood, and safely navigated. This chapter also mentions that property and public safety were thought to be secure in the presence of gas lamps and at grave risk in their absence.