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The French Revolution revived radical enthusiasm in Ireland, notably with the establishment of the United Irishmen. The government, concerned to contain disaffection, forced through a major Catholic Relief Act. But by this time, sectarian conflict between the Protestant Orange Society and the Catholic Defenders, was rising out of control. The United Irish rebellion of 1798, ostensibly in support of a secular, democratic republicanism, degenerated in some areas into vicious sectarian warfare. The government's decision, immediately afterwards, to end Ireland's status as a separate kingdom reflected a longer term frustration with the unmanageable demands of Irish patriotism, as well as a belief that religious conflict could be satisfactorily resolved within the framework of an act of union.

This chapter aims to demystify sectarian identity by critically examining some of the key debates and false binaries that dominate discussions of ‘sectarianism’. These include several impractical dichotomies: religion and politics; unity and division; primordialism and instrumentalism; top-down and bottom-up drivers; the role of foreign powers versus local agency. The chapter demonstrates the impossibility of these binaries and their incompatibility with the inherently multidimensional nature of sectarian dynamics. Firstly, the role of religious beliefs and doctrinal differences in sectarian dynamics will be examined. It will be argued that, like inter-group relations generally, sectarian relations are animated by a broad nexus of factors that cannot be reduced to doctrinal difference. The chapter then interrogates the dichotomization of sectarian conflict and sectarian coexistence – a binary that obscures the more common reality of sectarian irrelevance. This highlights the importance of context and of having a sufficiently broad historical scope when considering sectarian dynamics. Acontextual and ahistoric accounts routinely exaggerate the relevance/irrelevance of sectarian identity. Finally, the chapter turns to the dichotomization of top-down and bottom-up drivers and the role of foreign powers versus local agency. It will be argued that circularity not dichotomization is the better way of understanding such binaries.

This chapter takes a closer look at the way in which political actors and popular discourses mobilize sectarianism as an explanation for conflict as well as justification for actions taken in the aftermath of violence, creating a sectarian narrative that appears rigid, intractable, and deeply historical. Moreover, the sectarian explanation appears to give it a sense of unending repetition. The aftermaths of three violent incidents that took place in Beirut in recent years shape the analysis: a 2009 fatal shooting in a Beirut neighborhood that was quickly forgotten; a larger street clash in Beirut in 2010 that was perceived as a harbinger of political instability; and a fight in 2011 in Bourj Hammoud that launched a large-scale eviction of Kurdish and Syrian migrant workers. This final example is explored in the most ethnographic detail and reveals just how a wholly new kind of “sectarian conflict” (between Armenians and Syrian-Kurds) emerges as an explanation in the aftermath of a violent incident.

In the 1925 Northern Ireland general election, three Labour party candidates and four independent unionists were returned for constituencies in the east of the province. This suggested that, outside border areas, voters could look beyond constitutional and religious issues. A further encouraging feature of the poll for the northern government was the relative failure of the Sinn Féin party. During the years that followed, however, no new spirit arose. North-South relations were characterised by a pervasive cold war. Internally, Northern Ireland became the most economically disadvantaged region in the United Kingdom and it remained the most politically divided. Moreover, the economic and political context in the late 1920s and 1930s was not conducive to increased tolerance and mutual understanding. Persistent recession not only accentuated sectarian conflict, it lessened the government's chance of winning over a section at least of the nationalist community.

A basic feature of the universal human condition is the need to find commonality with others and form larger associations at the individual, group, and community level. This is at the heart of the concept of identity. A variety of factors ranging from physical attributes, language, and culture to societal norms and structures work to promote a self-awareness and self-consciousness of sameness with a larger collective. Probably nowhere else in the world is group identity—be it ethnic, racial, religious, sectarian or communal—so closely associated with persistent, and even genocidal, violence than in Africa. This makes identity conflict a primary threat to peace and security on the continent.

The situation in Lebanon shared many features with that in Syria. Education and language were symbolic pillars of political power and collective identity in both countries. That said, there were marked differences between the educational systems in Syria and Lebanon. In spite of the occasional threat of violence, schools in Lebanon did not become targets for popular aggression as they did in Syria. Struggles over education were confined to the political sphere where the debates were sometimes intense. The actual practice of politics was dominated by intra-sectarian conflict in which Christians and Muslims formed cross-confessional allegiances to further their interests within their own communities. The discussion also considers how educational provision affected the network of relationships between the French government, the French missionaries, the Maronite Patriarchy, and the Maqāsid Islamic Charitable Association.

This chapter highlights the violent clashes that mostly happened during Muharram when the Shias perform mourning rituals or azadari in public and take out huge processions. Since the mid-1980s, parties and violent groups, often sponsored by Islamic states, have emerged with a narrow sectarian agenda. The chapter discusses how the level and intensity of violence has tremendously increased in Afganistan and Kashmir due to the availability of weapons and easy access to training facilities. Sunnis and Shias have killed each other in the name of religion in the Punjab, in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), in Karachi, and in the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. This chapter analyzes the internal and external causes of the emergence of the sectarian conflict in Pakistan at the macro level.

Following waves of Sunni Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent, Shi’ism has spread there mainly due to the influence of Sufism and Persian culture. Since the eighteenth century regular Shia mourning processions have been an important additional factor in strengthening communal bonds and winning new converts. But the growing assertiveness and visibility of Shias has often led to enmity and even persecution from the Sunni majority. Sunni-Shia sectarian conflicts have been widespread in India since the seventeenth century, including polemical writings by religious scholars which are still being reprinted today. With the decline of the Sunni Mughal empire in the eighteenth century the principality of Awadh around Lucknow emerged as an important Shia stronghold. Later, Shias benefited from British rule, which guaranteed religious freedom for all denominations, and many members of the Shia aristocracy became staunch British allies, including influential landlords of the Punjab. In the early decades of the twentieth century Shia communal organisations emerged, centered in Lucknow, and sectarian tensions increased, culminating in the 1939 “Tabarra Agitation.”

According to conventional wisdom, states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their territories, and delegate its operation to closely held state agents such as the military and police. Yet when faced with insurgencies, states often enlist the support of paramilitary organizations or militias. The competence–control tradeoff is especially stark in these cases, as states depend on capable militias to fight insurgents, but also risk losing control over them. This chapter examines the tradeoff in light of the relationship between militia groups and the Iraqi government. To bring a semblance of security to Iraq, both the United States and the Iraqi government used paramilitary groups such as the Sons of Iraq and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Following the withdrawal of US troops, the government has become increasingly beholden to Shia militias, yet the case defies a simple, sectarian logic. This chapter examines the choice of governance strategy vis-à-vis militias in Iraq, and changes in that strategy over time, providing insights into the governor’s dilemma, counterinsurgency strategy, and state formation.