Stephen Darwall
David Copp (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195147797
- eISBN:
- 9780199785841
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195147790.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an ...
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A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, that moral agents are mutually responsible for their treatment of one another. Viewing Kant’s ethics from this second-person standpoint opens up a line of thought that promises to vindicate the Kantian idea that moral obligations are categorical imperatives.Less
A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, that moral agents are mutually responsible for their treatment of one another. Viewing Kant’s ethics from this second-person standpoint opens up a line of thought that promises to vindicate the Kantian idea that moral obligations are categorical imperatives.
Hanoch Sheinman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195377958
- eISBN:
- 9780199893836
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195377958.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their ...
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Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their own right. This book comprises fifteen chapters to the philosophical discussion of promises and agreements, and a context-providing introduction. Some of the chapters emphasize what's special or distinct about promises; others simply treat promises as a useful example of a general phenomenon they wish to illuminate. Most of the chapters focus on promises, but others discuss (or also discuss) contracts, conventions, and agreements. Most of the chapters focus on promises to another; but one chapter focuses on promises to oneself. Several chapters explore some broadly consequentialist perspective. Most chapters focus on perfectly good promises, but some chapters focus on rather problematic promises. Most of the chapters are largely ahistorical, but others are historically informed. The final section of the introduction (Chapter 1) gives an overview of the collection.Less
Promises are routinely treated as a useful philosophical laboratory for testing moral, volitional, and social phenomena. Recently, they have also come to be treated as a philosophical topic in their own right. This book comprises fifteen chapters to the philosophical discussion of promises and agreements, and a context-providing introduction. Some of the chapters emphasize what's special or distinct about promises; others simply treat promises as a useful example of a general phenomenon they wish to illuminate. Most of the chapters focus on promises, but others discuss (or also discuss) contracts, conventions, and agreements. Most of the chapters focus on promises to another; but one chapter focuses on promises to oneself. Several chapters explore some broadly consequentialist perspective. Most chapters focus on perfectly good promises, but some chapters focus on rather problematic promises. Most of the chapters are largely ahistorical, but others are historically informed. The final section of the introduction (Chapter 1) gives an overview of the collection.
Stephen Darwall
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- September 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780199357666
- eISBN:
- 9780199357697
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199357666.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Joshua Greene argues that science can advance ethics and that, in particular, empirical evidence tends to support characteristically consequentialist over deontological judgments, because ...
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Joshua Greene argues that science can advance ethics and that, in particular, empirical evidence tends to support characteristically consequentialist over deontological judgments, because characteristically deontological judgments are frequently tied to, and perhaps the product of, automatic emotional responses, which should lead us to have less confidence in them than in consequentialist judgments. This chapter argues that Greene’s experimental results are compatible with a certain kind of rule consequentialism, acceptance rule consequentialism, and that since the dictates of this kind of rule consequentialism are “characteristically deontological,” this means that Greene’s analysis should not lead us to have more confidence in characteristically consequentialist judgments rather than characteristically deontological judgments.Less
Joshua Greene argues that science can advance ethics and that, in particular, empirical evidence tends to support characteristically consequentialist over deontological judgments, because characteristically deontological judgments are frequently tied to, and perhaps the product of, automatic emotional responses, which should lead us to have less confidence in them than in consequentialist judgments. This chapter argues that Greene’s experimental results are compatible with a certain kind of rule consequentialism, acceptance rule consequentialism, and that since the dictates of this kind of rule consequentialism are “characteristically deontological,” this means that Greene’s analysis should not lead us to have more confidence in characteristically consequentialist judgments rather than characteristically deontological judgments.
Rowan Cruft
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- October 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198793366
- eISBN:
- 9780191884122
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198793366.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
What do we mean by rights, and can our use of the concept be justified? This book offers a partial vindication of the concept of a right, defending its use in relation to human rights while ...
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What do we mean by rights, and can our use of the concept be justified? This book offers a partial vindication of the concept of a right, defending its use in relation to human rights while questioning it in relation to property. It starts with a new ‘Addressive’ account of the nature of rights as bringing together duty-bearer and right-holder first-personally—a theory which moves beyond and complements traditional Interest and Will Theories. This Addressive account implies that a right exists pre-institutionally (as a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ right) only when a duty owes its existence predominantly to the right-holder’s good. On this basis, the book defends human rights law and practice as justifiably institutionalizing certain pre-legal moral rights held against other individuals and the state, including socio-economic rights. This defence proceeds independently of whichever conception of ‘the important human features’ (e.g. agency, capabilities, freedoms, interests, needs) one takes to underpin human rights—though it does depend on a distinction between individual and other goods. The book ends by arguing that for much property, conceiving the relevant duties in rights terms can mislead us into overlooking their foundation in the collective good. An alternative non-rights property system—broadly resembling modern markets but not conceived in terms of rights—is outlined. The result is a defence of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, while pressing new doubts about much property as an individual right.Less
What do we mean by rights, and can our use of the concept be justified? This book offers a partial vindication of the concept of a right, defending its use in relation to human rights while questioning it in relation to property. It starts with a new ‘Addressive’ account of the nature of rights as bringing together duty-bearer and right-holder first-personally—a theory which moves beyond and complements traditional Interest and Will Theories. This Addressive account implies that a right exists pre-institutionally (as a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ right) only when a duty owes its existence predominantly to the right-holder’s good. On this basis, the book defends human rights law and practice as justifiably institutionalizing certain pre-legal moral rights held against other individuals and the state, including socio-economic rights. This defence proceeds independently of whichever conception of ‘the important human features’ (e.g. agency, capabilities, freedoms, interests, needs) one takes to underpin human rights—though it does depend on a distinction between individual and other goods. The book ends by arguing that for much property, conceiving the relevant duties in rights terms can mislead us into overlooking their foundation in the collective good. An alternative non-rights property system—broadly resembling modern markets but not conceived in terms of rights—is outlined. The result is a defence of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, while pressing new doubts about much property as an individual right.
Brendan Dill and Stephen Darwall
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780198717812
- eISBN:
- 9780191787324
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
On the basis of recent work in moral philosophy (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b), this chapter hypothesizes that interpersonal accountability plays a foundational role in moral psychology. Drawing on a ...
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On the basis of recent work in moral philosophy (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b), this chapter hypothesizes that interpersonal accountability plays a foundational role in moral psychology. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, it argues that the implicit aim of the central moral motives and emotions is to hold people accountable for compliance with the demands of morality. Moral condemnation aims to hold perpetrators accountable to moral demands, and moral conscience aims to hold oneself accountable to these demands. This framework allows us to see what makes morality distinctive: its essential connection to accountability.Less
On the basis of recent work in moral philosophy (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b), this chapter hypothesizes that interpersonal accountability plays a foundational role in moral psychology. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, it argues that the implicit aim of the central moral motives and emotions is to hold people accountable for compliance with the demands of morality. Moral condemnation aims to hold perpetrators accountable to moral demands, and moral conscience aims to hold oneself accountable to these demands. This framework allows us to see what makes morality distinctive: its essential connection to accountability.
