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Narrative and the Knowledge of Persons

Eleonore Stump

in Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering

On the basis of recent research in developmental psychology and neurobiology, this chapter explains the nature of the knowledge of persons and the second-person experience that enables the knowledge ... More

On the basis of recent research in developmental psychology and neurobiology, this chapter explains the nature of the knowledge of persons and the second-person experience that enables the knowledge of persons. It examines some contemporary work on autism, joint attention, imitation, including neonatal abilities for imitation, social cognition, and other topics related to the knowledge of persons and second-personal experience. It argues for a role of narratives in communicating the knowledge of persons, and it shows the way in which this discussion can be extended into theology. It suggests that some of the central insights of Levinas and Buber had to do with the knowledge of persons and second-personal experience between God and human persons, as they understood it.Less

Morality and Practical Reason:: A Kantian Approach

Stephen Darwall

David Copp (ed.)

in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory

A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an ... More

A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, that moral agents are mutually responsible for their treatment of one another. Viewing Kant’s ethics from this second-person standpoint opens up a line of thought that promises to vindicate the Kantian idea that moral obligations are categorical imperatives.Less

Authority, Autonomy, and Second-Personal Reasons

Benjamin McMyler

in Testimony, Trust, and Authority

One might object to the interpersonal account of testimony developed thus far by arguing that there are no genuinely second-personal reasons for belief, that the relations of authority and ... More

One might object to the interpersonal account of testimony developed thus far by arguing that there are no genuinely second-personal reasons for belief, that the relations of authority and responsibility between persons appealed to by this account of testimonial belief in particular and trust-based belief more generally are simply the wrong kind of thing to play an irreducible role in epistemically justifying belief. Along these lines, one might accept that second-personal considerations can play a genuine role in practical rationality but deny that such relations play an analogous role in theoretical rationality. This chapter argues that there is just as much reason to think that second-personal considerations play an irreducible role in theoretical rationality as there is to think that they play an irreducible role in practical rationality. The rational significance of the second-person thus spans whatever divide there may be between theoretical and practical reason.Less

Trusting A Person

Benjamin McMyler

in Testimony, Trust, and Authority

One might object to the interpersonal account of the epistemology of testimony developed in chapters 2 and 3 by arguing that relations of interpersonal trust are a matter for ethics, not ... More

One might object to the interpersonal account of the epistemology of testimony developed in chapters 2 and 3 by arguing that relations of interpersonal trust are a matter for ethics, not epistemology. Indeed, theorists of trust often claim that there is an inherent tension between interpersonal trust and theoretical rationality. This chapter argues that this is not the case. Interpersonal trust can be aptly construed as a form of belief justified in virtue of the very same kind of interpersonal relations that serve to justify testimonial belief.Less

First, second, and third person inquiry

Geralyn Hynes

in Participatory Research in Palliative Care: Actions and Reflections

This chapter outlines first, second and third person in action research from different theoretical perspectives. First, second and third person inquiry bring different but complementary aspects to an ... More

This chapter outlines first, second and third person in action research from different theoretical perspectives. First, second and third person inquiry bring different but complementary aspects to an action research project that facilitate both knowledge generation and change. First person inquiry provides an important basis for inquiring into one's own engagement with the value-laden and political nature of action research. Second person inquiry focuses on inquiry with others while third person inquiry looks to dissemination of findings to a wider audience. In palliative care, the nature of engagement, participation and second person inquiry present particular challenges for action researchers. However, engaging with these challenges will help address important impediments to developing palliative care practice. Attending to third person inquiry is crucial for strengthening the potential of practice-based research to influence policy.Less

Three Models of Epistemic Dependence

Benjamin McMyler

in Testimony, Trust, and Authority

This chapter distinguishes between three competing models for understanding the way in which, in believing something on the basis of testimony, an audience is epistemically dependent on a speaker and ... More

This chapter distinguishes between three competing models for understanding the way in which, in believing something on the basis of testimony, an audience is epistemically dependent on a speaker and her testimony. According to the Evidential Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for providing the audience with evidence; according to the Inheritance Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for expressing a belief the justification of which can be inherited; and according to the Second-Personal Model, the audience is epistemically dependent on the speaker for assuming a kind of second-personal relationship towards the audience. Chapter 2 defended a version of the Second-Personal Model. This chapter examines what is at stake between the Second-Personal Model and the Evidential and Inheritance Models.Less

The Second Person

Donald Davidson

in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays Volume 3

The author argues that language is necessarily a social phenomenon. The argument draws heavily on considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that meaning something requires understanding, and ... More

The author argues that language is necessarily a social phenomenon. The argument draws heavily on considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that meaning something requires understanding, and being understood by, a second person. Davidson denies that it is necessary for successful communication between X and Y that X speaks as Y; in substitution of this requirement, Davidson proposes a three‐way speaker–speaker–world relation he labels ‘triangulation’, which is not constituted by syntax but by common stimuli and responses.Less

Self-Monitoring

William Ickes

in Strangers in a Strange Lab: How Personality Shapes Our Initial Encounters with Others

High self-monitors are people who act like “social chameleons”: they change the way they present themselves depending upon who they are with. In contrast, low self-monitors are simply themselves: ... More

High self-monitors are people who act like “social chameleons”: they change the way they present themselves depending upon who they are with. In contrast, low self-monitors are simply themselves: they don't try to be “all things to all people.” In initial interactions, the partner who scores higher in self-monitoring tends to speak first, to initiate more conversation sequences, and to use the other person's behavior more as a guide. High self-monitors also tend to use a higher percentage of second-person (“you”) pronouns and to reciprocate their interaction partner's disclosures. High self-monitors run the risk of appearing phony, however, when they try too hard to impress an attractive, opposite-sex partner.Less

Internal Evidence for Continuity and Leveling

Ricardo Otheguy and Ana Celia Zentella

in Spanish in New York: Language Contact, Dialectal Leveling, and Structural Continuity

Variable hierarchies and constraint hierarchies are first studied in baseline reference lects in both regions. Variable hierarchies are the same in both regions and remain the same cross‐regionally ... More

Variable hierarchies and constraint hierarchies are first studied in baseline reference lects in both regions. Variable hierarchies are the same in both regions and remain the same cross‐regionally and cross‐generationally, providing evidence of continuity. A prediction about constraint hierarchies is made on the basis of dialectal leveling. Constraint hierarchies should undergo changes in ranking of constraints and in reductions of constraint range differences when the regions are compared cross‐generationally. Predictions are confirmed for most of the internal variables, but not for all. Strong evidence for dialect leveling is seen in the predicted widespread reduction of range differences and in rank changes in some variables, especially in the variable related to person‐number inflections and in the constraints related to second‐ and third‐person verbs.Less

Ideas for an Affective “Neuro-physio-phenomenology”

Giovanna Colombetti

in The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind

This chapter introduces the enactivist research program of “neurophenomenology”, and argues that it should be applied to the scientific study of emotion experience. Affective neuroscience so far has ... More

This chapter introduces the enactivist research program of “neurophenomenology”, and argues that it should be applied to the scientific study of emotion experience. Affective neuroscience so far has focused primarily on developing third-person methods for the generation of data about brain and bodily activity during emotion, but has paid relatively less attention to the possibility of developing first- and second-person methods for the generation of data about experience. Drawing on neurophenomenology, I argue that affective neuroscientists should also focus on developing first- and second-person methods, and on integrating them with already existing third-person methods. I argue further that such an integrated “affective neuro-physio-phenomenology” could help answer some longstanding questions in affective science. For example, it could help scientists understand whether emotions such as fear, anger, etc. come in different experiential varieties, which would in turn help interpret concomitant brain and bodily activity; and it could help investigate the bodily nature of emotion experience, including how experience relates to actual brain and bodily activity.Less

Knowing at Second Hand

Benjamin McMyler

in Testimony, Trust, and Authority

Both reductionists and anti-reductionists about testimony commonly describe knowledge acquired from testimony as knowledge acquired at second hand. This chapter argues that appreciating the ... More

Both reductionists and anti-reductionists about testimony commonly describe knowledge acquired from testimony as knowledge acquired at second hand. This chapter argues that appreciating the distinctive sense in which testimonial knowledge is secondhand supports anti-reductionism over reductionism but also that it supports a particular kind of anti-reductionism very different from that typically offered in the literature. Testimonial knowledge is secondhand in the demanding sense of being justified by the authority of a speaker, where this serves to parcel out epistemic responsibility for the audience's belief between speaker and audience. The epistemic credentials of testimonial knowledge are in this sense importantly interpersonal.Less

Interpersonal Self-Consciousness

Christopher Peacocke

in The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness

Interpersonal self-consciousness is a particular form of awareness that one features, in another’s consciousness, as a conscious subject. It is involved in joint action; linguistic communication; ... More

Interpersonal self-consciousness is a particular form of awareness that one features, in another’s consciousness, as a conscious subject. It is involved in joint action; linguistic communication; understanding of the second person; in the ordinary use of ‘self-conscious’; and in relationships of mutual concern. There is no irreducible second person concept. Interpersonal self-consciousness can be attained either through joint awareness, or through second order simulation. It goes beyond Neisser’s notion of intersubjectivity, and is of emotional importance to us.Less

My Pronoun, ’tis of Thee: Thou Art Lost and Gone Forever

Allan Metcalf

in The Life of Guy: Guy Fawkes, the Gunpowder Plot, and the Unlikely History of an Indispensable Word

Chapter 8 interrupts the narrative to explain the importance of the further development of “Guy” to “guy” or “guys.” It tells about the second-person personal pronouns of English from Old English ... More

Chapter 8 interrupts the narrative to explain the importance of the further development of “Guy” to “guy” or “guys.” It tells about the second-person personal pronouns of English from Old English times, a thousand years ago, to the present. These are words we regularly use in speech and writing: first-person singular “I” and plural “we,” third person “he, she, it” and “they,” and then the second person, which happens to have undergone major changes in the past few centuries. Originally the second-person singular was “thou,” the plural “you.” But then, like several other European languages, the second-person plural was seen as more polite than “thou,” so “you” became second-person singular too. That was fine, except now a listener couldn’t tell whether a speaker was referring just to the listener or to the whole group. So with “you” solidly entrenched as second-person singular, a substitute had to be found for second-person plural. One possibility was “y’all,” still preferred in the American South, but that can be used for the singular too. Eventually, while the vacancy remained empty two centuries later, a successful substitution emerged, none other than the “guys” most of use as second-person plural today.Less

Demystifying Promises

Stephen Darwall

in Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II

This chapter is concerned with philosophical puzzles about promising. The traditional problem has been to explain how it is possible to place oneself under obligation simply by expressing one's will ... More

This chapter is concerned with philosophical puzzles about promising. The traditional problem has been to explain how it is possible to place oneself under obligation simply by expressing one's will to do so. However, there is a second problem that is less discussed: How is it possible to become obligated to another person by so expressing one's will to that person. The major attempts to explain promissory obligations — consequentialist, Rawls', and Scanlon's — fail to account for this ‘directed’ or ‘bipolar’ obligation, whether or not they can explain promissory obligations period. By appreciating bipolar obligations' second-personal character and promising as a second-personal phenomenon, however, it is possible to account for promising as a species of a genus, transactions, in which parties acquire new obligations to and rights against one another through interactions that presupposes their mutual accountability and their sharing a common basic second-personal authority.Less

Guys Victorious

Allan Metcalf

in The Life of Guy: Guy Fawkes, the Gunpowder Plot, and the Unlikely History of an Indispensable Word

“You guys” or plain “guys” has now become the standard second-person plural personal pronoun used by most of us. We know that because we don’t have to stop and think about it; we just use it as the ... More

“You guys” or plain “guys” has now become the standard second-person plural personal pronoun used by most of us. We know that because we don’t have to stop and think about it; we just use it as the normal way to designate a group of people. In linguistic terms, it’s now unmarked, as it has been from the start; if it were marked, that is noticed, every time it’s used, that would be a sign that it’s not the regular plural. But it is. What about the competition? It has the advantage over “yous,” “you-uns,” and “yinz” by being less conspicuous and thus less likely to encounter objections for any reason. “You folks” and “you people” are impeccable, but they carry implications; the former is too folksy for some occasions, “you people” a little condescending for others. Without being obvious, “you guys” has a hint of friendship or camaraderie. “You guys” also has the advantage over “y’all,” in being clearly only plural, where “y’all” can be singular too. And “y’all” is strongly linked to the South, whereas “you guys” is tied to no particular region.Less

Future Guys

Allan Metcalf

in The Life of Guy: Guy Fawkes, the Gunpowder Plot, and the Unlikely History of an Indispensable Word

So “you guys” and plain “guys” have succeeded in filling the vacuum in second-person plural pronouns left by the departure of “thou.” What’s next? Four possible futures come to mind: (1) “guys” could ... More

So “you guys” and plain “guys” have succeeded in filling the vacuum in second-person plural pronouns left by the departure of “thou.” What’s next? Four possible futures come to mind: (1) “guys” could continue to extend its hegemony over other candidates for the role of addressing groups; (2) like the plural, the singular “guy” could extend refer not just to a male but to any human being; (3) “guys” could be excoriated sufficiently by those who object to its wider use, so it would retreat to meaning males only; and (4) student activists could follow the example of “guy” and “guys” and use their own names as second-person plural pronouns that everyone should use.Less

Rights’ Relation to the First and Second Person

Rowan Cruft

in Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual

Chapter 4 develops a new account of what it is to be owed a duty. There are two parts to the analysis. The first part says that it is distinctive of a duty owed to a capable party (an adult, young ... More

Chapter 4 develops a new account of what it is to be owed a duty. There are two parts to the analysis. The first part says that it is distinctive of a duty owed to a capable party (an adult, young person, corporation as opposed to, e.g. a baby or a rabbit) that that party is required to conceive the action the duty enjoins in first-personal terms as to be ‘done to me’. The second part says that it is distinctive of a duty owed to any party whatsoever (including ‘incapable’ parties such as babies or rabbits) that the duty-bearer is required to conceive the action the duty enjoins in second-personal terms as to be ‘done to an addressable party, a being conceivable as “you”’. These requirements need not be met for the duty to exist, for it to be fulfilled by its bearer, or for it to have a direction—but their obtaining as requirements is definitive of its being owed to someone. The chapter shows how this distinguishes demanding on one’s own behalf as owed a duty from demanding on behalf of another or in relation to an undirected duty.Less