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This chapter argues that a form of structural realism is motivated by reflection on issues that arise in two different domains that have been the subject of intense scrutiny during recent decades. These domains are related to: firstly, problems from the history of science about the abandonment of ontological commitments as old theories which are replaced by more empirically adequate ones; and secondly, questions arising from the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists about what really is at stake between them, and about the inadequacies of constructive empiricism. The so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic” understanding of the nature of scientific representation is suggested to fit very well with the kind of structural realism advocated in this chapter. The structure of the argument presented here is dialectical. The most serious problems for constructive empiricism are explained, and van Fraassen's empiricism is supplemented with a commitment to objective modality to respond to such problems.

This chapter makes a negative case for Kant's manifest realism by criticizing the leading contemporary version of maximal scientific realism, namely, scientific essentialism. It begins with a discussion of what is scientific essentialism. It presents four distinct ways that Kant would criticize scientific essentialism: the empirical inaccessibility of the microphysical world, why there is no necessary a posteriori, the antimony of essentialism, and the logical contingency of the laws of nature.

This chapter aims to work out the positive theory behind Kant's surprising claim that gold is necessarily a yellow metal, using scientific essentialism only as a critical foil. It discusses Kant's theory of natural kind terms and scientific realism in the manifest image. It explains Kant's Other Joke, which vindicates both natural science in general and fundamental physics in particular in a way that would similarly flummox the noumenal scientific realist.

This chapter begins with a discussion of scientific realism. It then looks at some reasons that have been given for doubting that the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by evidence really should lead us to withhold belief in the claims of the best scientific theories. It is argued that the most powerful challenge to scientific realism has yet to be formulated, but emerges naturally from a systematic consideration of the reasons that the much more famous challenges offered by the pessimistic induction, and that the underdetermination of theories by evidence have left scientific realists unconvinced of their significance.

This chapter addresses the question of whether there is any sense to be made of science without scientific realism. That is, it will try to identify whether there is any coherent positive view we might take of our successful scientific theories if we abandon the presumption that they must be approximately true descriptions of nature's innermost recesses and secret domains. A long and distinguished minority tradition has embraced a view entitled “instrumentalism,” which instead regards even our best scientific theories merely as effective tools or instruments for achieving our practical goals. It is argued that the problem of unconceived alternatives promises to breathe new life into this instrumentalist tradition: not into its discredited semantic theses, but into its positive conception of the status of scientific theories.

This chapter argues for scientific realism. Scientific realism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine about the existence and nature of the unobservables of science. There are good explanationist arguments for realism, most famously that from the success of science, provided abduction is allowed. Abduction seems to be on an equal footing, at least, with other ampliative methods of inference. One argument against realism is the argument from underdetermination. It starts from the claim that any theory faces many empirically equivalent rivals. Once we note the role of auxiliary hypotheses in testing theories, and our ability to create evidence in novel experiments, the argument collapses. Another argument against realism is the pessimistic meta-induction argument. The key defense against this is that, over recent centuries, methodological changes have greatly improved our capacity to understand the unobservable world.

This chapter begins by addressing the question: what is scientific realism? It then considers the most influential arguments for and against scientific realism. The arguments for are the ‘success argument’ and related explanationist arguments. The arguments against are the ‘underdetermination argument’, which starts from the claim that theories always have empirically equivalent rivals; and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, which starts from a bleak view of the accuracy of past scientific theories.

This chapter takes issue with the core assumption in Chapter 5 that the debate over scientific realism is primarily about what exists as opposed to how we represent what exists. It argues that a debate over scientific realism is primarily a debate over deep semantic issues – such as the plausibility of the causal theory of reference – a theory that is rejected. The chapter questions the core view that unobservables posited by a theory exist just when the theory has succeeded in giving good explanations. Rather, it often works the other way around: theories are said to give good explanations just when it is found that their posits exist.

A short historical review shows that originally, the realistic style had a legitimate place both in scientific realism and in the Realist novel. Much work was put later into establishing the difference between the two. The legitimizing efforts were directed at establishing each of them as genres in their own right.

This chapter examines and criticizes the main arguments offered for scientific realism, here identified as the following view: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. In contrast, constructive empiricism, which also opts for a literal understanding of scientific language, is the following view: Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate (but also has a pragmatic dimension, to be elucidated). Topics examined include the ’theory/observation dichotomy’, observable versus unobservable entities, epistemology and the epistemic community, inference to the best explanation, principle of the common cause, and fictionalism. The views of Smart, Sellars, Reichenbach, Putnam, and Dummett are considered. It is argued that the arguments offered for scientific realism, though telling against logical positivism, do not support it over and against constructive empiricism.

Since the Scientific Revolution, claims have been made about science and on behalf of science that include not only scientific but philosophical and theological assertions. When such a wide range of issues is included within the category of scientific knowledge, distinguishing science from a religious-like ideology becomes difficult. And when the authority of science is invoked in support of metaphysical positions, further problems arise. Thus, it is crucial to identify the salient features of distinct aspects of the scientific tradition, namely, science itself, the philosophical view known as scientific realism, the metaphysical ideology of scientific materialism, and the dogmatic form of that ideology known as scientism. According to science, empirical data always have the last word and there is no place for dogmas, sacrosanct theories, or a priori statements. Nevertheless, science has progressed together with the ideology of scientific materialism that does embody a number of sacrosanct theories and a priori statements, namely the principles of objectivism, monism, universalism, reductionism, the closure principle, and physicalism.

Scientific realists argue that science is not simply a collection of hypotheses supported by empirical test, but actually describes an underlying reality that exists outside of human observers. The world, according to this view, is “mind independent.” Critics of scientific realism contest the objectivity of knowledge and dispute this claim of mind-independence. Although Supreme Court justices would almost certainly consider themselves scientific realists, the justices operate like anti-realists when they ignore, elide, or manufacture facts in order to support their preconceived normative views of the Constitution. This chapter explores what it means to have a truly realistic constitutional jurisprudence and how it might be realized. It considers whether empirical inquiry can be sufficiently object so that the facts scientists discover should be taken seriously in constitutional adjudication. It focuses on social science, because it is the science most often presented in constitutional cases and the one most often disputed in those cases.

This chapter examines the ramifications of realism for understanding nature. It explains the concepts of three forms of realism: scientific, physical, and metaphysical. Scientific realism holds that science correctly describes the real world, physical realism suggests that the object of physics are actually real and not mere figments of speculations, and metaphysical realism maintains the existence of mind-independent natural reality. This chapter explains the shortcomings and problems of these doctrines of realism, and suggests that justification lies largely on their theoretical and practical utilities.

This chapter assesses the charge of humanism against absolutism. For the typical absolutist, they have the capacity to provide an account of the world that is both true and clean. This claim, in the humanist's view, is lacking in humility because it is one that someone could only have reason to accept if he or she were possessed of enhanced cognitive powers they in fact lack. Implicitly and illegitimately, therefore, absolutism pretends to an exalted cognitive capacity. The first section chronicles the points of both the ascending and descending absolutism. The second section explains the problems in the ‘super-spectator's position’. The third and fourth sections investigate the role of science and scientific realism. The last section explains the side of atypical absolutist. The chapter concludes that typical absolutism stands convicted of hubris, of positing cognitive capabilities that there is good reason to suppose human beings could never possess.