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G. Stanley Hall and the Child Study Movement

Alice Boardman Smuts

in Science in the Service of Children, 1893-1935

This chapter discusses a new scientific psychology, modeled on the physical sciences, which emerged in Europe in the 1860s. It first flourished in Germany, and reached America in the 1870s. It was ... More

This chapter discusses a new scientific psychology, modeled on the physical sciences, which emerged in Europe in the 1860s. It first flourished in Germany, and reached America in the 1870s. It was the product of evolutionary biology, the empirical tradition in philosophy, and experimental studies of the physiology of perception and sensation. Now called early experimental psychology, it was based in the laboratory, where researchers studied conscious reactions to touch, sights, and sounds. Since subjects had to be aware of and able to articulate their inner experience, animals, illiterate or abnormal persons, and children were excluded. Wilhelm Wundt, who founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, warned that the results of experiments on very young children were “wholly untrustworthy.” The belief that the mental life of adults can be understood only through the analysis of children's minds, Wundt declared, is an “error,” the exact opposite of the “true position.”Less

On the Couch: Sigmund Freud, Reflex Therapy, and the Beginnings of Psychoanalysis

Katja Guenther

in Localization and Its Discontents: A Genealogy of Psychoanalysis and the Neuro Disciplines

The chapter shows how Freud, working in the recesses of his apartment in Berggasse 19 in Vienna, was able to develop a new paradigm of disease and treatment that broke with central tenets of the ... More

The chapter shows how Freud, working in the recesses of his apartment in Berggasse 19 in Vienna, was able to develop a new paradigm of disease and treatment that broke with central tenets of the localization tradition. Freud radicalized the associative elements of Meynert's connectivism in order to challenge the localizationist paradigm for which previously it was a support. First in On Aphasia, Freud used elements of Meynert's own system to challenge the then dominant theory of localization. Then in later works he challenged the lesion model upon which localization theory had been based. In doing so, Freud was able to re-evaluate the etiology of mental disturbance, moving from an emphasis on physical to one on psychological trauma, and he re-cast the reflex exam as a form of “talk therapy.” Freud's mature psychoanalytic practice, this chapter argues, can then be seen as the ultimate rejection of the lesion and pathological anatomical model, because by dispensing with the “cathartic method” and focusing on working through resistances, it was no longer structured by the identification and confrontation of an underlying “trauma.”Less

Epilogue: Intensely Unsettled—Again

Christopher G. White

in Unsettled Minds: Psychology and the American Search for Spiritual Assurance, 1830–1940

This epilogue examines how scientific psychology fragmented and diversified in the twentieth century. It also looks at how this psychological fragmentation encouraged an efflorescence of new ... More

This epilogue examines how scientific psychology fragmented and diversified in the twentieth century. It also looks at how this psychological fragmentation encouraged an efflorescence of new religious ways of using psychological notions to think about the self and spiritual assurance.Less

Introduction: The Significance of the Psychological

Edward S. Reed

in Encountering the World: Toward an Ecological Psychology

This introductory chapter begins with a description of various crises faced by the science of psychology since the 19th century. It then discusses “the psychological” as a domain. It sets out the ... More

This introductory chapter begins with a description of various crises faced by the science of psychology since the 19th century. It then discusses “the psychological” as a domain. It sets out the four primary goals of the book: (i) to show that “the psychological” is part of nature and can therefore be studied ecologically; (ii) to show that both action and awareness can be studied scientifically; (iii) to show that “individual” and “social” psychology can be fit together if we recognize that many higher animals live in a populated environment and try to understand the implications of this for psychological evolution and development; and (iv) to begin to address some of the special features of human psychology—especially our evolution of language and other forms of “selected” information—and to show these as continuous with a more general psychology of the animate.Less

Introduction: A Chain of Associations

Cairns Craig

in Associationism and the Literary Imagination: From the Phantasmal Chaos

This chapter introduces associationism, which was the dominant psychological theory during the latter portion of the nineteenth century. It first studies how John Stuart Mill's bouts of depression ... More

This chapter introduces associationism, which was the dominant psychological theory during the latter portion of the nineteenth century. It first studies how John Stuart Mill's bouts of depression became symbolic of the destructive consequences of utilitarianism's conception of the human mind and of the aims and purposes of education. The chapter then looks at the development of nineteenth-century literature and the emergence of modernism and modern literary criticism during the twentieth century. It also discusses associationist and empiricist philosophy. Finally, the chapter considers the application and contribution of the association theory and associationism to the understanding of art and the development of scientific psychology.Less

Introduction

William R. Uttal

in Mind and Brain: A Critical Appraisal of Cognitive Neuroscience

This book examines the role played by brain imaging in cognitive neuroscience by exploring published studies and related literature that compare brain images to cognitive processes. It also discusses ... More

This book examines the role played by brain imaging in cognitive neuroscience by exploring published studies and related literature that compare brain images to cognitive processes. It also discusses whether brain imaging and other recording techniques have any role in providing a solution to the question of how the brain makes the mind. The book discusses two ontological postulates exerting influence on the development of the theory regarding the relationship between the mind and the brain, and emphasizes that no concrete solution to the mind–brain problem is provided by macroscopic brain imaging or any other electrical recording activity. It reports the implications of the ontological postulates for philosophy and neuroscience, and also discusses how these postulates affect the course of scientific psychology. Some conceptual and technical issues such as the attractiveness of brain images, the problem of interpreting and defining the mental process, the paucity of quantification, and indirectness as a measurement of brain activity are also discussed.Less

Trait Emotional Intelligence: Moving Forward in the Field of EI

K. V. Petrides, Adroan Furnham, and Stella Mavrveli

in The Science of Emotional Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns

This chapter suggests that two constructs of emotional intelligence (EI) should be distinguished based on the measurement method used in the operationalization process. Trait EI (or ‘trait emotional ... More

This chapter suggests that two constructs of emotional intelligence (EI) should be distinguished based on the measurement method used in the operationalization process. Trait EI (or ‘trait emotional self-efficacy‘) concerns emotion-related dispositions and self-perceptions measured via self-report, whereas ability EI (or ‘cognitive-emotional ability’) concerns emotion-related cognitive abilities that ought to be measured via maximum-performance tests. The view of them as different constructs implies that the operationalization of one does not have implications for that of the other. Still, the discussion suggests that ability EI will eventually find its place along the ever-growing number of pseudo-intelligences on the fringes of scientific psychology.Less

Concepts of mind

Euan M. Macphail

in The Evolution of Consciousness

Many of the concepts with which psychologists work have their origins in the writings of the early philosophers. This chapter traces the evolution of major themes in the philosophy of the mind before ... More

Many of the concepts with which psychologists work have their origins in the writings of the early philosophers. This chapter traces the evolution of major themes in the philosophy of the mind before scientific psychology began. Although it concentrates on accounts of the nature of the mind, one can best make sense of those accounts when given at least a sketch of their philosophical background. Therefore, this chapter includes sufficient information about the general philosophical position of each philosopher to make his account of the mind comprehensible.Less

Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax

Stephen Stich

in Collected Papers, Volume 1: Mind and Language, 1972–2010

This chapter begins with a quick overview of Fodor's account of narrow content. It provides a sketch of how Fodor proposes to construct the notion and sets out a pair of reasons for doubting that ... More

This chapter begins with a quick overview of Fodor's account of narrow content. It provides a sketch of how Fodor proposes to construct the notion and sets out a pair of reasons for doubting that Fodor's notion of narrow content will do what he wants. It then argues that the real problem with narrow content is that the taxonomy of mental states it imposes is both too coarse and too ill behaved to exploit in a serious scientific psychology. It illustrates the coarseness of a narrow content taxonomy by comparing three taxonomic schemes: the one imposed by fat syntax, the one imposed by broad content, and the one imposed by narrow content.Less

Freud and the Three Anxieties

Bettina Bergo

in Anxiety: A Philosophical History

Anxiety in Freud takes three basic forms over the course of his intellectual evolution. Initially it belies the interactions of neural energies and sexuality. From its mechanistic origins it ... More

Anxiety in Freud takes three basic forms over the course of his intellectual evolution. Initially it belies the interactions of neural energies and sexuality. From its mechanistic origins it gradually comes to denote the explicitly psychological situation of the subject caught in a conflict between its bodily drives and social norms. Finally, Freud traces the origin of angst in a surprisingly Schellingian way, with the trauma of birth. Against his brilliant colleague Otto Rank, he argues that anxiety is “there” before a mature ego has taken shape and is able to recollect its onset. Therefore anxiety in Freud precedes what we consider our subjecthood, our self or ego. As a symptom and defense response, anxiety echoes Nietzsche’s great intelligence of the Nietzschean body, and thereafter goes through a hermeneutic transformation as a sign of the human being caught between nature and culture.Less

Meeting the Problem

in The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy

This chapter discusses a question related to the problem of genesis that is motivated by the unquestionable progress of the natural and human sciences and, especially, by the advent of scientific ... More

This chapter discusses a question related to the problem of genesis that is motivated by the unquestionable progress of the natural and human sciences and, especially, by the advent of scientific psychology. The objectivity of knowledge is allowed to depend on the formal conditions of possibility that escape the living in time and every genesis and hence, the problem is then to base the incarnation and the application of formal a priori laws in the effective time of psychological subjectivity without having recourse to an ideality of time which would only push the problem one stage back. Husserl is closer to the logician-psychologists, like Sigwart than to such neo-Kantians or Platonists as Natorp. Husserl's mission will be to make progressively explicit the theme of intentionality and to define a new set of problems.Less

Self-Determination Theory and Its Supporting Research Base

Kennon M. Sheldon, Geoffrey Williams, and Thomas Joiner

in Self-Determination Theory in the Clinic: Motivating Physical and Mental Health

This chapter follows the rise of the theory of motivation in scientific psychology—a feat that took three decades. This theory is also known as the self-determination theory, or SDT. The sections in ... More

This chapter follows the rise of the theory of motivation in scientific psychology—a feat that took three decades. This theory is also known as the self-determination theory, or SDT. The sections in this chapter look at ideas of self actualization, advanced thinking of modern evolutionary biologists, philosophers, and dynamic systems theorists. This chapter also discusses the terms “true self,” “free will,” and “healthy values,” and even presents social contexts and the limiting or restraining effect authority communication styles can have on the growth of self-regulated and optimal functioning.Less