Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The Conclusion summarizes the book's main arguments. This book has argued that, conceptual change is an essential component of scientific progress but what is known about the psychology of concepts ...
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The Conclusion summarizes the book's main arguments. This book has argued that, conceptual change is an essential component of scientific progress but what is known about the psychology of concepts needs to be organized in a coherent framework. The Conclusion contends that current theories fail to explain all the known phenomena. The book has sketched a framework for developing multi-process theories of the higher cognitive competences, identifying several key questions that need to be answered by proponents of these theories.Less
The Conclusion summarizes the book's main arguments. This book has argued that, conceptual change is an essential component of scientific progress but what is known about the psychology of concepts needs to be organized in a coherent framework. The Conclusion contends that current theories fail to explain all the known phenomena. The book has sketched a framework for developing multi-process theories of the higher cognitive competences, identifying several key questions that need to be answered by proponents of these theories.
William L. Harper
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199570409
- eISBN:
- 9780191728679
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570409.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Part I. Distinctive features of Newton’s method: Successively more accurate approximations and increasing empirical support from measurements. Part II. The Mercury perihelion problem: A proposal to ...
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Part I. Distinctive features of Newton’s method: Successively more accurate approximations and increasing empirical support from measurements. Part II. The Mercury perihelion problem: A proposal to alter the inverse-square law ruled out by a more precise measurement. Einstein’s theory accounts for the extra precession and recovers the successful measurements of Newton’s theory. An alternative to general relativity that would answer a new challenge from Mercury is ruled out by a more precise measurement. Part III. Newton does not require or endorse scientific progress as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory. Part IV. Newton’s conception of scientific progress through successively more accurate approximations is not undermined by the classic argument against convergent realism. Part V: Agreeing measurements from diverse phenomena play a decisive role of in transforming dark energy from a dubious hypothesis into part of the accepted background framework guiding empirical research in cosmology today.Less
Part I. Distinctive features of Newton’s method: Successively more accurate approximations and increasing empirical support from measurements. Part II. The Mercury perihelion problem: A proposal to alter the inverse-square law ruled out by a more precise measurement. Einstein’s theory accounts for the extra precession and recovers the successful measurements of Newton’s theory. An alternative to general relativity that would answer a new challenge from Mercury is ruled out by a more precise measurement. Part III. Newton does not require or endorse scientific progress as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory. Part IV. Newton’s conception of scientific progress through successively more accurate approximations is not undermined by the classic argument against convergent realism. Part V: Agreeing measurements from diverse phenomena play a decisive role of in transforming dark energy from a dubious hypothesis into part of the accepted background framework guiding empirical research in cosmology today.
Michael C. Banner
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240198
- eISBN:
- 9780191680113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240198.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science
This chapter discusses and examines Kuhn's work in order to understand the nature of science and scientific progress. Based on the discussions in this chapter, it is stated that it is better to grasp ...
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This chapter discusses and examines Kuhn's work in order to understand the nature of science and scientific progress. Based on the discussions in this chapter, it is stated that it is better to grasp the main lines of Kuhn's position instead of agonizing over the subtleties of interpretation.Less
This chapter discusses and examines Kuhn's work in order to understand the nature of science and scientific progress. Based on the discussions in this chapter, it is stated that it is better to grasp the main lines of Kuhn's position instead of agonizing over the subtleties of interpretation.
William L. Harper
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199570409
- eISBN:
- 9780191728679
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570409.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the ...
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This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. Newton’s inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. To achieve this rich sort of empirical success a theory needs, not only to accurately predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but also, to have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Newton’s method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be empirically answered by measurement from phenomena. Newton employs theory-mediated measurements to turn data into far more informative evidence than can be achieved by confirmation from prediction alone. Propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory of everything and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton’s method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein’s. It is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity. In addition, it is very much at work in cosmology today.Less
This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. Newton’s inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. To achieve this rich sort of empirical success a theory needs, not only to accurately predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but also, to have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Newton’s method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be empirically answered by measurement from phenomena. Newton employs theory-mediated measurements to turn data into far more informative evidence than can be achieved by confirmation from prediction alone. Propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory of everything and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton’s method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein’s. It is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity. In addition, it is very much at work in cosmology today.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096538
- eISBN:
- 9780199833351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096533.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The notion of a scientific practice allows for an approach to the concept of progress. Progress can occur with respect to any of the components of a practice. The root notion concerns the development ...
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The notion of a scientific practice allows for an approach to the concept of progress. Progress can occur with respect to any of the components of a practice. The root notion concerns the development of language and the acceptance of statements in that language that permit the answering of significant questions. The account tries to make sense of the intuitive idea that we make progress by coming to understand the structure of the natural world.Less
The notion of a scientific practice allows for an approach to the concept of progress. Progress can occur with respect to any of the components of a practice. The root notion concerns the development of language and the acceptance of statements in that language that permit the answering of significant questions. The account tries to make sense of the intuitive idea that we make progress by coming to understand the structure of the natural world.
Farhad Khosrokhavar
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195378481
- eISBN:
- 9780199852345
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195378481.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
This chapter discusses the tormented history of scientific production in Iran during and after the Islamic revolution of 1979, its ups and downs, the negative aspects of the cultural revolution in ...
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This chapter discusses the tormented history of scientific production in Iran during and after the Islamic revolution of 1979, its ups and downs, the negative aspects of the cultural revolution in the Iranian universities in the first half of the 1980s, and the underlying anti-elitist ideology that led, in the first decade of the Revolution, to the decline of scientific activity in Iran. After a period of relative stagnation immediately after the Revolution, Iran witnessed significant advances in scientific research and activity during 1995–2005. This should be considered as a new trend and departure rather than a mere continuation of the projects left over from the Pahlavi period.Less
This chapter discusses the tormented history of scientific production in Iran during and after the Islamic revolution of 1979, its ups and downs, the negative aspects of the cultural revolution in the Iranian universities in the first half of the 1980s, and the underlying anti-elitist ideology that led, in the first decade of the Revolution, to the decline of scientific activity in Iran. After a period of relative stagnation immediately after the Revolution, Iran witnessed significant advances in scientific research and activity during 1995–2005. This should be considered as a new trend and departure rather than a mere continuation of the projects left over from the Pahlavi period.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096538
- eISBN:
- 9780199833351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096533.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The account of progress is defended against a number of objections. Some of these are offered by philosophers who are sceptical of realism in the philosophy of science; others are urged by historians ...
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The account of progress is defended against a number of objections. Some of these are offered by philosophers who are sceptical of realism in the philosophy of science; others are urged by historians and sociologists of science.Less
The account of progress is defended against a number of objections. Some of these are offered by philosophers who are sceptical of realism in the philosophy of science; others are urged by historians and sociologists of science.
Nicholas Maxwell
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261550
- eISBN:
- 9780191698750
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261550.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter first expresses that standard empiricism does not give justice to the achievements of modern science. The chapter then presents ten problems that standard empiricism cannot solve: the ...
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This chapter first expresses that standard empiricism does not give justice to the achievements of modern science. The chapter then presents ten problems that standard empiricism cannot solve: the practical, theoretical, and methodological problems of induction; the problem of what simplicity is; the problem of the rationale of preferring simple to complex theories; the problem of the theoretical character of evidence; the problem of the rejection of evidence when it clashes with theory; the problem of the meaning of scientific progress; the problem of progress in knowledge about the nature of fundamental physical entities; and the problem of scientific discovery. Lastly, it concludes that standard empiricism falls on the basis that evidence alone cannot conceivably determine choice of theory in science.Less
This chapter first expresses that standard empiricism does not give justice to the achievements of modern science. The chapter then presents ten problems that standard empiricism cannot solve: the practical, theoretical, and methodological problems of induction; the problem of what simplicity is; the problem of the rationale of preferring simple to complex theories; the problem of the theoretical character of evidence; the problem of the rejection of evidence when it clashes with theory; the problem of the meaning of scientific progress; the problem of progress in knowledge about the nature of fundamental physical entities; and the problem of scientific discovery. Lastly, it concludes that standard empiricism falls on the basis that evidence alone cannot conceivably determine choice of theory in science.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096538
- eISBN:
- 9780199833351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096533.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been ...
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The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.Less
The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.
Nicholas Maxwell
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261550
- eISBN:
- 9780191698750
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261550.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter attempts to show that aim-oriented empiricism solves the remaining five problems concerning scientific progress which standard empiricism fails to solve: the problem of the theoretical ...
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This chapter attempts to show that aim-oriented empiricism solves the remaining five problems concerning scientific progress which standard empiricism fails to solve: the problem of the theoretical character of evidence; the problem of the rejection of evidence when it clashes with theory; the problem of the meaning of scientific progress; the problem of progress in knowledge about the nature of fundamental physical entities; and the problem of scientific discovery. The chapter also asks if aim-oriented empiricism is required for the solution to the ten problems. It provides self-examination of how the problems are answered. The chapter concludes that the case for preferring aim-oriented empiricism to any version of weak aim-oriented empiricism is very powerful, given the outstanding successes achieved by natural science in progressively discovering dynamic unity in nature.Less
This chapter attempts to show that aim-oriented empiricism solves the remaining five problems concerning scientific progress which standard empiricism fails to solve: the problem of the theoretical character of evidence; the problem of the rejection of evidence when it clashes with theory; the problem of the meaning of scientific progress; the problem of progress in knowledge about the nature of fundamental physical entities; and the problem of scientific discovery. The chapter also asks if aim-oriented empiricism is required for the solution to the ten problems. It provides self-examination of how the problems are answered. The chapter concludes that the case for preferring aim-oriented empiricism to any version of weak aim-oriented empiricism is very powerful, given the outstanding successes achieved by natural science in progressively discovering dynamic unity in nature.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096538
- eISBN:
- 9780199833351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096533.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Using the details of the case study as an illustration, offers a picture of the scientist as a cognitive subject, and introduces the key notion of a scientific practice. Instead of thinking of a ...
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Using the details of the case study as an illustration, offers a picture of the scientist as a cognitive subject, and introduces the key notion of a scientific practice. Instead of thinking of a corpus of beliefs, it is suggested that the state of science at a time can best be represented by a multidimensional entity, among whose components are the language used, the questions hailed as significant, the answers accepted, the methodological and experimental lore, and so forth. Both individual practices and the consensus practice (the practice that represents the view of the community) are considered.Less
Using the details of the case study as an illustration, offers a picture of the scientist as a cognitive subject, and introduces the key notion of a scientific practice. Instead of thinking of a corpus of beliefs, it is suggested that the state of science at a time can best be represented by a multidimensional entity, among whose components are the language used, the questions hailed as significant, the answers accepted, the methodological and experimental lore, and so forth. Both individual practices and the consensus practice (the practice that represents the view of the community) are considered.
Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261826
- eISBN:
- 9780191698781
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261826.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter examines contextualistic realism, multifaceted reality, and the order in nature. It suggests that the view of the world changes accordingly in the course of technology-induced scientific ...
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This chapter examines contextualistic realism, multifaceted reality, and the order in nature. It suggests that the view of the world changes accordingly in the course of technology-induced scientific progress, and that the description of nature at one level of observational and experimental sophistication becomes destabilized at the next level. Thus nature can only be accurately described with reference to a certain level of investigative sophistication. This perspective casts a dark shadow across the prospects of a scientific realism that holds that nature is as current or even future science claims it to be.Less
This chapter examines contextualistic realism, multifaceted reality, and the order in nature. It suggests that the view of the world changes accordingly in the course of technology-induced scientific progress, and that the description of nature at one level of observational and experimental sophistication becomes destabilized at the next level. Thus nature can only be accurately described with reference to a certain level of investigative sophistication. This perspective casts a dark shadow across the prospects of a scientific realism that holds that nature is as current or even future science claims it to be.
Lawrence Sklar
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251575
- eISBN:
- 9780191598449
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251576.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
It is a platitude of scepticism that our theories are never more than transient holders of our scientific esteem, soon to be replaced by newer, incompatible theories. What are some ‘global’ responses ...
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It is a platitude of scepticism that our theories are never more than transient holders of our scientific esteem, soon to be replaced by newer, incompatible theories. What are some ‘global’ responses one can make to such a version of scepticism? How does science deal with the apparent transience of its best theories in its project of going onward to ever better theoretical characterizations of the world? Given the transience of our theories, how would it be best to characterize our epistemic attitude toward our theories: perhaps as believing them to be the appropriate starting points to be reconstructed as the source of our future theories. Science itself can provide theories about our current best theories as guides to the future.Less
It is a platitude of scepticism that our theories are never more than transient holders of our scientific esteem, soon to be replaced by newer, incompatible theories. What are some ‘global’ responses one can make to such a version of scepticism? How does science deal with the apparent transience of its best theories in its project of going onward to ever better theoretical characterizations of the world? Given the transience of our theories, how would it be best to characterize our epistemic attitude toward our theories: perhaps as believing them to be the appropriate starting points to be reconstructed as the source of our future theories. Science itself can provide theories about our current best theories as guides to the future.
Edouard Machery
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195306880
- eISBN:
- 9780199867950
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the ...
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This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the notion of concept are considered and are judged to be inconclusive. A new type of eliminativist argument called “scientific eliminativism”—showing that the extension of a scientific notion is not a natural kind—is developed and is applied to concepts. Because concepts are not a natural kind, the notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, if this discipline is to progress further.Less
This chapter draws the conclusion of the argument developed in previous chapters: The notion of concept should be eliminated from contemporary psychology. Previous eliminativist arguments against the notion of concept are considered and are judged to be inconclusive. A new type of eliminativist argument called “scientific eliminativism”—showing that the extension of a scientific notion is not a natural kind—is developed and is applied to concepts. Because concepts are not a natural kind, the notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology, if this discipline is to progress further.
Ilkka Niiniluoto
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251612
- eISBN:
- 9780191598098
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251614.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the ...
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This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the standard version of scientific realism, scientific theories are attempts to give true descriptions of mind‐independent and possibly unobservable reality, where truth means correspondence between language and reality. Critical realism adds to this view four important qualifications: our access to the world is always relative to a chosen linguistic framework (conceptual pluralism); all human knowledge about reality is uncertain and corrigible (fallibilism); even the best theories in science may fail to be true, but nevertheless, successful theories typically are close to the truth (truthlikeness); a part, but only a part, of reality consists of human‐made constructions (Popper's world 3). Niiniluoto combines Tarski's semantic definition of truth with his own explication of Popper's notion of verisimilitude, and characterizes scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. He argues in detail that critical scientific realism can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism.Less
This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the standard version of scientific realism, scientific theories are attempts to give true descriptions of mind‐independent and possibly unobservable reality, where truth means correspondence between language and reality. Critical realism adds to this view four important qualifications: our access to the world is always relative to a chosen linguistic framework (conceptual pluralism); all human knowledge about reality is uncertain and corrigible (fallibilism); even the best theories in science may fail to be true, but nevertheless, successful theories typically are close to the truth (truthlikeness); a part, but only a part, of reality consists of human‐made constructions (Popper's world 3). Niiniluoto combines Tarski's semantic definition of truth with his own explication of Popper's notion of verisimilitude, and characterizes scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. He argues in detail that critical scientific realism can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195096538
- eISBN:
- 9780199833351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195096533.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Offers an extensive case study—Darwin's formulation and defence of evolutionary theory—in an attempt to show how detailed study of a historical episode can make room for the possibility of scientific ...
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Offers an extensive case study—Darwin's formulation and defence of evolutionary theory—in an attempt to show how detailed study of a historical episode can make room for the possibility of scientific progress and rational acceptance of novel views.Less
Offers an extensive case study—Darwin's formulation and defence of evolutionary theory—in an attempt to show how detailed study of a historical episode can make room for the possibility of scientific progress and rational acceptance of novel views.
Marzio Nessi
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- September 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199669165
- eISBN:
- 9780191749346
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669165.003.0017
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Organization Studies, Knowledge Management
In a very personal reflective essay, Marzio Nessi, the technical coordinator of the ATLAS Collaboration at CERN, recounts Max Boisot’s work and interaction with the particle physics community at ...
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In a very personal reflective essay, Marzio Nessi, the technical coordinator of the ATLAS Collaboration at CERN, recounts Max Boisot’s work and interaction with the particle physics community at ATLAS and CERN, whose research on the Higgs particle, the famous “God particle”, has attracted a lot of media attention. Boisot was interested in the creation of knowledge at ATLAS and studied its unique organization, characterized by collaborative behavior, a bottom-up approach, and a consensus-driven management style, which has enabled this Big Science institution to create a new way of dealing with extreme complexity. Boisot was fascinated by how a scientific collaboration as large as ATLAS generates and sustains creative and constructive interactions among thousands of researchers from diverse cultures, traditions and habits. He believed that the self-organizational capability of the collaboration was the key to success. Boisot’s research also laid the ground for studying how scientific and technical progress is made and how the value of basic research can be captured for society.Less
In a very personal reflective essay, Marzio Nessi, the technical coordinator of the ATLAS Collaboration at CERN, recounts Max Boisot’s work and interaction with the particle physics community at ATLAS and CERN, whose research on the Higgs particle, the famous “God particle”, has attracted a lot of media attention. Boisot was interested in the creation of knowledge at ATLAS and studied its unique organization, characterized by collaborative behavior, a bottom-up approach, and a consensus-driven management style, which has enabled this Big Science institution to create a new way of dealing with extreme complexity. Boisot was fascinated by how a scientific collaboration as large as ATLAS generates and sustains creative and constructive interactions among thousands of researchers from diverse cultures, traditions and habits. He believed that the self-organizational capability of the collaboration was the key to success. Boisot’s research also laid the ground for studying how scientific and technical progress is made and how the value of basic research can be captured for society.
Evan Osborne
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780804796446
- eISBN:
- 9781503604247
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.11126/stanford/9780804796446.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic History
There is good reason to be skeptical of the assumption that political regulation operates with the public interest in mind. Scientific productivity has continued to advance in the past half-century, ...
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There is good reason to be skeptical of the assumption that political regulation operates with the public interest in mind. Scientific productivity has continued to advance in the past half-century, as has the value and quantity of human expression. The argument in favor of socioeconomic self-regulation is identical to that for the other two systems. Yet recent scholarship suggests declining rates of economic growth in the wealthiest countries most subject to increasing political regulation during this period, while greater reliance on self-regulating economic forces has resulted in dramatic improvement of socioeconomies in the developing world. As political regulation of human expression has declined, literary, artistic, and philosophical achievement have expanded. Guidance is offered for how people should understand social change in their role as citizens and how they should conduct themselves in a world full of short-term instability but tremendous long-term progress.Less
There is good reason to be skeptical of the assumption that political regulation operates with the public interest in mind. Scientific productivity has continued to advance in the past half-century, as has the value and quantity of human expression. The argument in favor of socioeconomic self-regulation is identical to that for the other two systems. Yet recent scholarship suggests declining rates of economic growth in the wealthiest countries most subject to increasing political regulation during this period, while greater reliance on self-regulating economic forces has resulted in dramatic improvement of socioeconomies in the developing world. As political regulation of human expression has declined, literary, artistic, and philosophical achievement have expanded. Guidance is offered for how people should understand social change in their role as citizens and how they should conduct themselves in a world full of short-term instability but tremendous long-term progress.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- September 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198744283
- eISBN:
- 9780191805691
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744283.003.0009
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter offers a general approach to the concept of progress, illustrating it by two examples. The first focuses on the least controversial instance of progress, in the domain of the natural ...
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This chapter offers a general approach to the concept of progress, illustrating it by two examples. The first focuses on the least controversial instance of progress, in the domain of the natural sciences. The second considers the notion of ethical progress, a notion viewed as fundamental to the understanding of social progress. At the heart of my approach is a distinction between the ambitious idea of teleological progress, and a more modest concept of pragmatic progress. The last two sections turn to the concept of social progress, identifying the spread of capacities for an autonomously chosen valuable life as the key. Standard economic measures of progress are often poor guides to social progress in my sense, and there are serious questions about whether contemporary socio-economic institutions are antipathetic to social progress.Less
This chapter offers a general approach to the concept of progress, illustrating it by two examples. The first focuses on the least controversial instance of progress, in the domain of the natural sciences. The second considers the notion of ethical progress, a notion viewed as fundamental to the understanding of social progress. At the heart of my approach is a distinction between the ambitious idea of teleological progress, and a more modest concept of pragmatic progress. The last two sections turn to the concept of social progress, identifying the spread of capacities for an autonomously chosen valuable life as the key. Standard economic measures of progress are often poor guides to social progress in my sense, and there are serious questions about whether contemporary socio-economic institutions are antipathetic to social progress.
Philip Kitcher
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145830
- eISBN:
- 9780199833344
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145836.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The theme of Chapter 4 is developed and illustrated by considering the example of maps. Maps are partly objective in that there are criteria of accurate representation; they are also partly dependent ...
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The theme of Chapter 4 is developed and illustrated by considering the example of maps. Maps are partly objective in that there are criteria of accurate representation; they are also partly dependent on our concerns in the choice of features of the terrain that are to be included.Less
The theme of Chapter 4 is developed and illustrated by considering the example of maps. Maps are partly objective in that there are criteria of accurate representation; they are also partly dependent on our concerns in the choice of features of the terrain that are to be included.
