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This chapter provides six arguments in favor of scientifically based ontology and against speculative ontology, a branch of analytic metaphysics. Parts of contemporary speculative ontology are untenable because they are factually false; intuitions are not domain-invariant; conceptual analysis is too closely tied to everyday experience; what counts as an acceptable philosophical idealization is left unarticulated; the world is not scale-invariant; and anthropocentric epistemology does not always minimize epistemic risk. Nevertheless, specifically philosophical arguments are necessary when making ontological claims and complete deference to scientific consensus is unreasonable. The overall strategy is to recognize that different domains of reality require different methods of discovery and justification, and that a significant part of contemporary metaphysics is employing methods that are inappropriate to its goals.

This chapter considers the relationship between scientific and philosophical approaches to ontology, with the aim of clarifying what it means to engage in the project of scientific ontology. It introduces the most influential conceptions of ontology to emerge in the history of philosophy of science. These include deflationary views, which redescribe talk of ontology in terms of other things, as well as views which, conversely, take ontology at face value as an inquiry seeking knowledge of what there is in the world—a world whose existence is independent of the thoughts one may have concerning it. It is argued that the sciences do not yield ontologies until and unless they are interpreted, which requires some recourse to philosophical thinking, and that case studies of science cannot by themselves settle disputes about how these interpretations should go.

A contrast is drawn between two approaches to ontology: scientific ontology, which is constrained by scientific knowledge, and speculative ontology, which is not. Three primary arguments are provided against speculative ontology: its factual falsity, its appeal to intuitions as a source of knowledge, and its lack of attention to scale variance. The need to formulate criteria judging the appropriateness of philosophical idealizations is suggested and reasons are given not to take scientists’ ontological positions as a guide to the correct ontology either for a given theory or more generally.

Retrospective reflections are provided on the papers “Aleatory Explanations,” “Analytic versus Synthetic Understanding,” “Scientific and Speculative Ontology,” and “Endogenous Uncertainty and the Dynamics of Constraints” by Paul Humphreys. Arguments are given for restricting probabilistic causation to situations in which single case propensities are present and for keeping the pragmatics of explanation as a secondary, rather than a primary, feature of explanations. A finite representation schema for ceteris paribus conditions is provided and some suggestions for how to deal with the pessimistic induction are floated. Some reasons why traditional empiricism should not place constraints on the ontologies we use are given. Motivations for a previously unpublished paper that identifies situations in which individual utility maximization strategies perform worse at the society level than do some common individual strategies are provided and the appropriate role for encouraging certain types of constraints on self-interest is discussed.