Search Results

This chapter examines the Islamic belief that the Koran (Qur'an) was authored by Allah and revealed to Muhammad via the angel Gabriel, and dissects the alleged ‘proofs’ for Koranic divinity. The chapter presents nine arguments against this belief, among which are the Koran's internal contradictions, obvious dependence on Judaism, and Jewish and Christian traditions, factual errors, superstitious beliefs, and inclusion of unethical and immoral teachings. The chapter discusses the danger posed to democratic societies and values by fundamentalist Muslims who seek to impose Qur'anic and Sharia law and values on non‐Muslim societies, while noting that some Muslims advocate democracy and religious freedom. The chapter discusses the absurd claim of some Muslims that the Koran contains scientific knowledge that was not discovered in the West until recently, and the belief in Koranic inimitability (Ijaz al Koran), and analyzes the psychology of Muslims who make irrational claims and profess irrational beliefs.

This chapter introduces the main themes of the book and explains its structure. It notes how the concerns of the book can be related to two other bodies of literature: first, the literature in religious epistemology, which has sought to compare knowledge of God to ordinary perceptual or scientific kinds of knowledge; and second, the literature on divine omnipresence. By contrast with the first literature, this book takes knowledge of place as an analogue for knowledge of God, and by contrast with the second, it supposes that God's relationship to place is not simply uniform, or at any rate, it supposes that there is differentiation in the religious meaning of place.

This chapter considers the general limits of scientific knowledge, and identifies probability and entropy as important measures of human ignorance; scientific predictions are shown to be severely limited in complex systems. It argues that fundamental limits on computer power may preclude the creation of artificial consciousness, even if natural brains actually do create minds, as assumed by most contemporary scientists.

Across Europe, as early as the seventeenth century (and even more so in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) women became the target of scientific treatises which aimed to explain new scientific knowledge to an unspecialized audience. Women were the privileged recipients of popularizing works of science and literature, and therefore indirectly contributed to introducing the new philosophers. In view of women's limited education, and their ignorance of Latin, works ‘for the ladies’ became synonymous with something adapted so as to become elementary and easy to grasp. Knowledge ‘for the ladies’ extended also to language, with the production across various countries of grammatical works which claimed to be, according to their titles and prefaces, expressly meant for the female sex. In agreement with the viewpoint that saw women as being incapable of real intellectual efforts, authors of these grammars shunned dry, boring, and taxing ways of learning, in favour of quicker and more pleasant and entertaining ones.

This chapter explores different understandings and interpretations of each process of global change. Drawing from discourse analysis and theories about the social construction of scientific knowledge, it shows that understandings of global environmental change and globalization are each embedded in separated and often competing sets of discourses. As a result, critical linkages and interactions between the two processes often remain unrecognized The chapter also emphasizes that discourses carry political weight and reflect underlying power structures, which give currency and legitimacy to some voices over others, and maintain the interests of some over the well-being and security of others. Discourses about global change influence the research questions that are asked, and prioritize the level or scale of analysis, both of which have profound implications for strategies to address the two processes.

It has been manifested over the past few centuries that science provides superbly powerful tools and methods for modifying the natural world. Many people would agree that it has also offered explanation and understanding. But it is still unclear that these tools and methodology can propel us to solve all of the cognitive dilemmas that exist. It has been assumed, for example, that scientific knowledge and religious knowledge are so different that they cannot even clash with one another. But the recent arguments about creation and evolution show that perhaps they can come into conflict after all.

In “Scientific Knowledge,” Philip Kitcher challenges arguments that deny the truth of the theoretical claims of science, and he attempts to discover reasons for endorsing the truth of such claims. He suggests that the discovery of such reasons might succeed if we ask why anyone thinks that the theoretical claims we accept are true and then look for answers that reconstruct actual belief‐generating processes. To this end, Kitcher presents the “homely argument” for scientific truth, which claims that when a field of science is continually applied to yield precise predictions, then it is at least approximately true. He defends this approach and offers a supplementary account that gives more attention to detail. This account includes a historical aspect (a dependence on the previous conclusions of scientists) that must answer to skeptical challenges and a social aspect (the coordination of individuals in pursuit of specific knowledge‐related goals).

The question that frames this chapter is how humans have managed to learn such amazing things as the age of the universe. After briefly reviewing logical, methodological, historical, and social approaches to this question, the chapter focuses on contributions of the cognitive study of science. This leads to a comparison of the cognitive study of science and the psychology of science, which study how fundamental cognitive mechanisms operate in the context of generating scientific knowledge. There is, however, a second way humans use their psychological powers in the pursuit of knowledge, namely, by designing material and symbolic artifacts that greatly increase their cognitive powers. The resulting physical-computational-human systems have been incorporated into the cognitive sciences as “distributed cognitive systems.” The chapter proposes adoption of an agent-centered approach, in which ever more ubiquitous distributed cognitive systems can be fully cognitive without being fully computational.

This chapter discusses the following: the multiplicity of scientific knowledge; the economic nature of science; the sophic nature of science; epistemology and praxeology; science and life; the “scientific worldview”; and science's self-consciousness.

This chapter reviews the dilemmas associated with establishing collective goals in matters of sustainable development, then the properties of the mechanisms available for deciding to frame our behaviors, as well as the policy toolkit. Governmental intervention is both possible and legitimate when crises occur. In that case, the need for rapid and massive mobilization of means, leads citizens and stakeholders to accept major policy measures and reforms. The resulting emergency plans, however, seldom result in the optimal measures being implemented. Therefore, a major goal of human collectivities should be crisis avoidance. An important step in this direction is to rely more on both decentralized and reflexive governance, since all stakeholders should feel accountable. Moreover, this is also a way to better manage and generate the necessary knowledge.

This chapter discusses secularism as a political project with its own utopian elements. Secularism refers to the growing importance of scientific knowledge that is not constrained by religious authority. Religion is sometimes taken to be an obstacle for scientific progress and secularism demands its removal for the benefit of societal development that is guided by scientific discovery and technological innovation. Secularization was seen by sociologists as an intrinsic and inescapable part of the modernization of Western society, with the assumption that this was something all societies had to go through. An alternative to post-Weberian arguments in sociology about religion and secularity is offered by theories that emphasize individual, rational choice in religious markets.

This chapter discusses issues concerning the interface between scientific knowledge and legislation for animal rights. It reviews available and up-to-date scientific evidence for awareness of self, theory of mind, complex memory, planning actions, complex communication, and intelligence in animals. The chapter considers brain size in relation to cognitive ability and social behaviour, and mentions that even smaller brains can process information very efficiently. Based on the anomalies in animal intelligence, it cautions us against ranking species according to performance on a single task or on a single set of criteria, and against attributing higher value to one set of characteristics than another.

Penelope Maddy investigates the concept of the a priori in the context of contemporary scientific naturalism, arguing that a naturalistic account of the growth of scientific knowledge refutes the suggestion that there are a priori truths. Maddy notes the importance of Kant's conception of the a priori to her naturalism, and works out the differences and similarities between Quine's and her (Quinean) naturalism.