Paul Maddrell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267507
- eISBN:
- 9780191708404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267507.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The years 1945-61 saw the greatest transformation in weaponry that has ever taken place, as atomic and thermonuclear bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons ...
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The years 1945-61 saw the greatest transformation in weaponry that has ever taken place, as atomic and thermonuclear bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons were developed by the superpowers. It was also a distinct era in Western intelligence collection. These were the years of the Germans. Mass interrogation in West Germany and spying in East Germany represented the most important source of intelligence on Soviet war-related science, weapons development and military capability until 1956 and a key one until 1961. This intelligence fuelled the arms race and influenced Western scientific research, weapons development, and intelligence collection. Using intelligence and policy documents held in British and US archives and records of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), this book studies the scientific intelligence-gathering and subversive operations of the British, US, and West German intelligence services in the period to date. East Germany's scientific potential was contained by inducing leading scientists and engineers to defect to the West, and the book shows that the US government's policy of ‘containment’ was more aggressive than has hitherto been accepted. It also demonstrates that the Western secret services' espionage in the GDR was very successful, even though the MfS and KGB achieved triumphs against them. George Blake twice did appalling damage to MI6's spy networks. The book reveals the identity of the most distinguished scientist to spy for the CIA as yet uncovered.Less
The years 1945-61 saw the greatest transformation in weaponry that has ever taken place, as atomic and thermonuclear bombs, intercontinental ballistic missiles and chemical and biological weapons were developed by the superpowers. It was also a distinct era in Western intelligence collection. These were the years of the Germans. Mass interrogation in West Germany and spying in East Germany represented the most important source of intelligence on Soviet war-related science, weapons development and military capability until 1956 and a key one until 1961. This intelligence fuelled the arms race and influenced Western scientific research, weapons development, and intelligence collection. Using intelligence and policy documents held in British and US archives and records of the Ministry of State Security (MfS) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), this book studies the scientific intelligence-gathering and subversive operations of the British, US, and West German intelligence services in the period to date. East Germany's scientific potential was contained by inducing leading scientists and engineers to defect to the West, and the book shows that the US government's policy of ‘containment’ was more aggressive than has hitherto been accepted. It also demonstrates that the Western secret services' espionage in the GDR was very successful, even though the MfS and KGB achieved triumphs against them. George Blake twice did appalling damage to MI6's spy networks. The book reveals the identity of the most distinguished scientist to spy for the CIA as yet uncovered.
Paul Maddrell
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199267507
- eISBN:
- 9780191708404
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267507.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, European Modern History
The main focus of this book is to discuss the acquisition of intelligence on current and future Soviet weaponry by Western — chiefly British — intelligence agencies in Germany during the period ...
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The main focus of this book is to discuss the acquisition of intelligence on current and future Soviet weaponry by Western — chiefly British — intelligence agencies in Germany during the period between the end of the Second World War and the building of the Berlin Wall. It examines the collection of intelligence from all human sources: spies, defectors, refugees, released prisoners-of-war, contacts, and attachés. It evaluates the systematic efforts to diminish the scientific potential of East Germany by inducing the defection of scientific personnel to the West. The book also argues that the scientific units of the Western intelligence services played an important part in their governments' efforts to maintain their superiority over the Soviet Bloc in war-related science and technology — a strategy of scientific warfare. It shows that the Western secret services adopted a strategy of inducing defection both to obtain scientific intelligence and to hamper scientific development.Less
The main focus of this book is to discuss the acquisition of intelligence on current and future Soviet weaponry by Western — chiefly British — intelligence agencies in Germany during the period between the end of the Second World War and the building of the Berlin Wall. It examines the collection of intelligence from all human sources: spies, defectors, refugees, released prisoners-of-war, contacts, and attachés. It evaluates the systematic efforts to diminish the scientific potential of East Germany by inducing the defection of scientific personnel to the West. The book also argues that the scientific units of the Western intelligence services played an important part in their governments' efforts to maintain their superiority over the Soviet Bloc in war-related science and technology — a strategy of scientific warfare. It shows that the Western secret services adopted a strategy of inducing defection both to obtain scientific intelligence and to hamper scientific development.
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0001
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This introductory chapter describes the problems associated with scientific intelligence, and introduces the key questions of the book, namely: Considering how successfully the United States ...
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This introductory chapter describes the problems associated with scientific intelligence, and introduces the key questions of the book, namely: Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? How did we get this so wrong?Less
This introductory chapter describes the problems associated with scientific intelligence, and introduces the key questions of the book, namely: Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? How did we get this so wrong?
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0004
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The third chapter discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent its successful completion. Following in ...
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The third chapter discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent its successful completion. Following in the footsteps of the Allied Armies, the intelligence mission to Europe, code-named “Alsos”, first arrived in Italy in December, 1943. Comprised of a mixture of intelligence operatives and trained scientific personnel, the mission scoured Italy for clues about the German atomic bomb program. Later in France, Alsos made a number of important discoveries, none more so than the location of a town on the French-German border which would, after close inspection, hold the key to unlocking all of the secrets of the German atomic bomb program.Less
The third chapter discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent its successful completion. Following in the footsteps of the Allied Armies, the intelligence mission to Europe, code-named “Alsos”, first arrived in Italy in December, 1943. Comprised of a mixture of intelligence operatives and trained scientific personnel, the mission scoured Italy for clues about the German atomic bomb program. Later in France, Alsos made a number of important discoveries, none more so than the location of a town on the French-German border which would, after close inspection, hold the key to unlocking all of the secrets of the German atomic bomb program.
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.003.0008
- Subject:
- History, Political History
Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking ...
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Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability.
While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.Less
Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability.
While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.
Vince Houghton
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- January 2020
- ISBN:
- 9781501739590
- eISBN:
- 9781501739606
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501739590.001.0001
- Subject:
- History, Political History
The subject of this book is the US atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework ...
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The subject of this book is the US atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework of an entirely new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. Because of the atomic bomb, for the first time in history a nation’s scientific resources became a key consideration in assessing a potential national security threat. In September 1949, US intelligence was shocked to discover that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. Coming just four years after the United States had become the world’s first nuclear power, the Soviet atomic bomb was produced in half the time American intelligence had predicted. Compounding the confusion was the fact that American intelligence had engaged in an effort against Nazi Germany that had correctly assessed the status of the German atomic bomb program. This book explores the following: Considering how successfully the US conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the US Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities?Less
The subject of this book is the US atomic intelligence effort against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the period 1942-1949. Both of these intelligence efforts operated within the framework of an entirely new field of intelligence: scientific intelligence. Because of the atomic bomb, for the first time in history a nation’s scientific resources became a key consideration in assessing a potential national security threat. In September 1949, US intelligence was shocked to discover that the Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb. Coming just four years after the United States had become the world’s first nuclear power, the Soviet atomic bomb was produced in half the time American intelligence had predicted. Compounding the confusion was the fact that American intelligence had engaged in an effort against Nazi Germany that had correctly assessed the status of the German atomic bomb program. This book explores the following: Considering how successfully the US conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the US Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities?