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The main focus of this book is to discuss the acquisition of intelligence on current and future Soviet weaponry by Western — chiefly British — intelligence agencies in Germany during the period between the end of the Second World War and the building of the Berlin Wall. It examines the collection of intelligence from all human sources: spies, defectors, refugees, released prisoners-of-war, contacts, and attachés. It evaluates the systematic efforts to diminish the scientific potential of East Germany by inducing the defection of scientific personnel to the West. The book also argues that the scientific units of the Western intelligence services played an important part in their governments' efforts to maintain their superiority over the Soviet Bloc in war-related science and technology — a strategy of scientific warfare. It shows that the Western secret services adopted a strategy of inducing defection both to obtain scientific intelligence and to hamper scientific development.

This introductory chapter describes the problems associated with scientific intelligence, and introduces the key questions of the book, namely: Considering how successfully the United States conducted the atomic intelligence effort against the Germans in the Second World War, why was the United States Government unable to create an effective atomic intelligence apparatus to monitor Soviet scientific and nuclear capabilities? Put another way, why did the effort against the Soviet Union fail so badly, so completely, in all potential metrics – collection, analysis, and dissemination? How did we get this so wrong?

The third chapter discusses the scientific intelligence mission sent to Europe to collect firsthand information about the German atomic project and to prevent its successful completion. Following in the footsteps of the Allied Armies, the intelligence mission to Europe, code-named “Alsos”, first arrived in Italy in December, 1943. Comprised of a mixture of intelligence operatives and trained scientific personnel, the mission scoured Italy for clues about the German atomic bomb program. Later in France, Alsos made a number of important discoveries, none more so than the location of a town on the French-German border which would, after close inspection, hold the key to unlocking all of the secrets of the German atomic bomb program.

Even the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in August, 1949 did not convince most Americans to reconsider their perception of Soviet science. American scientific, military, and policymaking elite spread blame widely for the intelligence failure, but refused to acknowledge the possibility of Soviet scientific strength as the primary culprit. Instead, they latched onto ideas that mitigated the impact of Soviet scientific ability. While the rest of the American national security system was improving, the refusal to give Soviet science the credit where credit was due meant that the American scientific intelligence apparatus continued to falter well into the 1950s. The CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) – which was explicitly created to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence concerning enemy scientific development – did not become an effective intelligence agency until the 1960s, despite the emerging Soviet atomic threat.