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This chapter examines theoretical principles of false memory. It considers three early explanations of false memory: constructivism, a more detailed version of constructivism that is known as schema theory, and the source-monitoring framework. The dual-process tradition in memory research is discussed. The chapter then considers what, at present, is the modal approach to explaining false memories: opponent-processes theories.

This chapter draws on cognitive approaches within stylistics (and with incidental reference to related work in media research) to further consider the concept of character in relation to television drama in particular. The use of schema theory is particularly noted as one of the ways that existing social knowledge and understanding interacts with textual cues to create meaningful characterizations. British television productions in which social class identities have been important offer an important foundation for the development of this account, which is extended into an examination of characters that are represented as being themselves playful with their own identities.

This chapter argues that problem of language evolution is not a box to be opened with a single key but a puzzle of many pieces. To put that puzzle together, we need the illumination from many different lampposts. It discusses the so-called “lampposts” that illuminated previous efforts to probe the mysteries of language evolution. These are schema theory for basic neuroethology; schema theory for vision and dexterity; embodied neurolinguistics; and social schemas.

Advocates for new approaches to development have increasingly called for people-led implementations. However, many models have failed, being both weak in the theory framing them, and in the practice that actualised them in the ground. This chapter weaves together theories to analyse critical flaws in how human rights and human development are enacted in the field. It advocates for human rights education interventions that engage people’s imaginative collaborative potential as they aspire toward the common good. Chapter 2 investigates the challenges of integrating human rights, as international instruments, in the local (especially non-western) setting. It is suggested that Human Rights Education (HRE) can play a key role in their contextualisation. The chapter also explores how individual and collective behaviours are influenced by both cognitive and social factors, drawing on two social science theories, cognitive schema theory and social norms theory. Drawing on key literature on gender and power, the last section offers an analysis of the structural conditions that shape what people think to be possible and achievable; that is: their aspirations and capabilities.

This chapter discusses the significance of Gaiman's creative disruptions of scripts and schemas in two of his visual retellings for young adults: The Sleeper and the Spindle (2014) and the graphic novel The Sandman: The Dream Hunters (1999). By weaving the old, well-worn cloth of fairy tale narrative scripts together with new schematics, Gaiman and his collaborators present sometimes radical ideologies clothed in the comfortable garb of rehearsed, longstanding traditions. As much as this action masks the changing cultural attitudes represented by the "new cloth," Gaiman's weavings also reveal to careful readers how narratives become ubiquitous and achieve metanarrativity. To understand how our minds interpret scripts, schemas, and metanarratives, this chapter will bring to bear conceptual blending and schema theories on my examination of the verbal and visual interplay of source texts and Gaiman retellings

Predictive processing (PP) is not a theory of consciousness. Hence, it is not obvious that PP should have any relevance to research on consciousness. A first promising possibility opens up if we consider the ambitious assumption that PP is a general theory of brain function. If the brain’s function is to minimize prediction error (just as the heart’s function is to pump blood), as Jakob Hohwy (2015) suggests, then it might well be that the computational processes underlying consciousness can usefully be described within the PP framework. This chapter focuses on (i) how PP accounts for attention, and what this suggests with regards to the relation between attention and consciousness (e.g., how volitional attention may change the contents of consciousness); (ii) furthermore, it is suggested that PP can provide a unifying perspective on some proposed functions and theories of consciousness (such as global workspace theory, attention schema theory, and integrated information theoy).

This chapter identifies three common objections to the possibility of spiritual perception and argues that all three are misguided from the point of view of contemporary cognitive science of perception. The objections are: (a) that there is no good inference from religious experience to divine reality; (b) that all religious experience is theoretically loaded; and (c) that God’s properties fall outside the scope of perception proper. The chapter considers three issues in the cognitive science of perception: (a) in what sense does perception involve inference or reasoning?; (b) to what degree is perception ‘cognitively penetrated’ by higher-level mental states of the perceiver?; and (c) what is the proper object of perception? While all three issues do involve substantive disagreements in the science of perception, consensus positions there regarding the nature and functioning of perception show that all three lines of objection are without force.

Mainstream literature in international development has focussed either on advocating for ‘direct’ interventions (changing developing countries following western models) or on the dangers of intervention (for instance advocating for neoliberal trade as a solution to African poverty). Until recently, this dichotomy has obscured a possible third way, that of ‘indirect’ interventions, an approach that has gained increasing consensus in the last decade. While indirect development offers a solid approach, no models are analysed in the literature that can help scholars and practitioners advance this field further. This first chapter introduces the reader to the need for exploring models of indirect interventions and explains how each chapter contributes to grounding such a model on ethnographic evidence. This chapter also briefly provides the reader with critical information about research methodology and the characteristics of the ethnographic study, introducing Tostan communities as appropriate sites for a case study.

This chapter explores the role that radical evil plays in distorting our spiritual perception and thus inhibiting, undermining, or damaging our ability to discern the truth about God. It shows how recent insights in contemporary epistemology and empirical psychology can pave a way forward in thinking constructively about radical evil and spiritual perception. Once we allow for the critical place of the proper functioning of our intellectual and perceptual capacities in the search for truth, then it is clear that these can be severely damaged by the influence of radical evil. C.S. Lewis’s Screwtape Letters will provide a fruitful, though fictional, proposal of radical evil that is illuminated by these current waves of thought.

How do listeners relate to musial instruments that they do not play? This chapter investigates technically mediated modes of listening in the context of Haydn’s horn music. The valveless horns in Haydn’s orchestra had distinctive pitch affordances, which gave rise to several idiomatic figures. This instrumental invariance can shape tonal expectations, affecting how the music appears to listeners. Haydn (and other composers) also used horn calls in compositions for other instrumental forces. If situated listeners are attuned to schematic instrumental textures—if, for example, they can hear virtual horns in a string quartet or piano piece—this implies that their perception is grounded in multimodal experiences of instruments. Like performance, then, listening is both embodied and conditioned by technology.

This chapter champions the notion of ‘strange’, paradoxical, level-crossing feedback loops as a means to address the shortcomings of information-processing approaches to cognition, especially as applied to musical improvisation. It highlights the inherent challenges of studying improvisation and consciousness, and suggests ways that embodied and enactive theories of cognition, and emerging ideas in predictive processing and social psychology, may offer productive ways to understand mind and consciousness, and the dynamics of collective musical improvisation. Improvising music together, the chapter argues, involves joint action, embodied coordination, collective attention, and shared intention in ways that challenge conventional understandings of cognition and consciousness.

Paradoxical as it may seem, memory can pre-date history, and even more surprisingly, forgetting can precede remembering. Historical events are perceived through the ‘prememory’ of reference to memories of previous events. Moreover, concerns of being forgotten, though often unnoticed, can be raised in advance of the unravelling of historical events and their remembrance. The subtle dynamics of this ‘pre-forgetting’, which are embedded into the very earliest stage of memory formation, are demonstrated through an examination of the case of the republican protomartyr William Orr. Remembrance of his trial and execution, in advance of the 1798 rebellion, offered a template for subsequent remembrance of the United Irishmen. Periodic calls to ‘Remember Orr’ were perforated with anxieties of forgetting that sustained forgetful remembrance.