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This chapter discusses the rules of procedure and evidence at the ICTY which have developed through experimentation and experience. By design or accident, the rules at the beginning of the ICTY left many questions unanswered and allowed for easy amendment. Over the years, judges have repeatedly amended the rules to reflect lessons learned along the way and to develop a procedure designed to address the particular challenges facing the ICTY.

This chapter discusses the challenges faced by the European Union with regards to the functioning of the Court. These include the language challenge, the members of the Court, the rules of procedure, and the timing and delivery of the opinion. It is argued that the present system on the whole works reasonably well at trying to fulfil conflicting demands.

As a rule, treaties do not come to an end automatically but entitle the injured state or all states parties to the treaty (as the case may be) to plead on the basis thereof the invalidity or termination of a treaty. In principle, therefore, it is up to the discretion of the party(ies) concerned to make the relevant choices. In this respect, no general role of the judiciary can be grounded in specific national provisions, application by analogy of the rules on the treaty-making power, or the courts' power to interpret the applicable law. A customary rule, however, has emerged on the basis of which courts of the parties concerned are under an obligation to impeach the validity, or terminate the operation, of treaties concluded under the threat of use of force or conflicting with jus cogens. It is also reasonable to conceive a rule of customary law allowing any third party to invoke invalidity or termination in accordance with Article 52, 53, or 64 (or the corresponding customary rules).

This chapter describes how the UN Security Council’s meetings are conducted, along with the participation of Member States in those meetings. It also considers the participation of non-Council Member States of the United Nations and States which are not UN members, together with individuals invited to participate in Council proceedings, including officials from Palestine and Yugoslavia. In addition, the Rules of Procedure that govern the order of speakers in Council meetings is discussed. The chapter also looks at the ‘right of reply’ or ‘further statements’; motions, proposals, and suggestions; ‘blue draft resolutions’ and order of submission; and non-member submission and co-sponsorship of resolutions. Finally, it provides an overview of other aspects of Council proceedings such as amendments, points of order, precedence motions, rulings by the Council President, and ‘stopping the clock’ procedure.

The modern class action was created in 1966 by an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by an obscure committee of lawyers, judges, and academics. Despite all of the opposition to it by big businesses today, corporate America did nothing to stop the creation in 1966. The business community has been making up for this mistake for the last 50 years. Their subsequent efforts to repeal or neuter the class action failed in Congress and before the rulemakers. Thus, corporate America turned to the U.S. Supreme Court. But efforts here were largely for naught as well until 2011, when the 5-4 decision in AT&T v. Concepcion held that companies can insulate themselves from class actions if they ask consumers and employees to agree to arbitrate disputes. This decision could lead to the end of class actions if it is not overruled by the Court or overturned by Congress.

This chapter focuses on the UN Security Council’s authority to convene meetings as embodied in its Provisional Rules of Procedures. It first considers the instances when the Council President shall call a meeting and cases where an agenda item may be rejected, along with the meaning of the term ‘agenda’ in the context of the Council. It then turns to a discussion of the Summary Statement of matters of which the Security Council is seized, which is issued each week by the Secretary-General pursuant to Rule 11 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. It also looks at Article 12(2) of the UN Charter requiring the Secretary-General to notify the UN General Assembly each year of any matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Finally, the chapter cites the Provisional Rules of Procedure requiring no rule in establishing a quorum, along with the notice and timing of Council meetings.

This chapter describes the constitutional framework that governs the UN Security Council’s mandate as an international organisation in charge of handling threats to international peace and security. It first outlines the Council’s Rules of Procedure and provides an overview of the UN Charter before turning to a discussion of the Council’s role and function. It concludes with an assessment of how the Council documents its procedures.

This chapter describes how voting is conducted in the UN Security Council as well as the rules governing voting, namely, Articles 27 and 109 of the UN Charter, a number of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, and Article 10 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The chapter first discusses the rules governing substantive decisions and the veto, insufficient affirmative votes, procedural matters and the ‘double veto’, voting on the establishment of subsidiary organs, and voting on amendments. It then considers separate voting on paragraphs; interruption of voting; unanimity, consensus, and adoption by acclamation; abstentions, absences, and non-participation in the vote; and finality of the voting process. Finally, it explains statements before or after the vote, draft resolutions withdrawn or not brought to a vote, and reconsideration of a draft resolution that has not been adopted previously.

This chapter explores the idea that litigation presupposes a space that has, to date, commanded little attention from legal geography. Legal systems and processes and their associated “rules of engagement” create the space in which the various actors—plaintiffs, defendants, judges, juries, expert witnesses, and so on—perform. Often described as “procedural” as opposed to “substantive” aspects of the law, these rules of engagement tend to operate under a veil of neutrality. In reality, however, they reflect cultural values and consolidations of power worthy of examination. The rules of engagement examined here are those that dictate when US citizens have standing to bring federal court cases to enforce environmental protections. The author demonstrates how these seemingly “procedural” rules are playing an increasingly dispositive role in environmental litigation, thereby policing the production of legal space and discerning who gets to enter it.

The Nuremberg Military Tribunals derived their rules of evidence from three sources: Article VII of Ordinance No. 7; the evidentiary provisions of the Uniform Rules of Procedure, which Tribunal I drafted and adopted in the Medical case; and the ‘fundamental principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilized nations generally’. This chapter discusses the evidentiary issues that the tribunals addressed. Section 1 discusses two threshold issues, admissibility and the standard of proof. Section 2 deals with testimonial evidence, including the tribunals' controversial practice of taking evidence via commissioners. Section 3 focuses on documentary evidence, particularly the widespread use of affidavits in lieu of live testimony. Section 4 examines how the tribunals applied the doctrines of res judicata and judicial notice and dealt with the decisions of their predecessors.

Article 21 of the Rome Statute sets out a complex system of sources of applicable law. In addition to the Statute itself, which contains a relatively detailed list of crimes, Articles 21 includes the Elements of Crimes, a very detailed document which unnecessarily limits the scope of the crimes listed in the Statute and reveals mistrust with regard to the Court, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the case law of the Court, despite the absence of stare decisis. In order to avoid risks of non liquet, Article 21 also refers to other norms and rules of international law. Article 21 establishes a hierarchy between the sources of law it refers to. It combines a formal hierarchy, on top of which lays the Statute, with a substantial hierarchy dominated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’ (Article 21(3)).

In 2012 the European Court of Justice underwent several important reforms, including its new Rules of Procedure. Also, its case-law on constitutional issues, fundamental rights, citizenship, the internal market and other EU policy areas continued to evolve. For the first time, the Court was asked in the case of Pringle to give its opinion on the legality of a treaty reform. These and other important decisions were rendered during the year that the Court celebrated its sixtieth anniversary.

The year 2014 was characterized by an important reform for the European Court of Justice: the elaboration of the draft rules of procedure of the European Court of First Instance, the General Court. These new Rules of Procedure, adopted in 2015, aim to improve the effectiveness of the General Court, and introduce instruments for guaranteeing that material concerning the security of the EU is defended when handled by the General Court. Its case-law on fundamental rights, competition, free movement of persons, and other EU policy areas continue to progress.

This chapter explains the second reason for Justice Antonin Scalia’s enduring historical significance in understanding American constitutionalism. The chapter argues that he was closely allied with the Republican Party and shared the values of the social groups that constituted the party’s base. His jurisprudence and judicial career reflected that fact and did so to an unusually high degree, implementing the conservative agenda in such areas as civil rights and cases involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all designed to handicap plaintiffs across the board, especially those who sued governments and corporations. Thus, the chapter argues that Scalia’s jurisprudence and career exemplified a second fundamental characteristic of American constitutionalism, the close and informing relationship that exists between personal politics on one hand and formal methodologies and theories on the other. In his books, articles, speeches, and opinions, Scalia became a public celebrity and gave voice to virtually every theme in the conservative coalition’s rhetoric, and in the great majority of the cases he supported results consistent with the goals and values of that coalition.

This chapter evaluates the first four years of the work of the 255 Panel from the point of view of its president, the chapter’s author. First, the chapter identifies the aims and objectives with which the 255 Panel was created. Second, its procedures and the ways in which the Panel operates are set out; this also includes discussion of the evaluation criteria which the Panel employs. Finally, an evaluation of the role of the Panel is offered, suggesting that the Panel has lived up to the expectations placed on it by the Treaties as well as by the Member States.