Uwe Steinhoff
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199547807
- eISBN:
- 9780191720758
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547807.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for ...
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In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.Less
In his preliminary considerations Habermas tries to demonstrate the initial plausibility of his programme of moral justification. He then uses Karl-Otto Apel's “transcendental pragmatics” for identifying rules of discourse. According to transcendental pragmatics, rules or presuppositions of discourse cannot be denied without so-called “performative self-contradictions”. The next step is to derive the fundamental discourse-ethical justification principles U and D from these discovered rules of discourse. According to U and D, only those norms are valid that in an ideal discourse situation would meet with the acceptance of each speaker affected by the norm. An alternative way of justifying U and D would appeal to Habermas' consensus theory of truth and validity. Finally, Habermas tries to show how norms that are justified with help of the principles U and D can reasonably be applied to real situations. The chapter explains and critically discusses each step in Habermas' line of reasoning.
Robert Alexy
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- August 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198796831
- eISBN:
- 9780191838507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198796831.003.0018
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views, which, by reference to their historical models, can be named as follows: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, ...
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Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views, which, by reference to their historical models, can be named as follows: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian, and Nietzschean. The subject matter of this chapter is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the core lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is presented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcendental-pragmatic argument, an argument that takes account of the maximization of individual utility, and an empirical premise addressing an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the chapter outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.Less
Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views, which, by reference to their historical models, can be named as follows: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian, and Nietzschean. The subject matter of this chapter is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the core lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is presented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcendental-pragmatic argument, an argument that takes account of the maximization of individual utility, and an empirical premise addressing an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the chapter outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.
