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This chapter explores two rituals patterns involving women and hair. One is a ceremony prescribed for a married woman accused of adultery by her husband in the absence of witnesses or other tangible proof (Numbers 5:11–31). It is a particularly troubling passage for modern appropriators of biblical material, with its implications concerning men’s abusive power and women’s subjugation. A key symbol of the ritual involves the woman’s hair and the difficult-to-translate term pr‘, explored in connection with heroic hair and the uncut hair of the Nazirite vow. The second symbolic complex involves the treatment of one of the most valuable and vulnerable spoils of war, captured women (Deuteronomy 21:10–14). If an Israelite man desires one of these women as a wife, he may take her, but she is first transformed by ritual actions, among which is the shaving of her hair. Both passages are disturbing, multilayered, and thought provoking regarding gender, cultural identity, and transformation.

Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frazer’s explanation of the rule of succession of the priest-king of Nemi are clarified. Professor Frank Cioffi’s objections to Wittgenstein’s criticisms are examined. In an appendix, Professor Cioffi’s objections to this discussion are rebutted.

This chapter focuses on ritual performance. An individual performance of a ritual was not merely a simple repetition of an eternally fixed formula, but rather the conscious attempt of a historical individual to do the ritual, to repeat a time-honored pattern, to perform it to and for others in a specific situation, in a particular place. Writing, that is literature, might have been part of the performance. Texts are not only a part of the actual performance but also a part of its context, part of the performer's and audience's knowledge. Communication about ritual performances can be a determining factor in the interpretation and modification of a ritual action, and an individual performance cannot be analyzed in isolation from communication about previous performances or about the norms of the ritual.

This introductory chapter explains how in the study of language and culture, scholars may be interested in the significance of meaning for reasons other than the pursuit of meaning for its own sake. Analyzing how societies speak about rituals and interpret them indicates a larger interest about the nature of ritual action, hermeneutics, and historiography. The study presents myths and methods that may turn out to represent social or cultural circles lying at the skirts of rabbinic authority. But, at the same time, it derives from bodies of ancient Jewish literature, such as magical and divination texts and liturgical poetry or piyyut, that are not included in the rabbinic canon. While there is still debate about whether these forms of expression should be included in the category of “rabbinic” Judaism, it is clear that these literatures were not produced by the central shapers of the Talmuds.

The final chapter explores the ways in which competing interests and social groups of the polis potentially threatened the unity of the synoikized city. It first discusses potential causes for disunity (competing founder cults and claims to religious and social prerogatives, the challenges of social organization). It then focuses on the ways in which these challenges were addressed and negotiated. The chapter stresses the functional role of ritual activity and symbolism in binding together communities of disparate backgrounds while simultaneously accommodating distinctiveness within a unified political community. In this context, religious and civic traditions could constitute a challenge to the authority of the Hellenistic kings, but the potential for using religious symbolism and ritual to forge a collective political identity also represented an opportunity for building consensus. The chapter engages sociological and anthropological perspectives on ritual and ritual activity, myth, symbolism, and memory to address issues of consensus, legitimacy, dialogue, and social response.

Readers are asked to take objects to which they have attached spiritual meaning and create special (sacred or ritual) spaces for those objects. They are then asked to examine how their awareness of the location of their spiritually endowed object influences their daily behaviour and the meanings they attach to local experiences.

This chapter examines the history and structure of face (aberu) and facework in Iran. Upon analyzing the interlinkages between saving face and cultural norms of modesty, the chapter argues that face-savers uphold a moral code comprised of four rules—hard work, self-sufficiency, appearance, and purity—that mitigate threats to their face. These rules serve as moral evaluative distinctions by which both face-savers and members of their community judge others’ moral worth. This process leads to a system of micro-stratification within low-income communities, whereby those who have accumulated moral capital by mimicking middle-class values hold a higher status than those who have not. By exchanging their moral capital for social and economic benefits, face-savers come to gain social mobility within poverty. Agency thus lies in the process of ritual compliance to the social order. The chapter further discusses how face-savers’ aspirations for middle-class lifestyles not only reflect the embourgeoisement of Iranian society beyond the middle and upper classes, but also the state’s own developmental initiatives.

Readers are invited to take an everyday object and animate it. The purpose is to examine how our attitude towards material things may be transformed by ritual engagement with the things around us. Readers may wish to reflect on how it is possible to put a monetary value on objects in other cultures where people's local worlds are ritually invested.

This chapter examines karma. Karma, most literally, means action. Initially, it meant very specific ritual actions to bring about certain results. Later, the meaning of the term expanded and started to refer to all actions. Not only that, it is also used to refer to the effects of an individual’s actions and the connections between their actions and those effects. Given this basic idea of karma, it is important to highlight what it is not. People sometimes talk about the “law of karma.” People think of laws as having a lawmaker and an enforcer. However, karma is not like that—there is nobody writing the law and making sure it is enforced. In this sense, it is more like the law of gravity—it is a regularity in the way the world is; nobody has to write or enforce it. Moreover, karma is not some form of cosmic justice; it need not be about deserving the effects. Karma is not fate as well. The Buddha is clear that not all events are determined by karma.