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The aim of risk management is to ensure that effective controls are in place to mitigate identified risks. Previous chapters have identified the preliminary stages of the risk management process including risk awareness, identification, and assessment. Controlling risk is the next phase of ensuring delivery of safe high-quality care. Risk controls, also sometimes known as treatments, can take many forms depending on the location and nature of the risk. This chapter discusses risk control options, contingency planning, evaluating risk control options, and the risk treatment cycle.

This chapter, the previous two, and the next one consider the alternative means through which a contracting strategy is devised and implemented. In Ch. 7, the design of contracts and performance management systems are discussed, with particular attention paid to obtaining adequate measures of control whilst maintaining flexibility. The important question of risk, and its allocation between the contracting parties are also considered. The different parts of the chapter are the following: Control; Controlling outcomes; Monitoring performance; Controlling risks; Allocating risks in contracts; Flexibility in contracts; and Which contract––classical or relational?

National Health Service (NHS) Hospital Trusts are required to have in place systems of internal control which identify and control risks to an acceptable level. This chapter discusses risk management at the organizational level, risk-management performance, and committee structure for managing risk within an NHS Trust.

This chapter focuses on operational risk management for hedge funds. It takes a practitioner’s view of how to implement an operational risk framework as part of an enterprise-wide risk and control system in a “hands-on” approach. The focus of the contribution is on practical implementation with simple tools, such as Excel, rather than trying to quantify operational risk with complex mathematical formulas. The chapter outlines how a midsize hedge fund can develop systematically an integrated perspective on its main risks and set priorities on how to mitigate and control these risks. It illustrates the proposed process framework and solutions by using an example of the operational risk of “unauthorized trading.” Hints to avoid pitfalls when implementing an operational risk management framework, based on the authors’ experience as practitioners, are also provided.

The new dimension of Cairo is marked by a flight of the urban elites made more visible by the de-densification of the urban center. Within this optic, the gated communities must appear as a privileged window onto the reality of liberalization in Egypt. Analysis of these settlements allows us to understand how mechanisms of risk control impose social exclusion and how they define the risks themselves. Urban ecology and the priorities of security are reversed to favor suburban desert colonies: defensive bastions against the lost metropolis. This chapter also traces the material development of the gated communities, their promotion and appropriation. Then it identifies the risk discourses that create the foundation for, and enable the legitimation of, the renewed management of social distances. However, first, it is appropriate to define what it means by fear, risk, myth, and urban ecology.

This chapter examines what is needed for successful investing: controlling risk. Outstanding investors are distinguished at least as much for their ability to control risk as they are for generating return. They take risks that are less than commensurate with the returns they earn. They may produce moderate returns with low risk, or high returns with moderate risk. But achieving high returns with high risk means very little—unless the investor can do it for many years, in which case that perceived “high risk” either wasn’t really high or was exceptionally well managed. Risk control is invisible in good times but still essential, since good times can so easily turn into bad times. It’s the investor’s job to intelligently bear risk for profit. Doing it well is what separates the best from the rest. This chapter presents comments and views from four renowned investors and investment educators.

This chapter examines an ingredient for successful investing: controlling risk. Great investors are those who take risks that are less than commensurate with the returns they earn. They may produce moderate returns with low risk, or high returns with moderate risk. But achieving high returns with high risk means very little—unless the investor can do it for many years, in which case that perceived “high risk” either wasn't really high or was exceptionally well managed. In order for a portfolio to make it through tough times, the risk generally has to be well controlled. If the portfolio thrives in good times, however, we can't tell whether risk control was present but not required or lacking. Risk control is not the same as risk avoidance. Risk control is the best route to loss avoidance whereas risk avoidance is likely to lead to return avoidance as well. This chapter argues that the road to long-term investment success runs through risk control more than through aggressiveness.

Much of the development of children, young people, and young adults is determined by opportunities for play and “real life” experience in their early years. This is not, as some believe, an optional or frivolous luxury, but an essential life experience for development of character, skills, self-awareness, and competence. Yet in recent years, evidence shows that opportunities for this at all ages have diminished in both quality and quantity in many countries. The reasons for this are multiple and complex, but one factor has been a drive to create a low risk or even risk-free society via the application of newly developed techniques of risk assessment and science-based methods of risk control. However, the health benefits of these public safety initiatives might have much less effect than people might believe and could, overall, be harmful through their prohibitions. We conclude that more research into the nature of risky play and risk exposure through teenage years and into adulthood is necessary, but tentatively propose that we need to also consider the possible effects of irrational overprotection. In addition to the conventional play setting, the current spread of trigger warning and safety rooms will be considered as an illustrative case affecting young adults. Rather than avoidance and consolidation of negative metacognitions about lack of control and vulnerability one needs to convey how science suggests that exposure or interventions to change perceptions of vulnerability may be more beneficial.

Over the past several decades the Japanese government has iteratively improved institutional and legislative frameworks for risk management after major natural disasters. Recently, reducing spatial vulnerability has been emphasized and laws related to land use and disaster management acts have been refined for implementation. Nevertheless, actual risk control via land use had been limited prior to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 (GEJE). Since Japan has relatively little residential land compared to their large population, designating hazardous areas was considered impractical and financially infeasible. In post-GEJE rebuilding, however, a paradigm shift has been observed – land use control has been strictly enforced, with an unprecedented amount of land designated as hazardous. This chapter explains the foundation of the disaster management system and land use control in Japan by introducing institutional and legislative frameworks that relate to water-related disasters.

This chapter, focuses on the adoption of an explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), what factors influence safety net design, and if these same factors are able to affect risk-shifting controls as well. The chapter assumes that the crafting of a country’s financial safety net is an exercise in incomplete contracting where the counterparties are major sectors of a nation’s economy. The study itself covers the deposit insurance design of over 170 countries, spanning the years 1960–2003. Overall, it is learned that democratic systems, though likely to adopt deposit insurance, are apt to design it poorly. Poor designs are also seen in systems installed during crisis circumstances and in response to external pressures to emulate other countries. All in all, it is not suggested that deposit insurance be avoided altogether, but that there are more effective substitutes that take many forms.

Collateral availability is the ultimate constraint to accessing central bank credit, which explains its importance for both monetary policy and financial stability. The ECB’s collateral framework is presented as an example. The role of risk control measures in the collateral framework is explained (collateral eligibility, haircuts, limits, valuation, margin calls). Desirable properties of central bank eligible collateral (legal certainty, credit quality, simplicity, market transparency and liquidity, settlement costs and currency denomination) are derived, and a simple economic logic to establish a collateral framework is proposed. The market impact of the collateral framework is considered. Finally, the impact of collateral eligibility on asset prices is discussed.

This concluding chapter recaps the most important requirements for successful investing. It reiterates the argument that the best foundation for a successful investment—or a successful investment career—is value. To achieve superior investment results, the investor must have superior insight into value. In order to know when to buy or sell, the investor’s view of value has to be based on a solid factual and analytical foundation. The price/value relationship, which is influenced by psychology and technicals, holds the ultimate key to investment success. Buying below value is the most dependable route to profit; it is also a key element in limiting risk. Other important factors that investors need to take into account are risk control, contrarianism, defensive investing, avoiding the pitfalls, and having reasonable expectations.

This concluding chapter recapitulates the author's ideas on successful investing. The best foundation for a successful investment—or a successful investment career—is value. To achieve superior investment results, the investor's insight into value has to be superior. Thus they must learn things others don't, see things differently or do a better job of analyzing them—ideally, all three. The investor's view of value has to be based on a solid factual and analytical foundation, and it has to be held firmly. Only then will they know when to buy or sell. The relationship between price and value holds the ultimate key to investment success. Buying below value is the most dependable route to profit. The price/value relationship is influenced by psychology and technicals, forces that can dominate fundamentals in the short run. Other important things to take into account by investors are contrarianism, defensive investing, risk control, and margin for error.

This chapter addresses the unitary strand to show that while some clear breaks have to be made from the existing setup, a unifying overarching concept of the employer can be maintained. Its opening sections return to the three main factors identified as driving the unitary strand in Chapter 1 (in particular privity of contract and separate legal personality), re-examining each one to demonstrate a growing incongruence between developments in the relevant areas and labour law’s rigid bilateral contractual analysis. The chapter then explores the need for an overarching concept of the employer to fulfil its key public-regulatory function of facilitating the risk/control trade-off at the heart of modern labour markets. Analysed thus, the received concept fails to achieve its basic tasks in nearly all situations beyond a unitary paradigm, whereas the reconceptualized strand ensures that the concept of the employer can grapple with complex multilateral manifestations of shared employer functions.

This chapter provides a commentary on the two previous chapters that discuss the causes of the 2008 financial crisis. The chapter first notes how both of the previous chapters take on the view of “the government did it,” and then denounces the method through which both chapters seek to find the underlying cause and find the guilty party. This chapter, then, suggests a third path to go down: that both parties (the markets and the government) were highly responsible, and did not necessarily intend for the outcome to be as such. The blame, then, is placed elsewhere: on a broad range of private players and public regulators in the financial sector. The chapter argues that regulation alone cannot be the complete and most effective approach to proper risk control. The solution, then, is to consider regulation in a new light. The focus, as this chapter suggests and expounds upon, should be on information.