David Ross
Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a ...
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The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.Less
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
Michael Smith
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199269914
- eISBN:
- 9780191710032
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter proposes a conception of Practical Ethics which ties what epistemically limited agents are to do on some occasion not only to limits on their non-evaluative information about how much ...
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This chapter proposes a conception of Practical Ethics which ties what epistemically limited agents are to do on some occasion not only to limits on their non-evaluative information about how much intrinsic value would result from various actions, but also to epistemic limits on their evaluative information about what has intrinsic value. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section spells out Moore's view of the way in which uncertainty affects the proposed definition of rightness in terms of the maximization of value. The second section compares Moore's view with an alternative put forward more recently by Frank Jackson (1991). The third and fourth sections present the author's own account and say why it should be preferred to both Moore's and Jackson's views. To anticipate, it turns out that Moore and Jackson are both right about something and wrong about something. The correct view combines elements from both.Less
This chapter proposes a conception of Practical Ethics which ties what epistemically limited agents are to do on some occasion not only to limits on their non-evaluative information about how much intrinsic value would result from various actions, but also to epistemic limits on their evaluative information about what has intrinsic value. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section spells out Moore's view of the way in which uncertainty affects the proposed definition of rightness in terms of the maximization of value. The second section compares Moore's view with an alternative put forward more recently by Frank Jackson (1991). The third and fourth sections present the author's own account and say why it should be preferred to both Moore's and Jackson's views. To anticipate, it turns out that Moore and Jackson are both right about something and wrong about something. The correct view combines elements from both.
Katherin A. Rogers
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231676
- eISBN:
- 9780191716089
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231676.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, General
Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry ...
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Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry Frankfurt. Contrary to one common interpretation, he does not foreshadow a Kantian ethic, but rather adheres to the standard eudaemonism of his day.Less
Free choice is the ability to keep justice, which Anselm defines as rightness of will kept for its own sake. He proposes a hierarchical analysis of free choice which prefigures the work of Harry Frankfurt. Contrary to one common interpretation, he does not foreshadow a Kantian ethic, but rather adheres to the standard eudaemonism of his day.
David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199751808
- eISBN:
- 9780199894840
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199751808.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After ...
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This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After furnishing positive arguments in favor of moral apologetics, the book defends theistic ethics against a number of objections inspired by the Euthyphro Dilemma. Such objections include normativity, “no reasons,” abhorrent commands, vacuity, epistemic, and autonomy objections. Subsequent chapters deploy seven distinctions that together enable both a defense of theistic ethics and an advancement of the moral argument(s) for God's existence. The relevant distinctions encompass matters of scope, semantics, modality, morality, epistemology, meta-ethics, and ontology. The book makes the case not just that God exists, but that a God of perfect love exists, a God who is holy, impeccable, perfect, and a God of covenantal fidelity who can be trusted. Such a notion of Deity provides the needed resources to answer the problem of evil and make sense of Old Testament conquest narratives, while at the same time providing warrant to resist portraits of God that are impossible to square with nonnegotiable moral intuitions. Finally, the book argues that morality receives its fullest and deepest illumination in light of distinctively Christian doctrines such as resurrection, incarnation, and heaven.Less
This book defends an interconnected set of moral arguments for God's existence by arguing that classical theism better explains moral duty, freedom, and responsibility than naturalism does. After furnishing positive arguments in favor of moral apologetics, the book defends theistic ethics against a number of objections inspired by the Euthyphro Dilemma. Such objections include normativity, “no reasons,” abhorrent commands, vacuity, epistemic, and autonomy objections. Subsequent chapters deploy seven distinctions that together enable both a defense of theistic ethics and an advancement of the moral argument(s) for God's existence. The relevant distinctions encompass matters of scope, semantics, modality, morality, epistemology, meta-ethics, and ontology. The book makes the case not just that God exists, but that a God of perfect love exists, a God who is holy, impeccable, perfect, and a God of covenantal fidelity who can be trusted. Such a notion of Deity provides the needed resources to answer the problem of evil and make sense of Old Testament conquest narratives, while at the same time providing warrant to resist portraits of God that are impossible to square with nonnegotiable moral intuitions. Finally, the book argues that morality receives its fullest and deepest illumination in light of distinctively Christian doctrines such as resurrection, incarnation, and heaven.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Act‐utilitarianism implies that lying is morally permissible when, and only when, there is no alternative course of action open to one that has better consequences than lying. Many critics contend ...
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Act‐utilitarianism implies that lying is morally permissible when, and only when, there is no alternative course of action open to one that has better consequences than lying. Many critics contend that utilitarianism is too permissive about the morality of lying. Mill attempts to answer this objection in Utilitarianism where he claims that lying always has indirect bad consequences (lying makes one less honest and undermines trust between people). Mill claims that, therefore, utilitarianism implies that there is a strong moral presumption against lying. The chapter defends Mill's argument and note two ways in which it can be extended and strengthened. First, there is another indirect bad consequence of lying that Mill does not mention – the difficulties that liars incur in trying to “keep their stories straight.” Second, in addition to the indirect bad consequences of lying (and deception), there are also direct bad consequences. We are (generally) harmed when we are deceived because we cannot effectively pursue our ends and interests if we act on the basis of false beliefs.Less
Act‐utilitarianism implies that lying is morally permissible when, and only when, there is no alternative course of action open to one that has better consequences than lying. Many critics contend that utilitarianism is too permissive about the morality of lying. Mill attempts to answer this objection in Utilitarianism where he claims that lying always has indirect bad consequences (lying makes one less honest and undermines trust between people). Mill claims that, therefore, utilitarianism implies that there is a strong moral presumption against lying. The chapter defends Mill's argument and note two ways in which it can be extended and strengthened. First, there is another indirect bad consequence of lying that Mill does not mention – the difficulties that liars incur in trying to “keep their stories straight.” Second, in addition to the indirect bad consequences of lying (and deception), there are also direct bad consequences. We are (generally) harmed when we are deceived because we cannot effectively pursue our ends and interests if we act on the basis of false beliefs.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of ...
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This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of economic distribution (both within society and internationally). Such sentimentalism founds its ideas about justice on a different basis from that which any form of rationalism would appeal to, but on such a differing and sentimentalist basis, it can in fact deal with the entire range of issues that any systematic approach to social/moral issues will want to discuss.Less
This chapter goes on to discuss justice. It shows how an ethics of care based on our understanding of how empathy operates can deal plausibly with issues of basic rights and liberties and issues of economic distribution (both within society and internationally). Such sentimentalism founds its ideas about justice on a different basis from that which any form of rationalism would appeal to, but on such a differing and sentimentalist basis, it can in fact deal with the entire range of issues that any systematic approach to social/moral issues will want to discuss.
Michael Slote
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195391442
- eISBN:
- 9780199866250
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391442.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter offers a specific account of the meaning of moral terms based on semi‐Kripkean theory that fixes the reference of right, wrong, and the like in relation to feelings of warmth and chill ...
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This chapter offers a specific account of the meaning of moral terms based on semi‐Kripkean theory that fixes the reference of right, wrong, and the like in relation to feelings of warmth and chill as caused by empathy with moral agents. This allows moral claims to be a priori, necessary, and objective — and works entirely in sentimentalist terms. But since empathy with agents helps to constitute moral approval and disapproval, the theory seems to allow claims about what we approve and disapprove to entail moral judgments, and this raises the issue whether sentimentalism wants to or has to allow the derivation of “ought's” from “is's.”Less
This chapter offers a specific account of the meaning of moral terms based on semi‐Kripkean theory that fixes the reference of right, wrong, and the like in relation to feelings of warmth and chill as caused by empathy with moral agents. This allows moral claims to be a priori, necessary, and objective — and works entirely in sentimentalist terms. But since empathy with agents helps to constitute moral approval and disapproval, the theory seems to allow claims about what we approve and disapprove to entail moral judgments, and this raises the issue whether sentimentalism wants to or has to allow the derivation of “ought's” from “is's.”
G. E. Moore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic ...
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This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic of all and only right actions, but also that right actions are right because they produce a maximum of pleasure. Moreover, this is true in all conceivable circumstances and in any conceivable universe. Moore also explains what it means for utilitarianism to judge something to be intrinsically better (or worse) than other things, and he distinguishes something as being ‘intrinsically good’ from its being ‘ultimately good’ or ‘good for its own sake’.Less
This chapter continues the previous chapter’s detailed analysis of the utilitarian account of right and wrong. Utilitarianism asserts not only that producing a maximum of pleasure is a characteristic of all and only right actions, but also that right actions are right because they produce a maximum of pleasure. Moreover, this is true in all conceivable circumstances and in any conceivable universe. Moore also explains what it means for utilitarianism to judge something to be intrinsically better (or worse) than other things, and he distinguishes something as being ‘intrinsically good’ from its being ‘ultimately good’ or ‘good for its own sake’.
Oswald Bayer and Jeff Cayzer
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199249091
- eISBN:
- 9780191697807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199249091.003.0016
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter deals with the concepts of power, law and justice. Power is conceived of as a causal relationship that is adopted as a relationship of means and end in areas of action. Knowledge is ...
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This chapter deals with the concepts of power, law and justice. Power is conceived of as a causal relationship that is adopted as a relationship of means and end in areas of action. Knowledge is power. On the other hand, Law means freedom, which is specifically the human form of power and is found in the congruence of hearing and speaking, or more specifically, of promises made and the trust placed in those promises. Justice is a concept moral of rightness based on ethics.Less
This chapter deals with the concepts of power, law and justice. Power is conceived of as a causal relationship that is adopted as a relationship of means and end in areas of action. Knowledge is power. On the other hand, Law means freedom, which is specifically the human form of power and is found in the congruence of hearing and speaking, or more specifically, of promises made and the trust placed in those promises. Justice is a concept moral of rightness based on ethics.
Brad Hooker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256570
- eISBN:
- 9780191597701
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256578.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Act‐consequentialism is best construed as a criterion of rightness, not a decision procedure. Act‐consequentialism recommends that our procedure for making moral decisions employs rules very like the ...
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Act‐consequentialism is best construed as a criterion of rightness, not a decision procedure. Act‐consequentialism recommends that our procedure for making moral decisions employs rules very like the ones endorsed by rule‐consequentialism. However, the chapter highlights the remaining significant differences between act‐consequentialism and rule‐consequentialism over prohibitions, and discusses the extreme demandingness of act‐consequentialist duties to aid.Less
Act‐consequentialism is best construed as a criterion of rightness, not a decision procedure. Act‐consequentialism recommends that our procedure for making moral decisions employs rules very like the ones endorsed by rule‐consequentialism. However, the chapter highlights the remaining significant differences between act‐consequentialism and rule‐consequentialism over prohibitions, and discusses the extreme demandingness of act‐consequentialist duties to aid.
W. D. Ross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This first chapter of Ross's book is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of right. The interest throughout is ethical, with value only being discussed as far as it seems relevant. The first aspect ...
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This first chapter of Ross's book is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of right. The interest throughout is ethical, with value only being discussed as far as it seems relevant. The first aspect addressed is the ambiguity inherent in any definition of the meaning of right. G. E. Moore's three definitions of a horse are discussed: these may be designated the arbitrary verbal definition, the verbal definition proper, and the definition that involves the sense of being reduced to elements simpler than itself. These three types of definition are applied to the subsequent discussion of the meaning of right, which includes looking at the difference between right and duty, at moral goodness, at the reduction of right to elements simpler than itself, at right definable as productive of a certain outcome (the greatest good), at ethical principles, at hedonistic utilitarianism, and at the sociological school.Less
This first chapter of Ross's book is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of right. The interest throughout is ethical, with value only being discussed as far as it seems relevant. The first aspect addressed is the ambiguity inherent in any definition of the meaning of right. G. E. Moore's three definitions of a horse are discussed: these may be designated the arbitrary verbal definition, the verbal definition proper, and the definition that involves the sense of being reduced to elements simpler than itself. These three types of definition are applied to the subsequent discussion of the meaning of right, which includes looking at the difference between right and duty, at moral goodness, at the reduction of right to elements simpler than itself, at right definable as productive of a certain outcome (the greatest good), at ethical principles, at hedonistic utilitarianism, and at the sociological school.
W. D. Ross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the ...
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This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).Less
This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).
Andrei Marmor
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780198268970
- eISBN:
- 9780191713187
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268970.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter examines four different questions about the objectivity of law. First, are there objective criteria about the identification of law? Second, can particular laws show objective rightness ...
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This chapter examines four different questions about the objectivity of law. First, are there objective criteria about the identification of law? Second, can particular laws show objective rightness or wrongness? The third question concerns another sense of objectivity which is particularly interesting in the legal case. It is the kind of objectivity which is concerned with the avoidance of bias, partiality, favouritism, and such. The chapter analyses the relations between objectivity in this sense, which is called judicial objectivity, and neutrality and equality. It also considers a familiar question about the possible objectivity of legal theory, arguing that although legal theory is evaluative in many respects, it does not necessarily depend on moral conceptions.Less
This chapter examines four different questions about the objectivity of law. First, are there objective criteria about the identification of law? Second, can particular laws show objective rightness or wrongness? The third question concerns another sense of objectivity which is particularly interesting in the legal case. It is the kind of objectivity which is concerned with the avoidance of bias, partiality, favouritism, and such. The chapter analyses the relations between objectivity in this sense, which is called judicial objectivity, and neutrality and equality. It also considers a familiar question about the possible objectivity of legal theory, arguing that although legal theory is evaluative in many respects, it does not necessarily depend on moral conceptions.
P. F. Strawson
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199587292
- eISBN:
- 9780191728747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587292.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This chapter examines the question of how, if moral rightness or goodness is unanalyzable, we can come to know what acts are right. It is particularly concerned with intuition and its role in ethical ...
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This chapter examines the question of how, if moral rightness or goodness is unanalyzable, we can come to know what acts are right. It is particularly concerned with intuition and its role in ethical theory. It suggests that our intuition is not a bare intuition of the moral characteristic, but also the intuition of its dependence on some others: so that this fundamental situation yields us, by intuitive induction, knowledge of moral rules, generalizations regarding the right and the good, which we can apply in other cases, even when an actual intuition is lacking.Less
This chapter examines the question of how, if moral rightness or goodness is unanalyzable, we can come to know what acts are right. It is particularly concerned with intuition and its role in ethical theory. It suggests that our intuition is not a bare intuition of the moral characteristic, but also the intuition of its dependence on some others: so that this fundamental situation yields us, by intuitive induction, knowledge of moral rules, generalizations regarding the right and the good, which we can apply in other cases, even when an actual intuition is lacking.
Mark Timmons
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- April 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780190203368
- eISBN:
- 9780190203399
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190203368.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This collection brings together nine previously published essays on Kant’s ethics, plus one new chapter on Kant’s conception of moral evil, by Mark Timmons. The collection is divided into three ...
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This collection brings together nine previously published essays on Kant’s ethics, plus one new chapter on Kant’s conception of moral evil, by Mark Timmons. The collection is divided into three parts. In Part I, Interpreting the Categorical Imperative, the author explores the complexities of Kant’s universal law formulation of the Categorical Imperative as well as semantic and epistemological elements of its justification. This part includes “Necessitation and Justification in Kant’s Ethics,” “Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions,” “The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability,” and “The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant’s Universality Formulations of the Categorical Imperative.” Part II, Motive, Rightness, and Virtue, explores Kant’s conception of virtue, moral motivation and its relation to moral rightness, the perfect duties to oneself as an animal being, and the complex duty of gratitude. This part features “Motive and Rightness in Kant’s Ethical System,” “Kant’s Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue,” “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being,” and “The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant’s Ethics.” Part III, The Psychology of Moral Evil, focuses on Kant’s conception of moral evil and the vices. It includes “Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Devilish Vices in Kant’s Ethics” and “The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: Reflections on Kant’s Conception of Moral Evil.” The collection also includes a thematic introduction.Less
This collection brings together nine previously published essays on Kant’s ethics, plus one new chapter on Kant’s conception of moral evil, by Mark Timmons. The collection is divided into three parts. In Part I, Interpreting the Categorical Imperative, the author explores the complexities of Kant’s universal law formulation of the Categorical Imperative as well as semantic and epistemological elements of its justification. This part includes “Necessitation and Justification in Kant’s Ethics,” “Decision Procedures, Moral Criteria, and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions,” “The Categorical Imperative and Universalizability,” and “The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant’s Universality Formulations of the Categorical Imperative.” Part II, Motive, Rightness, and Virtue, explores Kant’s conception of virtue, moral motivation and its relation to moral rightness, the perfect duties to oneself as an animal being, and the complex duty of gratitude. This part features “Motive and Rightness in Kant’s Ethical System,” “Kant’s Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue,” “The Perfect Duty to Oneself as an Animal Being,” and “The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant’s Ethics.” Part III, The Psychology of Moral Evil, focuses on Kant’s conception of moral evil and the vices. It includes “Love of Honor, Emulation, and the Devilish Vices in Kant’s Ethics” and “The Good, the Bad, and the Badass: Reflections on Kant’s Conception of Moral Evil.” The collection also includes a thematic introduction.
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226487953
- eISBN:
- 9780226487977
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226487977.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This chapter discusses the propositional form of rules of law. The “anomaly” about a rule of law, that it “is made for the purpose of covering its own breach” was an “anomaly” which depends on first ...
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This chapter discusses the propositional form of rules of law. The “anomaly” about a rule of law, that it “is made for the purpose of covering its own breach” was an “anomaly” which depends on first seeing the rule as in a fundamental sense a command. The Oughtness of a legal consequence in a propositional form of rule lay in an inevitable and similar flux between legal rightness and ethical rightness. Rules of law were rules with the function of accomplishing control by language-communication. There were two elements in this: language-communication and accomplishment of control. The very propositional form of [a] rule of law was itself an ideal type, not a description of the actual and current rules. Current rules were very commonly elliptical in phrasing; on the case-law side, they rarely have an accepted form of precise wording—what is “the universally accepted rule” is an idea, not a phrasing.Less
This chapter discusses the propositional form of rules of law. The “anomaly” about a rule of law, that it “is made for the purpose of covering its own breach” was an “anomaly” which depends on first seeing the rule as in a fundamental sense a command. The Oughtness of a legal consequence in a propositional form of rule lay in an inevitable and similar flux between legal rightness and ethical rightness. Rules of law were rules with the function of accomplishing control by language-communication. There were two elements in this: language-communication and accomplishment of control. The very propositional form of [a] rule of law was itself an ideal type, not a description of the actual and current rules. Current rules were very commonly elliptical in phrasing; on the case-law side, they rarely have an accepted form of precise wording—what is “the universally accepted rule” is an idea, not a phrasing.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780198732600
- eISBN:
- 9780191796821
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732600.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that we human beings can enjoy a good life only insofar as we act towards one another out of attachments like love and friendship, virtues like honesty and fidelity, and the respect ...
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This book argues that we human beings can enjoy a good life only insofar as we act towards one another out of attachments like love and friendship, virtues like honesty and fidelity, and the respect that enables us each to enjoy autonomy in exercising our basic liberties. The goods we put in one another’s hands by acting out of such dispositions make robust demands. I do not enjoy an attachment like your friendship just because you actually give me favour; you must provide that treatment regardless of my charm or your convenience. And as this is true for friendship and favour, so it is true for a virtue like honesty and truth-telling, and for any form of respect and non-interference. In each case my enjoyment of the good requires you to treat me well, not just actually, but robustly: that is, across ways things might be as well as ways things actually are. The book argues that making a place in ethics for the goods of attachment, virtue, and respect has serious implications for how we think people ought to behave. It means that doing good is not just a matter of performing beneficial acts; it requires performing those acts out of beneficent dispositions. And it requires those who seek to do what is right to let themselves be guided under suitable conditions by motives of attachment, virtue, and respect: they must give those dispositions a controlling role in their lives.Less
This book argues that we human beings can enjoy a good life only insofar as we act towards one another out of attachments like love and friendship, virtues like honesty and fidelity, and the respect that enables us each to enjoy autonomy in exercising our basic liberties. The goods we put in one another’s hands by acting out of such dispositions make robust demands. I do not enjoy an attachment like your friendship just because you actually give me favour; you must provide that treatment regardless of my charm or your convenience. And as this is true for friendship and favour, so it is true for a virtue like honesty and truth-telling, and for any form of respect and non-interference. In each case my enjoyment of the good requires you to treat me well, not just actually, but robustly: that is, across ways things might be as well as ways things actually are. The book argues that making a place in ethics for the goods of attachment, virtue, and respect has serious implications for how we think people ought to behave. It means that doing good is not just a matter of performing beneficial acts; it requires performing those acts out of beneficent dispositions. And it requires those who seek to do what is right to let themselves be guided under suitable conditions by motives of attachment, virtue, and respect: they must give those dispositions a controlling role in their lives.
Elinor Mason
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198833604
- eISBN:
- 9780191872037
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198833604.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. The book presents a pluralistic view of both our ...
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This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. The book presents a pluralistic view of both our deontic concepts and our responsibility concepts, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective rightness and wrongness. Subjective obligation and ordinary blameworthiness apply only to those who are within our moral community, that is to say, those who understand and share our value system. By contrast, the second sort of blameworthiness, detached blameworthiness, can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. We blame agents for acting objectively wrongly, even if we do not have any view about their state of mind in so doing. Finally, the third sort of blameworthiness is ‘extended blameworthiness’, which applies in some contexts where the agent has acted wrongly, and understands the wrongness, but has acted wrongly entirely inadvertently. In such cases the agent is not personally at fault but the social context may be such that she should take responsibility, and thus become blameworthy.Less
This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. The book presents a pluralistic view of both our deontic concepts and our responsibility concepts, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective rightness and wrongness. Subjective obligation and ordinary blameworthiness apply only to those who are within our moral community, that is to say, those who understand and share our value system. By contrast, the second sort of blameworthiness, detached blameworthiness, can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. We blame agents for acting objectively wrongly, even if we do not have any view about their state of mind in so doing. Finally, the third sort of blameworthiness is ‘extended blameworthiness’, which applies in some contexts where the agent has acted wrongly, and understands the wrongness, but has acted wrongly entirely inadvertently. In such cases the agent is not personally at fault but the social context may be such that she should take responsibility, and thus become blameworthy.
Daniel Whiting
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- November 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780192893956
- eISBN:
- 9780191915185
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780192893956.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person’s ...
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This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person’s actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person’s beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.Less
This book contributes to two debates and it does so by bringing them together. The first is a debate in metaethics concerning normative reasons, the considerations that serve to justify a person’s actions and attitudes. The second is a debate in epistemology concerning the norms for belief, the standards that govern a person’s beliefs and by reference to which they are assessed. The book starts by developing and defending a new theory of reasons for action, that is, of practical reasons. The theory belongs to a family that analyses reasons by appeal to the normative notion of rightness (fittingness, correctness); it is distinctive in making central appeal to modal notions, specifically, that of a nearby possible world. The result is a comprehensive framework that captures what is common to and distinctive of reasons of various kinds: justifying and demanding; for and against, possessed and unpossessed; objective and subjective. The framework is then generalized to reasons for belief, that is, to epistemic reasons, and combined with a substantive, first-order commitment, namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The upshot is an account of the various norms governing belief, including knowledge and rationality, and the relations among them. According to it, the standards to which belief is subject are various, but they are unified by an underlying principle.
Lawrence Dewan
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- March 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780823227969
- eISBN:
- 9780823237210
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fso/9780823227969.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
James Keenan's book Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae offers us an occasion to reflect on the conception of the will and its relation to ...
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James Keenan's book Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae offers us an occasion to reflect on the conception of the will and its relation to intellect. This book favors a distinction involving the use of the words “goodness” and “rightness.” Whereas classical Christian moral theology has spoken of both persons and their actions as “good” and “bad,” Keenan proposes that one reserve the vocabulary of “goodness” for persons (persons are good if they strive to do the right thing), while speaking of actions as “right” and “wrong.” This chapter discusses Chapters 2 and 3, which are the fundamentals for the reading of Thomas presented in the book. It then expresses an opinion on the proposed distinction between goodness and rightness.Less
James Keenan's book Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae offers us an occasion to reflect on the conception of the will and its relation to intellect. This book favors a distinction involving the use of the words “goodness” and “rightness.” Whereas classical Christian moral theology has spoken of both persons and their actions as “good” and “bad,” Keenan proposes that one reserve the vocabulary of “goodness” for persons (persons are good if they strive to do the right thing), while speaking of actions as “right” and “wrong.” This chapter discusses Chapters 2 and 3, which are the fundamentals for the reading of Thomas presented in the book. It then expresses an opinion on the proposed distinction between goodness and rightness.
