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This chapter argues that Tea Party advances its agenda using the historic rhetoric, tropes, and frames of right-wing populism, especially the narrative called “producerism.” In right-wing producerist movements, activists tend to perceive their political adversaries through the lens of fear-based dualism (self versus other; us versus them) and demonization of the “other.” They claim their opponents threaten the very existence of the nation. In the Tea Party movement, these views are intertwined with long-standing right-wing conspiracy theories about liberal betrayal. In an effort to mobilize its members, the Tea Party movement largely has adopted fear-based frames and narratives in which liberal and left ideological opponents are demonized and scapegoated as consciously or unconsciously destroying the America of liberty and freedom.

This chapter argues that the core problem is not ideology or corporate self-interest but rather the rise of a right-wing populism that feeds on racism and xenophobia. When workers suffer from stagnating or declining incomes, loss of benefits and pensions, declining health and health care coverage, and increased job insecurity, the right gives them an answer: blame black people, Latinxs, immigrants, Jews, or Muslims; blame the media elites, academics, or experts, not your employer; embrace the rich in the hope that someday you can be one of them; and condemn powerless people as the cause of your problems. The chapter describes how populism draws its energy from a racist, sexist, and xenophobic framing of the impact of the economic crisis on working-class Americans while also rejecting the postwar global order in favor of a return to American isolationism. It laments the Left's failure to offer plausible solutions and to create lasting solidarity across gender, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. This chapter explains that no revival of labor will be possible without engaging union members about race, gender, immigration, and the true nature of right-wing populism.

This chapter examines the relationship between right-wing populism and community development. Community development has identified itself as working with the most marginalised in society, as a result of its 'welfare' orientation and mandate to address social problems, and has also identified itself with more politically progressive movements for social change, such as anti-racism, feminism, Indigenous land rights, pro-LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, Queer) rights, refugee rights, environmentalism, and so on. It positions itself as supporting the 'parasites' so mistrusted by right-wing populism. Such a positioning of community development suggests that community development is as much an anathema to right-wing populists as right-wing populism is to community development workers, and that the two are fundamentally opposed. The chapter then considers the relationship between them first in relation to the crisis in modernity, and then more specifically in relation to one aspect of that crisis, namely the erosion of the legitimacy and the institutions of liberal democracy. This will lead to some suggestions of how community development might move to address some of these issues and retain both its relevance and its integrity in a world where right-wing populism will be a continuing presence.

This chapter explores the potential responses of community development practice to the proliferation of populist practices in Hong Kong. Populism is an under-researched area in the community development field in Hong Kong, despite the increasing prominence of populism globally and the rising popularity of populist practice in Hong Kong since its return to China in 1997. Studies of populism, particularly right-wing populism, have developed the 'globalisation loser' hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, disadvantaged groups, which in the present context include young people, who are frequent users of community development programmes, support right-wing populism. Currently, community workers in Hong Kong are unprepared to respond to this phenomenon. This study is the first stage of a research project examining the implications of populism for community development practice in Hong Kong. To contextualise the study, the chapter outlines the productivist welfare regime of Hong Kong and the resultant characteristics of community development services in Hong Kong.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the issues that the book discusses, as well as the challenges in editing it. The book offers diverse critical perspectives, both international and cross-disciplinary, on the challenge of how to make sense of contemporary forms of populism and also how community development responds to these. It particularly focuses on right-wing populism. How can those committed to community development endeavours respond to populism? When thinking about any community development response to populism, it is important to understand that feelings of alienation and resentment, and concerns about uncertainty and material insecurity, have a rational basis. From this perspective, populism should be viewed as a symptom of underlying factors that have characterised much of the global state of affairs since the last decades of the twentieth century. Taking the viewpoint that populism is a symptom, any response to populism must be cognisant of the underlying conditions in which populism has arisen. The chapter then considers the view that populism is a symptom of the deterioration of the project of democracy.

This chapter uses a regression study to attempt to identify the link between populist governments and the country’s degree of trade openness, based on data from 1995 to 2018. The degree of protectionism associated with populism depends in part on its left-wing, right-wing, or anti-establishment orientation. Left-wing populist regimes tend to be more protectionist, and anti-establishment regimes more favorable to open trade, for example, but the results are often inconsistent and insignificant. Trade policy in populist regimes appears to depend in large part on the national context, export profile, and populist leader. A review of trade policy in several recent populist regimes reveals that Latin American populist governments tend to be the most protectionist. Smaller open economies, or those either participating in or seeking integration trade agreements with larger countries, tend to have more open trade policies.

This chapter explores how European social democracy is threatened to be undermined and overrun by radical left-wing competitors and right-wing populist opponents. The pan-European rise of right-wing populism has had far-reaching consequences. First of all, the political and public agenda has shifted from a socioeconomic perspective to a cultural perspective. Right-wing populism is ‘culturalising’ all political issues, and is characterised by a nativist focus on putting its ‘own people first’. Second, right-wing populism portrays and demonises social democracy as forming the elite ‘which betrays ordinary people’. It also depicts social democratic parties as being simply parties for migrants. By doing so, right-wing populists deliberately seek to distance traditional social democratic voters from social democratic parties. Third, the rise of right-wing populism is increasing opportunities for right-wing or Conservative governments.

This chapter evaluates what community development's response might be to right-wing populism. It begins by looking at the literature's analysis of right-wing populism. The chapter then considers a theory of social change that might help in charting a way forward for community development praxis. Community development practitioners need to engage locally and globally, bringing their particular skills in creating spaces, places, and platforms for associational life, filled with dialogical and agonistic conflict. It is their job to create the places where people can put aside their rage, and learn the disciplines of conversation and deliberation, heard, while not affirmed as necessarily right. In a nutshell, the work of reconnecting. These are the basic qualities of liberal democracy also infused with a radical egalitarian spirit, and a cohesive society.

This chapter takes a less optimistic view about the future of social democracy, showing how right-populist and anti-immigration parties have exploited weaknesses in the Nordic model and appropriated defence of the welfare state and even gender equality in order to undermine the social democratic appeal.

This chapter explores the relationship between populism and environmental justice in Latin America. It was not only within the framework of overtly dictatorial regimes during the 20th century that the struggles for social justice and human rights in Latin America faced severe obstacles and suffered setbacks. They have also been badly hampered by populism — both right-wing neo-populism with its component of intolerance and conservatism, and left-wing populism, which, by means of co-opting civil society, helps demobilise it and slow down or limit processes of awareness and radicalisation of democracy. The struggles for environmental justice are a crucial example of this. The chapter then addresses the main aspects of how left-wing neo-populism has undermined environmental justice in Latin America, and particularly in Brazil. It focuses more closely on the political and ideological consequences of left-wing populism's contradictions and failure in terms of a deepening of social tensions and struggles. The chapter argues that left-wing neo-populism has been ultimately part of the problem rather than of the solution.

The introduction argues that the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment has been overlooked as a significant intellectual resource for American conservative thought. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, a group of neoconservative intellectuals introduced to American political discourse a figure of the virtuous “common man,” and thus significantly contributed to the rise of right-wing populism. The neoconservatives’ embrace of a populist epistemology was a result of a serious engagement with, and reinvention of, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophies of common sense, the moral sense, and moral sentiments. In the eighteenth century, thinkers such as Adam Smith, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and Thomas Reid contributed to the emergence of naturalistic, secular ethics by arguing that all humans—not only sophisticated individuals—were capable of distinguishing between right and wrong because of certain characteristics of human nature. Two centuries later, four eminent neoconservative theorists—Irving Kristol, Gertrude Himmelfarb, James Q. Wilson, and Francis Fukuyama—reinvented the Scottish tradition to serve conservative needs in the culture wars environment. Neoconservative intellectuals must be seen not merely as foreign policy hawks or critics of the welfare state but as shapers of the Scottish intellectual tradition—common-sense populists in a fractured post-1960s America.

This chapter examines threats and responses to threats as they play themselves out in human interactions. One of the significant topics here is crime and punishment—notably, how criminal statutes seek to prevent crime by threatening criminals with punishment sufficient to provide an effective deterrent. There is a long and fascinating history of such efforts, with very little success. This leads to a look at the death penalty in particular and whether it has been effective in preventing capital crimes. The chapter also assesses how people turn to religion when under threat, as well as how religions have often threatened their adherents with after-death retribution for sin, which has long influenced much human anxiety and, in some cases, compliance. Moreover, the chapter reflects on the menace of death plus threats involved in the American gun culture, and race-based and economic anxieties driving the rise of right-wing national populism.

While scientists protest publicly against right-wing populists bending truths, humanists and social scientists are remarkably quiet. This is not surprising since constructivist relativism and poststructuralist ideas about the politics of knowledge have been widely adopted. This chapter explores the ideological conundrum facing social scientists and argues that pragmatism can provide resources for finding a way forward. By formulating specific criteria by means of which theories and truths can be compared and evaluated, pragmatist epistemology positions the academic as a social advisor or mediator. Moreover, on the basis of pragmatic democratic theory, it can be argued that politics is not only agonistic but needs a conciliatory moment to function sustainably. In this spirit, academic criticism should be understood not only as opposition but also as mediation. Rather than just opposing dominant thinking, the academic can engage in a cooperative vein, contributing to the decisions that are taken by mediating between different positions and points of view.

The 19th Biennale of Sydney, discussed in the last chapter, is a case study that reveals the way contemporary western governments are increasingly closing down public criticism. The tendency is to raise opaque screens over controversial actions, and to use financial retaliation as a method for keeping artists’ protests inside exhibiting contexts. This chapter looks at political theorists who write about the re-emergence of forms of authoritarianism, beginning with Nicos Poulantzas who argued as early as 1970 that a new form of fascism was materialising, and Michel Foucault’s warning that we each need to check our own fascist tendencies, no matter how private or small the context. More recent comments by Judith Butler and Madeline Albright insist on the danger of this burgeoning trend and the urgent need to fight it. Through the writings of Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, this chapter also describes right populism as a prominent feature of western democracies, and the way concerns from climate change to human rights divide today along ideological, partisan lines. [170]

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the radical change currently occurring in European politics. Recent years have witnessed the steady electoral decline of mainstream parties and the rise of political outsiders. These political entrepreneurs gained electoral traction through their attacks on the political establishment and their mobilization of new issues. What explains these upheavals in European politics? Political commentators and scholars provide a series of different interpretations. Much of the commentary has focused on the rise of right-wing populism, and many have pointed to structural changes to the economy, increasing globalization, and economic downturns as the root cause of this upsurge. This book argues that in order to understand change in European politics, one needs to account for the drivers of both the political upheavals observed recently and the decades of relative stability and dominance of the traditional mainstream parties. Rather than simply asking why political outsiders have been so successful recently, one also needs to query why mainstream parties have been able to maintain their grip on power for so long.

This chapter focuses on ideology, different ideological perspectives, our relationship with them, and how we may change that for the better. It particularly discusses political ideologies. These are two words that for many people may be more likely to feel alien and difficult than comfortable and familiar. The chapter aims to make connections between two ideas that seem to have increasing significance for us all: participation and ideology. While they seem to be closely interrelated and to have major implications for each other, so far efforts to explore the relationship of the two seem to have been limited. The chapter starts from the premise that if the aim is to advance an ideological perspective which promotes an empowering society and reflects everyone's rights and needs, then this is more likely to be achieved if it is done in a participatory way. Ultimately, the chapter distinguishes right-wing populism and grassroots activism, which both challenge conventional politics and highlight their limitations and disconnect from the grassroots.