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There have been unsuccessful attempts to use constitutionally entrenched rights claims to challenge criminal prohibitions on assisted suicide in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These challenges, brought by patients, reached the highest courts in Canada, the United States, and Europe. Their failure makes unlikely — in any major common law or European jurisdiction — the legalization of assisted suicide or euthanasia using challenges based on constitutionally entrenched rights. To determine what we can learn about the use of rights as a mechanism for legal change on assisted dying from the debate which surrounded these cases requires an examination of the use of rights in litigation and debate over the legalization of assisted suicide, including the rights to liberty, autonomy, privacy, dignity, equality, freedom of conscience and religion, life, and property.

This chapter examines the issues of plural autonomy and cultural diversity, focusing on the British debate on forced marriage. It argues in defence of universal normative commitment to individual self-direction which the chapter frames in terms of a right to autonomy and explains that a commitment to this universal right sometimes justifies special protective measures for women of non-liberal cultures. The chapter then investigates whether liberal conceptions of autonomy permit a meaningful distinction between forced and arranged marriage and explains the concept of plural autonomy. It concludes that the difficulties involved in ascertaining the issue of endorsement for legal purposes indicates the need for a range of policies through, which women's rights to autonomy can be supported, without incurring the costs of cultural alienation that would arise from imposing liberal values on them comprehensively.

This chapter defends the idea of a general right to autonomy. It demonstrates that it is coherent to accept rights to whatever is in the interest of the autonomy of a person, including socio-economic rights (which protect the preconditions of autonomy) and rights to engage in trivial activities (such as pursuing one's hobbies) and even immoral and harmful activities. It thus concludes that the almost unanimously held view that there is a threshold which separates mere interests (which have no special importance) from rights should be given up. The point and purpose of constitutional rights under the global model is thus to ensure that all autonomy interests of a person are adequately protected at all times. Further sections assess the implications of this view for constitutional design and interpretation, and the relevance of the general interest and considerations relating to the legitimacy of the democratic process for the weight of a constitutional right.

This chapter expresses support for the concept of conceiving women's rights as multicultural claims by highlights the issues of rights to mediation and autonomy and the presumption for educational accommodation. It discusses the way in which attention to cultural particularity serves to reconfigure universal judgements about gender justice in an interest theory of rights. It explores the origins of the ‘headscarves affair’ and defines reciprocity in terms of non-alienation. It argues that women would be more likely to participate in the dialogues of the right to mediation if they have not been alienated from state education and invokes a different conception of reciprocity in order to engage with the complicated issue of whether Muslim women endorse their decisions to wear the veil.

In her influential paper on abortion, Judith Thomson invokes but does not defend the right to bodily autonomy to draw fairly liberal conclusions about abortion. This chapter uses this as a springboard for developing the right to bodily autonomy. It examines two cases raised by Thomson and argues that her reliance on the right to bodily autonomy allows her to draw stronger conclusions than she does. In examining the cases, the chapter proposes and defends some ceteris paribus principles that help to explain and expand on the right to bodily autonomy as Thomson invokes it, in a way that is sensitive to concerns raised by relational autonomy theorists.

This chapter examines the legal and medical doctrine of informed consent and whether it adequately protects the rights of children born with an intersex condition. It also considers legal approaches that could be used to successfully challenge these medical practices. It asks whether parents, in consultation with doctors, should have the legal power to consent to genital modification surgery on behalf of their children with an intersex condition. The chapter first discusses the right to autonomy and the requirement that medical treatment and other procedures be undertaken only with proper informed consent. It then explains how the legal requirement of informed consent is applied to decisions made on behalf of children. Finally, it evaluates three proposed alternatives to the current informed consent procedures affecting children with an intersex condition: to impose enhanced informed consent rules; to delay all surgeries until children mature and can decide for themselves; and to impose some type of external oversight by a court or an ethics committee.

This chapter examines the legal and medical doctrine of informed consent and whether it adequately protects the rights of children born with an intersex condition. It also considers legal approaches that could be used to successfully challenge these medical practices. It asks whether parents, in consultation with doctors, should have the legal power to consent to genital modification surgery on behalf of their children with an intersex condition. The chapter first discusses the right to autonomy and the requirement that medical treatment and other procedures be undertaken only with proper informed consent. It then explains how the legal requirement of informed consent is applied to decisions made on behalf of children. Finally, it evaluates three proposed alternatives to the current informed consent procedures affecting children with an intersex condition: to impose enhanced informed consent rules; to delay all surgeries until children mature and can decide for themselves; and to impose some type of external oversight by a court or an ethics committee.