P. M. S Hacker
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199245697
- eISBN:
- 9780191602245
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924569X.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be ...
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The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be chimerical, and descriptive metaphysics is argued not to be a form of metaphysics at all. Strawson’s failure to account for the status of propositions of descriptive metaphysics is held to be remediable by reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical propositions that express norms of representation.Less
The logical positivists’ critical attitude towards metaphysics is sketched. Strawson’s conception of descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is described. Revisionary metaphysics is argued to be chimerical, and descriptive metaphysics is argued not to be a form of metaphysics at all. Strawson’s failure to account for the status of propositions of descriptive metaphysics is held to be remediable by reference to Wittgenstein’s conception of grammatical propositions that express norms of representation.
Leemon B. McHenry
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781474400343
- eISBN:
- 9781474416108
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474400343.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Strawson’s famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics describes two different methodological approaches to the question of fundamental ontology. This chapter focuses mainly on ...
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Strawson’s famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics describes two different methodological approaches to the question of fundamental ontology. This chapter focuses mainly on the origin of the descriptive enterprise in Aristotle’s metaphysics and examines Whitehead and Quine’s criticisms of this approach to the formulation of a viable conceptual scheme for modern physics. The project of descriptive metaphysics and the concept of substance are rejected on both scientific and philosophical grounds.Less
Strawson’s famous distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics describes two different methodological approaches to the question of fundamental ontology. This chapter focuses mainly on the origin of the descriptive enterprise in Aristotle’s metaphysics and examines Whitehead and Quine’s criticisms of this approach to the formulation of a viable conceptual scheme for modern physics. The project of descriptive metaphysics and the concept of substance are rejected on both scientific and philosophical grounds.
Leemon B. McHenry
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781474400343
- eISBN:
- 9781474416108
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9781474400343.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the affinities and contrasts in the event theories advanced by Whitehead, Russell and Quine, all of which originate from the revolution in twentieth-century physics. The ...
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This chapter examines the affinities and contrasts in the event theories advanced by Whitehead, Russell and Quine, all of which originate from the revolution in twentieth-century physics. The revisionary theory of events overthrows the descriptive theory, according to which events are dependent on substances. Events, under this new theory, are basic and substance, as an ontological category, is eliminated.Less
This chapter examines the affinities and contrasts in the event theories advanced by Whitehead, Russell and Quine, all of which originate from the revolution in twentieth-century physics. The revisionary theory of events overthrows the descriptive theory, according to which events are dependent on substances. Events, under this new theory, are basic and substance, as an ontological category, is eliminated.
Kenneth A. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198803447
- eISBN:
- 9780191841620
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803447.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Throughout this book, I have attempted to detail some ways in which the native syntactic and semantic structures of natural language may fail to recapitulate the ultimate metaphysical structure of ...
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Throughout this book, I have attempted to detail some ways in which the native syntactic and semantic structures of natural language may fail to recapitulate the ultimate metaphysical structure of reality. I argued, for example, that the thematic structures of argument-taking expressions may vary significantly from language to language even when they express the same real-world relations, properties, states of affairs, or event structures. I begin this chapter with a further argument that changes in our encyclopedic representations of the world typically are not reflected in our native semantic representations of the world. Finally, I close the chapter and the book by illustrating the potential of the way of reference in metaphysics with respect to achieving metaphysical insight into the true nature of human freedom.Less
Throughout this book, I have attempted to detail some ways in which the native syntactic and semantic structures of natural language may fail to recapitulate the ultimate metaphysical structure of reality. I argued, for example, that the thematic structures of argument-taking expressions may vary significantly from language to language even when they express the same real-world relations, properties, states of affairs, or event structures. I begin this chapter with a further argument that changes in our encyclopedic representations of the world typically are not reflected in our native semantic representations of the world. Finally, I close the chapter and the book by illustrating the potential of the way of reference in metaphysics with respect to achieving metaphysical insight into the true nature of human freedom.
