SWINBURNE RICHARD
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780197264898
- eISBN:
- 9780191754074
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This ...
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The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contributions to this volume.Less
The theme of this volume is the extent to which humans have a free choice of which actions to perform, and what kind of free choice would make them morally responsible for their actions. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contributions to this volume.
Steve Vanderheiden
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195334609
- eISBN:
- 9780199868759
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195334609.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
When policies of or activities within one country and generation cause deleterious consequences for those of other nations and later generations, they can constitute serious injustices. Hence, ...
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When policies of or activities within one country and generation cause deleterious consequences for those of other nations and later generations, they can constitute serious injustices. Hence, anthropogenic climate change poses not only a global environmental threat, but also one to international and intergenerational justice. The avoidance of such injustice has been recognized as a primary objective of global climate policy, and this book aims to comprehend the nature of this objective–to explore how climate change raises issues of international and intergenerational justice and to consider how the design of a global climate regime might these aims into account. Enlisting conceptual tools from ethics as well as legal and political theory, it treats justice as concerned with equity and responsibility and considers how each is undermined by climate change but might be incorporated into climate policy. Various theoretical problems in applying norms of equity and responsibility across borders, over time, and to nations for their greenhouse emissions are considered, and responses are given to these challenges. Finally, an outline for a global climate policy that adequately incorporates norms of justice is articulated and defended, along with a case for procedural fairness in policy development processes. Demonstrating how political theory can usefully contribute toward better understanding the proper human response to climate change as well as how the climate case offers insights into resolving contemporary controversies within political theory, the book offers a case study in which the application of normative theory to policy allows readers to better understand both.Less
When policies of or activities within one country and generation cause deleterious consequences for those of other nations and later generations, they can constitute serious injustices. Hence, anthropogenic climate change poses not only a global environmental threat, but also one to international and intergenerational justice. The avoidance of such injustice has been recognized as a primary objective of global climate policy, and this book aims to comprehend the nature of this objective–to explore how climate change raises issues of international and intergenerational justice and to consider how the design of a global climate regime might these aims into account. Enlisting conceptual tools from ethics as well as legal and political theory, it treats justice as concerned with equity and responsibility and considers how each is undermined by climate change but might be incorporated into climate policy. Various theoretical problems in applying norms of equity and responsibility across borders, over time, and to nations for their greenhouse emissions are considered, and responses are given to these challenges. Finally, an outline for a global climate policy that adequately incorporates norms of justice is articulated and defended, along with a case for procedural fairness in policy development processes. Demonstrating how political theory can usefully contribute toward better understanding the proper human response to climate change as well as how the climate case offers insights into resolving contemporary controversies within political theory, the book offers a case study in which the application of normative theory to policy allows readers to better understand both.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257676
- eISBN:
- 9780191600197
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257671.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book is a collection of 11 essays written from a perspective that is at once sympathetic towards, and critical of, liberalism and liberal political philosophy. The essays explore the capacity of ...
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This book is a collection of 11 essays written from a perspective that is at once sympathetic towards, and critical of, liberalism and liberal political philosophy. The essays explore the capacity of liberal thought, and of the moral traditions on which it draws, to accommodate a variety of challenges posed by the changing circumstances of the modern world. Scheffler considers how, in an era of rapid globalization, we can best conceive of the responsibilities of individual agents and the normative significance of people's diverse commitments and allegiances. Some of the essays are primarily concerned with the role of individual desert in liberal theory. Others focus on the nature of people's special responsibilities to their families, communities, and societies, and assess the compatibility of such responsibilities with liberal ideas of justice and equality. Still others deal with the possibility of developing a liberal conception of justice that acknowledges the normative significance of social and global interdependencies, while reaffirming the values of personal life and the continuing importance of ideas of individual responsibility.Less
This book is a collection of 11 essays written from a perspective that is at once sympathetic towards, and critical of, liberalism and liberal political philosophy. The essays explore the capacity of liberal thought, and of the moral traditions on which it draws, to accommodate a variety of challenges posed by the changing circumstances of the modern world. Scheffler considers how, in an era of rapid globalization, we can best conceive of the responsibilities of individual agents and the normative significance of people's diverse commitments and allegiances. Some of the essays are primarily concerned with the role of individual desert in liberal theory. Others focus on the nature of people's special responsibilities to their families, communities, and societies, and assess the compatibility of such responsibilities with liberal ideas of justice and equality. Still others deal with the possibility of developing a liberal conception of justice that acknowledges the normative significance of social and global interdependencies, while reaffirming the values of personal life and the continuing importance of ideas of individual responsibility.
Ermanno Bencivenga
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195307351
- eISBN:
- 9780199867851
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195307351.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about ...
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Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about them? Unless satisfactory answers are provided for these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be swallowed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory: an outcome quite common in recent (post-Hegelian) times as well as one to be strongly regretted. Immanuel Kant's philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need, and this book is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on the author's previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant'sCopernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus. Free choice is rational choice, hence, it is also what reason would consider a good choice; evil behavior is not free — when we behave irrationally, we lose all control on our conduct and become obtuse wheels in the hands of irresistible nature. Which does not mean, however, that we should not take responsibility for our evil actions. On the contrary, that is exactly the right thing to do, despite the absurdity of the stance it involves. This very absurdity teaches us an important Kantian lesson on how to negotiate the bounds of sense: how there is not a single line demarcating sense from nonsense, but rather a variety of shades of (non)sense, experienced in the wake of an ideal of perfect meaningfulness but forever falling short of that ideal. In pursuing this troubling suggestion, the author brings additional light on Kant's understanding of the human form of life. Specifically, on its irremediably conflictual, undecidable character, and on the primacy unrealizable norms have in it.Less
Can we regard ourselves as free originators of some of our behavior? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral imperatives, and why should we care about them? Unless satisfactory answers are provided for these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be swallowed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory: an outcome quite common in recent (post-Hegelian) times as well as one to be strongly regretted. Immanuel Kant's philosophy is a sustained, bold, and successful effort aiming at offering us the answers we need, and this book is a clear and thorough account of this effort that builds on the author's previous interpretation of transcendental philosophy (as articulated in his Kant'sCopernican Revolution) and draws on the entire Kantian corpus. Free choice is rational choice, hence, it is also what reason would consider a good choice; evil behavior is not free — when we behave irrationally, we lose all control on our conduct and become obtuse wheels in the hands of irresistible nature. Which does not mean, however, that we should not take responsibility for our evil actions. On the contrary, that is exactly the right thing to do, despite the absurdity of the stance it involves. This very absurdity teaches us an important Kantian lesson on how to negotiate the bounds of sense: how there is not a single line demarcating sense from nonsense, but rather a variety of shades of (non)sense, experienced in the wake of an ideal of perfect meaningfulness but forever falling short of that ideal. In pursuing this troubling suggestion, the author brings additional light on Kant's understanding of the human form of life. Specifically, on its irremediably conflictual, undecidable character, and on the primacy unrealizable norms have in it.
Simon Harrison
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780198269847
- eISBN:
- 9780191713385
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198269847.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, ...
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For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.Less
For Augustine, one’s freedom and responsibility is elucidated by means of a process of calling the notion of will into question (‘I don’t know’). This process gives rise to an understanding of will, freedom, and responsibility as the condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is this process that is most cogito-like. However, it is significantly cogito-unlike in that the argument depends on the very possibility of denying that one has will. Augustine’s account of freedom and responsibility is grounded in a deep notion of subjectivity, and the epistemological significance of the first-person perspective.
Christopher Lake
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241743
- eISBN:
- 9780191599743
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241740.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people ...
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These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.Less
These days, arguments about distributive justice—i.e. arguments about who should get what—often centre around two ideas. One is that goods should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. In a wide‐ranging discussion, the author asks what it is that draws us to these two ideas and whether they lend themselves to being combined, in the way contemporary egalitarian thinkers seek to combine them, or whether they necessarily pull in different directions. Along the way, he examines how arguments about responsibility and natural talents bear upon the standing of market rewards and he looks at recent theoretical attempts to show that the recipients of social benefits should be willing to engage in contributive activity in return. The conclusion is clear—there is no natural tendency for a commitment to equality to support an attachment to responsibility nor for an attachment to responsibility to support a commitment to equality.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293972
- eISBN:
- 9780191599798
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293976.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic ...
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This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal equality, the book examines Dworkin's contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. The book also examines the issues concerning individual responsibility and entitlement as well as the nature of justice with respect to persons with disabilities. The author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.Less
This book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal equality, the book examines Dworkin's contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. The book also examines the issues concerning individual responsibility and entitlement as well as the nature of justice with respect to persons with disabilities. The author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.
David Miller
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199235056
- eISBN:
- 9780191715792
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235056.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Russian Politics
This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as ...
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This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations.Less
This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations.
Daniel Butt
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199218240
- eISBN:
- 9780191711589
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218240.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to ...
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The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. These are presented as complementary but distinct bases for modern day rectificatory duties. It is claimed that taken together, these mean that those who advocate international libertarianism may have to accept the existence of demanding rectificatory duties, which may, in the short run, coincide with the demands of redistributive cosmopolitanism. Though present day individuals and groups may dislike the idea that they can acquire rectificatory duties in an involuntary fashion, without bearing moral responsibility for the original wrongdoing, they nonetheless act wrongly if they do not seek to rectify historic international injustice.Less
The conclusion of the book reviews the three forms of morally relevant forms of connection with historic injustice, based on benefit, on the inheritance of entitlement, and on an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. These are presented as complementary but distinct bases for modern day rectificatory duties. It is claimed that taken together, these mean that those who advocate international libertarianism may have to accept the existence of demanding rectificatory duties, which may, in the short run, coincide with the demands of redistributive cosmopolitanism. Though present day individuals and groups may dislike the idea that they can acquire rectificatory duties in an involuntary fashion, without bearing moral responsibility for the original wrongdoing, they nonetheless act wrongly if they do not seek to rectify historic international injustice.
George Sher
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195187427
- eISBN:
- 9780199786596
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195187423.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility ...
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Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book’s most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself — that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those who violate the principles. Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions. These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of feeling, a combination of these elements, or something entirely different? What sort of moral concept is blameworthiness? How do blame and blameworthiness — correlative concepts — fit together? Although the book draws both on Hume’s treatment of the relation between character and blame and Strawson’s landmark discussion of the “reactive attitudes”, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor Strawsonian. It is a new theory that seeks to do more justice than its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our moral lives.Less
Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book’s most important conclusion is that blame is inseparable from morality itself — that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those who violate the principles. Because blame has not received much sustained attention, the book works its way toward its conclusions by first raising, and then seeking to resolve, a series of conceptual and normative questions. These questions include: How are blameworthy acts related to the characters of the agents who perform them? Can agents deserve blame for their bad traits as well as their bad acts? Is blame best understood as a kind of action, a kind of belief, a kind of feeling, a combination of these elements, or something entirely different? What sort of moral concept is blameworthiness? How do blame and blameworthiness — correlative concepts — fit together? Although the book draws both on Hume’s treatment of the relation between character and blame and Strawson’s landmark discussion of the “reactive attitudes”, the theory that emerges is neither Humean nor Strawsonian. It is a new theory that seeks to do more justice than its predecessors to the indispensable role that blame plays in our moral lives.
Jill Duerr Berrick and Neil Gilbert (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195310122
- eISBN:
- 9780199865284
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195310122.001.0001
- Subject:
- Social Work, Social Policy, Children and Families
Over the last half a century, technological and medical advances, shifting patterns of employment, the loosening of marital bonds, changing social norms, and the women's rights movement have ...
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Over the last half a century, technological and medical advances, shifting patterns of employment, the loosening of marital bonds, changing social norms, and the women's rights movement have dramatically altered the landscape of family life. On this new terrain, parents struggle with balancing the demands of work and child care responsibilities, selecting the right schools, and sorting through a bewildering array of medical and psychological nostrums. At the same time, public officials are under increasing pressure to formulate policies that assist parents to meet the challenges of childrearing in contemporary society. This book looks at the troubling concerns of childrearing in modern family life, and raises provocative questions about the benefits and hazards of policy alternatives designed to alleviate these issues. It frames the emerging needs and new risks that impact child rearing, addressing controversial issues such as the roles of schools and government in promoting children's health, the facts and the myths about Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), the family dynamics of balancing work and childcare, and allocating responsibility for care and support of children when family life breaks down. The book analyzes a range of state interventions to assist parents in dealing with these issues. Although these interventions are sometimes seen as a substitute for parental authority, the book explains how they can be framed as efforts to empower parents.Less
Over the last half a century, technological and medical advances, shifting patterns of employment, the loosening of marital bonds, changing social norms, and the women's rights movement have dramatically altered the landscape of family life. On this new terrain, parents struggle with balancing the demands of work and child care responsibilities, selecting the right schools, and sorting through a bewildering array of medical and psychological nostrums. At the same time, public officials are under increasing pressure to formulate policies that assist parents to meet the challenges of childrearing in contemporary society. This book looks at the troubling concerns of childrearing in modern family life, and raises provocative questions about the benefits and hazards of policy alternatives designed to alleviate these issues. It frames the emerging needs and new risks that impact child rearing, addressing controversial issues such as the roles of schools and government in promoting children's health, the facts and the myths about Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), the family dynamics of balancing work and childcare, and allocating responsibility for care and support of children when family life breaks down. The book analyzes a range of state interventions to assist parents in dealing with these issues. Although these interventions are sometimes seen as a substitute for parental authority, the book explains how they can be framed as efforts to empower parents.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
Critics of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have often claimed that it is individualistic in an objectionable way. ‘Individualism’ is a slippery term that is employed in many different senses. ...
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Critics of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have often claimed that it is individualistic in an objectionable way. ‘Individualism’ is a slippery term that is employed in many different senses. This chapter distinguishes some of these different senses and explores the extent to which responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism counts as individualist in each of them, and it determines what problems it may face as a result.Less
Critics of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism have often claimed that it is individualistic in an objectionable way. ‘Individualism’ is a slippery term that is employed in many different senses. This chapter distinguishes some of these different senses and explores the extent to which responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism counts as individualist in each of them, and it determines what problems it may face as a result.
Will Kymlicka
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers how the left’s traditionally uneasy relationship with liberalism has been challenged by recent left-wing engagements with liberal conceptions of equality, of which Cohen’s work ...
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This essay considers how the left’s traditionally uneasy relationship with liberalism has been challenged by recent left-wing engagements with liberal conceptions of equality, of which Cohen’s work is the pre-eminent example. It argues that the liberal concern for individual responsibility has proved a necessary corrective to traditional left-wing ideas of egalitarianism that endorse the unconditional redistribution of wealth.Less
This essay considers how the left’s traditionally uneasy relationship with liberalism has been challenged by recent left-wing engagements with liberal conceptions of equality, of which Cohen’s work is the pre-eminent example. It argues that the liberal concern for individual responsibility has proved a necessary corrective to traditional left-wing ideas of egalitarianism that endorse the unconditional redistribution of wealth.
T. M. Scanlon
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, ...
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This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.Less
This essay considers the disagreement between Cohen and Rawls on the question of whether individuals should be held responsible for their tastes and preferences. It notes the difference in principle, since the primary goods measure of Rawls holds individuals responsible for their choices as to how to deploy these goods, whereas Cohen’s aim is to equalize access to advantage, and thereby the satisfaction of persons, however costly. It is argued that since Cohen concedes that practical matters of application might compromise egalitarian principle, the two thinkers might be, in practice, not that dissimilar.
Samuel Scheffler
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should ...
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This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.Less
This essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.
Susan Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281688
- eISBN:
- 9780191603747
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281688.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible ...
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This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible choice. A possible response to Cohen’s argument against incentives might be that since individuals can choose to work harder on behalf of the disadvantaged, they are also partly responsible for, and entitled to, the extra wealth they produce. This view is rejected, noting that were the tax rate adjusted to accommodate responsibility for being productive, it would whittle away the benefits of productivity for redistributive purposes.Less
This essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible choice. A possible response to Cohen’s argument against incentives might be that since individuals can choose to work harder on behalf of the disadvantaged, they are also partly responsible for, and entitled to, the extra wealth they produce. This view is rejected, noting that were the tax rate adjusted to accommodate responsibility for being productive, it would whittle away the benefits of productivity for redistributive purposes.
N. J. Sewell‐Rutter
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199227334
- eISBN:
- 9780191711152
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199227334.003.0008
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Plays and Playwrights: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that issues of familial interaction, causation, human action, and moral responsibility in Attic ...
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This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that issues of familial interaction, causation, human action, and moral responsibility in Attic tragedy are by no means settled; and that interpreters of these endlessly absorbing and undeniably intoxicating texts ignore them at their peril.Less
This concluding chapter presents a synthesis of the discussions in the preceding chapters. It argues that issues of familial interaction, causation, human action, and moral responsibility in Attic tragedy are by no means settled; and that interpreters of these endlessly absorbing and undeniably intoxicating texts ignore them at their peril.
N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen, and Jeff McMahan (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195325195
- eISBN:
- 9780199776412
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This book pays to tribute to Jonathan Glover, a pioneering figure whose thought and personal influence have had a significant impact on applied philosophy. In topics that include genetic engineering, ...
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This book pays to tribute to Jonathan Glover, a pioneering figure whose thought and personal influence have had a significant impact on applied philosophy. In topics that include genetic engineering, abortion, euthanasia, war, and moral responsibility, Glover has made seminal contributions. The chapters here, written by contemporary moral philosophers, address topics to which Glover has contributed, with particular emphasis on problems of conflict discussed in his book, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century. There are also testaments to the influence Glover has had on colleagues, students, and friends. Glover himself contributes a series of fine replies, which constitute an important addition to his published work.Less
This book pays to tribute to Jonathan Glover, a pioneering figure whose thought and personal influence have had a significant impact on applied philosophy. In topics that include genetic engineering, abortion, euthanasia, war, and moral responsibility, Glover has made seminal contributions. The chapters here, written by contemporary moral philosophers, address topics to which Glover has contributed, with particular emphasis on problems of conflict discussed in his book, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century. There are also testaments to the influence Glover has had on colleagues, students, and friends. Glover himself contributes a series of fine replies, which constitute an important addition to his published work.
M. Jamie Ferreira
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195130256
- eISBN:
- 9780199834181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195130251.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This commentary on Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love (1847), a series of 15 deliberations on the love commandment (to love one's neighbor as oneself), argues that Works of Love provides resources for ...
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This commentary on Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love (1847), a series of 15 deliberations on the love commandment (to love one's neighbor as oneself), argues that Works of Love provides resources for understanding our ethical responsibility for others in ways that respect concrete distinctiveness and equality, partiality and impartiality, as well as the relation between self‐esteem, human needs, and self‐denial. This reading of Kierkegaard's Christian love ethic – an ethic of agape – relates to contemporary discussions of love as infinite debt and radical gift; it presents the ethical relation as one of moral vision and moral blindness, in order to respect alterity and kinship; it also clarifies Kierkegaard's relation to his Lutheran heritage, highlighting both love's hiddenness and its works (fruits). Moreover, the deliberations on building up others, on forgiveness, and on reconciliation, address dimensions of our responsibility for community.Less
This commentary on Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love (1847), a series of 15 deliberations on the love commandment (to love one's neighbor as oneself), argues that Works of Love provides resources for understanding our ethical responsibility for others in ways that respect concrete distinctiveness and equality, partiality and impartiality, as well as the relation between self‐esteem, human needs, and self‐denial. This reading of Kierkegaard's Christian love ethic – an ethic of agape – relates to contemporary discussions of love as infinite debt and radical gift; it presents the ethical relation as one of moral vision and moral blindness, in order to respect alterity and kinship; it also clarifies Kierkegaard's relation to his Lutheran heritage, highlighting both love's hiddenness and its works (fruits). Moreover, the deliberations on building up others, on forgiveness, and on reconciliation, address dimensions of our responsibility for community.
Andrew Mason
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199264414
- eISBN:
- 9780191718489
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264414.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that ...
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This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that people can legitimately be required to bear the costs of their behaviour if and only if they could have acted otherwise and no excusing conditions apply. Against this formulation, some would argue that what matters is whether an agent's behaviour is responsive to his reasons in the right way, and whether there are any excusing conditions, but not whether he could have acted otherwise. It is argued that both of these accounts are inadequate because they do not recognize the full range of reasons we might have for not requiring a person to bear the full costs of his behaviour.Less
This chapter explores this form of egalitarianism further by asking when justice requires us to hold people responsible for their behaviour by requiring them to bear its costs. Some maintain that people can legitimately be required to bear the costs of their behaviour if and only if they could have acted otherwise and no excusing conditions apply. Against this formulation, some would argue that what matters is whether an agent's behaviour is responsive to his reasons in the right way, and whether there are any excusing conditions, but not whether he could have acted otherwise. It is argued that both of these accounts are inadequate because they do not recognize the full range of reasons we might have for not requiring a person to bear the full costs of his behaviour.
