Thomas E. Hill
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238348
- eISBN:
- 9780191597688
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238347.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Addresses the questions, why should we respect humanity in all persons? and why not regard extremely immoral persons as having forfeited all respect? Respect for persons as persons is distinguished ...
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Addresses the questions, why should we respect humanity in all persons? and why not regard extremely immoral persons as having forfeited all respect? Respect for persons as persons is distinguished from respect for personal merit and conventional roles, but that someone is a person is not sufficient to explain why we must respect the person. The essay sketches some Kantian grounds, formal and substantive, for presuming that all human beings ought to be respected, and then addresses several objections. For example, should we respect sociopaths? The Kantian legislative perspective sketched earlier suggests reasons for a strong presumption for treating basic respect for humanity as non‐forfeitable, and arguably neither self‐protection, just punishment, nor legitimate moral censure require that we set aside the presumption.Less
Addresses the questions, why should we respect humanity in all persons? and why not regard extremely immoral persons as having forfeited all respect? Respect for persons as persons is distinguished from respect for personal merit and conventional roles, but that someone is a person is not sufficient to explain why we must respect the person. The essay sketches some Kantian grounds, formal and substantive, for presuming that all human beings ought to be respected, and then addresses several objections. For example, should we respect sociopaths? The Kantian legislative perspective sketched earlier suggests reasons for a strong presumption for treating basic respect for humanity as non‐forfeitable, and arguably neither self‐protection, just punishment, nor legitimate moral censure require that we set aside the presumption.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that ...
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There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that there are general conceptual difficulties with Kantian responses to consequentialism, and Kantian consequentialism in particular. We consider, first, the significance of the Kantian deontologist emphasis on the principle of respect for persons. Second, we explore the relevance of Kant's distinction between price and dignity, his conception of the dignity of humanity, and Hill's interpretation of the dignity principle. Third, and last, we focus on Kant's related formula of the kingdom of ends, and consider Rawls’ development of Kant's idea in his hypothetical social contract theory and more general Kantian constructivist conception of moral reasoning.Less
There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that there are general conceptual difficulties with Kantian responses to consequentialism, and Kantian consequentialism in particular. We consider, first, the significance of the Kantian deontologist emphasis on the principle of respect for persons. Second, we explore the relevance of Kant's distinction between price and dignity, his conception of the dignity of humanity, and Hill's interpretation of the dignity principle. Third, and last, we focus on Kant's related formula of the kingdom of ends, and consider Rawls’ development of Kant's idea in his hypothetical social contract theory and more general Kantian constructivist conception of moral reasoning.
Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195308198
- eISBN:
- 9780199867325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308198.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins an argument for ethical theory. It focuses on the elements of ethical theory that have to be seen as useful, and indeed as indispensable for adequate ethical reflection. These ...
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This chapter begins an argument for ethical theory. It focuses on the elements of ethical theory that have to be seen as useful, and indeed as indispensable for adequate ethical reflection. These include fairness, respect for persons, and sympathy.Less
This chapter begins an argument for ethical theory. It focuses on the elements of ethical theory that have to be seen as useful, and indeed as indispensable for adequate ethical reflection. These include fairness, respect for persons, and sympathy.
Russell Hardin
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199232567
- eISBN:
- 9780191715976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232567.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hume is held by various scholars to be a utilitarian, a rule-utilitarian, a halfhearted utilitarian, or not a utilitarian at all, and he is also held to be a consequentialist or he is not held to be ...
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Hume is held by various scholars to be a utilitarian, a rule-utilitarian, a halfhearted utilitarian, or not a utilitarian at all, and he is also held to be a consequentialist or he is not held to be a consequentialist. The remarkable fact of many of these opposing views is that they are grounded in the same passages by Hume. This chapter examines the nature of the utilitarianism that Hume commonly invokes.Less
Hume is held by various scholars to be a utilitarian, a rule-utilitarian, a halfhearted utilitarian, or not a utilitarian at all, and he is also held to be a consequentialist or he is not held to be a consequentialist. The remarkable fact of many of these opposing views is that they are grounded in the same passages by Hume. This chapter examines the nature of the utilitarianism that Hume commonly invokes.
Joel J. Kupperman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195308198
- eISBN:
- 9780199867325
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308198.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the three foundations—fairness, respect for persons, and sympathy—and examines how the considerations that they point toward might be combined in a single theory. It considers ...
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This chapter discusses the three foundations—fairness, respect for persons, and sympathy—and examines how the considerations that they point toward might be combined in a single theory. It considers one influential attempt to reduce all moral considerations to consideration of consequences, namely act consequentialism.Less
This chapter discusses the three foundations—fairness, respect for persons, and sympathy—and examines how the considerations that they point toward might be combined in a single theory. It considers one influential attempt to reduce all moral considerations to consideration of consequences, namely act consequentialism.
Samuel J. Kerstein
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199692033
- eISBN:
- 9780191748813
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692033.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book takes its inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s “Formula of Humanity,” which commands that we treat persons never merely as means but always as ends in themselves. The book aims, first, to ...
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This book takes its inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s “Formula of Humanity,” which commands that we treat persons never merely as means but always as ends in themselves. The book aims, first, to develop ideas suggested by the Formula of Humanity into clear, plausible moral principles. It builds a new, detailed account of when a person treats another merely as a means, that is, “just uses” the other and thereby acts pro tanto wrongly. The book questions the plausibility of an orthodox Kantian account of the dignity of persons, but then offers a novel account of its own. The book’s second main goal is to show how the Kantian principles it develops shed light on pressing issues in bioethics. The book investigates how, morally speaking, scarce resources such as flu vaccine ought to be distributed. Allocating such resources in order to maximize benefits can be inconsistent with respecting persons’ dignity, the book argues. But it is not necessarily a violation of persons’ dignity to allocate them so as to preserve as many persons as possible. The book also explores the morality of regulated markets in organs (e.g., kidneys). Finally, it probes the ethics of doing research on “anonymized” biological samples and of conducting placebo-controlled pharmaceutical trials in developing countries. The book champions the view that even if an agent gets another’s voluntary, informed consent to use parts of his body for transplantation or medical research, she might nevertheless be treating him merely as a means or failing to respect his dignity.Less
This book takes its inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s “Formula of Humanity,” which commands that we treat persons never merely as means but always as ends in themselves. The book aims, first, to develop ideas suggested by the Formula of Humanity into clear, plausible moral principles. It builds a new, detailed account of when a person treats another merely as a means, that is, “just uses” the other and thereby acts pro tanto wrongly. The book questions the plausibility of an orthodox Kantian account of the dignity of persons, but then offers a novel account of its own. The book’s second main goal is to show how the Kantian principles it develops shed light on pressing issues in bioethics. The book investigates how, morally speaking, scarce resources such as flu vaccine ought to be distributed. Allocating such resources in order to maximize benefits can be inconsistent with respecting persons’ dignity, the book argues. But it is not necessarily a violation of persons’ dignity to allocate them so as to preserve as many persons as possible. The book also explores the morality of regulated markets in organs (e.g., kidneys). Finally, it probes the ethics of doing research on “anonymized” biological samples and of conducting placebo-controlled pharmaceutical trials in developing countries. The book champions the view that even if an agent gets another’s voluntary, informed consent to use parts of his body for transplantation or medical research, she might nevertheless be treating him merely as a means or failing to respect his dignity.
James Q. Whitman
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195182606
- eISBN:
- 9780199850266
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182606.003.0003
- Subject:
- Law, Criminal Law and Criminology
This chapter refers to Blackstone's Commentaries to further examine Blackstone's interpretation of the place that the respect for persons holds in the ...
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This chapter refers to Blackstone's Commentaries to further examine Blackstone's interpretation of the place that the respect for persons holds in the law. Blackstone believed that common law rejected the notion of “respect of persons”—the Christian term used in the New Testament to depict how Christ refused to respect the differences in social classes—since the common law did not account for social rank and position. With this, common law is described not merely as Christian, but as something enlightening. The chapter explains that America's criminal justice system rejects this respect of persons because it aims to treat people equally, and that this approach veers away from treating offenders with respect.Less
This chapter refers to Blackstone's Commentaries to further examine Blackstone's interpretation of the place that the respect for persons holds in the law. Blackstone believed that common law rejected the notion of “respect of persons”—the Christian term used in the New Testament to depict how Christ refused to respect the differences in social classes—since the common law did not account for social rank and position. With this, common law is described not merely as Christian, but as something enlightening. The chapter explains that America's criminal justice system rejects this respect of persons because it aims to treat people equally, and that this approach veers away from treating offenders with respect.
Samuel J. Kerstein
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199692033
- eISBN:
- 9780191748813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692033.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter explores what it means to respect persons when scarce, life-saving resources (e.g., flu treatment) must be distributed. In different age cases, both an older person and a younger one ...
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This chapter explores what it means to respect persons when scarce, life-saving resources (e.g., flu treatment) must be distributed. In different age cases, both an older person and a younger one need a scarce resource to survive, but we can save only one; in different number cases, we can use the resource either to save one person or to save five, but not to save everyone. The chapter applies three accounts of respect for the worth or dignity of persons to such cases: the Respect-Expression Approach to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, an Equal Worth Account, suggested by Jeff McMahan, and a Kant-Inspired Account of Dignity (KID). The chapter argues that KID has more plausible implications than the others. The chapter ends by contrasting KID with a benefit-maximizing view of the distribution of scarce resources—one that uses the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) as a measure of improvement in health-related quality of life.Less
This chapter explores what it means to respect persons when scarce, life-saving resources (e.g., flu treatment) must be distributed. In different age cases, both an older person and a younger one need a scarce resource to survive, but we can save only one; in different number cases, we can use the resource either to save one person or to save five, but not to save everyone. The chapter applies three accounts of respect for the worth or dignity of persons to such cases: the Respect-Expression Approach to Kant’s Formula of Humanity, an Equal Worth Account, suggested by Jeff McMahan, and a Kant-Inspired Account of Dignity (KID). The chapter argues that KID has more plausible implications than the others. The chapter ends by contrasting KID with a benefit-maximizing view of the distribution of scarce resources—one that uses the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) as a measure of improvement in health-related quality of life.
Mary-Jane Schneider, Joseph J. Fins, and Jonathan R. Wolpaw
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195388855
- eISBN:
- 9780199932689
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388855.003.0024
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Techniques
This chapter discusses the ethical issues raised by brain-computer interface (BCI) research in humans. It is organized around the three principles set out in the Belmont Report of 1978, which is ...
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This chapter discusses the ethical issues raised by brain-computer interface (BCI) research in humans. It is organized around the three principles set out in the Belmont Report of 1978, which is generally considered the founding document of modern human research standards. The three principles are beneficence, respect for persons, and justice. Beneficence requires that the potential benefits of human research (to humanity and perhaps to the research subjects) far outweigh its risks to the subjects. Respect for persons requires that informed consent be obtained from the subjects. Justice requires that the benefits and burdens of the research be fairly distributed.Less
This chapter discusses the ethical issues raised by brain-computer interface (BCI) research in humans. It is organized around the three principles set out in the Belmont Report of 1978, which is generally considered the founding document of modern human research standards. The three principles are beneficence, respect for persons, and justice. Beneficence requires that the potential benefits of human research (to humanity and perhaps to the research subjects) far outweigh its risks to the subjects. Respect for persons requires that informed consent be obtained from the subjects. Justice requires that the benefits and burdens of the research be fairly distributed.
David Cummiskey
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195094534
- eISBN:
- 9780199833146
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195094530.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that (at least in principle) it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both ...
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It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that (at least in principle) it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both positive and negative duties. The problem at issue is thus the competing demands of the conflicting duties, or grounds of obligation, that confront us when the only way to save some involves sacrificing others. In these types of tragic cases, a commitment to the equal unconditional value of all persons should lead moral agents to recognize the legitimacy of their own sacrifice to save others. If a sacrifice is rationally defensible to the sacrificed, then it also respects human dignity and treats rational nature as an end‐in‐itself. This chapter also discusses the limits of beneficence, self‐sacrifice, and the nature of justified coercion.Less
It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that (at least in principle) it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both positive and negative duties. The problem at issue is thus the competing demands of the conflicting duties, or grounds of obligation, that confront us when the only way to save some involves sacrificing others. In these types of tragic cases, a commitment to the equal unconditional value of all persons should lead moral agents to recognize the legitimacy of their own sacrifice to save others. If a sacrifice is rationally defensible to the sacrificed, then it also respects human dignity and treats rational nature as an end‐in‐itself. This chapter also discusses the limits of beneficence, self‐sacrifice, and the nature of justified coercion.
Eric J. Cassell
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195369052
- eISBN:
- 9780199979103
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195369052.003.0012
- Subject:
- Palliative Care, Patient Care and End-of-Life Decision Making
The overriding ethical precepts of clinical medicine are benevolence and respect for persons. Benevolence—a disposition to do good and promote the well-being of the patient—goes back to Hippocratic ...
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The overriding ethical precepts of clinical medicine are benevolence and respect for persons. Benevolence—a disposition to do good and promote the well-being of the patient—goes back to Hippocratic times. Respect for persons elaborated in 1974 requires that individuals should be treated as autonomous and that those with diminished autonomy should be protected. Autonomy is defined through quotations and commentary essentially as self-legislated and not ruled by others or outside causes or forces. Sickness impinges on autonomy and may diminish it through effects on cognition or the ability to act directly, or through unwanted effects of relationships or context. This increases the responsibility of healers to meliorate the negative impact of sickness and actively support the intactness of the person. How this is accomplished is detailed.Less
The overriding ethical precepts of clinical medicine are benevolence and respect for persons. Benevolence—a disposition to do good and promote the well-being of the patient—goes back to Hippocratic times. Respect for persons elaborated in 1974 requires that individuals should be treated as autonomous and that those with diminished autonomy should be protected. Autonomy is defined through quotations and commentary essentially as self-legislated and not ruled by others or outside causes or forces. Sickness impinges on autonomy and may diminish it through effects on cognition or the ability to act directly, or through unwanted effects of relationships or context. This increases the responsibility of healers to meliorate the negative impact of sickness and actively support the intactness of the person. How this is accomplished is detailed.
Samuel J. Kerstein
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- March 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190921415
- eISBN:
- 9780190921446
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0017
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen Gamlund suggest that in allocating scarce, life-saving resources we ought to consider how bad death would be for those who would die if left untreated. We have moral ...
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Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen Gamlund suggest that in allocating scarce, life-saving resources we ought to consider how bad death would be for those who would die if left untreated. We have moral reason, they intimate, to prioritize persons for whom death would be worse, according to the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. In response, I try to show that an allocation principle that specifies minimizing the badness of death among those vying for a life-saving resource would fail to respect the worth of persons. Solberg and Gamlund mention several other allocation principles. But, I argue, even when these others also come into play, allocations can fail to respect persons’ worth. A principle of respect for the worth (or dignity) of persons should, I contend, be employed in the allocation of scarce, life-saving resources. I sketch and apply a Kantian principle in an effort to allay the common worries that such a principle will be too vague to be useful and implausibly disallow length of future life to be a deciding factor in choosing whom to save.Less
Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen Gamlund suggest that in allocating scarce, life-saving resources we ought to consider how bad death would be for those who would die if left untreated. We have moral reason, they intimate, to prioritize persons for whom death would be worse, according to the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. In response, I try to show that an allocation principle that specifies minimizing the badness of death among those vying for a life-saving resource would fail to respect the worth of persons. Solberg and Gamlund mention several other allocation principles. But, I argue, even when these others also come into play, allocations can fail to respect persons’ worth. A principle of respect for the worth (or dignity) of persons should, I contend, be employed in the allocation of scarce, life-saving resources. I sketch and apply a Kantian principle in an effort to allay the common worries that such a principle will be too vague to be useful and implausibly disallow length of future life to be a deciding factor in choosing whom to save.
Jeffrey M. Blustein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199329397
- eISBN:
- 9780199363506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199329397.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
The moral values of remembrance are sometimes embodied in social practices of memorialization, which in its various incarnations is always essentially a type of symbolic activity, so the chapter ...
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The moral values of remembrance are sometimes embodied in social practices of memorialization, which in its various incarnations is always essentially a type of symbolic activity, so the chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of symbolic activity and symbolic value. Its central claim is that the moral value of memorialization is realized symbolically, by activities and practices that have symbolic meaning. According to the “thesis of lesser value,” as it is called here, however, symbolic value is not a terribly serious sort of value as compared with the value of actually making a difference in the world. It is either non-moral value or moral value that has less weight. Several reasons are presented to counter this: memorialization can express moral attitudes of respect for value as well as persons; can embody a commitment to justice; and can implicate a community’s sense of what is integral to its collective identity.Less
The moral values of remembrance are sometimes embodied in social practices of memorialization, which in its various incarnations is always essentially a type of symbolic activity, so the chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of symbolic activity and symbolic value. Its central claim is that the moral value of memorialization is realized symbolically, by activities and practices that have symbolic meaning. According to the “thesis of lesser value,” as it is called here, however, symbolic value is not a terribly serious sort of value as compared with the value of actually making a difference in the world. It is either non-moral value or moral value that has less weight. Several reasons are presented to counter this: memorialization can express moral attitudes of respect for value as well as persons; can embody a commitment to justice; and can implicate a community’s sense of what is integral to its collective identity.
Stephen Darwall
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- June 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199699575
- eISBN:
- 9780191793035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
One dominant theme in Tom Hill’s work is his interpretation of Kantian respect for persons, which he contrasts with an aristocratic view according to which individuals merit differential treatment ...
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One dominant theme in Tom Hill’s work is his interpretation of Kantian respect for persons, which he contrasts with an aristocratic view according to which individuals merit differential treatment owing to heredity and social rank. This chapter explores this contrast, arguing that the sort of respect characteristic of the Kantian notion grounded in one’s dignity and the sort of respect characteristic of honor codes involve different conceptions of personhood and, correspondingly, different conceptions of moral and social order. In particular, it is argued that on the Kantian notion, respect for persons essentially involves calls second-personal address and acknowledgment, while the notion of honor respect involves conceiving of persons as having a particular hierarchical status that is socially constituted. One significant point of contrast between second-personal respect and honor respect, developed in this chapter, concerns differences in appropriate responses to violations of these forms of respect.Less
One dominant theme in Tom Hill’s work is his interpretation of Kantian respect for persons, which he contrasts with an aristocratic view according to which individuals merit differential treatment owing to heredity and social rank. This chapter explores this contrast, arguing that the sort of respect characteristic of the Kantian notion grounded in one’s dignity and the sort of respect characteristic of honor codes involve different conceptions of personhood and, correspondingly, different conceptions of moral and social order. In particular, it is argued that on the Kantian notion, respect for persons essentially involves calls second-personal address and acknowledgment, while the notion of honor respect involves conceiving of persons as having a particular hierarchical status that is socially constituted. One significant point of contrast between second-personal respect and honor respect, developed in this chapter, concerns differences in appropriate responses to violations of these forms of respect.
Jeffrey M. Blustein
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199329397
- eISBN:
- 9780199363506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199329397.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
Ethical norms of different sorts work together to inform and facilitate responsible deliberation and action with respect to memorializing the victims of wrongdoing. These are divided into ...
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Ethical norms of different sorts work together to inform and facilitate responsible deliberation and action with respect to memorializing the victims of wrongdoing. These are divided into consequentialist and non-consequentialist norms, and the latter are subdivided into norms for the expression of intrinsically valuable attitudes, the possession and exercise of virtues, and the prescriptions of deontology. The approach is eclectic rather than systematic, as it draws on each of these normative approaches for assistance in developing a credible alternative to an exclusively consequentialist approach to an ethics of remembrance. The chapter focuses on three intrinsically valuable attitudes—self-respect, respect for persons, and fidelity to the dead—expressed by processes of memorialization. It then asks how remembrance can be made to endure so that these valuable attitudes are sustained over time. This is called the “sustainability of memory problem,” and commemorative rituals are singled out for their particular importance in this regard. The chapter concludes by returning to the theme of forgiveness and suggesting how commemoration and forgiveness can be coherently combined in a program of transitional justice.Less
Ethical norms of different sorts work together to inform and facilitate responsible deliberation and action with respect to memorializing the victims of wrongdoing. These are divided into consequentialist and non-consequentialist norms, and the latter are subdivided into norms for the expression of intrinsically valuable attitudes, the possession and exercise of virtues, and the prescriptions of deontology. The approach is eclectic rather than systematic, as it draws on each of these normative approaches for assistance in developing a credible alternative to an exclusively consequentialist approach to an ethics of remembrance. The chapter focuses on three intrinsically valuable attitudes—self-respect, respect for persons, and fidelity to the dead—expressed by processes of memorialization. It then asks how remembrance can be made to endure so that these valuable attitudes are sustained over time. This is called the “sustainability of memory problem,” and commemorative rituals are singled out for their particular importance in this regard. The chapter concludes by returning to the theme of forgiveness and suggesting how commemoration and forgiveness can be coherently combined in a program of transitional justice.
Lainie Friedman and J. Richard Thistlethwaite, Jr
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- December 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197618202
- eISBN:
- 9780197618233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197618202.003.0003
- Subject:
- Clinical Medicine and Allied Health, Medical Ethics
This chapter advances an ethical framework for living donor transplantation. Given the analogies between living donor transplantation and human subjects research, the three principles enumerated in ...
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This chapter advances an ethical framework for living donor transplantation. Given the analogies between living donor transplantation and human subjects research, the three principles enumerated in the National Commission’s Belmont Report are adopted as the starting point: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Two additional principles are also adopted: the principle of vulnerability and the principle that special relationships create special obligations. Whereas the Belmont Report discussed vulnerable groups, vulnerability is more aptly understood as an assortment of vulnerabilities that may apply to different people in different circumstances at different times of their lives. Eight distinct but overlapping vulnerabilities are described: capacitational, juridic, deferential, social, medical, situational, allocational, and infrastructural. The living donor advocate team (LDAT) stands in special relationship with the potential living donor and supports living organ donation provided that the living donor successfully addresses the challenges to autonomy and voluntariness that these vulnerabilities pose.Less
This chapter advances an ethical framework for living donor transplantation. Given the analogies between living donor transplantation and human subjects research, the three principles enumerated in the National Commission’s Belmont Report are adopted as the starting point: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Two additional principles are also adopted: the principle of vulnerability and the principle that special relationships create special obligations. Whereas the Belmont Report discussed vulnerable groups, vulnerability is more aptly understood as an assortment of vulnerabilities that may apply to different people in different circumstances at different times of their lives. Eight distinct but overlapping vulnerabilities are described: capacitational, juridic, deferential, social, medical, situational, allocational, and infrastructural. The living donor advocate team (LDAT) stands in special relationship with the potential living donor and supports living organ donation provided that the living donor successfully addresses the challenges to autonomy and voluntariness that these vulnerabilities pose.
Lainie Friedman Ross and J. Richard Thistlethwaite, Jr.
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- December 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197618202
- eISBN:
- 9780197618233
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197618202.001.0001
- Subject:
- Clinical Medicine and Allied Health, Medical Ethics
This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. This book is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some ...
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This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. This book is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some specific applications are not, eg, pre-mortem organ procurement of an imminently dying patient. When Joseph Murray performed the first successful living kidney donor transplant in 1954, he thought this would be a temporary stopgap. Today, however, the goal of adequate organ supply without living donors remains elusive. If anything, the supply:demand ratio is worse. In this book, a five-principle living donor ethics framework is developed and used to examine the ethical issues raised by living donor selection demographics, innovative attempts to increase living organ donation, and living donor decision-making and risk thresholds. This ethics framework uses the three principles of the Belmont Report modified to organ transplantation (respect for persons, beneficence, and justice) supplemented by the principles of vulnerability and of special relationships creating special obligations. The approach requires that the transplant community fully embraces living organ donors (and prospective living organ donors) as patients to whom special obligations are owed. Only when living organ donors are regarded as patients in their own right and have a living donor advocate team dedicated to their well-being can the moral boundaries of living solid organ donation be determined and realized. This book provides theoretical arguments and practice guidelines, complemented by case studies, to ensure that living donors are given the full respect and care they deserve.Less
This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. This book is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some specific applications are not, eg, pre-mortem organ procurement of an imminently dying patient. When Joseph Murray performed the first successful living kidney donor transplant in 1954, he thought this would be a temporary stopgap. Today, however, the goal of adequate organ supply without living donors remains elusive. If anything, the supply:demand ratio is worse. In this book, a five-principle living donor ethics framework is developed and used to examine the ethical issues raised by living donor selection demographics, innovative attempts to increase living organ donation, and living donor decision-making and risk thresholds. This ethics framework uses the three principles of the Belmont Report modified to organ transplantation (respect for persons, beneficence, and justice) supplemented by the principles of vulnerability and of special relationships creating special obligations. The approach requires that the transplant community fully embraces living organ donors (and prospective living organ donors) as patients to whom special obligations are owed. Only when living organ donors are regarded as patients in their own right and have a living donor advocate team dedicated to their well-being can the moral boundaries of living solid organ donation be determined and realized. This book provides theoretical arguments and practice guidelines, complemented by case studies, to ensure that living donors are given the full respect and care they deserve.
Lainie Friedman and J. Richard Thistlethwaite, Jr
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- December 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780197618202
- eISBN:
- 9780197618233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780197618202.003.0001
- Subject:
- Clinical Medicine and Allied Health, Medical Ethics
This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. It is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some ...
More
This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. It is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some instantiations are not, eg, pre-mortem organ procurement of an imminently dying patient. In this chapter, the objection to living solid organ donation based on the obligation to do no harm is rejected because it ignores the fact that for many living donors, the benefits outweigh the harms. It is argued that the principle of respect for persons permits some living solid organ donation provided that both the donor and the recipient are treated as patients in their own right. This chapter then provides an outline for the rest of the book in which a five-principle living donor ethics framework is developed and applied to various living donor transplant proposals.Less
This is a book about living solid organ donors as patients in their own right. It is premised on the supposition that the field of living donor organ transplantation is ethical, even if some instantiations are not, eg, pre-mortem organ procurement of an imminently dying patient. In this chapter, the objection to living solid organ donation based on the obligation to do no harm is rejected because it ignores the fact that for many living donors, the benefits outweigh the harms. It is argued that the principle of respect for persons permits some living solid organ donation provided that both the donor and the recipient are treated as patients in their own right. This chapter then provides an outline for the rest of the book in which a five-principle living donor ethics framework is developed and applied to various living donor transplant proposals.
Nancy S. Jecker
- Published in print:
- 2020
- Published Online:
- May 2020
- ISBN:
- 9780190949075
- eISBN:
- 9780190949105
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190949075.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Chapter 2 introduces the idea of dignity as species integrity. For human beings, respecting dignity requires making reasonable efforts to support human capabilities at a basic floor level. Human ...
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Chapter 2 introduces the idea of dignity as species integrity. For human beings, respecting dignity requires making reasonable efforts to support human capabilities at a basic floor level. Human capabilities include the central kinds of things we can do and be as human beings, including capacities for a life narrative; health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relating to nature; play; and participating in the environment. Contrary to what “healthy aging” advocates claim, medical progress will not eliminate threats to these human capabilities. Chapter 2 compares dignity as species integrity with sub-Saharan African conceptions of Ubuntu, the Nguni word for “humanness.” Ubuntu prizes relational values and human capacities for harmonious relationship. The chapter concludes that to have global traction, capability lists must be balanced, life stage informed, and provisional.Less
Chapter 2 introduces the idea of dignity as species integrity. For human beings, respecting dignity requires making reasonable efforts to support human capabilities at a basic floor level. Human capabilities include the central kinds of things we can do and be as human beings, including capacities for a life narrative; health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relating to nature; play; and participating in the environment. Contrary to what “healthy aging” advocates claim, medical progress will not eliminate threats to these human capabilities. Chapter 2 compares dignity as species integrity with sub-Saharan African conceptions of Ubuntu, the Nguni word for “humanness.” Ubuntu prizes relational values and human capacities for harmonious relationship. The chapter concludes that to have global traction, capability lists must be balanced, life stage informed, and provisional.
Charles Larmore
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- August 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199669530
- eISBN:
- 9780191749377
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669530.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Political liberalism seeks to define the principles of political association in terms that are independent, not only of religious convictions and substantive notions of the human good, but also of ...
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Political liberalism seeks to define the principles of political association in terms that are independent, not only of religious convictions and substantive notions of the human good, but also of the individualist ideals, encouraging a self-critical attitude toward the conception of the good one espouses, to which the classical liberalism of Locke, Kant, and Mill typically appealed. This chapter explores the basic problem of political life to which political liberalism aims to provide a solution, the means—among which the moral assumptions, particularly a principle of equal respect for persons—by which it seeks to solve this problem, and the ends it can reasonably hope to achieve by the solution it develops.Less
Political liberalism seeks to define the principles of political association in terms that are independent, not only of religious convictions and substantive notions of the human good, but also of the individualist ideals, encouraging a self-critical attitude toward the conception of the good one espouses, to which the classical liberalism of Locke, Kant, and Mill typically appealed. This chapter explores the basic problem of political life to which political liberalism aims to provide a solution, the means—among which the moral assumptions, particularly a principle of equal respect for persons—by which it seeks to solve this problem, and the ends it can reasonably hope to achieve by the solution it develops.